Housing as Governance

Interfaces between Local Government and Civil Society Organisations in Cape Town, South Africa

vorgelegt von
Dipl.-Ing.
Astrid Ley

Von der Fakultät VI - Planen Bauen Umwelt
der Technischen Universität Berlin
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Promotionsausschuss:
Vorsitzende: Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schäfer
Berichter: Prof. Dr. Peter Herrle
Berichter: Prof. Dr. Volker Kreibich

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Preface

In 2000 I conducted a survey on different civil society initiatives engaged in the broad field of sustainable urban development in Cape Town. Since this first encounter with the landscape of local actors in the city, the idea developed to have a closer look at how the interface between these actors materialises in a specific field. Housing seemed to be an exciting area of investigation since it is a driving force behind many government, non-governmental and grassroots initiatives. The emerging institutional frameworks for participation and active civil society organisations also opened a window of opportunity to study such interactions. It framed the understanding that housing processes need to be understood as a matter of governance.

When I started with my field study in 2006 the organisations as case studies seemed to be well selected, defined and contacts with key actors established. However, just before entering into the field, the setting changed all over: after the municipal elections a new ruling party got into power with all kinds of changes involved at the political and administrative level. It was also a time of considerable restructuring and rebuilding within the civil society sector. Organisational structures around my two selected case studies dissolved: The Non-Governmental Organisation *Development Action Group* and the People's Organisations on grassroots level were affected by the break-up of their inter-organisational structures: the *Urban Sector Network* and the *People's Housing Networking Forum*. The organisations aligned to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) in South Africa also experienced vigorous transformations. Here the split of the Federation and closure of *People's Dialogue* led to a resolution of the Alliance between the Federation and the NGOs *uTshani Fund* and *People's Dialogue* as well as to the introduction of the *Federation of the Urban Poor* as the successor of SDI practice and Federation-building in South Africa.

An international consultant commented on my empirical research: "You have chosen a very interesting, and also complex topic - a kind of "moving target"." Thanks to David Sogge - he made me realise that the field of investigation is much more dynamic – a key aspect that my initial research framework had not taken into consideration. This comment became the motto of my further investigations: "Searching for moving targets."

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Neil Ross took an active role making me familiar with the political side of housing in Cape Town. In the difficult time of controversy about the Executive Mayoral System, he still found the time to share his long years of knowledge and experience.

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Thanks finally to my family and friends. My parents have been forever supportive. I would like to give my special thanks to my father who assisted with proof-reading. Particularly I would also like to thank Uta Ruhkamp, Grace Stead and Bouwer Serfontein for their great encouragement which enabled me to complete this work.

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Acronyms

ABM Abahlali Base Mjondolo

AEC Anti-Eviction Campaign

ANC African National Congress

APF Anti-Privatisation Forum

APO Association of People's Organisations

ARC Alliance of Rural Communities

AsgiSA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa

BCM Black Consciousness Movement

BESG Built Environment Support Group

BLAs Black Local Authorities

Bn billion

BNG Breaking New Ground

CBO Community Based Organisation

CBDO Community Based Development Organisation

CCMT Community Construction Management Team

CCS Centre for Civil Society

CCT City of Cape Town

CDS City Development Strategy

CDW Community Development Worker

CLO Community Liaison Officer

CMN Community Microfinance Network

CMC Cape Metropolitan Council

CMA Cape Metropolitan Area

CORC Community Organisations Resource Centre

COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions

CPA Communal Property Association

CRO Community Resource Organisation

CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research

CSO Civil Society Organisation

CUP Coalition of the Urban Poor

DA Democratic Alliance

DAG Development Action Group

DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa

DFA Development Facilitation Act

DFID UK Department for International Development

DLG Developmental Local Government

DoH Department of Housing

DP Democratic Party

DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

FCR Foundation for Contemporary Research

FEDUP Federation of the Urban Poor

FPDA Freedom Park Development Association

FPSA Freedom Park Squatter Association

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy

GGP Gross Geographic Product

GLTN Global Land Tool Network

GRO Grassroots Organisation

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

Ha Hectares

HDI Human Development Index

HHA Hazeldean Housing Association

HIC Habitat International Coalition

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

HSC Housing Support Centre

HSMS Housing Subsidy Management System

HSS Housing Subsidy Scheme

ID Independent Democrats

IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa

IDP Integrated Development Plan

IDT Independent Development Trust

IHSS Integrated Human Settlements Strategy

IIED International Institute for Environment and Development

IMF International Monetary Fund

JDA Johannesburg Development Agency

KDF Khayelitsha Development Forum

KZN KwaZulu-Natal

LAA Land Availability Agreement

LDF Local Development Forum

LDO Land Development Objectives

LDR Less Developed Regions

LED Local Economic Development

LGNF Local Government Negotiating Forum

LGTA Local Government Transition Act

LPM Landless Peoples Movement

LRC Legal Resource Centre

LUPO Land Use Planning Ordinance

MAYCO Mayoral Executive Committee

MCPs Municipal-Community Partnerships

MCSA Methodist Church of Southern Africa

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MEC Member of the Executive Committee

MIF Mortgage Indemnity Fund

MIG Municipal Infrastructure Grant

MSA Municipal Systems Act

MSDF Municipal/Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework

MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework

NDR National Democratic Revolution

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NGDO Non-Governmental Development Organisation

NHBRC National Homebuilders Registration Council

NHF National Housing Forum

NHFC National Housing Finance Corporation

NHP Netreg Housing Project

NHSDB National Housing Subsidy Database

NIMBY Not-In-My-Backyard

NMTT Niall Melon Township Trust

NNP New National Party

NPM New Public Management

NSDF National Spatial Development Framework

NSM New Social Movement

NURCHA National Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency

p.a. per annum

PD People's Dialogue

PEP People's Environmental Planning

PHB/PHDB Provincial Housing Board/Provincial Housing Development Board

PHNF People's Housing Networking Forum

PHP People's Housing Process

PHPT People's Housing Partnership Trust

PIE Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act

PISA Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act

PLA Participatory Learning Appraisal

p.m. per month

PO People's Organisation

PONGO Policy-Oriented NGO

POS Political Opportunity Structure

PPM Poor People's Movement

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme

PTO Permission to Occupy

R Rand (at about EUR 0.11 in 2006)

RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme

RoU Record of Understanding

RSA Republic of South Africa

SACN South African Cities Network

SAHF South African Housing Fund

SAHPF South African Homeless People's Federation

SALGA South African Local Government Association

SANGOCO South African National NGO Coalition

SANCO South African National Civics Organisation

SCIF Social Capital Implementation Framework

SDF Spatial Development Framework

SDI Shack/ Slum Dwellers International

SHO Self-Help Organisation

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SLAG Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant

SONGO Service-Oriented NGO

SPARC Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres

TPA Tafelsig People's Association

TLC/TMC Transitional Local Council/ Transitional Metropolitan Council

TSMO Transnational Social Movement Organisation

UCT University of Cape Town

UDF Urban Development Framework

UDF United Democratic Front

UISP Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme

UN United Nations

UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UPF Urban Poor Fund

URP Urban Renewal Programme

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USN Urban Sector Network

WCSHSS Western Cape Sustainable Human Settlements Strategy

Glossary

Adequate shelter "[…] adequate housing is the sum of a number of considerations, including location, basic infrastructure, affordability, sustainability, right to tenure, and a range of household types." (Pottie, 2003: 433)

Backyard shack Special term used in South Africa: Shelter occupied in the backyard of one household who rents out the space to other households. (see Crankshaw/Gilbert/Morris, 2000: 842)

Beneficiary Special term used in South Africa: An individual who qualifies for a housing subsidy or in whose name a subsidy has already been allocated. (see USN, 2003)

Civic organisations/ Civics Special term used in South Africa: "[…] residents' associations in black communities that were part of the mass democratic movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Civics were initially formed to deal with local issues and, more specifically, to campaign for an improvement in the conditions in townships." (van Donk/ Pieterse, 2006: 127)

Empowerment Redistribution of power to control sources of power for a group (see Friedmann, 1984)

Erf/erven Special term used in South Africa: Plot/plots, site, deriving from erven [Dutch = land, yard]

Greenfield Land that has never been built upon as opposed to Brownfield land (previously developed land).

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time. (City of Cape Town, 2006c)

Gross Geographic Product (GGP) The total value of goods and services by sector in an area per annum. (City of Cape Town, 2006c)

Happy letter	Special term used in South Africa: Signed declarations that the house is complete according to building inspection and accepted by beneficiaries. Thereby beneficiaries become homeowners and take over responsibility for fees and property.
Managed PHP	Special term used in South Africa. Centrally managed housing development with confined choices in house design and layout and with labour contribution by households during construction process. (see DAG, 2003c: 16)
Mortgage loan	Loan for purchasing fixed property in which the property is used as security (see USN, 2003)
Imbizos	Special term used in South Africa: public policy discussion fora organised by government.
Informal settlement	Unauthorised status of a settlement. Informality can occur in terms of access to land, layout of sites, shelter construction and infrastructure provision.
In situ upgrading	The de facto recognition of informal settlements by upgrading in terms of tenure regularisation and service provision.
People's Housing Process (PHP)	Special term used in South Africa: A housing delivery approach in which people build, or manage the building of, their own houses. The term is also used in a narrow sense to refer to projects which gain access to People's Housing Process establishment grants in terms of the Housing Subsidy Scheme. (see USN, 2003)
PHP support organisation	Special term used in South Africa: Legal entity which is either formed or contracted by beneficiaries. Possible support organisations are provincial and local government, Community-Based or Non-Governmental Organisations or private sector institutions. They are required to establish a housing support centre and give technical, financial and administrative assistance.

Political opportunity	"Political opportunity refers to the relative openness or closure of the political system, the stability of alignments among dominating groups, the possibilities for movements to associate with sections of the elite, and the risk of harsh repression." (Törnquist, 2002: 12)
Rollover scheme	Special term used in South Africa: Internal relocation of households within informal settlement to conform to standardisation.
Slum	The term refers to poor housing and living conditions. Slums range from high-density, central-city tenements to squatter settlements at the periphery. Physical conditions are characterised by lack of basic services, inadequate building structures, overcrowding, unhealthy, hazardous conditions, insecure tenure, poverty and exclusion. (see UN-Habitat, 2005)
Sites-and-services	Formal land subdivisions with basic services but no top structure housing provision.
Stokvel	Special term used in South Africa: Saving club.
Top structure	The housing unit, excluding infrastructure.
Upgrading	Land regularisation and service provision in existing informal housing settlements.
Stakeholder	Stakeholders are affected or affect development (see World Bank, 1998: 1).
"uTshani"	Special term used in South Africa: Zulu word for "grass"

1. Introduction

1.1 Focus of thesis

This research aims to provide an analysis of collective actors and networks and their impact on urban governance. The relevance of such an approach is illustrated by the empirical analysis of two civil society alliances, their internal relations and their interface to local government in the field of housing in Cape Town, South Africa.

Cities in South Africa, as others in the 'Global South'[1], are trapped in contradicting challenges of globalisation and developmentalism. In South Africa cities are promoted as 'World Class Cities' and constitute important contributors to the national economy. Meanwhile, they are characterised by increasing fragmentation in terms of social, political, economic and physical development.

Against this background, the rising levels of urbanisation and urban poverty lead to a growth of informal housing solutions which are mostly characterised by a lack of adequate shelter, secure land and basic services. Housing has thus become a critical issue which is addressed in the development context.

Current models to meet housing needs reflect the international 'good governance' agenda. In South Africa horizontal forms of governance are fostered both as partnerships with the private sector and with civil society and last, but not least, as community participation. An opening of the political space, however, requires political will and an organisational change by state and civil society actors as well as the establishment of new interaction between them.

The research is therefore interested in an interaction-oriented explanation of prospects and limits of governance in local housing processes. The focus on civil society alliances and their interface with the state in South Africa is motivated by the fact that civil society organisations are restructuring their networks and practices towards the state whilst the state has transformed in a way to allow a degree of participation in the housing process. From their experience one can draw key lessons about urban governance and social change.

[1] 'Global South' refers to the difference between developed countries (mostly in the Northern hemisphere) and less developed regions (predominantly in the Southern hemisphere). Although this North-South divide is imprecise, the term 'Global South' is commonly used to explain the development gaps between regions.

Beyond participating in institutional forums, civil society organisations advocate on other strategic levels and households negotiate with the local state on a day-to-day project-basis. Obviously, both the expanded space and alternative engagement require adequate capacities and mechanisms to influence decision-making. Therefore similarly, civil society actors foster empowerment and build up new internal relations both as multi-scalar and horizontal networks. Organisations (as actors) and their interactions become essential to provide an intermediary interface on project-specific and strategic scale between everyday practices and state regulations.

Moreover, dynamics are at work in these processes which lead to shifting roles, changing relationships, and moving in and outside formal governance arrangements by some actors. This is what is referred to as 'moving targets' in this study.

Current research seeks to explain the organisational mechanisms for community involvement in the housing process and to understand the impact of new civil society organisations in state-negotiations. Often, associated discussions either indicate prospects for responsive governance or question the emerging structures in the light of new exclusions.

Instead, this research maintains that in-depth understanding of the substance of the new relationships is still lacking. The research is firstly interested in variations of organisational structures and networks and secondly, in the meaning of urban governance.

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Research rationale

Researchers construct knowledge by selecting and excluding specific theories. Sehested therefore suggests that knowledge is not objective but an "expression of power". Following her argument, instead of verifying or disproving a theory, this research takes a social constructivist perspective[2] when investigating urban governance.

> *"Viewing theories as different social constructs of "reality" implies that the multiplicity of theories is not a problem for research into urban governance, rather it is productive in the sense that it illustrates a variety of possible interpretations to build on in further research."*[3]

Furthermore, since the research assumes that actors construct their perception of reality, it also adopts a social-constructivist perspective in its empirical part. Given this understand-

[2] See Berger/Luckmann (1967).
[3] Sehested (2001), p. 7.

ing, the methodology led to a set of qualitative methods in the field research (see chapter 3).

1.2.2 Research approach

The research is based on a review of three discourses: Housing, urban governance and civil society. It is supported by in-depth empirical research on actor constellations in local level housing processes (which will be detailed in chapter 3).

The literature review brings together political science, planning, sociological and social science perspectives. Discussions are reviewed both from an international and South African academic context.

The review will show how these discourses interlink. Actor-centred and network theories are identified as the link and common thread when discussing housing and governance contexts and in regard to the focus on emerging alliances in civil society. Thus, the discourses provide three conceptual pillars as the basis for the analysis of multiple actors and networks in local housing processes (see figure 1.1).



Fig.1.1: Research topics, Source: Own design

This approach is chosen because each conceptual pillar provides key aspects for understanding the particular interface between civil society actors and local government in housing. In development policy it is assumed that the devolution of power provides direct access to political decision-making processes. In the context of good governance and partnerships there is a further normative valuation of participation which emphasises the

empowerment aspect of local communities.

Nevertheless, the line of argument remains ambiguous: local participation and inclusion of communities might well gain momentum from decentralised government structures. However, there is no evidence that decentralisation will automatically lead to institutionalised participation or even empowerment. Consequently, if one investigates the inclusion of civil society in housing processes, what becomes obvious is the need to understand the transformed interface between the local state and civil society in the context of local governance.

In fact, such analysis becomes crucial in the context of transformative governance. In South Africa the legacy of segregation and exclusion poses a key challenge for the integration of society. Increasing poverty and inequality threaten stability. The unsolved housing crisis is indicative of these tendencies. With rising inequality internationally this phenomenon is not unique to South Africa.

This means that South African cities should not only be understood as a case for general developments, but to put it in Appadurai's words as "[…] a site for the examination of how locality emerges in a globalizing world […] and of how global facts take local form."[4] Cape Town is therefore not of interest as a geographic site, but as a locality where governance transformation becomes visible. Experiences from there could feed into the general research interest.

Indeed, South Africa offers the opportunity of learning something about these processes. Firstly, the shift from representative to participatory democracy and partnership models were central to local government reforms in South Africa.

Secondly, South Africa is an illustrative case for an active civil society and a housing field characterised by informal practices. Local modes of housing provision play a central role in the post-apartheid societal transformation.

Thirdly, policy and implementation, governance and civil society are in a state of flux in South Africa which provides a rich context in which to study the dynamics of governance arrangements.

The case study design seemed ideally suited to explore governance arrangements in-depth and from a variety of perspectives. It is supported by the understanding that new urban governance forms only derive from specific contexts.

[4] Appadurai (2000), p. 18.

Furthermore, the advantage of studying two cases is that: a) it allows analysing and explaining a phenomenon such as complex organisational arrangements in detail, and b) by exposing similar or contrasting results under similar conditions, it allows a degree of replication and analytical generalisation. Yin defines the scope of case study as:

> *"[…] an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."*[5]

However, in contrast to Yin, case study research here was limited to the choice of the object of study and not as the method applied for data generation and interpretation as these involved further qualitative instruments (see chapter 3).

1.3 Scope and limitations

With the focus on actors and networks this analysis will be limited to understanding the interface between the local state and organised civil society in local housing processes. The ultimate aim is to understand the agency structures in civil society-government interfaces and to detect types and tendencies in the way they organise and relate to one another.

Based on empirical research between 2001 and 2007 the research focuses on the actors and networks at work in Cape Town. Focus will be given to what extent local government and civil society actors create relationships in people-driven housing processes with specific attention to the organisational and relational change.

Increasing fragmentation, differentiation and social complexity make it necessary to apply theoretical frameworks which enable an understanding of planning as social control. In this context planning can gain from withdrawing from other disciplines. The sociological perspective applied here for empirical research draws from theories of policy networks and actor-centred institutionalism.

Thus the research is intended to uncover characteristics of networks and contribute to the understanding of local governance through civil society alliances in the context of the housing process in South Africa. The question therefore is, if one can speak of a new mode of urban governance which is reflected through innovations in organisational and network structures.

The research focus is embedded in the wider field of literature which aims at developing a

[5] Yin (2003), p. 13.

better understanding of urban governance focusing on the interaction between the state and civil society.

It therefore excludes urban social or spatial development aspects which are both influencing factors and outcomes of urban policy. Such structural conditions will be provided as context information without in-depth analysis.

Furthermore, there is an awareness of the inadequacies of Eurocentric and Western concepts as criticised in postcolonial theory[6] and stressed by South African researchers who call for more context-sensitivity while studying respective situations[7]. The research implied literature review of the South African discourse (which is however similarly characterised by Western approaches) and qualitative methods based on Grounded Theory to provide a certain degree of context-sensitivity.

1.4 Structure of study

The study comprises three parts:

Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework and conceptual model for the empirical study. It provides a critical review of the three key concepts: housing, governance and civil society. It is based both on the international and on South African academic discourses, policies and practices. The relationship between these concepts will be exploited by network and actor-centred theories.

The first section of Chapter 2 gives a brief reflection on housing trends which indicate a tendency towards governance concepts as well as a juxtaposition of interventionism and enabling approaches in the settlement context. This leads to the second domain of discourse which reviews theories related to urban governance. Governance is discussed from a variety of perspectives which share concerns for the interaction between the public and private sector. Deriving comprehensive governance concepts stress the fluid relationships of actors in networks. Based on this understanding, focus is given to the integration of civil society actors in governance arrangements. This brings about the third theme of civil society. Concepts of the third sector, social capital and civil society, are introduced as a background for a review of the discourse on the relevance of Non-Governmental Organisations and Grassroots Organisations in (urban) development. Thus this section reconnects to the housing discussion by reviewing the discourse on the role of civil society or-

[6] See for instance Said (1978) and (1994); Bhabha (1994).
[7] See for example Watson (2002b).

ganisations in the settlement planning context. Finally, the last section presents the theoretical perspective and conceptual model. From a sociological perspective a concept is outlined that integrates the structuring effects of organisations (as collective actors) and networks for the interaction of actors. A deficit of the concepts of organisations and networks is indicated since they fail to describe the hybrid and dynamic structures which are exposed by actors and their relationships in the local housing processes.

The third chapter introduces the field study by outlining the research design and methods used for the empirical part. It explains the selection criteria of case studies, looks at data generation and identifies the variables that specified data collection, and concludes with a brief review of Grounded Theory analysis for data interpretation.

Chapter 4 describes the housing, governance and civil society context in Cape Town. This is followed by the fifth chapter which presents the two case studies and an in-depth account of the actors and networks in practice.

Chapter 6 assesses the characteristics of actor and network structures found in the case studies and outlines emerging tendencies. Based on this synthesis the final chapter discusses how the findings can be interpreted in relation to housing, governance and civil society and provides some conclusions for actors and policy-making.



Fig. 1.2: Structure of study, Source: Own design

2. Theoretical framework: the discourse on housing, governance and civil society

2.1 Housing discourse

2.1.1 Urbanisation trends as a housing challenge

Contemporary dynamics of urbanisation[1] in the 'Global South' are without precedent. As a result the global urbanisation level is expected to reach 61% by 2030.[2] The year 2007 marked the watershed when the percentage of people living in urban areas exceeded those living in rural areas.[3] Thus the new millennium is also characterised as the 'urban millennium'. Of the 2.1 billion new urban population expected by 2030 about 2.0 billion will live in urban areas in the Less Developed Regions (LDR). Hence, Jenkins/Smith/Wang refer to these regions as the 'rapidly urbanising world'. They outline that while in 1950 more than half of the worldwide urban population lived in developed regions, this has shifted and by 2003 around 70% lived in developing regions.[4]

Differences in urbanisation trends amongst regions are significant as some may have reached stable urbanisation levels whilst others are still in the process of urbanisation. Jenkins/Smith/Wang offer three broad categories: firstly, regions in an 'urban explosive phase' such as Sub-Saharan Africa; secondly, regions which have passed this phase but still experience rapid growth in secondary cities such as Latin America and thirdly, regions with relative stabilisation of urban population after rapid urbanisation which are characterised by a need of consolidation such as parts of East Asia.[5]

Urbanisation is often explained against the background of accounts of globalisation and liberalisation. Clark argues that urbanisation is a global phenomenon today due to changes in the economy. As production, trade and services extend globally, urbanisation extends to the 'Global South'.[6]

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[1] Urbanisation refers to the process of movement of people from rural to urban areas (measured by annual urbanisation rates) by which the proportion of people in urban areas increases (urbanisation level).
[2] Compared to 47% in 2000. See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006).
[3] However, it needs to be stressed that the distinction between rural and urban is increasingly misleading as the boundaries between them get blurry. Therefore scholars suggest referring to an 'urban/rural continuum'. See for instance Montgomery et al (2004), pp. 67ff.
[4] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 12.
[5] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 299.
[6] See Clark (1996), p. 77.

Cities affected by globalisation are conceptualised either as 'global cities' or 'megacities'. Firstly, some large cities arise as powerful actors which function as primary capital markets and sites for corporate headquarters.[7]

Secondly, at the same time megacities emerge characterised by dynamic urban growth, large numbers of population and socioeconomic problems. Both concepts have limitations. The global cities concept does not explain what characterises large agglomerations without transnational economic functions while the concept of megacities remains blurry. It focuses on population numbers without giving universal qualitative characteristics which megacities have in common. However, two aspects might be considered as common threads linked to dynamic urbanisation:

a) Increasing inequalities are produced between and within cities, and

b) Informality is increasing and not just as an outcome of lack of state or market capacity but fulfilling a function within the market logic. It therefore is assumed not to be a temporary but a permanent phenomenon.

Whereas previous urbanisation processes were linked to industrialisation and economic development, this is not necessarily the case anymore. African cities for instance experience a job-less urban growth.[8] As a result the urban population is increasingly confined to inadequate living conditions. Estimates assume that about 1 billion new slum dwellers will be added to the current worldwide slum population of 924 million (see table 2.1).

Characteristics	2000	2015	2030	Increase (2000 – 2030)
Global urbanisation in %*	47.1	53.6	60.8	
Urban population in bn*	2.8	3.8	4.9	2.09
Urban pop. in LDR in bn*	2.0	2.9	3.9	1.95
Slum population in bn**	0.92 (2001)		ca. 1.9	ca. 1.00

Tab. 2.1: Urbanisation trends, Source: Own design, *UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006); ** UN Statistics Division (2006)

These urbanisation tendencies indicate social and political risks as one third of all urban dwellers in the world are living in slums.[9] Therefore the challenge of urbanisation was linked to the need for shelter and increasingly entered the international development agenda.[10]

[7] See Sassen (2001).
[8] See Rakodi (1997).
[9] See Herrle/Jachnow/Ley (2006), p. 2.
[10] See UN-Habitat (2003b); (2004); Hall/Pfeiffer (2000).

2.1.2 Housing in the international development debate and practice

Slums, informal settlements and squatter camps need to be differentiated. Whereas the term ‘slum’ refers to the physical housing condition, the terms ‘squatter’ or ‘informal settlement’ can be equated with the legal (unauthorised) status.

UN-Habitat offers an operational definition of slums based on a combination of physical and legal characteristics of settlements which comprise:[11]

a) Inadequate access to safe water

b) Inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure

c) Poor structural quality of housing

d) Overcrowding

e) Insecure residential status

Although slums cannot be equated with informal settlements there is a great overlap since the majority of slum dwellers are excluded from formal housing provision. Therefore informal settlements are the prevalent and mostly the only accessible housing option for the urban poor. Informality can occur in terms of access to land, layout of sites, shelter construction and infrastructure provision. Consequently in the context of informal settlements planning and housing issues are interlinked. A broad typology of informal settlements can be made following characteristics of their unauthorised status:

	Informal house/ temporary construction	**Formal house/ permanent construction**
Informally occupied land	Shack on invaded land	Permanent structure on invaded land
Officially planned and authorised land occupation	Shack on an official serviced site	Formal house in an official subdivision

Tab. 2.2: Informal settlement types, Source: University of the Witwatersrand (2003)

These settlements primarily function through an extended and diverse informal sector, as there is little access to the formal housing and job market. AlSayyad and Roy (2004) argue that this informality is presently an organising urban logic.[12]

[11] See UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 12.
[12] See AlSayyad/Roy (2004).

Formal housing and planning interventions changed according to shifts in international development thinking.[13] Deriving mechanisms for housing provision comprise state-provided, self-help or market-driven interventions which in practice mostly coexist or are combined.

1960s	Mass public housing and slum clearance
1970s	Sites-and-services and physical upgrading
1980s	Community enabling (comprehensive upgrading) and market enabling approaches
mid 1990s	Urban management approaches
since 2000	Juxtaposition of technical and community-driven approaches

Tab. 2.3: Shifts in housing approaches, Source: Own design

2.1.2.1 Providing approaches

Public housing and slum clearance

In the 1960s/70s the international development debate linked the poverty agenda to economic development ('trickle down'). Furthermore, poverty was associated with the rural context and urbanisation seen as a solution to overcome poverty.

The supply of housing was supposed to stabilise labour. The welfare state implemented large-scale housing and slum improvement programmes. State subsidised housing comprised mostly tenement blocks and individual units at the periphery. In terms of slum improvement projects master plans suggested the clearance and redevelopment of slums by conventional housing. Policy-makers perceived informal settlements as 'marginal' linked to social decay and substandard housing. Eradication therefore represented the solution to marginality. However, the housing provision appeared to be too costly for the state. Also, in terms of rental accommodation, government failed to be an effective landlord: rents were too low and the maintenance and rent payments by tenants poor. The subsequent attempt to sell off the rental housing stock led to slum-like conditions. Furthermore, housing in ownership tenure led to a resale of housing units to the middle class. The failure of mass public housing resulted in an increased housing backlog and further spread of slums and informal settlements.[14]

[13] For a detailed overview on development theories see Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 36ff.
[14] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 154-156; Ward (1982a), (1982b); Gilbert (2007a).

2.1.2.2 Self-build and self-help housing paradigm

An alternative approach to eradication and provision of conventional housing was seen in self-build and self-help housing.

The 'self-build' and 'self-help' housing concept was influenced by ideas of Charles Abrams (1966) and John Turner who stressed the relevance of incremental settlement upgrading. According to Turner migrants to the city undergo a progress from 'bridgeheader' to 'consolidator'.[15] Incremental upgrading was therefore supposed to facilitate a consolidation process. Following Turner's understanding, self-help was more needs based, effective and affordable than conventional housing. Housing shifted from being perceived as a product to be understood as a process ('housing as a verb').

The housing needs of the urban poor were linked to the livelihood opportunities of a specific housing solution. Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel suggest a differentiation of housing needs exemplified for the case of Calcutta (see the figure 2.1).[16]



Fig. 2.1: Needs fulfilled by informal housing in Calcutta
Source: Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel (1981), p.93, adapted from Duyar-Kinast (2005), p.72

Turner opposed eradication approaches and promoted to see settlements as part of the solution to the housing challenge. He argued that squatter areas expose potentials of 'self-

[15] See Turner/Fichter (1972).
[16] See Herrle/Lübbe/Rösel (1981), pp. 90-95.

help' and thus need more autonomy. This understanding was linked to anthropological studies of the self-development potential of informal settlements in the mid 1960s referred to as 'slums of hope'[17]. Scholars opposed the view about the urban poor being 'marginal'.[18] Marginality was rather understood as the poor being exploited and repressed.

> *"Marginality exists but it is the marginality of exclusion and exploitation rather than of low motivations and parochialism."*[19]

Self-help projects underwent significant changes from autonomous and self-build approaches in the 1960s to assisted and self-managed processes in the 1970s/80s (see figure 2.2). Also Turner, who initially called for autonomy and self-building approaches, later in the 1980s turned to promoting self-organised processes with a focus on community development.[20]



Fig. 2.2 Shifts in self-help approaches, Source: Own design

Aligned to self-help approaches was a reduced role of the state that was to ensure the provision of tenure security, introduction of lower standards and giving access to financial and technological assistance.

Sites-and-services and slum upgrading interventions

The self-help ideas of the Turner/Abrams school influenced international thinking[21] and became a dominant development strategy of the 1970s and 80s.

[17] See Lloyd (1979).
[18] See Perlman (1979); Castells (1983).
[19] Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 161.
[20] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 161.
[21] See for instance UNCHS (1976).

The de facto recognition of informal settlements translated into project-oriented upgrading in terms of tenure regularisation and service provision (in situ upgrading) as well as the provision of new serviced sites (sites-and-service schemes). The state shifted its support from housing production to the provision of housing subsidies and promotion of self-help. The World Bank financed these self-help housing projects on the principle of cost-recovery in terms of payment by users (instead of subsidies) which required affordability.[22] This approach is criticised for transferring responsibility to the poor and thereby distorting the original concept of self-help.[23]

Operational critics pointed out that the approach failed to reduce the backlog and was difficult to implement on the principle of cost recovery. Unit costs appeared to be above the affordability of the poorest. Shortcomings emerged in terms of lack of capacity in administration, inappropriate norms and standards, increasing costs for transport through peripheral location of settlements, lack of access to income-generating opportunities and unaffordable monthly payments for services. Physical upgrading and provision of sites-and-services did not translate into social upliftment. Instead the infrastructure investments often led to speculation and crowding-out of the poor by the middle class. Moreover, formal interventions threatened community cohesion and thereby increased vulnerability (social disruption through planning, relocation, and individualisation).[24]

Finally, slum-upgrading and site-and-service approaches were perceived as failing as they were not replicable and were too cost-intensive. With the international debt crisis and reduced funding the site-and-service schemes ended in the 1980s[25] and upgrading approaches were adapted.[26]

The operational concerns were combined with a general critique of the 'myth of self-help' which resulted in an extensive 'self-help housing debate' in the 1970s and 80s. From a Neo-Marxist perspective the reason for self-help to be introduced as a development strategy lies in the compatibility to the World Bank's interest to make housing affordable without subsidising. Turner's approach of self-help, incrementalism and legalisation

[22] See Pugh (1995).
[23] See Harms (1982), Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 30.
[24] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 38.
[25] Site-and-services housing loans by the World Bank decreased from 100% in 1972 to 5% in 1990. See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 167.
[26] See Pugh (1995); Gilbert (2007a); Van der Linden (1986); Davis (2006).

therefore fitted in with the World Bank's search for pragmatic and effective mechanisms. Davis (2006) argues that the compatibility represented a downsizing of entitlement and withdrawal of the state.[27]

> *"Self-help emerges as governmental policy where redistribution and social equity are low priorities."*[28]

Most prominent critic was put forward by Burgess who argued that self-help housing represented a form of double exploitation. He stressed that state-assisted self-help reduced the advantages of 'spontaneous' self-help as it seeks to commodify practices.[29]

From a Neo-Marxist position the self-help framework does not enhance empowerment and instead leads to depoliticisation. By promoting individual self-help, according to the critique, the state attempts to break down group solidarity.[30]

The self-help debate was by-passed in the late 1980s as the critique did not provide alternative solutions. Instead the focus broadened and empirical studies focused on the negotiation processes and on the link between policy and practice.[31] From this perspective scholars criticised the Neo-Marxist analysis for simplifying the role of the state and underestimating its power as being dictated by elite classes. Moreover, they see the self-help approach as being misinterpreted. It is argued that self-help provides a means to empowerment for the poor by building collective capacity and thereby contributes to social stability and state legitimacy.[32]

2.1.2.3 Enabling approaches

In the 1980s a 'whole housing system' approach emerged which comprised enabling of private and community sector activities.

> *"Enablement was defined as providing legislative, institutional and financial frameworks for entrepreneurship of private sector, communities and individuals, and hence in this period the international agencies focused assistance on promoting the development of policies and programmes as opposed to projects."*[33]

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[27] See Davis (2006), p. 72; Burgess (1992), p. 82.
[28] Marcuse (1992), p. 21.
[29] See Burgess (1992); Mathey (1992); Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), pp. 163ff.
[30] See Burgess (1992); Harms (1982), p. 49.
[31] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 166; Payne (1984); Gilbert (1986).
[32] See Mathey (1992); Fiori/Ramirez (1992); Gilbert (1986); Muller/Mitlin (2007).
[33] Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 168.

Differences consist in the *United Nations Centre for Human Settlements* (UNCHS)[34] enabling approach with an emphasis on community and grassroots participation and the World Bank approach[35] with a stronger focus on enabling markets, property rights and mortgage finance. Later the UNCHS enabling approach shifted from a grassroots focus to private and third sector integrative approach and from community to market enablement.[36]

Community enabling by comprehensive upgrading

The slum upgrading approach regained momentum in the late 1980s with the rise of the urban poverty agenda. The greater concern for poverty alleviation was aligned to a new understanding of poverty as a process instead of a physical condition. Given this context, in situ upgrading was seen as a potential to maintain social ties. Upgrading was internationally acknowledged as a strategy for poverty reduction in the Habitat Agenda. The approach shifted from single projects to comprehensive programmes. In this context self-help was extended to 'community self-management' whereby the state acted as an enabler of local development managed by communities.[37]

This was linked to the vulnerability debate whereby interventions had to prevent shocks and stress events (such as relocation) and to strengthen resilience (such as through social capital[38]). Whereas previous interventions were often limited to top-down physical upgrading, and thereby posed a threat to social assets, the realigned approach promotes people-centred and participatory interventions.[39]

Apart from physical improvements the comprehensive upgrading approach comprises the provision of social infrastructure, employment, community organisation and security of tenure. In contrast to earlier strategies, roles and responsibilities are more complex. Government is required to moderate between interests and to find a flexible approach with norms and standards. Shortcomings were seen in the lack of capacity, skills and adequate

[34] See UNCHS (1987).
[35] See The World Bank (1993).
[36] See Pugh (1997).
[37] See Gilbert (2007a); Smith H. (2002); Hamdi (1991); The World Bank (1991), p. 9.
[38] For a review of the social capital debate see chapter 2.3.
[39] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), pp. 42ff.

analysis within the administration. Also, there is often mistrust in the community towards government and the assumed solidarity within communities is often not present.[40]

Beyond these externally designed comprehensive upgrading approaches, alternative support-based interventions emerged. Huchzermeyer (2004b) differentiates these alternative approaches into those initiated by government and those by civil society organisations.[41] The latter were again linked to an empowerment agenda.[42] NGO-initiated support-based interventions were perceived as "[…] fulfilling the important function of assisting informal settlement residents in strengthening their position in society and in relation to the state."[43]

Market enabling approach through property titles and finance

The criticism of sites-and-service provision and physical upgrading led to an adjustment of World Bank policies in the 1980s which now focused on the enablement of private sector engagement in housing. The 'affordability problem' of home owners was seen to be overcome by private sector housing investment or by improving household investment capacity. The underlying assumption was that the private sector would need to compete and thereby produce at lower cost. Subsidies or loans were given to the poor who then could buy a house on the market. However, in reality, the private sector perceived low cost-housing as a risk investment and did not engage in housing developments.[44]

By the late 1980s the market approach gained momentum when the World Bank shifted to enhancing household finance capacity by the provision of property titles. De Soto argued that titling would provide access to capital for the poor as it represented collateral for bank loans and would eventually lead to housing improvements. The underlying assumption is that the housing need could be addressed through the integration of the poor into the market.[45] This assumption was questioned by scholars who stressed that titling does not unlock capital lending by banks.[46] Moreover, the house would not represent a collat-

[40] See UNCHS (1999).
[41] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 53.
[42] For a detailed discussion on the role of civil society organisations see chapter 2.3.
[43] Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 77.
[44] See Gilbert (2007a); Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 166.
[45] See De Soto (2000).
[46] See Datta/Jones (2000); Durand-Lasserve /Payne (2006).

eral in the context of a non-existent secondary housing market.[47] In contrast scholars feared that titling will result in further speculation, displacement and social differentiation.[48] Payne illustrates that titling results in a distortion of the land market as better-off households crowd-out the newly legalised freeholders (see figure 2.3).



Fig. 2.3: Distortion of land market and crowding-out as effects of titling, Source: Payne (2006)

Also, as Muller/Mitlin point out, poor households are hesitant to borrow in order to avoid financial risks by loan repayments. Instead they resort to savings for lower-cost housing investments. To motivate these investments the legal recognition of the right to stay is therefore more of a concern, than titles as such.[49]

Therefore scholars call for alternatives to titling such as rental housing, progressive improvement of land rights or temporary occupation permits. UN-Habitat recognised the need for a continuum of land rights to secure tenure and introduced a *Global Campaign for Secure Tenure* and a *Global Land Tool Network* (GLTN).

[47] See Gilbert (2002a).
[48] See Durand-Lasserve/Royston (2002a); Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006); Payne (2000), (2006); Davis (2006), p. 80.
[49] See Muller/Mitlin (2007), pp. 431-432.

Further, scholars promote interventions preventing speculation such as land banking and property taxes.[50]

Nevertheless, titling has continued to be a popular approach. Davis (2006) explains the popularity of de Soto's approach by its easy implementation and by representing a form of appeasement of the urban poor.[51] He warns that in the context of decreasing free land and lack of employment and commodification of property this "is a theoretical recipe for exactly the vicious circles of spiralling rents and overcrowding […]."[52]

2.1.2.4 Urban management approaches

In the last couple of decades the understanding of the state shifted from that of a provider to the state as an enabler and partner in development.[53] Given this context, indirect development strategies gained momentum. Since the mid 1980s the housing approach by the World Bank shifted from project or programme interventions to a policy 'support approach'. This was paralleled by an Urban Management Program (UMP) as a combined initiative by UNCHS, UNDP[54] and the World Bank. It focused on housing as part of the urban economy and promoted decentralisation and institutional development. However, weak local governments had difficulties in facing the complexity of the institutional approach. Instead decentralisation often reinforced local power structures.[55] In the 1990s the urban management approach therefore emphasised capacity-building, good governance and alliance-building which was also stressed by the Habitat Agenda as its overarching approach to adequate shelter and sustainable human settlements.

Capacity-building

It is argued that policy adjustments would not lead to changes in interventions as long as the capacity for implementation has not been enhanced. Capacity-building has to be differentiated between institutional development (to increase the efficiency of formal institutions) and empowerment as informal capacity-building in a situation of organisational structures which are lacking.

[50] See Gilbert (2007a); Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006); GLTN (2006).
[51] See Davis (2006), p. 81.
[52] Davis (2006), p. 94.
[53] See also Jenkins/Smith (2001a); Pugh (1995).
[54] United Nations Development Programme
[55] See Jenkins/Smith/Wang (2007), p. 172; Gilbert, (2007a), p. 9.

The institutional approach stresses that the state, market and society require structures and capacity to play their roles in the housing systems. The deriving frameworks to analyse actor capacity are therefore linked to new institutionalism and can be divided into two schools of thought: the state capacity concepts[56] and the social movement capacity concepts[57]. The objective is to understand the actor capacity and to enhance it through capacity-building (see also chapter 2.2.2).

With regards to communities capacity-building was extended to empowerment. In 'The Architecture of Empowerment' Serageldin argues that the poor know better than any architect or technocrat about their needs and feels that architects should show more respect to them as partners in development.[58] The focus is on mediating structures between the government and the individual.[59] Later empowerment concepts were linked to concepts of social capital.[60]

For housing delivery to reduce poverty and to be needs-based, it is argued that, "[…] poor residents need to be able to articulate their needs and assert their claims on resources through the political and administrative systems."[61]

Good governance

The urban poverty agenda was also linked to the normative agenda of 'good governance'.[62] Increasingly governance of cities was understood as relevant for dealing with the housing backlog, polarisation and poverty. Based on the assumption that poverty alleviation requires improved governance structures, UN-Habitat introduced a *Global Campaign on Urban Governance* in 1999. UN-Habitat recognised that a key factor for pro-poor policies is to adopt new roles for the urban actors involved, i.e. the state, private sector and civil society. The Habitat Agenda specifically mentions institutional cooperation and partnerships and identifies governments as responsible for enabling cooperative models.[63]

[56] See for instance Jenkins/Smith (2001b); Grindle (1996).
[57] See for instance Rakodi (2002); Stokke (2002); Törnquist (2002).
[58] See for instance Seralgedin (1997).
[59] See Berger/Neuhaus (1984).
[60] See for instance Bebbington et al (2006); Muller/Mitlin (2007).
[61] Rakodi (2002), p. 105.
[62] For a detailed discussion on governance see chapter 2.2.
[63] See UN (1996) ; UN-Habitat (2001), p. 211.

Partnerships in housing

Urban development and housing challenges were perceived as not being able to be solved by government on its own which led to the formation of partnerships. The Habitat Agenda perceived partnerships as key to realising adequate shelter and sustainable human settlements. The *Millennium Project Task Force* sees partnerships with slum dwellers and their organisations (providing legitimacy) and with private sector (providing investment), local government (providing accountability and resources), and national government (providing policy and frameworks) as central. However, the 'good governance' approach idealised partnerships as strong relationships between distinct sectors, thus the critique. In reality, Majale indicates, these relationships are far more complex and heterogeneous.[64]



Fig. 2.4: Idealised versus complex relationships between sectors, Source: Hamdi/Majale (2004)

Hamdi and Majale (2004) outlined that central for partnership formation is an understanding of power relations and interests of actors, assistance of poor in unequal power relations and selection of appropriate organisational forms and levels of relations according to the capacities of stakeholders. This formation is based on thorough analysis of stakeholder capacities, of opportunities and threats, and of stakeholder interests based on action planning methods.[65]

2.1.2.5 Juxtaposition of technical and community-driven approaches

The World Bank realigned its strategy from urban management to an emphasis on national urban strategies, *City Development Strategies* (CDS), services for the poor, upgrad-

[64] Majale (2005), p. 3.
[65] See Hamdi/Majale (2004).

ing and capacity-building.[66] This approach was accompanied by the introduction of the *Cities Alliance* in 1999 as an international coalition of UN-Habitat, the World Bank, numerous cities and development partners addressing urban poverty through CDS and a *Cities without Slums* action plan.[67]

Slums were interpreted as an outcome of urbanisation and poverty. The *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs)[68] therefore call for an improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 (target 11 of Goal 7) which is to be realised through improved access to water, sanitation and security of tenure.[69] The MDGs are criticised for their limitations in terms of top-down expert-led interventions and focus on measurable outcomes.[70] Scholars fear that with "the return of the slum" in the international development language, earlier research and recommendations will be ignored. It is argued that by stressing physical decay governments will return to instant solutions such as eradication.[71]

UN-Habitat promotes a broader focus integrating the underlying causes of poverty for the existence of slums. The Habitat Agenda underlined the need for pro-poor policies in formulating, adopting and implementing land, housing and service provision. The report 'The Challenge of Slums' stresses the importance of income generation and integration for poverty reduction. The 'State of the World's Cities 2004/05' report also focuses on the importance for citizenship rights and proactive planning for social inclusion.

Scholars stress the multiple aspects of urban poverty (including voicelessness and powerlessness) and call for official development assistance to redirect their funds accordingly. A focus is given to local institutions (both municipality and urban poor organisations) which are, according to the critique, neglected through the dominant channelling of resources through national government. Instead they specifically stress the contribution by civil society organisations in addressing poverty and local governance.[72] Given the context of limited regulation capacity of the public sector, municipalities can only meet the

[66] The World Bank (2000).
[67] See Cities Alliance (2005) and Cities Alliance (no date).
[68] At the Millennium Summit in 2000 the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) outlining the targets for poverty reduction.
[69] See UN (2000); UN Millennium Project (2005).
[70] See Bigg/Satterthwaite (2005).
[71] See Gilbert (2007b).
[72] The debate is therefore interlinked with the civil society discourse which is reviewed in chapter 2.3.

challenges of rapid urbanisation through cooperation with informal institutions.[73] Scholars advocate for a shift from conventional international development funding to the support of community-driven processes in order to realise the goals outlined in the Millennium Declaration.[74]

2.1.3 Housing in South Africa

80% of all households in South Africa are considered to be unable to access adequate housing on their own.[75] Against this background the South African housing policy is based on the notion of 'adequate shelter for all'[76] which, as a social right, is also entrenched constitutionally. In the post-apartheid period after 1994 the government introduced a national housing programme and promised to build one million houses within five years. As a result, between 1994 and 2001 South Africa delivered more subsidised houses than any other country worldwide.[77]

This mass delivery of housing perpetuated settlement structures of the apartheid era.[78] Furthermore, it did not meet the backlog. Instead informal settlements and the numbers of inadequately housed people have been growing.[79] The high demand for land and housing is met with the help of informal institutions and unlawful occupation of land which continue to be primary options for poor households to access land and housing in cities.

The housing situation is characterised by approximately 50% of households owning their accommodation, about a third residing in rental accommodation (including formal and informal rental) and 12.3% of residents living in informal dwellings (squatting, backyard shack and backyard room rental).[80]

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[73] Kombe/Kreibich (2003).
[74] See for instance Satterthwaite (2002), p. 385; Mitlin/Satterthwaite (2004a), (2004b), p.278ff; Biggs/Satterthwaite (2005); D'Cruz/Satterthwaite (2005).
[75] See Smit (2003), p. 167.
[76] According to the Housing Act adequate shelter is measured by legal security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, cultural adequacy. See RSA (1997b), preamble.
[77] See Rust (2006), p. 7.
[78] See Godehart (2001), p. 31.
[79] The number of households in shacks increased from 1.45 million in 1996 to 1.84 million in 2001. This increase of 27% is greater than the 10% population increase in the same period. See Statistics South Africa (2001).
[80] See Rust (2006), p. 15.

2.1.3.1 Land reform since 1994

South Africa still tries to come to terms with its legacy of unequal land distribution and tenure insecurity.[81] Racially based legislation caused land inequalities and tenure insecurity for non-white people[82] within urban areas and formed part of the urban exclusion strategy by the apartheid state government (see following table).

1913	Access to land restricted to homeland territories
1923	Restricted access to urban areas
1945	Section 10 right defines legitimacy of presence in urban areas
1951	Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (PISA) authorises evictions and forced removals
1952	Pass Laws control residence permit of black people in urban areas
1959	Group Areas Act defines racial zones in cities
1978	99-year leasehold right
1986	End of pass laws and influx control – residence and land ownership in urban areas legalised

Tab. 2.4: Land rights in urban areas for non-whites during apartheid era, Source: Own design

As a result, access to land represented a key concern on the post-1994 political agenda. Section 25 of the new Constitution (also referred to as the 'property clause') outlines that:

> *"The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis."*[83]

In the transition to democratic government racially based legislation was repealed and legislation for a new land regulation provided.[84] Based on the Constitution and the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) the government introduced various acts and policies[85] and embarked on a land reform in 1994. The reform consists of a land restitution programme to compensate those previously dispossessed, a land redistribution programme to enable access to land for black South Africans, as well as a tenure reform programme to secure tenure for those who have been deprived.

All three land reform programmes showed limited effects which has contributed to in-

[81] A detailed overview and assessment of the historical context of housing and land related policy and delivery in South Africa has been given for instance by Christopher (1994); Judin/Vadislavic (1998), Roysten (2003), Todes/Pillay/Kronje (2003); USN/Development Works (2004).
[82] The usage of racial-based terminology is only applied to further the understanding of the differentiations made in land and housing provision.
[83] RSA (1996a), Chapter 25(5).
[84] The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (ARBLMA) (No. 108 of 1991); the Less Formal Township Establishment Act (No. 113 of 1991); the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (ULTRA) (No. 112 of 1991).
[85] For instance the Development Facilitation Act (1995), the White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) and the Housing Act (1997).

creased disillusionment. The land inequality has been described as a "time bomb" by the World Bank warning against a similar situation as with the Zimbabwean land-grabs.[86] Therefore on the National Land Summit in 2005 both government and civil society stressed the need to review the land reform programme.[87]

Moreover, land reform was primarily aimed at the transfer of agricultural land and rural development. The only land reform financing mechanism available in urban areas to access land for residential purposes is the *Settlement / Land Acquisition Grant* (SLAG). However, it has never been used extensively.[88]

The largely agricultural land reform focus and the neglect of urban areas has been criticised:

> *"If there is no land question in urban areas, how do we explain the rise and spread of informal settlements, which often arise out of illegal occupation of vacant - in most cases, municipal - land? There is a clear need for a more nuanced conception that incorporates the quest for land in both urban and rural areas."*[89]

In reality access to land and tenure security in urban areas is provided outside the land reform programmes. For urban poor households the only viable option to access security of tenure and land is either through legal protection from eviction or through the housing process by upgrading their tenure status and access to land.

Tenure security

The *Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act* (PIE Act) (No. 19/1998) and various Constitutional court rulings provide for tenure security. The new housing strategy also prioritises informal settlement upgrading as opposed to resettlement. However, there is a tendency by the state to redeem from earlier prevention of eviction regulations. The reorientation towards a policy of eradication of slums induced a change of legal provisions. Given this ambiguous policy context there are two alternative routes to implement policy: either to recognise the *de facto* occupancy and provide for upgrading or to evict, resettle and provide alternative accommodation.

In reality local political choice is constrained by limited resources and powerful interests

[86] See Blandy (2007).
[87] See Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2005), p. 9.
[88] See Royston (2002), p. 173ff; Royston (2003), p. 241; Hall R. (2004), p. 32.
[89] Ntsebeza (2007).

to regenerate high value land for other uses. Therefore impetus is given to evictions in prime locations whereas land invasions on the periphery are often neglected as government would be responsible to finance the resettlement and alternative accommodation.

Access to land for low-income housing

The state is confronted by two contradicting normative principles:

a. Spatial integration by allocating well-located land and promoting a compact city model

b. Equity in land access by making land available to as many beneficiaries as possible

Integration as a normative objective to land release for low-income housing projects was difficult to implement by local government as it was challenged by objections of private property-owners referred to as 'Not-In-My-Backyard' (NIMBY) syndrome. In addition, the principle of well-located and integrated development was challenged by a dominating housing subsidy route which aimed at minimal costs for land development.

The scope of action which remains for local government then is to secure sites against invasion and provide alternatives to evictions. "[…] the *de facto* driver of local authority land release is invasion/eviction/resettlement".[90]

2.1.3.2 Housing reform since 1994

The evolution of housing policy and its implementation also referred to as the 'housing legacy'[91] still impacts the housing need as well as policy and delivery orientation.[92]

In the 1950s and 60s (referred to as 'early apartheid') state housing for black people in urban areas was characterised by demolitions of unregularised slums, forced removals and mass rehousing.[93] The technocratic housing delivery approach was informed by the standardisation of low-cost housing units, neighbourhood planning and township design and influenced by European modernist planning.[94]

State subsidised housing shifted in the 1960s/70s (referred to has 'high apartheid'). In-

[90] Royston (2003), p. 41.
[91] See for instance Gardner (2003), p. 5.
[92] The evolution of the post-1994 housing policy has been reviewed extensively. See for instance Goodlad (1996); Huchzermeyer (2001); Jenkins (1999) and (2002); Khan (2003).
[93] For more information on the history of state housing provision see: Lemon (1991), Parnell (1992); Smith D. (1992); Wilson/Ramphele (1989).
[94] See Japha (1998); Crankhaw/ Parnell (1998).

stead of extending township areas in the as 'white' considered cities, urban areas for black occupation were developed in the homelands. The ban of state subsidised housing in 'white' South Africa led to an increased housing backlog which fuelled political opposition in the 1970s.

In the 1980s the state left the housing production to the private sector which provided only to higher income township residents.[95]

The poor, who were unable to access credit and therefore lacked financial resources to contribute to housing production or to purchase the privatised state housing, were limited to site-and-service schemes.

1950s/60s (early apartheid)	Forced eviction and relocation to townships or homelands Mass public housing in peripheral township areas by the state
1960s/70s (high apartheid)	State housing provision ceased and was only limited to homelands
1980s	Private sector housing production and housing finances Site-and-service schemes by government

Tab. 2.5: Apartheid state approach to housing for non-whites in urban areas, Source: Own design

Pre-1994 housing policy negotiations

With democracy coming into being the new government had to tackle the massive backlog in housing and service provision and open new ways for empowerment of the formerly disadvantaged. The *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) and the South African Constitution are therefore based on a strong commitment to social and economic rights. Housing was regarded as a basic human right and the delivery thereof as a central means to approach the inequalities. The Constitution of South Africa (Section 26) states that all South Africans have the right to adequate housing. Government is therefore responsible to achieve the realisation of this right on a progressive basis.

The strategies and instruments as to how government is to fulfil its responsibility have been laid out in the South African Housing Policy. Policy negotiations initiated in the pre-1994 period with the *National Housing Forum* (NHF) which consisted of representatives from state, private and civil society sector. However, a key critique which was formulated was the lack of participation of progressive civil society groups and the lack of influence

[95] See Porteous (2003), p. 192.

by the landless and homeless.[96]

At the forum, private sector delivery interests met interests of the democratic movement towards process orientation in housing. Numerous commentators have pointed out that the housing policy therefore accommodates contradicting interests and thus lacks coherence.[97]

1994-1999 State-assisted market-driven delivery

In 1994 the *Housing White Paper* was launched. Since then policy development has primarily been managed by the state with limited participation of non-state actors.[98]

The housing policy has been fixed in two macro policy frameworks. In 1994 the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) as the socio-economic policy stressed that housing provision for all is a responsibility of government. The *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* strategy (GEAR), as the macro-economic strategy, was adopted in 1996 to ensure financial discipline and macro-economic stability. In the following government expenditure was reduced which therefore also impacted on the housing budget allocation.[99]

The *Housing White Paper* of 1994 represents the framework for the National Housing Policy and for all policy, programmes and guidelines which followed. It specifies the right to adequate housing, as was formulated in the RDP, by emphasising a product orientation in terms of housing provision. This became most apparent with the National Housing Goal set out in the White Paper declaring "to reach the target of the Government of National Unity of 1,000,000 houses in five years".[100]

The provisions of the White Paper were later legislated by the *Housing Act* of 1997 (Act No. 107 of 1997) which is the supreme law replacing previous housing legislation. It lays down the general principles applicable to housing development and clarifies the functions of the different spheres of government. Government is required to prioritise the needs of the poor in housing development and to ensure that housing development is based on the

[96] See for example Khan/Thurman (2001), p. 6ff; Goodlad (1996); Huchzermeyer (2001); Khan (2003), p.11ff; Khan/Ambert (2003), p.iv.
[97] See Khan (2003), p. 14.
[98] See Gardner (2003), p. 6.
[99] For a review of the development discourse in South Africa see chapter 2.3.3.
[100] Department of Housing (1994), 4.3.

principles of integration, participation, and empowerment, and that it offers a range of housing and tenure options.[101] A report by CSIR acknowledges that the Act embraces a more holistic notion of housing. At the same time, the authors argue that the Act reinforces the market-centred approach by prescribing an enabling role for the state and "thus stepping back to let others take control of the situation".[102]

The *Urban Development Framework* (UDF) and housing policy (laid down in the National Housing Code of 2000) refer to be aligned to the Habitat Agenda (1996) and stress a more comprehensive understanding of housing emphasising aspects such as integration, habitable communities, economic development, institutional transformation and partnerships with non-state actors.[103]

The housing policy provided a *National Housing Programme*. One significant element of the housing programme is the *Housing Subsidy Scheme* (HSS).[104] The subsidy scheme gives households earning below a specific income line access to funding for housing, security of tenure and services. The interpretation of the ANC objective of 'housing for all' was highly disputed. Government avoided approaches like site-and-service schemes due to community opposition against such 'apartheid-like' state approaches. The once-off capital had to make provision for a starter house (also referred to as RDP houses[105]) which was supposed to be improved incrementally by the beneficiaries.

Most stakeholders in the housing process agreed upon policy direction but have concerns around its implementation. The fundamental critique is around the low quality and inadequate size of the building and surrounding environment, the lack of affordability by poor households and the lack of integration which contributes to a perpetuation of apartheid style settlement location on the peripheries.[106]

In fact, Huchzermeyer (2004) questions that the South African housing policy is in line with the Habitat Agenda since it makes no reference to urban poverty.[107]

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[101] See RSA (1997b), 2(1).
[102] Du Plessis/Landmann (2002), p. 113.
[103] See Republic of South Africa (1997), UDF.
[104] The other elements of the housing programme will not be reviewed in the following.
[105] As a reference to the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
[106] See Thurmann (1999); Jenkins (1999); Seekings (2000); Huchzermeyer (2001).
[107] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 46.

The state-delivery model however nurtured a culture of entitlement to a house which could not be realistically fulfilled. Therefore scholars strongly promoted alternative mechanisms beyond the state-driven housing delivery.

> *"The assumption is that people will wait in the queue. The nature of the queue is long and slow. There is only one queue, the queue is for only one product. How trustworthy is the queue? There is an issue of corruption – people know that the queue is not fair. The key premise of an informal settlement upgrading policy is that people can't wait for government to deliver. At the moment, there is only one channel through which to access legal housing – the subsidy system. One needs to open this to different alternatives."*[108]

1999-2004 State-assisted self-help and state-driven delivery

The limitations of the housing policy were acknowledged both by academics and government itself. With the second term of ANC government the housing ministry responded with policy refinements towards a more qualitative approach, minimum norms and standards, greater beneficiary responsibility and new forms of tenure.

The housing policy integrated both an enabling role for the state as a 'state-assisted, market delivery approach' and a 'state-assisted self-help' approach including both private sector and people-driven housing delivery.[109]

Since 1998 one key national strategy to shift housing policy towards quality delivery and sustainable human settlements has been the support of the *People's Housing Process* (PHP). PHP assists households to access housing subsidies and to build or organise the building of their homes themselves. The people-centred development route gives a facilitating and co-ordinating role to government and leaves more responsibility to civil society organisations.

PHP is meant as an entry into other economic and livelihood enhancing activities by giving more control over planning, location and design to residents and thus contributing to the beneficiary's satisfaction and to social inclusion.[110] PHP was largely influenced by international donors which were promoting a slum upgrading approach and by the pressure of civil society organisations particularly the *South African Homeless People's Federation* with its support NGO *People's Dialogue* which were pioneering new self-help approaches in South Africa. A national *People's Housing Partnership Trust* (PHPT) was es-

[108] Royston (2003) quoted from University of the Witwatersrand (2003).
[109] See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 255.
[110] See DoH (no date).

tablished to strengthen PHPs by a capacitating programme at provincial and local level.[111]

In terms of the PHP process the discourse is split into a benefit view and a perception that the state is shifting responsibility to the poor.

An evaluation of *Housing Subsidy Scheme* recommended the support of PHP. An expected outcome is the restoration of human dignity through community participation, quality products and environments as well as a job-creation strategy.[112]

However, some operational weaknesses have also been noted since its inception. Housing experts highlight the slow process and low delivery rate of PHP projects, the complexity of community organisation-building and participation, the lack of capacity and the limitation to community construction which is also hindered by inappropriate building norms and standards.[113]

Critics point out that the neglect of a more incremental approach is due to a focus on the number of delivery as the key performance indicator.[114] In fact, it is argued that in South Africa upgrading approaches are distorted by the capital subsidy system. The government-initiated interventions are reduced to the house construction component. As a result, no space is given for community decision-making over layout or management of infrastructure projects.[115]

Rust (2003) claims while there is growing emphasis of PHP processes, nevertheless procedures in implementation have not transformed adequately.[116]

Lohnert (2002) even questions the feasibility of self-help approaches in the South African context. She argues that the willingness and capacity for self-help is reduced in a context of high mobility. Moreover, the incremental upgrading, consolidation and socio-economic upliftment is not given in the context of economic deprivation and effects of HIV/AIDS.[117]

2002 marked a further shift from a Public-Private Partnership model towards a state-

[111] For further information on the evolution of PHP see Napier (2003).
[112] See USN (2003a).
[113] For evaluations of PHP see for example Napier (2003); Rust (2003); Thurmann (1999); USN (2003a); Baumann (2003); Bay Research and Consultancy (2003); USN (1998).
[114] See Napier (2003), p. 329; Rust (2003), Huchzermeyer (2003a), pp. 591ff; Charlton/Kihato (2006).
[115] See Huchzermeyer (2004), p. 77.
[116] See Rust (2003).
[117] See Lohnert (2002), pp. 255ff.

driven approach. Reasons are seen in the withdrawal of the private sector in low-income housing delivery, but also in increased political interests of gaining control over delivery.[118] Since local authorities have been allowed to act as developers since 2002, some local councillors are interested in demonstrating delivery outcomes to their constituents.

Critics stress that subsidised housing developments continue to be inadequately located and integrated, and housing finance largely ignores the needs of the poor.[119]

Since 2004 new housing policy 'Breaking New Ground'

Since 2004 the political discourse emphasises the link between public investment in housing and poverty reduction. The *Department of Housing* was under constraint to adjust policy in order to integrate socio-economic concerns.[120] It launched a new Housing Plan *Breaking New Ground* for the development of 'sustainable human settlements'.[121] This plan comprises the integration of social facilities, subsidies for middle-income households, greater co-ordination between different spheres of government, new structures for monitoring and evaluation, pro-active land identification and acquisition. Further it promotes incremental planning and redevelopment of existing physical structures. However, the plan does not substitute existing housing policies and programmes. The strategy entails the alignment between the housing programme and municipal *Integrated Development Plans* (IDP) and promotes the preparation of municipal housing plans in the IDP process.[122]

Charlton and Kihato, however, argue that BNG "[…] does not seem to have essentially departed from the original housing policy" since it neglects key weaknesses which have been identified in the policy.[123]

On the one hand the state intends to activate a private housing finance market; on the other hand it promotes self-build processes and community savings. At the same time its

[118] See Khan/Ambert (2003), p. xv; Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 263f.
[119] See Huchzermeyer (2001); CSIR (2002); Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 275.
[120] See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 256f.
[121] "Sustainable human settlements" implies a shift from the production of single housing units to responsiveness to multidimensional needs. It refer to "well-managed entities in which economic growth and social development are in balance with the carrying capacity of the natural systems on which they depend for their existence and result in sustainable development, wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equity." DoH (2004b), p. 11.
[122] See DoH (2004b).
[123] See Charlton/Kihato (2006), p. 257.

capital subsidy system is ambiguous between scaling up delivery and promoting empowerment. As an result, the state is regarded both as an enabler and a supplier of housing which Khan describes as a "combination of a selective appropriation of enablement and high modernism".[124]

2.1.3.3 Governing the gaps in land and housing provision

Low-income housing in South Africa is characterised by a general ambiguity between contradicting aims of policies and contradictions between policies and practices. The aim to create sustainable settlements is contrasted by quantitative delivery targets and performance measurement. The policy adjustment also entails ambiguous attitudes which translate in a variety of practices.

On the one hand, to ensure fast track and mass delivery, constructor-built projects are promoted. This would entail a further engagement of the construction industry which in reality sees very low profit margins in the low-income housing sector and which, at the time, is absorbed by high profit projects.

People-driven processes on the other hand are promoted as a way to ensure more quality in the housing process. Tight regulations and formalised application processes however impede implementation and require much support for community groups.

The underlying opposing pressures under which housing policies are developed may result from different political orientations and values which constitute 'governance gaps'.[125] These gaps generate different local policies and practices (see table 2.6).

The contradictions in policy orientation are displayed in a variety of interventions. The tensions particularly between the delivery and process oriented positions were not resolved within the policies but were left open for interpretation by programmes or during implementation on the ground.

Finally, the discrepancies between policy ideal and practice are based on:

a) How policy is interpreted and thus a matter of political or institutional will,

b) Institutional arrangements affecting policy implementation,

[124] Khan (2003), p. 77.
[125] See Pierre (1999), pp. 373ff.

c) Capacities to implement, and

d) Resources to bring policy into being.

Phase		Economic growth oriented	GAP	Basic needs oriented
Tenure security	Objectives	Protect right of property owner		Protect right of unlawful occupier
	Instrument	Eviction		Emergency services, Temporary rights
	Policy	Amendment to PIE Act, Norms and standards		PIE Act, Grootboom Case
Access to land	Objectives	Equity in land allocation, protect high value land, attract investors, promote private initiative		Integration, well-located land, redistribution, control private initiative
	Instrument	„Willing-seller-willing-buyer" transactions		Pro-active land identification (IDP), expropriation
	Policy	Land Reform Programme, BNG		BNG
Housing finance	Objectives	Subsidy: Development, mass delivery (quantity) Credit: Increase engagement of private sector to offer loans		Subsidy: Empowerment, enhance livelihood strategies (quality) Credit: Promote self-build process and community-based finances
	Instrument	Subsidies for supply-driven private developer delivery Reduce risks and costs for loan		Subsidies for demand-driven people-led process Secure loans against savings, combine subsidy with savings and loan
	Policy	BNG		BNG, PHP
Land development	Objectives	Product orientation Fast-track delivery by private developer land development Greenfields		Process orientation Demand-driven by application and development through beneficiaries In situ upgrading
	Instrument	Pre-planning, township establishment, relocation		Land application by beneficiaries Land rehabilitation
	Policy	BNG		BNG, PHP
Tenure alternatives	Objectives	Enabling markets		Enabling livelihoods, tenure choice, entry points in housing
	Instrument	Individual ownership, property asset creation		Area-based, alternative tenure, rental, enhancing social capital as asset
	Policy	BNG		PHP within BNG Rental Housing Act (50 of 1999)
Construction	Objectives	Consumer Protection		Promote self-built process
	Instrument	Control norms and standards		Progressive housing standards, support by consumer education
	Policy	National Home Builders Regulations, Provincial minimum norms and standards		Less Formal Township Establishment Act (1991); Development Facilitation Act (1995)

Tab. 2.6: Governance value orientation in different phases of low-cost housing, Source: Own design

2.1.3.4 Role of developmental local government in housing

> *"[…] making the connection between local government and housing is a challenging task, one that has largely been ignored in most discussion about low-cost housing."*[126]

Since 1994, responsibilities for infrastructure, spatial development and subsidies have been extensively passed on to the local level. Parnell and Pieterse argue that these strategies "reflect a fundamentally different approach to the management of human settlements".[127] Based on the principle of developmental local government the *Housing Act* (1997) defines the role of the different spheres of government in housing provision (see table 2.7).

Sphere of government	Roles and responsibilities
National government	Determines national housing policy Sets national housing delivery goals Facilitates provincial and local housing delivery goals Performance monitoring Capacity support Consultation Communication Provides programmes and finance Land registration Tenure reform Finance for acquisition and servicing of land
Provincial government	Administers national and provincial housings programmes Administers Housing Subsidy Scheme (if municipality is not accredited) Determines provincial policy and legislation Co-ordinates housing development in the province Capacity support for municipalities Intervention to perform municipal duties Provides a multi-year plan Assesses application for municipal accreditation Approves IDP Subsidises bulk infrastructure Legalizes informal settlements Approval of Land Development Applications
Local government	Must ensure that right to adequate housing is realised on progressive basis Identifies land and sets housing delivery goals in IDP Initiates, plans, co-ordinates, facilitates, promotes and enables appropriate housing development Provides land and services for new housing developments If accredited, municipalities can administer funding through national housing programmes Land Development Objectives (LDO) through IDP Spatial Development Framework (SDF) through IDP Town Planning Schemes Taxation Land acquisition

Tab. 2.7: Roles and responsibilities in housing provision
Source: Own design according to the Housing Act, RSA (1997)

[126] Pottie (2003), p. 439.
[127] Parnell/Pieterse (2002), p. 80.

Local government was perceived as an enabler of private sector investment in housing delivery according to the 'state-assisted market-delivery approach' which was predominant between 1994 and 1999. Confronted with the reluctance by the private sector to engage in low-income housing delivery and with the political interest to control housing, local government shifted towards enabling self-help approaches as well as 'state-driven delivery' between 1999 and 2004.

Since 2004 national government has shifted towards a poverty reduction framework combined with an interventionist role for the local state. To improve state-driven housing delivery the *Breaking New Ground* policy provides reforms for greater co-ordination amongst different spheres of government and for pro-active land identification by local government.

Local government has a defined area of powers and function in housing policy. In terms of constitutive functions to reform laws and regulations and to set policies, it is limited to control and ensure the rule of law. This however leaves room for political interpretation.

Local government withholds more power when it comes to strategic planning and identifying land for development. The municipal IDP is the strategic instrument for the realisation of these functions. The challenge lies in how to provide well-located land for housing. To access strategic land parcels, a municipality can either use legislative instruments such as expropriation or use fiscal instruments by increasing taxation on property.

The scope for local government to allocate and purchase land is presently broadened. Previously land allocation for low-income housing was defined through the *Housing Subsidy Scheme* which contributed to the development of Greenfield projects at the periphery. The new housing strategy BNG provides for the transfer of well-located state land to local government and empowers local government to the acquisition of private land for low-income housing. However, it does not empower local government to allow community organised land acquisition.

In terms of land development the South African system is highly centralised. Bottlenecks with land development occur most notably with land application approvals and the registration of titles which are within the provincial and national government competency. Therefore land development procedures cause intergovernmental conflict between prov-

ince and local government.[128]

Another obstacle in land development is the conflicting town planning and land use schemes. These define regulations such as zoning, subdivision, land use, floor-area ratio and building height. These are formalised as bye-laws and administered by local government. The schemes therefore form a key part of a municipality's regulatory power.

In terms of the housing process and practice, local government's area for innovation is limited by the standardised housing programme. Municipalities are reluctant to apply for accreditation to administer housing subsidies. Therefore higher spheres of government continue to be the key players in state subsidised housing provision. Especially provincial government holds vested powers. This implies that provinces largely control the type of housing development and kind of developer.[129]

Nevertheless, the scope for municipal action is broadened. In its role of delivering houses and services local government can strategically select and prioritise projects and influence the degree of community inclusion and the mode of governance it is willing to embark on. Still it has a political choice in the situation of governance gaps. Key areas for local government to influence housing provision are: pro-active land identification and prioritising people-driven processes. Both areas therefore represent the political opportunity structure for influence by civil society organisations at local government level.

[128] In the case of the DFA route, for instance, development application approval is taken away from local government to provincial tribunals.
[129] See Khan (2003), p. 17; Durand-Lasserve (2002), p. 21.

2.2 Urban governance discourse

2.2.1 The rise of governance concepts

Against the background of the financial crisis in the 1970s the role of the state shifted from a welfare to a managerial state which was assumed to be more efficient. Subsequently new governance arrangements became prominent. Programmes implemented in this context were 'New Public Management' (NPM) focusing on outsourcing service functions to the private sector and thereby reducing the role of the state.[130]

The governance discourse also influenced development policy-making as by the end of the 1980s the difficulties in implementing structural adjustment programmes became apparent.[131] The World Bank embarked on 'new governance' seeing political and institutional changes as effective for economic reform.[132]

Since the mid 1990s international politics have shifted from a rollback of state to improving and reforming state institutions, deepening democracy and enabling roles for non-state actors.[133] Since then the term governance is used to refer to new emerging organisational forms and coordination in society.

> *"Governance indicates a new kind of social-political steering logic in the public sector characterised by a differentiated and multicentered political system with a mix of private and public actors participating directly in the decision-making process without any clear hierarchic relation between the many centers and actors."*[134]

The governance concept broadened from a state-centred perspective to an integration of other sectors of society. This shift was induced by economic globalisation, financial constraints of governments, the rise of transnational corporations and increased demands by civil society. Given this context, the fragmentation of governance and the interdependence of various agencies became apparent. The following numerous international conferences, such as the *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (UNCED) in 1992 or the United Nations world conference on human settlements (Habitat I 1976, Habitat II 1996), reflected the approach to integrate other stakeholders into a global governance decision-making process. In 1992 a *UN Commission on Global Governance* was

[130] See Heinrichs (2005), p. 28.
[131] See for example The World Bank (1989), (1992).
[132] See Heinrichs (2005), pp. 28f.
[133] See Weiss (2000), pp. 804f.
[134] Sehested (2001), p. 11.

endorsed which stressed the need for co-operation between different sectors of society in order to manage common affairs.[135] The Agenda 21 programme which was adopted at the UNCED conference in 1992, also makes particular reference to the inclusion of non-state actors.[136] This transformation of political regulation has created debates on the democratic legitimacy of governance arrangements and thereby crossed the particular discourses within political science policy-making research.[137] Here the discourse on governance interlinks with the discourse on democracy and civil society. Benz and Papadopoulos outline normative democratic governance as a continuous adjustment of preferences between power holders and those affected by decisions.[138]

Normative 'good governance' concepts became conditional also in developing countries (e.g. by Poverty Reduction Strategies). "Good" refers to the quality of governance processes and their institutions and the responsible use of power and resources to provide public goods and services.[139]

The aspects of good governance are, however, differently accentuated. Whereas the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) and the World Bank highlighted public sector management and the rule of law[140], UN institutions emphasise human development aspects such as the need for horizontal coordination (UNDP)[141], the aspect of collaborative action (UN-Habitat)[142] and human rights (UNCHR)[143].

In urban management the new approach translated into an enabling role for government which was differentiated in market enablement (e.g. privatisation), local government enablement (by decentralisation and institutional reform) and community enablement (by participation and empowerment).[144]

Critics of the 'good governance' principle claim that it reflects a further reduction of the state and focus on economic growth, and thus is just a mechanism to enable capital

[135] Commission on Global Governance (1995), p. 2.
[136] UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1992), III (27).
[137] See for example Benz/Papadopoulos (2006a), (2006b).
[138] Benz/Papadopoulos (2006b), p. 6.
[139] See BMZ (2002).
[140] See The World Bank (no date a).
[141] See UNDP (no date).
[142] See UNCHS (2001).
[143] See UNHCHR (no date).
[144] See Post/Baud (2002), p. 10. For a detailed review of the enabling approach see chapter 2.1.

flow.[145]

Thus comprehensive governance concepts seek to conceptualise the patterns of interaction, the regulation of common affairs and the fusion of public and private resources. Benz and Papadopoulos (2006) characterise a comprehensive governance concept along the following elements[146]:

a) There is a plurality of decision centres with no clear hierarchy. Instead decision structures are characterised by **relationships** between actors organised in networks.

b) **Boundaries** of decision structures are fluid in terms of inclusion and outcomes. They are determined in functional, not territorial terms.

c) **Actors**, especially collective actors, hold power. Interest group participation is an essential characteristic of governance.

d) **Modes of governance** vary in negotiation processes as interaction can be characterised both by competition and cooperation. However, a general willingness to compromise is expected.

e) **Institutions** characterise governance as they determine inclusion, mode of interaction and influence the linkage between actors. The degree of institutionalisation varies.

2.2.2 International discourse on urban governance

In the context of a dynamic urban society and economy, government cannot only be seen as a function to deliver services, but also as a realm for agency and powers to govern these dynamics.

Given this context, local governments are not understood to have exclusive control of governance matters. The mechanisms at work and the role of the different institutions and actors have been interpreted in various ways.

The conceptual understanding of urban governance was further expanded by integrating a perspective of re-scaling of urban governance. This is based on the experience of increased global competitiveness of cities.[147] Castells interprets the consequences of globalisation as a deterritorialisation and circulation of people, commodities and identities in a

[145] See for example Evans (2001).
[146] See Benz/Papadopoulos (2006b), pp. 2f.
[147] See Sassen (2001); Taylor (2003); GAWC (no date).

'space of flows'.[148] Instead Brenner argues that spatial fixes persist and cities become reterritorialised. As a consequence, polity is increasingly fragmented and power redistributed vertically from international to local level and horizontally between localities which is subsumed under the term 'glocal governance'.[149]

The theoretical discourse on urban governance is very diverse. The multiplicity of theories, however, shares a perspective on processes and mechanisms of coordination by different actors.[150] Based on the acknowledgment of increasing fragmentation, differentiation and complexity in social and political life, theories have widened conceptual horizon and connected earlier theories.[151] The interest into complex interaction of private and public decisions has been induced by the practical experience of urban change. Cities have increasingly become the economic growth producers for the national economy, competition between cities has increased, the disparity between local government responsibility and its institutional set-up has become apparent leading to institutional reforms and finally, urban social movements re-emerge.

2.2.2.1 Urban political economy theories

Urban political economy theories are based on two perspectives: a structuralist and a postmodern structuralist-pluralist perspective.

Structuralist accounts show evidence that cities cannot be looked at as isolated elements but are affected by social and economic constraints and imperatives. The 'urban growth machine' model focused on the relationship between politics and economy and argued that stable coalitions between the political agenda and private investment decisions are dominant.[152] Scholars have accused these structuralist accounts of limiting local politics to functionalist imperative to support private investment and that the model is based too much on US experience. Their argument is that the structuralist imperative does not give an explanation for variations of local politics and neglects other social forces at play.[153]

The return to politics in theoretical accounts gave rise to a theoretical synthesis which ac-

[148] See Castells (1989).
[149] See for example Brenner (1999).
[150] See Pierre (2005), p. 452.
[151] For an overview on earlier perspectives on urban governance see Mollenkopf (1994), p. 99; Parker (2004), pp. 122f.
[152] See Molotch (1987).
[153] See for instance Mollenkopf (1994), p. 106; Harding (1999), p. 679.

knowledged both the impact of market forces as well as the influence of popular interests.

Common to postmodern theories, and what differentiates them from earlier work, is that they see a diffusion and decentralisation of political steering and increased dysfunction of bureaucratic means. Consequently the divisions between politics and administration, as well as those between public and private spheres dissolve.[154]

Urban regime theory

Urban regime theory tries to overcome the limits of the growth machine model by focusing on the nature of informal coalition behaviour. The model expands also to non-business directed regimes since dominant coalitions are in need of grassroots legitimacy and support.[155] Criticism of urban regime theory stresses that the model is US-centric and cannot be applied universally.[156] Even Stone (2005) acknowledged later that a prevalence of the business sector in regimes is common but not inevitable and depends on the context.

Regulation theory

Post-Fordist analysis describes the change of urban politics under the conditions of increased complexity and flexibility. In contrast to regime theory a Post-Fordist perspective holds that if the constraints of regimes are not taken into account, they will result in conflict.[157]

The outsourcing of public service and social consumption functions to the private and non-profit sector results in an 'expansion of the sphere of local political action'. Thus bargaining systems, forms of collaboration and the role of local government are redefined. According to Mayer, whether the outcome of bargaining is responsive to needs or enforces marginalisation will be determined by the capacity of the local authorities to enable negotiation and the ability of the third sector to influence decision-making.[158]

[154] See Sehested (2001), p. 13.
[155] See Stone (1993).
[156] See for instance Harding (1999); Strom (1996).
[157] See LeGates/Stout (1996), p. 238.
[158] See Mayer (1996), pp.231ff. For a review of the Third Sector discussion see chapter 2.3.

2.2.2.2 Urban governance from an institutional perspective

With the shift from government to governance Pierre points out the risk of oversimplification as every exchange between public and private becomes governance.[159]

'New institutionalism' is based on earlier sociological perspectives. It assumes a wider governance concept and relative autonomy of the state as opposed to political concepts. Whereas growth coalition and urban regime theories see the state as a weak actor, it has, from an institutional perspective, economic, legal and political privileges. Hence political institutions not only react to, but direct processes. However, they are neither static nor do they behave in consistent ways. Instead, as Pierre says, it depends on the underlying economic, political and ideological frameworks (value systems) which determine the configurations of the actors.[160]

'Actor-centred institutionalism'[161] therefore assumes that interactions of intentional actors are influenced by the institutional setting.[162] Instead of a cause-and-effect filter model (policies determine institutions, institutions determine options for action), actor-centred institutionalism takes the view that policy, institutions and options for actions influence one another in a circular model.[163]



Fig. 2.5: Policies, institutions and action - from a filter to a circular model, Source: Own design

Institutions and policies can therefore be influenced by the actions of actors. These actors, Scharpf argues, are interdependent. Thus, outcome is not produced by a single but multi-

[159] See Pierre (1999), p. 376.
[160] See Pierre (1999), pp. 376f.
[161] For a review of actor-centered institutionalisms see Mayntz/Scharpf (1995); Scharpf (1997) and (2000); Mayntz (2002).
[162] See Scharpf (1997), p. 1.
[163] See Benz (1997), p. 305.

ple actors with different interests, perceptions and capabilities.[164]

Institutionalism is therefore interested in interagency relationships as modes of governance. Different concepts to categorise modes of governance reflect ideal types which in reality might constitute rather a combination or hybrid of modes of governance.[165]

Therefore Pierre and Gaetano/Strom present models which categorise the modes of governance not in the three steering logics (hierarchy, market and networks) but according to criteria such as instruments, values, outcomes, interactions (governance relations), methods (governance logic), actor constellation and political objectives.

Gaetano/Strom thereby arrive at a categorisation of clientelistic (pragmatic personalised exchange relationship), corporatist (consensus-oriented exclusionary ruling coalitions), managerial (formal and bureaucratic relations), pluralist (bargaining, competing interests) and populist (inclusion and participation of grassroots) modes of governance (see table 2.8).

	Clientelistic	**Corporatist**	**Managerial**	**Pluralist**	**Populist**
Governing relations	Particularistic, personalised, Exchange	Exclusionary negotiation	Formal, bureaucratic, or contractual	Brokering or mediating among competing interests	Inclusionary negotiation
Governing logic	Reciprocity	Consensus building	Authoritative decision making	Conflict management	Mobilisation of popular support
Values	Pragmatic	Control or support market forces	Support market forces	Control market forces	Control market forces
Instrument	Networks	Deliberation Partnerships	Contracts	Deliberation	Networks
Key decision makers/ Participants	Politicians and clients	Politicians and powerful civic leaders or private sector elites (pro growth coalition)	Politicians and civil servants (Professionals)	Politicians and organised interests	Politicians and community movement leaders
Political objectives	Material (Selected Benefits)	Purposive (Distribution or Growth)	Material (Efficiency)	Purposive (Equity)	Symbolic (Participation)

Tab. 2.8: Modes of urban governance, Sources: Pierre (1999), p. 388; Gaetano/Strom (2003), p. 366.

[164] See Scharpf (1997), p. 11.
[165] See Lowndes/Skelcher (1998), p. 318; DiGaetano/Strom (2003), p. 367.

2.2.2.3 Re-politisation of governance through networks

Institutionalism has been criticised for its apolitical standpoint. Particularly network governance is increasingly politically interpreted with regards to the legitimacy and democratic nature of networks.[166]

Networks are defined as informal, decentralised and horizontal inter-organisational relations.[167]

Castells claims that society has moved to an information age by new information technology and globalisation. Castells feels that these technologies allow reconfigurations in flexible and networking forms of social relations ('network society'). Networks in this context become a key feature as they increase efficiency as opposed to hierarchical structures. Participation within networks, according to Castells, is determined by the ability of actors (as nodes within networks) to contribute to the goals of the network.

The normative assumption is that networks are better equipped than state or market to deal with interdependencies and complexity in society.[168] According to Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) networks constitute an 'expansive democracy' which is characterised by direct democracy or through strong linkages "by relating decision-making to the persons who are affected."[169]

Critics argue that network-style relationships may also lead to the formation of inner and outer networks. Those who have resources and status are more likely to be included.[170]

Instead people unrelated to networks are often oriented to communities as the 'space of place' whilst information networks are placeless operating in a 'space of flows': "elites are cosmopolitan, people are local", so Castells.[171] He argues that communal resistance against the 'space of flows' is determined by the ability of communities to build networks with other communities.[172]

It then becomes essential to ask who is included, how policy preferences are shaped, to

[166] See Haus/Heinelt/Stewart (2005).
[167] See Thompson et al (1991), p. 14.
[168] For a detailed review on network theories see Messner (2000).
[169] Hajer/Wagenaar (2003), p. 3.
[170] See Lowndes/Skelcher (1998), pp. 323f.
[171] Castells (1999), p. 446.
[172] See Castells (1989), p. 21.

whom they are responsive, and how constituency can make decision-makers accountable on policy outcomes.[173]

Hence a network form of governance is reconnected to democracy concerns. Analytical frameworks then interpret governance arrangements as either representing a collaborative advantage or exclusion.

2.2.2.4 Urban governance from a planning perspective

Planning theory assumed that planners act on the basis of normative concepts such as the good city (compact, revitalisation), good planning (rationality) and good society (equity, efficiency). According to rational, incremental and neo-rational theories planners as experts define needs and values in society and regulate and control urban development. According to postmodern neo-rational planning this is to be achieved by new management methods such as New Public Management (NPM).

Other postmodern planning scholars perceived planning no longer as a technical process, but a political activity. In this context communicative and collaborative planning theory[174] withdraws from Habermas and promotes planning as an interactive and deliberative process to find consensus. The "good" planner is understood to be a reflexive planner who is aware of the power relations and who enables participation, empowerment and community action.

Power relations in participation have been categorised for the first time by Arnstein in 1969. With her prominent 'ladder of participation' she revealed a continuum of influence in decision-making from non-participation to citizen control.[175] Her model has been refined by Hamdi and Goethert who suggest distinguishing levels and stages of participation. The level of participation can vary during a project cycle. Differences in the level of participation also involve a variation of aligned roles for the participants and outside experts (see figure 2.6).[176]

[173] See Benz/Papadopoulos (2006b), p. 8.
[174] See for example Forester (1999); Innes/Booher (2000); Healey (1997).
[175] See Arnstein (1996).
[176] See Hamdi/Goethert (1997).



Fig. 2.6: Roles related to levels and stages of participation
Source: adapted from Hamdi/Goethert (1997), p. 66 and 68.

From a critical planning perspective planning cannot be normatively good. Collaborative planning, scholars argue, would fail to see the underlying processes that shape cities. Instead they applied frameworks to understand 'planning as social control' to contribute to a critical theory of planning.[177]

> *"[…] cities and regions might be shaped by forces that planning has no ability to influence. This does not mean giving up in despair but, rather, searching for unthought possibilities for action and resistance beyond the confines of 'planning' (however defined)."*[178]

Referring to Foucault's auto-governmentality[179] they argue that the actors always reproduce power relations - also in deliberative and participatory processes.

A further critique questions the relevance of Western normative planning ideals in the context of the contentious and complex reality of 'everyday life' in the cities of the Global South.

[177] See for instance Yiftachel (1998); Flyvbjerg (1998).
[178] Yiftachel/Huxley (2000b), p. 923; see also Yiftachel/Huxley (2000a).
[179] Foucault applies the term governmentality for the way governments seek to produce the citizen best suited to fulfil its policies as well as for the organised practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) through which subjects are governed. See Foucault (2000).

Watson has demonstrated the gap between a normative formal planning ideal and the reality of informality and everyday techniques of survival.[180]

Obviously tensions are present between rational planning and communicative planning ideals, between communicative planning ideals and theories of power as well as between the Northern dominated rationality and the planning reality in the Global South.

Against this background Watson asks how to arrive at a normative understanding of planning without withdrawing from conflicting rationalities. She promotes a research which is 'Seeing from the South'. Cities in the Global South illustrate worldwide tendencies of informality and inequality. Therefore the study of these phenomena can contribute to planning theory in general. To do so, she argues that one should take a theoretical perspective outside the planning field.[181]

AlSayyad and Roy for instance suggest applying an analytical framework on urban informality which not only focuses on the built form but enlarges the understanding of the organising logic of urban informality revealing the social and political processes. They argue that new forms of informality may entail both formal and informal sectors, which may include not only the poor but also the middle-class, and which may have new forms and geographies.[182]

Herrle and Walther outline that these disjointed discourses can again be integrated under the use of the concept of social exclusion and inclusion since it combines normative with critical analysis and overcomes the limitations of universal concepts which are not grounded in the complexity and particularity of informality in the development context. The authors argue that it also translates beyond local particularities since it is applied against the background of general tendencies of fragmentation and complexity in cities.[183]

Given this context, the relevance of participation can be re-evaluated. Geddes for instance questions the extent to which local partnerships enhance cohesion and integration to combat social exclusion in the EU. Partnerships which aim to engage those excluded, claim to link communities with formal organisations. Geddes points out that it is rather local activ-

[180] See Watson (2003b).
[181] Watson (2008).
[182] See AlSayyad/Roy (2004), p. 26.
[183] See Herrle/Walther (2005b), pp. 2-4.

ists than the wider community which are involved. Moreover those involved lack the capacity and resources to engage in the expert circles. Also the tensions and divisions within a community are often neglected. Geddes concludes that there are limits to inclusion in partnership projects.[184]

Participation can then be characterised as creating new exclusion. But it can also integrate the informal mechanisms of 'the excluded'. Goethert asks: "Perhaps it is us, the minority formal sector of development planners that are the excluded and irrelevant?" He envisages a change of participation which does not try to integrate the informal into the formal framework, but instead he assumes a convergence towards the informal.[185]

2.2.3 Local government and governance in South Africa

2.2.3.1 Developmental local government

The role of local government has been constantly re-shaped within a changing development discourse in South Africa. The *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP), which was introduced in 1994, expressed a developmental state model. It focused on redistribution and meeting basic needs.[186]

In 1996 national government embarked on the *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) strategy. The shift from RDP to GEAR is seen as a result of the weakness of the state to deliver and the willingness of the *African National Congress* (ANC) to take up a more economy oriented position.[187] Given this context the state shifted from delivery towards enabling development by the private sector. Chipkin argues this implied a changing role for government from a technical and administrative to a policy co-ordinator and mediator role. Government then had to stimulate private investment and to enable alliances with non-state bodies.[188]

After the financial crisis in mid-1997 the ANC turned to Third Way governance as this was agreeable to both economic and social-oriented agencies.[189] In the following government tried to resolve the ambiguity in the development discourse through a combination

[184] See Geddes (2000), pp. 793f.
[185] See Goethert (2005a), pp. 18-21.
[186] See Harrison (2006a), p. 194; Mabin (2006), p. 139.
[187] See Chipkin (2002), p. 57; Harrison (2001), p. 177.
[188] See Chipkin (2002), p. 61.
[189] See Harrison (2006a), p. 194.

of public sector efficiency and individual responsibility.[190]

Influenced by the international debate on *New Public Management* (NPM) budget reforms and public sector reform were introduced. This entailed speeding up delivery whilst maintaining fiscal stability.[191] At the same time development responsibility was passed on to the new and transformed local government:

> *„A municipality must – (a) structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development of the community; and (b) participate in national and provincial development programmes.“*[192]

Given the Third Way approach the role of local government was redefined as *Developmental Local Government* (DLG).[193] DLG entails both an economic and redistributive role for local government as the key driver in delivery in partnership with the non-state sector.[194]

DLG has been widely criticised since the development mandate did not acknowledge the contradiction between GEAR and RDP and thus entails a competing interpretation which either triggered strategies for economic liberalisation or addressing basic needs.[195]

Since 2000 stronger focus has been given to poverty reduction however whilst ensuring macroeconomic stability.[196] Although government has reached macroeconomic stability, unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Instead the economic growth rather contributed to further income inequality.[197] Opponents of the economic growth strategy argue that it has not contributed to any significant job creation for un-skilled labour and has rather enhanced a perpetuation of poverty within a new so-called ‘economic apartheid’.[198]

Therefore since 2005, DLG has been redefined as requiring more control and direct influence in order to reduce poverty.[199] This implies a shift towards interventionist policies. Swilling outlines:

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[190] See The School of Public Management and Planning (2006), pp. 6f.
[191] See Pieterse/Meintjes (2004), p. 42.
[192] RSA (1996a), Chapter 7, §153.
[193] See RSA (1998b).
[194] See Harrison (2006a), p. 197.
[195] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 117; Parnell/Pieterse (2002), p. 82; Pieterse (2002b).
[196] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2004), p. 42.
[197] See Bhorat (2006).
[198] See for example Khan (2003), p. 33; Bond (2003a).
[199] See Swilling (2006a), pp. 24f.

> *"Building the "developmental state" is now official government policy, and with this comes an interventionism across the board that is premised on the assumption that greater state control means greater success."*[200]

In 2006 government introduced the *Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa* (AsgiSA) which aims at accelerating economic growth and to cut poverty and unemployment by half by 2014.[201] It continues in the belief that economic growth will eventually reduce poverty. AsgiSA is therefore not a new macroeconomic paradigm but provides adjustments towards a more interventionist role of the state.[202]

The recent shift in development policy towards a new poverty agenda is based on international thinking and their aligned delivery mechanisms. Although being welcomed in terms of a more refined understanding of poverty and processes, scholars caution that the new agenda will lead to an oversimplified approach and shift the focus away from citizenship and empowerment.[203]

Phase	Development Discourse	Role of Developmental Local State
1994-96	Basic needs	Delivering/ Interventionist state
1996-1998	Economic growth	Enabling private sector investment
1998-2004	"Third Way": Poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability	Driving delivery in partnership with non-state sector
Post 2004	Poverty reduction	Delivering/ Interventionist state

Tab. 2.9: Shifts in the development role for local government in South Africa, Source: Own design

2.2.3.2 Decentralisation and local government restructuring

Reforms to decentralise government functions in South Africa have been pushed since the 1980s. At that time local government structures restricted representation of the black population in urban areas. In 1982 the apartheid state aimed at disrupting the anti-apartheid struggle by establishing *Black Local Authorities* (BLAs) in the townships.[204] These however lacked financial resources to be autonomous and moreover represented the continuous racial-based differentiation. Therefore local authorities were not accepted in

[200] Swilling (2006a), p. 25.
[201] See RSA (2006c).
[202] See FES (2006), p. 6.
[203] See The School of Public Management and Planning (2006), pp. 4f.
[204] See Parnell (1992); Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003).

the black, coloured or Indian communities.[205]

During the transition, the South African government intended to strengthen an integration of urban areas. In this context decentralisation was considered antidotal to fragmentation and segregation. Hence government restructured racially-based areas, transformed government institutions and provided strategic planning tools.

The negotiations in terms of reforming local government[206] in the 1990s resulted in policies which particularly emphasise the role of local authorities. Three of the groundbreaking policies in the transitional period were:

a) In terms of institutional reform the *Local Government Transition Act* (LGTA) in 1993 which provided for institutional transition and mapped out the phases of the transition process;

b) In terms of restructuring racially-based areas the *Municipal Demarcation Act* of 1998 which enabled the restructuring into newly demarcated municipalities.[207]

c) In terms of introducing strategic planning tools the *Development Facilitation Act* (DFA) in 1995 which allowed former planning instruments to be bypassed, introduced instruments to transfer power to the local sphere and made *Land Development Objectives* (LDO) and *Integrated Development Planning* (IDP) obligatory to strategically develop land and direct resources according to priorities.[208]

Institutional restructuring

Political and administrative restructuring of local government can be distinguished in three phases: pre-interim until 1996, interim until 2000 and final phase (see following table).[209] In 1996 the Constitution established a third sphere of government and the *White Paper on Local Government* detailed the local government system which came into effect after the municipal elections in 2000.[210]

[205] See Mabin (1998), p. 270; Oldfield (2002a), p. 95.
[206] e.g. the Local Government Negotiating Forum in 1990 and the National Housing Forum in 1992.
[207] See RSA (1998a).
[208] See RSA (1995).
[209] For more information about the local government restructuring process see Van Donk/Pieterse (2006); SACN (2004).
[210] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), pp. 107-112; Nel/ Binns (2003), p. 166.

Phase	Local Government Structure
Pre-interim until 1995/96	Local negotiation forums as statutory bodies and appointed temporary councils
Interim 1996-2000	Transitional local government structures and two-tier local government structures in metropolitan areas
Post-2000	Single-tier local government structure with Metropolitan Council and Ward committees

Tab. 2.10: Transition phases and aligned local government structures in South Africa, Source: Own design

Local government in South Africa includes both political representation and administration. The executive power remains with a metropolitan council which appoints officials in administration. There are two options for political representation: the *Executive Mayoral Committee* system which provides larger powers to the mayor or the *Executive Committee* system with proportional representation from council.

In terms of administration the former government negotiated a 'sunset clause' which meant a job guarantee for civil servants in order to ensure economic and administrative continuity.[211] With the amalgamation of administrations in 2000 the internal administration was restructured and new top management and organisational structures introduced. Subsequently, staff replacements took place on a large scale. The re-organisation also implied a shift from a hierarchical bureaucracy to a more 'networked' organisation.[212]

Re-demarcation

The demarcation of municipal boundaries as a means for segregation policies during apartheid has been a highly contested field in the South African context. In the following controversial standpoints emerged in terms of establishing single (Unicity) or dual-level (with subcouncils) metropolitan systems. After an interim period (1996-2000) of dual-level structures the ANC implemented the Unicity concept by 2000.[213] As Nel and Binns point out this reduced the numbers of local and metropolitan municipalities to less than a third.[214]

[211] See Graham (2005), p. 42.
[212] See SACN (2006), p. 53.
[213] For a discussion on the municipal demarcation process see Mabin (2006); Cameron (2006).
[214] Today there are 231 local municipalities and six metropolitan councils existent plus 47 District Municipalities as intermediaries for local municipalities. See Nel/Binns (2003), p. 169.

Local government autonomy and powers

The devolution of power to the new local government structures was incorporated in the Constitution. It granted an executive and legislative power to the local state as a distinct sphere of government:

> *"A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution."* [215]

Nevertheless, the level of autonomy of the local state has remained an area of concern. Chipkin has put forward that 'autonomy' of local government was interpreted as internal operational or management autonomy but not as autonomy in policy-choice.[216]

According to Chipkin, the notion of local government is contradictory. On the one hand it is informed by the ANC theory of *National Democratic Revolution* (NDR) which perceived the city and community as part of the struggle for socialism. Following this thinking local government has to implement the pre-defined general interest which has been expressed in the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP). Thus it is reduced to administrative and managerial functions. On the other hand, particularly activist planners understand government as a mediator between contesting interests and social forces. This notion is based on theories of local democracy, autonomous political space and social movements.[217]

Oldfield (2002) argues that other spheres of government can still influence local state autonomy and performance. Financial incentives through funds and programmes by higher sphere of government on local government activities are an indication that the vertical inter-tier state relations are not only determined by legislation but are far more complex and open to political bargaining.[218]

Pottie also puts forward that political power remains centralised and stresses:

> *"While this political practice gives the party an important strategic lever in terms of policy implementation, it can also negatively blunt local accountability and representation."*[219]

This entails an ambiguity for local authorities as an autonomous sphere of state which has

[215] RSA (1996a), Chapter 7, §151 (3) Status of municipalities.
[216] See Chipkin (2002), p. 65.
[217] See Chipkin (1997), pp. 146ff.
[218] See for instance Oldfield (2002b); Lemon (2002).
[219] Pottie (2003), p. 441.

to function as the key agent for the delivery of programmes by a higher sphere of state. The tendency becomes even more explicit with the promotion of multi-level governance as a mechanism for aligning state budgets and planning.[220] For instance the *Sun City Action Plan* stresses that local council areas are 'impact zones' for higher sphere of government action.[221] At a *South African National Civic Organisation* (SANCO) conference in December 2006, President Thabo Mbeki stressed the importance of local government as the sphere of government where delivery must take place.[222]

Various authors have pointed out that in reality, the requirement for alignment and development limited decentralisation to the delegation of functions to local government to fulfil national government policies and programmes.[223] Oldfield therefore applied the term 'embedded autonomy' to illustrate the interrelated and interdependent vertical governance structures.[224]

Alternatively to limited local government autonomy, there emerges a potential for collective city actors.[225] The *South African Local Government Association* (SALGA) as a body to influence national policy, however, has been questioned if it is capable of fulfilling its mandate of representing local government.[226]

Instead, the *South African Cities Network* (SACN) was established in 2002 by nine metropolitan centres as a knowledge-sharing network between cities and spheres of government. Van Donk and Pieterse put forward that it influences policy processes not as an interest group but through information sharing.[227]

Intergovernmental cooperative governance

The mode of integration of the three spheres of government is specified in the White *Paper of Local Government* (1998) as 'cooperative governance'. It further regulates the competencies between the different tiers of government. To support intergovernmental

[220] Harrison points out that since 1999 frameworks such as the *Medium Term Expenditure Framework*, the *National Spatial Development Perspective*, the *Provincial Government Development Strategies* were seen as integrated mechanisms to secure that budgets are in line with national strategies. See Harrison (2006), p. 200.
[221] See DPLG (2004a), p. 21.
[222] See Mail & Guardian online (2006).
[223] See Harrison (2001).
[224] See Oldfield (2002a).
[225] See Mabin (2006), pp. 148f.
[226] See Pottie (2003), p. 440; Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 124.
[227] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 124.

coordination the *Department of Provincial and Local Government* (DPLG) was established which has policy-making, capacity-building and monitoring functions in terms of provincial and local government systems and performance.

However, concerns have been raised around poor co-ordination between the different spheres of government. Often this is a result of a power struggle between provincial and local government level.[228] Confronted with service delivery constraints and aligned protests the provincial and local government system is under review.[229]

Since 2005 the *Inter-Governmental Relations Framework* Act (Act 13 of 2005) has been introduced to clarify the delegation of power and functions to local government. The Act provides for new intergovernmental consultative forums to discuss national policy implementation and outlines procedures for intergovernmental relations as a mechanism to resolve disputes around roles and responsibilities. Concerns have been raised that this restricts local and provincial government to administrative units of national government.[230]

Financial restructuring

With the delegation of functions local governments are under financial pressure. Overspending resulted in a fiscal crisis for many metropolitan areas by the end of the 1990s. As a consequence, local government operations were reorganised by selling or transforming entities to corporations and shifting from redistribution to economic growth orientation.[231]

Municipalities can draw from three sources of finance: tax revenue, provincial transfers and an 'equitable share' funds from national government. The provincial and national funds are low[232] and local revenue is difficult to generate. This situation can cause difficulties in cost recovery in the context of increasing poverty and unemployment in urban areas.[233]

The *Municipal System Act* of 2000 differentiates between the transfer of authority (as-

[228] See Pottie (2003), p. 441; IDASA (2006), p.38; Mabin (2006), p. 150.
[229] See Tabane (2007).
[230] See Seedat (2005), p. 2.
[231] See Mabin (2006), p. 144.
[232] However, in 2004 national government introduced 'Project Consolidate' as a strategic programme to enhance municipal performance. This included the increase of equitable share funds as well as conditional grants for infrastructure delivery. See IDASA (2006), pp. 38f.
[233] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 121.

signment) and the transfer of responsibility (delegation) to local government. Provinces prioritise the delegation of responsibility without adequate resources. One primary concern therefore is the 'unfunded mandate' as municipalities have to perform delivery functions without adequate financial resources.[234]

2.2.3.3 Horizontal governance

The policies and legislations introduced since the early 1990s not only prescribe the vertical relations between the spheres of government, but also the horizontal integration of civil society to local government. The Constitution outlines the objectives of local government as being accountable to local communities and "to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government."[235]

Integration to decision-making in South Africa is largely limited to consultation via stakeholder forums. In 1996 a shift had taken place from ad hoc participation to bureaucratic, limited participation.[236]

The conceptual challenge, according to Pieterse, is to integrate effects of economy, bureaucracy, power and agency.[237] The following institutional structures have been introduced to ensure participation:

a) Representation through council by local government elections and through local ward committees as an interface between the community and political representatives.

b) Neo-corporatist forums such as *Integrated Development Plans* (IDPs) which require local governments to inform and consult communities on development priorities and *City Development Strategies* (CDS).

c) Partnerships such as Public-Private and Municipal-Community-Partnerships.

d) Participatory mechanisms aligned to specific services (such as housing).

Representative forms

National policy outlines that at local government level there is supposed to be a structure

[234] See for example Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 119 and IDASA (2006), pp. 38f.
[235] RSA (1996a), §152 (1).
[236] Khan (2003), pp. 28f.
[237] See Pieterse (2005a), pp. 144f.

of participatory governance above the formal representative council structures.[238]

The *White Paper on Local Government* (1998) specifies the role of the developmental local state to enhance local democracy. Local councillors are required to encourage the participation of citizens and community groups in establishing and implementing municipal programmes.[239]

Since the post-2000 municipal election ward committee structures became a widespread model for community participation in local government. They are supposed to be a consultative body and meant to ensure interaction between the community and municipality. Reasons for the non-functioning of ward committees can be summarised as a neglect of diverse community interests, competition between existing community structures and council as well as a lack of consensus on who represents the community. It has been indicated that their performance can be largely defined as dysfunctional and ineffective.[240]

> *"Many of these ward committees have become non-functional or have yet to be formed in the first place. We have witnessed, in 2005 in particular, major tensions and protest actions at local government level, fuelled in part by the inability of this sphere to effect credible participation."*[241]

Given this context, local government and civil society engagement remains problematic as mutual consensus on interventions are almost impossible to achieve.[242]

Also, local government was required to fulfil a double democratic responsibility by integrating participation and delivering in terms of RDP objectives. The White Paper acknowledges that opening the development process to participation might cause bargaining over resources and strategies. Thus it emphasises that development overrules empowerment objectives:

> *"[…] the participatory processes must not become an obstacle to development, and narrow interest groups must not be allowed to 'capture' the development process. It is important for municipalities to find ways of structuring participation which enhance, rather than impede, the delivery process."*[243]

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[238] See RSA (2000), Section 16 (1).
[239] See RSA (1998b), 3.3.
[240] See SACN (2006), p.59; Van Donk/Pieterse (2006), p. 115. For all full account on ward committee assessment see USN (2003c).
[241] Landsberg (2006), p. 2.
[242] See Chipkin (2002), p. 66; Pieterse/Oldfield (2002), p. 3.
[243] RSA (1998b), 1.3.

The White Paper allows local government to create and structure the participation and therefore influence who and how to integrate civil society.

In an attempt to increase its public outreach, government increasingly convenes public hearings (*Imbizos*). They are criticised for not enabling a structured participation process, for being limited to information sharing and for excluding the poor.[244]

Further, *Local Development Forums* (LDFs) were conceptualised to directly represent 'people's power' and community interest. Later they were reconceptualised as representative forms of civil society recognising the existing plurality in communities. This also informed 'community-driven development' as Local Development Forums were then limited to advisory bodies and only consulted in terms of prioritising development needs.[245]

The report for the *African Peer Review* puts forward that there are concerns around the effectiveness of decentralisation for local democracy.[246]

Firstly, the legitimacy of development forums is questioned. Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) outline that LDFs tend to be dominated by ANC structures in the black urban areas and contribute to a co-optation of civil society actors into state structures.[247]

Secondly, Mabin (2006) therefore suggests integrating perceptions of the marginalised urban population whose "[…] priorities for development may be very different from those of councillors and officials". In reality, however, according to Bettina von Lieres, the post-apartheid system has produced a new political exclusion of the marginalised despite citizenship rights which are provided.[248]

Furthermore, there are concerns around an arrogant mode of leadership. Meintjes (2004) asserts that as the ANC has the confidence to remain in power, leaders become distanced from people-needs.[249] The *Congress of South African Trade Unions* (COSATU) even warned that the ANC leadership was "drifting towards dictatorship" and that the ANC only provides a "low-intensity democracy".[250]

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[244] See Landsberg (2006), p. 6.
[245] See Chipkin (2002), p. 66 and pp. 152f.
[246] See IDASA (2006), p. 40.
[247] See Pieterse/Oldfield (2002), pp. 4ff.
[248] See von Lieres (2005).
[249] See Meintjes (2004), p. 310.
[250] See Letsoalo/Robinson (2006).

Neo-corporatist forums in planning

South African planning practice has shown evidence of both modern and postmodern planning ideals. The apartheid state used modern planning concepts for social control ("planned oppression") and enforced the planning ideal through authoritarian measures coupled with large public spending. Since the 1980s planning followed the international notion of urban management with a focus on effective local government, financial performance and service delivery. This was juxtaposed by the opposition movement which resorted to comprehensive planning and power redistribution ("planned emancipation"). It demanded institutional changes and new processes and practices of planning particularly in terms of participation.[251]

At the beginning of the 1990s the ideal of urban reconstruction was largely informed by normative planning ideas about the compact city, spatial integration and mixed land use.[252] Chipkin outlines that, in this context, municipal planning has been understood as rational planning to overcome the spatial deficiencies of the apartheid city. The role of planners was to make recommendations in terms of realising this planning ideal with the use of land-use and zoning plans.[253]

There were two key concerns raised with the adoption of a spatial planning approach. Firstly, it has been widely questioned whether the compact city, as an urban reconstruction concept, can be realised when confronted with the power realities which materialised in fragmentation and suburbanisation.[254]

Secondly, the ambiguity over roles and responsibilities of local government made apparent the need for a strategic and more comprehensive instrument for coordination.[255]

Post-modern planning - both neo-rational planning and communicative planning - emerged with the introduction of *Integrated Development Plans* (IDP) in the mid 1990s. IDPs were seen as key strategic instruments for planning during the local government transition. The plan has a legal status and is supposed to supersede all other local plans. It directs resources and activities of a municipality aligned to the five-year local government

[251] See Mabin/Smit (1997), p. 215; Mabin (1995), p. 191; Mabin (2002), pp. 43f.
[252] As promoted by Dewar/Uytenbogaardt (1991).
[253] See Chipkin (2002), p. 63.
[254] See Mabin (1995), p. 194; Mabin/Smit (1997), p. 215.
[255] See Harrison (2006a), p. 195.

election period. They became legally binding through an amendment to the *Local Government Transition Act* (LGTA)[256] and *Municipal Systems Act* (MSA)[257] which require all local councils to prepare and adopt IDPs.

Although all municipalities were to prepare a full IDP by March 2002, because of difficulties in strategic planning, alignment with budget and intergovernmental linkage, only a few met the deadline.[258]

IDPs have been influenced by the international discourse on *New Public Management* (NPM) which was believed to strengthen efficiency in public sector agencies.[259] Later IDPs were reshaped integrating a notion of planning which incorporates various sectors, activities and actors. This is based of an understanding of planning as a coordination process to enhance synergy effects.[260]

Harrison puts forward, IDPs emphasise concerns for participation, integration and empowerment while integrating NPM objectives on service-delivery and performance. They require both a collective process in terms of "collaborative planning" and spatial policy-making to regulate strategic investments and land use.[261]

Integration was based on the acknowledgement of interdependence of agents. This has built the ground for institutionalising participation and promoting partnerships between agents in governance networks.

One of the key elements of *Integrated Development Planning* is to involve the local stakeholders and integrate the community in the planning process. The objective is to identify the needs of the community through a prioritisation process.[262]

Mabin criticises the standardisation of the planning process[263] and argues that planning processes are messier than can be outlined in a manual.[264]

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[256] See RSA (1996e).
[257] RSA (2000).
[258] See Harrison (2003); Harrison (2006a), p. 198.
[259] Harrison (2006a), pp. 186ff; Harrison (2001), Parnell/Pieterse (2002), p. 81.
[260] See Bohnsack (2003), p. 7; DPLG (2001), p. 5.
[261] See Harrison (2001), p. 180; Harrison (2006a), pp. 190ff.
[262] The IDP Process is divided in five phases from community issue analysis, developing strategies and project identification, setting priorities and project formulation and integration of projects in overall IDP plan, approval by council. All phases entail different levels of participatory elements.
[263] Referring to an IDP manual produced by the DPLG. See DPLG (2001).
[264] See Mabin (2002), p. 49.

Various authors have pointed out that there is evidence that participation and integration of informal networks in the planning process remains limited. They are concerned with how to incorporate the diversity of informal networks.[265]

Harrison states that in regard to participatory governance, IDPs show mixed and varying results. One challenge, he argues, is that it is confronted with a culture of performance management which contradicts the need for more flexibility and time within participatory processes.

> *"The IDP attempts to marry inclusiveness and participation with a largely technocratic managerialism, and top-down control with bottom-up processes."*[266]

Moreover, local government had to ensure both participation and alignment with national programmes as *Integrated Development Plans* are dependent on national financial resources and have to be linked with national and regional priorities and programmes.[267] Hence in reality national government supersedes local planning and thereby undermines local priorities. Given this context, the IDPs have been perceived as 'lengthy shopping lists'.[268]

The *City Development Strategy* (CDS) methodology exemplifies a further forum for institutionalised participation. CDS is aligned to the Cities Alliance's promotion of economic development and, according to the critics, exposes a threat of new exclusion and of demobilising civil society actors.[269]

Partnerships

South African academics have outlined that there has been a radical shift from the perception that local government is responsible for delivery to that municipalities share functions and power with civil society organisations, citizens and the private sector. This requires greater organisational collaboration to form alliances and partnerships with the non-state sector in development.[270]

Partnerships therefore have appeared between the public and private sector in policy areas

[265] See Mabin (2002), p. 49.
[266] Harrison (2006a), p. 202; Parnell/Pieterse (2002), p. 86.
[267] Harrison (2006a), p. 190.
[268] See Pieterse (2006), pp. 132ff.
[269] See Pieterse (2002a) and (2005b)
[270] See Chipkin (2002), p. 76; Pieterse/Meintjes (2004), p. 43.

such as housing, urban regeneration and infrastructure delivery exemplified by public-private companies such as the *Johannesburg Development Agency* (as JDA) and *Cape Town Partnership*. However, some critical observers put forward the constraints questioning their effectiveness[271] and cautioning that the private sector tends to take over control.[272]

Partnerships with organised civil society are interpreted as an option for resource mobilisation. This instrumentalisation of civil society organisations is specifically outlined in the White Paper on Local Government:

> *"Partnerships with community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations can be effective ways of gaining access to external expertise and experience."*[273]

Renewed *Municipal-Community Partnerships* (MCPs) are particularly stressed given the fact that delivery is realised largely through informal practices. Since the relationship of the poor to local government is characterised by 'negative engagement", these resources remain untapped.[274]

Beyond delivery advantages Municipal-Community Partnerships are simultaneously perceived as enhancing democracy. However, a number of constraints, such as inner-community conflicts, tensions and mistrust between municipality and community, lack of capacity and skills for engagement, hinder meaningful partnership relations. For partnerships to work, critics promote a better understanding of the diversity of the civil society sector, taking into consideration the existing power imbalances and creating an enabling environment. [275]

Participatory mechanisms in housing

Housing delivery in South Africa was driven by contradicting aims of government to promote both community development through the introduction of the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) and to engage the private sector in low-income housing. The state interpreted community participation as self-help in labour-intense work. Jenkins (1999) argues that housing delivery did not stimulate community involvement and development. In-

[271] Cleabury (2006).
[272] See Mabin (1998); Mabin (2006), p. 147.
[273] RSA (1998b).
[274] See Khan/Cranko (2002), p. 264.
[275] See Khan/Cranko (2002), p. 270; Pieterse/Meintjes (2004), p. 47.

stead, the state moved away from people-centred development. Jenkins (2002) therefore recommends a strengthening of civil society and its role for community development.

> *"[…] it is through organisations within civil society that negotiations with the state on settlement upgrading can take place, as well as negotiation at the higher, urban strategy or national policy-making level".*[276]

Khan criticises that the housing policy is mainly about market enablement and integration in formal circuits and as an alternative suggests transforming social relations and institutions.[277] An entry point according to Khan is presented by decentralised associations:

> *"Institutional reform- downsizing and descaling, initially widely criticised, is now believed to have had positive effects, leading to the construction and mobilisation of new decentralised associations on the boundaries between state and civil society."*[278]

Towards multi-tiered relations

Given the context that institutionalised forms of horizontal governance showed limitations (also referred to as the 'crisis of institutionalisation'[279]), scholars have shifted recommendations and interest to network forms of governance. They put forward that state-centred concepts of governance are not applicable in the South African context. Instead, they suggest shifting from a state-centred focus on institutions to a relational perspective of state and society. This is based on an understanding of governance practice which in reality is characterised by 'nodal governance' and entails a variety of governance outside the state.[280]

In reality, it is assumed, that African identities are mobile social formations based on multiple spaces of operation. This mode of 'becoming', it is argued, is more creative and productive and often embedded in invisible spaces. Urban residents maintain multiple memberships in various associations and participate in formal and informal economies across different localities. In terms of governmentality, Gotz and Simone (2003) argue, these processes create blind spots for government to determine in advance the interests of a diversifying set of actors.

Current institutionalised governance arrangements and participatory mechanisms con-

[276] Jenkins/ Smith (2001b), p. 487.
[277] See Khan (2003), pp. 53f.
[278] Khan (2003), p. 58.
[279] See Khan/Cranko (2002).
[280] See Pieterse/Oldfield (2002), p. 8; Shearing/Wood (2005), p. 98.

struct particular kinds of citizenship and function as practices of self-improvement and self-accountability. They are perceived as inadequate as they may erode less visible practices through which residents are able to access other activities.[281]

Pieterse therefore suggests a relational model to study urban politics and thereby transcend the limited focus on either local government restructuring or on social movements.

[281] See Gotz/Simone (2003), pp. 123ff.

2.3 Civil society discourse

2.3.1 The international debate on third sector, social capital and civil society

In international development policy and practice concepts of third sector, civil society and social capital gained popularity. In the development field NGOs were increasingly recognised as representatives of the *third sector* throughout the 1980s. UN-Habitat promoted the cooperation with NGOs already in 1976 at the first Habitat-conference and again at Habitat II in 1996[282], the World Bank developed a programme for cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in 1981 and the *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP) founded the *Civil Society Division* in 1986.

This reflects a new understanding of NGOs as development actors. Since the role of the state was reduced and poverty increasing, funding was increasingly channelled through NGOs as donors were faced with corruption of postcolonial states.[283] "[…] NGOs have emerged to fill a gap at a time of increasing need and declining institutional "suppliers".", refer Mitlin.[284]

This technocratic-managerial perspective shifted to a broader and political governance understanding of civil society organisations in the 1990s.

> *"Although most international agencies will be reluctant to admit it, the urban management debate has gradually become more political, dealing with issues of power […]."*[285]

The impact of informal self-help groups for development was recognised which was coupled with a concern about accountability and effectiveness of NGOs. Given this context, the term *third sector* was increasingly avoided. Instead, *social capital* experienced particular prominence amongst international development actors. This was aligned to the reappearance of poverty reduction as the key objectives in development. The World Bank for instance initiated a *Social Capital Implementation Framework* (SCIF) and became interested in the practical relevance of the concept for its operations. The assumption was that social capital represents a resource for improving government performance.[286]

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[282] See Navarro Astrand (1996); UN-HABITAT (2003a); UN-HABITAT (2003b), pp. 148ff; UN-HABITAT (1996), Chapter III, paras 44, 45.
[283] See Kössler (2001), p. 17.
[284] Mitlin (1999), p. 7.
[285] Post/Baud (2002), p. 10.
[286] See The World Bank (no date b); Bebbington et al (2006); Ritchey-Vance (2002).

With this shift came an empowerment agenda by the mid 1990s. The discourse of civil society was concerned with its radical role for social transformation and creating new relationships between the poor and the state. Scholars stressed the significance of these actors for development alternatives.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the new millennium the poverty reduction focus again reduced civil society organisations to development actors conforming to a reformist notion of intervention alternatives ("big D" Development) as opposed to a systemic alternative notion of development as a process of structural change ("little d" development).[287]

There are various discourses whether concepts of third sector, social capital and civil society are applicable in the development context. A general concern is whether they should be interpreted as an imposition of Western concepts aligned to the promotion of neoliberal policies or if they constitute a progressive development of democracy and empowerment.

Third sector

The term *third sector* was formed at the beginning of the 1970s in the US context. The third sector was clearly differentiated from market and state. It included all formal organisations which take over tasks which neither market nor state fulfilled.[288]

Focus of interest in third sector research was the organisational structure of volunteer associations and their comparative advantages of performance. Furthermore, the third sector was also contributed an intermediary role between the public and state. Its meso level functions, it is assumed, also comprises advocacy, the articulation of needs and representation of interest. Thereby direct relations between the citizen and the state and market shift to indirect relations.[289]

Thus third sector research and practice shows a predominant interest in organisational structure and performance assuming and promoting an apolitical nature of third sector organisations.

With regard to the relevance of third sector concepts scholars critically point out that outside the Western-centric model of a third sector other intermediary forms exist such as lo-

[287] Relating to Hart (2001), in: Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b), p. 5.
[288] See Salamon/Anheier (1996).
[289] See Neubert (1997), p. 61; Zimmer (2002), p. 11; Jessen (1994), pp. 51f.

cal self-organisation, ethnic groups or patron-client systems. All in all intermediary functions are transmitted by a wide range of structures which articulate, filter and concentrate needs and interests vis-à-vis policy formulation and participate in its enforcement.[290] Also, the apolitical position was unrealistic particularly in a context of poor neighbourhoods where they unavoidably work in politicised conditions.[291]

Social capital

The social capital discourse derived from sociological theory in the early 20th century. A prominent differentiation was offered by Bourdieu who distinguished three forms of capital (economic, cultural and social capital). Social capital, according to Bourdieu, is defined as resources which are achieved through social networks.[292] Whereas Bourdieu applies the concept in order to critically reflect on inequalities in society, a more normative strain gained momentum in the US debate in the 1990s[293]: An influential approach for political science is based on Putnam's concept of 'Making Democracy Work' (1993). Social capital, according to Putnam, comprises trust, networks and norms. It determines success or failure of policy implementation. Putnam's work exposes a link to the civil society and third sector discourse as he stresses the democratic value of collective social capital. Lack of social capital - characteristic for individualism and limited social networks in modern societies - increases transaction costs within society, according to the assumption. He thereby highlighted the significance of associations, participation and the intermediary sphere. Later social capital research referring to Putnam shifted analysis from collective to individual social capital and thereby distanced from civil society concepts.[294]

Critical reviews of Putnam's concept argued that social capital is not normatively as good as assumed.[295] Moreover, Bak and Askvik (2005) argue that there is a paradox between trust and democracy. According to the authors a democratic system has to institutionalise distrust through the principle of legitimacy.[296] The normative value of social capital has also been questioned in the development context. A general concern is that the normative

[290] See for instance Neubert (1997), p. 61; Mitlin (1999).
[291] See UN-HABITAT (2003b), p. 148 and p. 154.
[292] See Bourdieu (1983).
[293] See for instance Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993) and (1995).
[294] See Zimmer/Freise (2008), pp. 19ff; Lin (2001).
[295] See Tarrow (1996).
[296] See Bak/Askvik (2005), p. 18.

understanding of social capital disregards the fluidity of social capital and structural factors in emerging democracies.[297] Further, Mitlin (1999) for instance suggests that social capital can facilitate links to government (based on trust), however, the purpose of links is left open (can also be used by regimes).[298] Also Robins questions the 'civic virtue' of social capital. Robins criticises the normative conception of social capital as it "[…] fails to acknowledge the embeddedness of local hierarchies and patronage networks". Moreover, he stresses that what is perceived as 'good social capital' is determined by the state (which can suppress one form of social capital and support another).[299]

Civil society

Zimmer and Freise (2008) argue that the concept of civil society offers a framework to integrate both micro-level social capital and meso-level third sector research (see figure 2.7).



Fig. 2.7: Civil society as an encompassing concept, Source: adapted from Zimmer and Freise (2008), p.29.

Civil society and third sector research refer to the same phenomenon in society: The intermediary level of social organisation. However, while discourses on civil society and social capital focus on democracy theoretical problems, third sector discourses are interested in the performance and while civil society and third sector discourses focus on volunteer associations and organisational structure, social capital research is more interested in collective and individual networks.

[297] See Koelble (2003).
[298] See Tarrow (1996); Mitlin (1999), p. 10.
[299] Robins (2005b), p. 124.

The concept of civil society derives from pluralistic systems of Western societies. It has experienced a renaissance since the end of the Cold War. The civic movements of the 1970s in Eastern Europe, the new social movements in the 1980s and the emergence of an international civil society were interpreted as the "[…] re-entry of civil society in political discourse"[300]. Civil society is broadly defined as the intermediary space between state and society.[301] The social science discourse focused on the relevance of civil society actors in the transformation process and the significance of civil society in Western liberal democracies.[302] It was further dealt with in globalisation discourses reinforced by global tendencies of increased social inequality and deficiencies of the nation state. This discourse has lead to a re-emergence of political and democracy-related theoretical concepts of the interrelation between civil society and the state.

Limitations of representative democracy and steering of society resulted in a normative understanding of civil society to fulfil an intermediation role between state and society and to deepen democracy. This aspect of civicness is entailed in the definition of civil society:

> *"Civil societies are non-violent entities, capable of intensive discourse and able to reach consensus by means of discussions."*[303]

In the development field Mitlin uses the following definition:

> *""Civil society" is used as an all-embracing term for voluntary associations between the state and individual citizens and their families. As such, the definition includes non-government organizations, non-profit associations, informal organizations addressing public interest issues and self-help groups and associations."*[304]

In the development discourse the civil society concept seemed paradoxal since this heterogeneous space of intermediary organisations could only be relevant as long as it controls resources independently of the state. Neubert (1992) argued that the poor are excluded from formation processes of a civil society and Thiery (1992) put forward that self-help organisations remain politically irrelevant as they concentrate on survival.

By the end of the 1990s research focused on collective action of the urban poor and the

[300] Zimmer/Freise (2006), p. 3.
[301] See Klein (2001), p. 172.
[302] See Lauth/Merkel (1997b), Klein (2001).
[303] Zimmer/Freise (2006), p. 4.
[304] Mitlin (1999), p. 5.

role of grassroots organisations as intermediaries to the formal world. This links the development discourse to democratic concerns. As Post and Baud (2002) postulate:

> *"In fact, this is the debate where the public management perspective and the people-centred perspective in urban development studies meet."*[305]

Törnquist (2002) for instance focuses on how to link democratisation with development efforts and suggests an alternative conceptualisation of 'substantial democratisation'.[306]

2.3.1.1 NGOs as the interface between third sector and civil society

The term NGO was first used by international organisations embracing all organisations outside government. This catch-all application was criticised by scholars as it lacks characteristics outside its negative definition and thereby comprises a wide range of different organisational structures.[307]

The development discourse adopted the term NGO for organisations which outside, or in cooperation with the state, took over development tasks (also referred to as Non-Governmental Development Organisations). Mitlin defines NGOs as:

> *"NGOs are defined as professional, non-profit, non-membership intermediary organizations that are independent of the state and which undertake a range of activities in order to further development."*[308]

The experience of global interrelated problems has stimulated the emergence of an 'international civil society' characterised by NGOs entering in international policy arenas. It is argued that globalisation has influenced NGOs which have become actors on multiple levels with multiple linkages.[309] More recently also locally based NGOs from the Global South are representing their constituencies in international arenas.

Particularly the reorientation of development policy in the 1990s resulted in declarations and programmes such as Habitat II and Agenda 21 appreciating NGOs as the bearer of hope or a 'magic bullet' followed by numerous studies on their evolution and perform-

[305] Post/Baud (2002), p. 11.
[306] See Törnquist (2002).
[307] See for instance Martens (2000), pp. 30f.; Altvater et al (2000), pp. 13ff., Brunnengräber/Walk (2000).
[308] Mitlin (1999), p. 5.
[309] See Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b), p. 7.

ance in development aid.[310]

The reason for the rise of NGOs was related to the post cold war 'New Policy Agenda': In the face of criticism of the state-driven development aid NGOs received recognition supplementing or complementing state tasks. Development policy thereby followed neoliberal trends to shift state tasks to other non-state actors.

'Non-Governmental Organisation' (NGO) is a loose term which, depending on the theoretical perspective, holds different definitions. Furthermore, NGOs were both interpreted as a third sector between market and state or from a civil society perspective as an expression of an emerging civil society.

From a third sector perspective NGOs function as a formal and modern form of self-coordination outside state and market coordination.[311] NGOs are seen as being double embedded ("doppelter gesellschaftlicher Anschluss") in society towards the recipients and towards the supporter.[312] This intermediary position distinguishes them from self-help organisations and government.[313]

Uphoff argues that the characterisation of NGOs as a 'third sector' is incorrect as the institutional space between public and private sector belongs to people's associations and membership organisations. Uphoff puts forward that the difference lies in the way to whom these institutions are accountable. As most NGOs are service organisations they are not accountable to members.[314]

Fowler (2002) stresses, that the three sector separation is not useful for analysing Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs). They integrate characteristics of state, market and civil society and therefore are anchored in civil society without belonging to it. Instead he suggests a fourth position to NGDOs which is grounded in ethics and values and provides the competence to interact and mediate between state, market and civil society. According to Fowler, linkages are two-ways: towards the state they are characterised as policy influence and watchdog in return for demand for legitimacy and

[310] See Korten (1984); Edwards/Hulme (1996a); Schneider (1986); Glagow (1992), (1993), (1994); UN-HABITAT (2003b).
[311] See Glagow (1994), p. 144.
[312] See Glagow (1990b), p. 165; Neubert (1997).
[313] See Teuber (1993), p. 7; Neubert (1990), pp. 562ff.
[314] See Uphoff (1996), pp. 23-27; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b), p. 6.

accountability. Relationships to civil society are characterised by NGDOs receiving legitimacy and accountability and resources through grassroots, in exchange for innovations, articulation of interests, mediation and negotiation.[315]

From a civil society perspective NGOs cannot be distinguished from the state and market as a third sector. The argument is that boundaries are much more fluid and NGOs therefore cannot be understood as integral to civil society. Instead it was argued to differentiate between policy-oriented and operational NGOs although being acknowledged that in reality mostly mixed forms dominate.[316]

The central argument is that NGOs could only be understood through their relationships to social movements and other social arrangements.[317] NGOs in this context can function as cores of movement networks referred to as 'movement organisations'. This constitutes an interface between new social movement research (in civil society discourse) and research on non-profit organisations (in third sector research).[318]

Some scholars argue that NGOs are dualistic in themselves since they are required to take on informal structural elements of social movements and to include elements of organisations such as formal rules, inclusion of members and control mechanisms. Stucke concludes that this exposes them to the dilemma of combining formal and informal organisational structures in order to be capable of acting vis-à-vis formal organisations and their membership base.[319]

Comparative advantages of NGOs

The comparative advantages credited to NGOs entail numerous assumptions about their relation to the target group, knowledge of local conditions, potential for mobilising self-help and self-initiative, facilitating participation, commitment and motivation, trust and acceptance by the community, long-term engagement, non-bureaucratic flexibility and cost efficiency.[320]

Comparative advantages are increasingly critically reviewed: Central questions emerged

[315] See Fowler (2002a), pp. 20-22.
[316] See Brunnengräber/Klein/Walk (2005), Debiel/Sticht (2005), p. 132; Uphoff (1996); Mitlin/Hickey/Bebbington (2006), p. 9; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b), p. 6.
[317] See Mitlin/Hickey/Bebbington (2006), p. 10; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b).
[318] See Frantz (2002), p. 70; Klein (2001), pp. 319f.
[319] See Stucke (1990), p. 186.
[320] See Glagow (1993), Mitlin (1999).

around their independence, their orientation towards the media and neoliberal agenda, their impact on reducing mobilisation capacity, the growth of uncontrollable networks and their legitimacy.[321]

The shifting NGO discourse can be summarised as follows[322]:

a) In order to scale up impact from localised projects to systems, support was extended to institutional development and advocacy of NGOs.[323]

b) By scaling-up NGOs became more dependent on donor budgets. This resulted in questions about their performance, accountability and relations with funding sources. Therefore performance monitoring and accountability were increasingly promoted (see figure 2.8).[324]

c) NGOs were increasingly questioned as agents for democratisation.[325] Instead it was feared that they disempower other civil society organisations. As a result, the focus shifted towards 'radical' empowerment methods. NGOs were promoted to also work outside the aid system and to lobby for restructuring of the aid system. In the 1990s the shift to 'good governance' gave NGOs access to policy processes.[326]

d) By the end of the 1990s the democratisation efforts were contrasted by a changing global context. The shift towards a poverty reduction agenda (MDGs) resulted in changing donor priorities aligned to a return of a delivery focus. Central criticism regarding these shifts is that the increased aid flow to NGOs depoliticises the sector, negatively affects the relationship between NGOs and social movements and marginalises smaller NGOs with no capacity to deal with bureaucracy.[327]

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[321] See Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber (2005), p. 59; Debiel/Sticht (2005), pp. 134f.
[322] See Bebbington et al (2008b); Edwards (2008).
[323] See Edwards/Hulme (1992).
[324] See for instance Edwards/Hulme (1996b), p. 8; Frantz (2002), p. 68; Edwards/Fowler (2002b), pp. 3-5; Neubert (1990).
[325] See Edwards/Hulme (1996b), p. 2; Glagow (1985), p. 1; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b).
[326] See Edwards (2008), p. 45.
[327] See Edwards (2008), p. 45; Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008b), p. 16; Satterthwaite (2002); Mitlin/Sattherthwaite (2004a).



Fig. 2.8: NGOs in the aid chain, Source: adapted from Fowler (2002b), p. 294.

e) Since 2000 the question has shifted to whether NGOs are still existent. This question was posed by Bebbington et al (2008) against the normative understanding that NGOs have to offer an alternative to the dominant development model. In the context of neoliberalism, aid agenda and survival needs of organisations, the authors therefore asked if NGOs could still practice alternatives. Although NGO scope for action was constrained, the authors indicated that horizontal relationship between NGOs and movements, a critical role of NGOs in public debates and a role of NGOs to facilitate the space for interaction between grassroots and the state, constitute new ways of 'alternative' development practice.[328]

f) Further, they note a trend towards a 'new' security agenda ('Global War on Terror') which links issues of security to development. As a result aid flows become aligned to the security strategy. It thereby limits an alternative or counter-hegemonic position of NGOs.

The understanding that external structural changes have impacted the NGO agenda, has particular relevance since the development discourse also shifted to urban development related problems. Since the Habitat II conference in 1996 a broad range of reports and studies refer to the urban context as the new entry point for development initiatives.

Service delivery was particularly criticised for taking over state functions and undermin-

[328] See Bebbington/Hickey/Mitlin (2008), p. 32; Mitlin/Satterthwaite (2004b), pp. 282f.

ing the critical role of civil society organisations. Fowler (2002) argues that NGDOs need to reconceptualise delivery as the tool to leverage systemic changes. Learning for leverage has become the new mandate and strategy by NGOs (see figure 2.9).

> *"In other words, the immediate shift needed in NGDO thinking is to learn in order to apply leverage on others […]."*[329]



Fig. 2.9: Shift in NGDO strategies and roles, Source: adopted from Fowler (2002c), p. 354.

NGO Typologies

The term NGO embraces a wide range of different forms of organisations. Concepts vary on how to categorise NGOs.[330] A general differentiation is made between NGOs focusing on cultural issues from those active in the development context. The latter are referred to as Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs).[331]

A further differentiation in the development context is made between civil society organi-

[329] Fowler (2002c), p. 356.
[330] Criteria applied comprise field of activity, embeddedness, reason for establishment, kind of financing, kind of religious or secular connection, size, constellation, importance, membership, professionality, organisational structure or objective. See Teuber (1993), pp. 8f.
[331] See Arrossi et al (1994), p. 45.

sations in the Global North or South based on the fact that Northern NGOs might work in the South but at the same time they are embedded in the Western civil society.[332]

Typologies according to the type of activity and function[333] appeared not to be a practicable typology for empirical research. Korten instead suggested an evolutionary model of NGOs to illustrate the transition from relief and welfare (first generation) to local self-help (second generation) to changes in institutions and policies (third generations) to organisations which develop alternative development strategies.[334]

The evolutionary model was applied in various contexts and described, for instance, how African NGOs transcended from colonial Christian welfare organisation to second or third generation NGOs in the 1990s. [335]

However, certain pitfalls appeared as NGO transition does not appear in phases but is rather a steady expansion of their field of activity.[336] Moreover, scholars showed evidence that there is no linear progression as NGOs move back and forth along Kortens typology.[337]

Further criticisms concerning the evolutionary model put forward that it would be difficult to empirically relate to the ideal typology.[338] Instead, a continuum of NGO methodologies is suggested which can, but not necessarily have to emerge in progressive process over time.[339]

A different approach was made by not focusing on the NGO activity or evolution, but on their embeddedness in society.[340] Glagow stresses that NGO performance is based on solidarity and not on state or market mechanisms.[341] He differentiates the solidarity contribution between the one from society and the one which goes into society. This process he defines as double embeddedness in society.[342]

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[332] See for instance Neubert (1992), p. 31.
[333] See Kirsch (1994), p. 69; Wegner (1993), p. 15; Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 91.
[334] See Korten (1990); Jessen (1994), p. 51.
[335] See for instance Fowler (1992); Teuber (1993), pp. 114f.
[336] See Neubert (1997), p. 37; Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 38.
[337] See Biggs/Neame (1996).
[338] See Neubert (1997), p. 37; Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 38.
[339] See Avina (2002), p. 124.
[340] See Glagow (1994); Kirsch (1994), p. 69; Neubert (1992).
[341] See Glagow (1990b), p. 165.
[342] See Glagow (1990b), p. 165.

Based on this concept Neubert (1992) developed four ideal types of civil society organisations which combine the criteria of the kind of activity and the beneficiary of activity:[343]

- articulation of interests of members: lobbying
- articulation of interests of non-members: advocacy
- support function for members: self-help
- support function for non-members: service and welfare

Concerning NGOs Neubert (1994) only counts those organisations as NGOs which have a primary orientation towards the common good (outside help) and excludes those organisations which have a primary orientation towards self-interest (self-help). NGOs can therefore be differentiated between service or advocacy NGOs.[344]

For NGDOs in the urban context a further differentiation is offered by Aina (1997) between urban-based organisations and organisations with a focus on urban development. Mitlin stresses that whilst many organisations are urban-based only a small proportion have a focus on urban development issues (such as housing).[345] Arrossi et al (1994) distinguish community (services and empowerment) and city level (influencing policy and practices) activities.[346] Mitlin stresses that many NGOs do both recognising the complementarity of activities at both levels.[347]

2.3.1.2 Grassroots Organisations

Grassroots Organisations (GROs), also referred to as Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), are defined as:

> *"Grassroot organizations are membership organizations which are also independent of the state. As membership organizations, the risks, costs and benefits are shared among the members, and the leadership may be called to account by members. Most are non-profit although some operate as cooperative commercial enterprises. Many are informal and operate as loose associations."*[348]

With increased criticism of NGO legitimacy and accountability and the rise of 'good governance' principles related to social capital/ empowerment of local communities, Grass-

[343] See Neubert (1992), pp. 30f.
[344] See Neubert (1994), p. 195.
[345] See Mitlin (1999).
[346] See Arrossi et al (1994), pp. 48-50.
[347] See Mitlin (1999), p. 29.
[348] Mitlin (1999), p. 5.

roots Organisations entered the international development field. Whereas NGOs were perceived as more accountable to their donors ('upward'), GROs were seen as being more accountable to members ('downward').[349]

Local organisations, it is assumed, are more needs based and flexible to meet the challenges of (urban) poor households. Bottom-up community initiatives were therefore perceived as the new approach to building sustainable urban settlements.[350] The UN *Millennium Project Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers* particularly promotes that slum dwellers and their organisations must be recognised and engaged with as development partners.[351] International agencies thus focused on capacity development and empowerment of local actors as an important component of community development (see chapter 2.1.2).[352]

The relevance of GROs for poverty reduction and civicness has been critically reflected. The 'Global Report on Human Settlements 2003' outlines that there is a tendency in idealising community cohesion neglecting the heterogeneity and conflict in grassroots groups as well as their at times undemocratic structures and practices. Moreover, despite all partnership rhetoric, the report stresses that poor communities have few bargaining power.[353]

Dreier provides some answers to the two limitations: With regard to community fragmentation, he stresses the significance of grassroots to change attitudes within the entire community beyond single interests. Bargaining constraints, he argues, can be solved by intermediary institutions and horizontal relationships and learning.[354]

> *"Thanks in part to the work of these intermediary institutions, community-based development organizations have become increasingly sophisticated in terms of finance, construction, management, and other key functions. This has been accomplished […] by enabling groups to learn from one another, build on one another's successes, and form partnerships and coalitions."*[355]

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[349] See Edwards/Hulme (1996b), p. 11; UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 151.
[350] See for instance Carley/Jenkins/Smith (2001); Romaya/Rakodi (2002); Bigg/Satterthwaite (2005); d'Cruz/Satterthwaite (2005); Herrle/Jachnow/Ley (2006).
[351] See UN Millennium Project Task Force 8 (2005).
[352] Dreier (2007) distinguishes three strategies for community empowerment: community organising (to influence decision-making), community-based development (to improve local conditions), community-based service provision (to deliver services). However, in reality, Dreier argues, all three strategies often co-exist. See Dreier (2007), p. 194.
[353] See UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 153.
[354] See Dreier (2007), pp. 196ff.
[355] Dreier (2007), p. 198.

In the development context the call to support Grassroots Organisations was accompanied by advising these organisations to build collective bargaining power beyond the community level and to access support outside local government.[356] Thus research has increasingly taken a combined governance and collective action perspective.

Mitlin refers to three activity options for grassroots within development: using existing opportunities, challenging the present opportunities or challenging the system.

By using the existing opportunities Grassroots Organisations build up social relationships with external actors to ensure resource allocation (e.g. land). These relationships can expose the problem of patronage (by local politicians and state officials). Furthermore, the dependency on leaders can cause low motivation to be involved and active by residents.[357]

With regard to successfully challenging the present opportunities Mitlin refers to the Indian alliance of the NGO *Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres* (SPARC), *Mahila Milan* and the *National Slum Dwellers' Federation*. Through its link with the grassroots SPARC gained credibility with policy-makers and succeeded in being involved in policy-making. Other examples for grassroots participation in policy-making are joint decision-making boards or participatory budgeting processes. Mitlin puts forward that all these forms of integration have been criticised for low participation and exclusion of the poorest parts of society. She therefore concludes that:

> *"[…] policy changes (at the city, province and national level) are possible but they may be limited and implementation of the desired changes maybe difficult. Moreover, the poorest and most vulnerable community members do not participate equally and are often unrepresented."*[358]

Finally, challenging the system can be achieved by either claim-making or alternative development practices by Grassroots Organisations. The latter includes the transformation of relationships between the poor and the state as part of a more radical grassroots agenda.

Typology of Grassroots Organisations

There is a limited general overview on Grassroots Organisations. Mitlin stresses these organisations are prevalent in urban areas. They have very diverse types of organisations. A common characteristic, according to Mitlin, is that these organisations coexist in local set-

[356] See Post/Baud, p. 12.
[357] See Mitlin (1999), p. 47.
[358] Mitlin (1999), p. 51.

tlements and that many have evolved through collective need. They therefore engage in a wide field of activities which Mitlin subsumes to land, infrastructure and services, housing and income generation.[359] UN-Habitat (2003) distinguishes two common types of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs):

a) Local development associations representing the entire community, and

b) Interest associations representing specific groups.[360]

2.3.1.3 New social movements

Internationalisation and the connection between global and local problems required a new organisational and structural approach to enable action at diverse levels. Thus interest was drawn to *New Social Movements* (NSM) and their relational logic. The rise of their transnational networks was consequently interpreted as a reaction to globalisation.[361]

New social movement theory and research are very diverse and concentrate on various aspects.[362] A particular interest is in the analysis of networks, interaction with the political and administrative system[363] and political opportunity structures[364]. This focus obviously exposes an extended overlap to governance research.

Urban social movements are hardly covered in new social movement theory,[365] although in the 1960s the urban space as a location of conflict and of alternative civil society, gave rise to Neo-Marxist accounts of urban social movements. Urban studies tried to explain the dynamics of urban growth by locational and infrastructural needs (consumption). Castells, in his work 'The Urban Question' argued that cities are products of capitalist processes. [366] Later, in 'The City and the Grassroots' (1983), he took into account that urban social movements emerge as powerful non-class alliances around collective consumption issues.[367] The assumption was that political action can modify some constraints of capital-

[359] Mitlin further differentiates Grassroots Organisations according to their formation. See Mitlin (1999), pp. 14ff.
[360] See UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 151.
[361] See Klein (2000), pp. 320f; Klein (2001), pp. 319f; Appadurai (2000), p. 23.
[362] For an overview of the different paradigms see Klein/Legrand/Leif (1999). Stokke (2002) promotes an integration of the various aspects.
[363] See Walk (2000).
[364] See Janett (2000).
[365] See Hamel/Lustiger-Thaler/Mayer (2000b), p. 1.
[366] See Castells (1977).
[367] See Castells (1983).

isms. Irrespectively whether this can be taken as a 'radical departure'[368] from his earlier Marxist analysis or as an adaptation of urban social movement theory[369], it essentially means a rapprochement to Lefebvre who argued that space is a social construct[370]by acknowledging the importance of collective identity creation.

Parker stresses the relevance of urban movements in a globalising context: "[…] as urban activists begin to act locally they also start to think globally."[371] This understanding of movements also indicates a trajectory from a micro level activity to macro level activism.

According to local political studies the integration of social movement organisations to municipal programmes has however harnessed their 'reform energy'[372]. On the other hand, the expanded urban polity increases the opportunities for movement input. Therefore, Mayer (1998) concludes, that proactive movements which are integrated into governance arrangements, are "contradictory and complex agents".

> *"They have to deal with the new fragmentation within the movement sector as well as with massive marginalization and social disintegration processes characteristic of urban life."*[373]

2.3.1.4 The rise of civil society networks and alliances

Discourses on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Grassroots Organisations (GROs) and social movements reveal their interdependence in matters of policy reform. NGOs need GROs to work on micro level and to gain legitimacy. GROs overcome their lack of accountability to donors through NGOs.

> *"[…] CBOs frequently require the support of NGOs or other CBOs if they are to develop and implement strategies that build their power base and maximise their access to resources."*[374]

Therefore, the focus of interest shifted to alliances between grassroots, intermediary NGOs and others. In the urban sector field NGO networks such as *Habitat International Coalition* (HIC) or horizontal networks between GROs and alliances with NGOs under the umbrella of *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) are prominent examples.

Various scholars focused on the integration, effectiveness and accountability of multior-

[368] See Ward/McCann (2006), p. 192.
[369] See Parker (2004), p. 132.
[370] See Lefebvre (1997).
[371] Parker (2004), p. 132.
[372] Mayer (1998).
[373] Mayer (1998), p. 75.
[374] UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 153.

ganisational alliances. Their complexity has been analysed in terms of how interests, participation and power are balanced among members. Competing interests between different actors within alliances and problems of organisational structures have been outlined as key challenges.[375]

Wallace et al (2007) argue that donors are increasingly encouraging alliances and networks both between the donors and NGOs[376] as well as between NGOs and organisations and movements at grassroots level.

Hulme (2008) argues that the NGOs and grassroots present rather fluidity of analytical boundaries:

> *"Defining NGOs and precisely separating them from social movements may be less important than exploring the relationships between entities that seem to have NGO or social-movement characteristics."*[377]

The relationships between NGOs and grassroots are characterised as manipulative: NGOs seek to legitimise their advocacy work on the one hand and local leaders seek to access NGO resources on the other. NGOs primarily work through leaders and only establish giver/recipient relations to the community itself. This results in a lack of clear understanding of community needs.[378]

The increased awareness of NGO dependency and domination in alliances has led to alternative approaches by NGOs and grassroots to cooperate. Bolnick outlines that with SDI, grassroots determine the kind of partnership. However, grassroots autonomy is threatened by the formal context whereby NGOs manage grassroots resources:

> *"Having struggled to secure their autonomy as subjects in command of their own struggles, they are forced to relinquish this important space and turn professionals into their own gatekeepers."*[379]

2.3.1.5 Interface between civil society and the State

Interface between state and civil society actors differ (from indifference, market-like ex-

[375] See for instance Glagow (1992); Fowler (1992); Covey (1996); Kirsch (1994); Herrle/Jachnow/Ley (2006).
[376] The networks between local NGOs and donor or International NGOs are characterised by dependency. The authors outline that local NGOs are controlled in what they do and have to give report about their accountability (donor dependency).
[377] Hulme (2008), p. 337.
[378] See Wallace/Bornstein/Chapman (2007), pp. 133-140.
[379] Bolnick (2008), p. 326.

change or cooperation). They are characterised by the constitution of the civil society organisations and the orientation of the political system. Grindle (1996) names the strategies by civil society towards the state from opposition, negotiation, bargaining, substitution of state functions, and disengagement.[380]

The state can also apply a range of strategies: control and regulation (e.g. by formal registration), integration, infiltration and cooptation (e.g. by creating financial dependency or establishment of quasi NGOs), ouster (e.g. by integrating unions to a political party system), disruption (e.g. by using differences/conflicts within member-organisations), coercion and oppression. The choice of strategy is informed by how the state deals with a general dilemma: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Grassroots Organisations (GROs) contribute to delegitimising the state. Some of them directly question the reliability of the state and others indirectly question the legitimacy of the state by taking over state responsibilities. Government therefore has either to accept deligitimisation through civil society organisations or renounce using their resources.[381]

Relationships with the state are discussed controversially: The rise of new civil society actors in governance has resulted in a discourse on their legitimacy and accountability. A principle constraint is the democratic deficit caused by exclusionary governance regimes (see also chapter 2.2.1). A lack of linkages as well as a tight coupling to the state exposes problems for civil society. Benz and Papadopoulos therefore suggest that "[…] a kind of loose coupling between democratic institutions and networks would be an adequate solution."[382]

2.3.1.6 Shack/Slum Dwellers International

A prominent and widely discussed transnational movement of Grassroots Organisations are *Slum/ Shack Dwellers International* (SDI). Robins (2005) outlines that SDI is referred to as 'grassroots globalisation'. Its networks, according to Robins, "[…] are recognised as playing a crucial role in the creation of international civil society representing the needs of the poorer 80 percent of the population of the world […]."[383]

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[380] See Grindle (1996).
[381] See Neubert (1992), pp. 43-48; Wahl (2000), p. 298.
[382] See Benz/Papadopoulos (2006c), p. 292.
[383] See Robins (2005b), p. 122.

The SDI network consists of homeless and landless people's federations and was launched in 1996. In 2006 fifteen federation affiliates were active in countries such as Cambodia, India, Namibia, Nepal, South Africa, Thailand and Zimbabwe. It has mobilised two million women and 250,000 families have accessed secure tenure, sanitation and impacted policy.[384] The SDI approach was developed in India and is based on a common understanding of the structural realities which impact the federation members. They share the discontent of their living conditions and experience with state, social movements, donors and NGOs. This shared experience represents a catalyst of change, according to Bolnick.[385] Slum dwellers are confronted with various uncertainties due to their informal status. The federation's approach, also described as 'rituals', is a way to cope with the instable situation. The aim is to empower communities by building trust networks of federations. Thus SDI strongly promotes the building of social capital in order to strengthen the negotiation capacities of federations vis-à-vis external agencies. SDI affiliated federations are organised in local savings schemes which constitute city-wide and national federation networks. Interaction is produced by practicing daily savings and horizontal exchanges within and amongst saving schemes. The techniques are advanced by self-enumeration, house-modelling and building exercises. Horizontal exchanges enable ways for direct learning of these techniques and demonstrate a 'governance from below' which constitutes the basis for engagement with the state. Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2004) outline:

> *"What this suggests is that democracy will not deliver for the urban poor unless they are organized and have the capacity to identify improved urban development processes; make demands; and develop their own autonomous actions, as well as work with formal agencies (including local government, higher levels of government and international agencies)."*[386]

The spread of federations aligned to SDI attracts notice to both policy-makers[387] and researchers[388]and led to the question of whether they represent new options for responsive

[384] See Bolnick (2008), p. 320.
[385] See Bolnick (2008), p. 320.
[386] Mitlin/Satterthwaite (2004b), p. 281.
[387] SDI has agreements with the City Alliance, various national government ministries as well as partnerships with a number of municipalities such as Durban, Mumbai and Blantyre. UN-Habitat (2003). See also UN-Habitat (2003b), p. 152.
[388] See for example Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001) and (2004); d'Cruz/Satterthwaite (2005); Mitlin (1999) and (2000); Patel/Mitlin (2002); Mitlin/Satterthwaite (2004); Mitlin (2006); Mitlin/Hickey/Bebbington (2006); Robins (2005b); Appadurai (2001); Wilson/Lowery (2003); Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003); Khan/Pieterse (2006); Muller/Mitlin (2007); McFarlane (2008); Neuwirth (2005).

governance. Promoters of the SDI model claim that poverty needs to be framed comprehensively including voicelessness and powerlessness. Empowerment, they argue, is a form of poverty reduction. Thus housing is seen as a means of connecting livelihoods. It provides an understanding "[…] that they are part of an urban reality".[389] Promoters stress that the SDI model has contributed to an increased collective solidarity and organisation of the urban poor.

Furthermore, Mitlin (1999) argues that alternative development strategies are more independent from external support as well as more proactive by setting precedence. SDI seeks to find innovative ways to influence public policy. For instance they communicate to government through data collection (referred to as 'politics of information').[390]

Robins (2005) argues that the practice as a shifting of power and knowledge from the state to federations demonstrates the 'autogovernmentality'of federations. The larger transnational networks then function as a "catalyst for cross-cultural reflection".[391]

Concerning its engagement with the state the federation pursues a more collaborative approach. It outlines mutual interest and acknowledges state deficiencies to provide pro-poor strategies.[392] This 'Politics of Patience' (Appadurai, 2001) is criticised for its non-confrontational engagement with the state. Representatives from right-based or radical democratic approaches argue that the federation's 'feel-good' organising ignores local corruption and the need for confrontational politics.[393] Satterthwaite (2006) instead maintains that the federations refuse informal payments and use various engagement tactics comprising also protest.

> *"The general impression is of a fast game of ice hockey, with players constantly tumbling in and out of the most active roles in response to shifting needs and game plans."*[394]

Furthermore, since the federations experienced that confrontation has often not resulted in benefits, they prioritise partnerships and negotiations with government. Satterthwaite stresses:

> *"[…] developing less antagonistic relationships with city government […] is central to re-*

[389] Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), p. 37; Bolnick et al (2006), p. 38.
[390] See Mitlin (1999), p. 54.
[391] See Robins (2005b), pp. 127f.
[392] See for instance Muller/Mitlin (2007), p. 427.
[393] See for instance Neuwirth (2005).
[394] Appadurai (2001), p. 32.

ducing this vulnerability. As the slum and shack dwellers' federations have recognized, it can also build a new basis for "slum" policies."[395]

A further critique is concerned with its democratic value. Appadurai argues that the federations reflect the meaning of 'deep democracy' as they direct their own development, engage with outside key actors and build-up a horizontal solidarity-network. Thus they reconstitute citizenship and represent a 'governmentality from below'. Muller and Mitlin (2007) put forward that the federation challenges the governmentality of conventional poverty reduction approaches. It decentralises decision-making to autonomous 'community-federated-networks' and thus extends beyond self-help functions. The building of organisational capital, it is argued, is key to challenge the state.

"[…] self-help is not seen as a replacement for government. Rather, it is seen first as a necessary catalyst and then as an ongoing mechanism to safeguard the autonomy of people's organizations."[396]

Other scholars are sceptical about the governmentality from below. Appadurai himself acknowledges the threat of self-surveillance taking Foucault's auto-governmentality[397] into account. Swyngedouw, without specifically referring to the federation, argues that the state must necessarily respond to actors which withdraw from 'governance-beyond the state' on multiscalar levels. The seemingly innovative horizontally organised arrangements might just be a "[…] Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates 'the market' […]."[398]

Muller and Mitlin (2007) argue instead, that the federation practice has strategic and practical outcomes which are "[…] being used as a platform to avoid Foucauldian governmentality and to build an institution that is accountable and able both to represent its members and challenge the higher echelons of state power." The key to the renewed understanding of self-help is not the focus on state provision, but on redistribution of its resources and functions to the organised poor.[399]

[395] Satterthwaite (2006), p. 544.
[396] Muller/Mitlin (2007), p. 437.
[397] Foucault applies the term governmentality for the way governments seek to produce the citizen best suited to fulfil its policies as well as for the organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) through which subjects are governed. This applies also to urban management and state provision as means to disciplin citizens. See Foucault (2000).
[398] Swyngedouw (2005), pp. 2002f.
[399] See Muller/Mitlin (2007), p. 437.

Particular reference is made by some authors to the enumeration process which traditionally is a mechanism by the state to exercise control and authority. The argument is that by own data gathering exercises federation members keep the "locus of learning" in the community, construct their own knowledge and control development.[400]

2.3.2 Civil society in South Africa

Civil society in the African context differs from more Western-Eurocentric notions.

> *"Prevailing ethnic and kinship structures, the legacy of colonialism, the pattern of economic development, and authoritarian forms of political rule gave rise to civil societies that differ markedly from the voluntary associational form characteristic of the United States and Western Europe […]."*[401]

What is characteristic in the South African context is a different application of typologies[402] and terminology with regard to civil society organisations. The South African conceptualisation of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Grassroots Organisations (GROs)/ Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) is broadly based on Uphoff's differentiation between sector of activity and geographic level.[403]

Firstly, in South Africa the term 'Community-Based Organisation' (CBO) functions as an umbrella label and comprises a range of structures such as local NGOs, civic organisations, stokvels (saving clubs) and cooperatives. However, discussions reveal ambiguity about the boundaries of CBOs. What all CBO definitions have in common is the "community-based" geographic location of the organisations. They differ with regard to other characteristics. Whereas Mabin equates the term CBO with the South African term 'civics'[404], Pieterse (1994) stresses that civics are just one form of community organisation under the comprehensive term CBO. He defines CBOs as community organisations that have a membership base, elected leadership and are active in a specific geographic area.[405] Huchzermeyer (2004), however, refers to civic organisations as representative committees in contrast to membership-based structures.[406] Thus CBOs either also include non-membership-based structures or have to be differentiated from civics.

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[400] See Muller/Mitlin (2007); Patel/Mitlin (2002).
[401] Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 7.
[402] See for instance Schmidt (1997), pp. 325f.
[403] See Upfhoff (1996), p. 27.
[404] See Mabin (1995), p.187.
[405] See Pieterse (1994), p. 6.
[406] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 186.

Secondly, the South African understanding of NGOs is narrower than the international usage of the term. NGOs in South Africa are defined as non-profit service organisations with professional and paid staff which provide services to constituencies such as CBOs.[407]

The state of civil society in South Africa

The 1990s in South Africa meant extensive changes for civil society. Previously it was characterised and unified by the opposition to the apartheid regime. An important counter-hegemonic structure was represented by the *United Democratic Front* (UDF).[408] It functioned as a substitute of the ANC which was banned at the time.[409] Kößler (1992) takes the UDF as a case in point for a civil society from below with overlapping civil society structures.[410]

The assumption that civil society has a democratic potential, led donors to shift their funding to civil society in Africa, especially NGOs in advocacy.[411] In the 1980s and 90s South African NGOs therefore grew on the background of political liberalisation aligned to the anti-apartheid movement.[412]

In the post-apartheid period the organised structures in civil society had great influence in shaping policy. The immediate post-1994 time was perceived as an unprecedented collaboration and alliance between state and non-state actors.

However, Robinson and Friedman note a shift from public participation during the first post-apartheid administration to a focus on implementation and therefore decline in structured engagement since the second post-apartheid administration (1999).[413]

With the shift to neoliberal politics in 1996 non-state actors started to address deficiencies and showed increasing opposition to privatisation and liberalisation.[414]

In the beginning of the 2000s two important research projects were commissioned: one by

[407] See for instance Pieterse (1994), p. 6; Smit (2001), pp. 237f.
[408] The UDF was founded in 1983 as a multi-racial and multi-class alliance of anti-apartheid organisations with about 700 member organisations. See Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 24.
[409] See Hundsdörfer (1994), p. 211.
[410] See Kössler (1992), pp. 18f.
[411] See Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 1; Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 1.
[412] See Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 8.
[413] See Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 11.
[414] See Fakir (2004), p. 127.

the *South African NGO Coalition* (SANGOCO)[415] and another one by the *Centre for Civil Society* (CCS)[416]. Both reflect different thinking of the role of civil society in South Africa.

Whereas the CCS report assessed size and shape of civil society, the SANGOCO report also focused on values and impact of the sector. The CCS report was based on non-profit sector definitions and differentiates NPOs between developmental, survivalist and oppositional. The study indicated that there are about 99,000 non-profit organisations across all sectors. More than half (53%) are less formalised community-based associations. The study also highlights that many NGOs fail to directly engage with these communities.[417]

Pieterse and Meintjies (2004) therefore call for a better understanding of the diversity of the sector. They criticise that government and other formal organisations simplify the sector and neglect to channel resources also to local organisations in marginalised neighbourhoods.[418]

The SANGOCO report revealed that ordinary citizens are not adequately represented by civil society organisations and that the majority of CSOs feel they have insufficient influence over government.

Habib and Kotzé (2002) criticised the limitations of both approaches. They see a general romanticising of civil society in South Africa based on the anti-apartheid movement. The authors feel that NGOs have become implementing agents for government and thus caused scepticism from donors and communities. As a result, the civil society sector, according to Habib and Kotzé, is fragmented and conflictual.[419]

> *"A key finding is that while most civil society organisations acknowledge the importance of engaging in public policy, few demonstrate a consistent level of direct involvement in the policy process and fewer still have a significant impact on policy outcomes."*[420]

Social capital also gained prominence in the South African discourse. Research was undertaken by the University of the Witwatersrand through a SIDA[421]-funded project ('De-

[415] See IDASA/CORE (2001).
[416] See Swilling/Russel (2002).
[417] See Swilling/Russel (2002), p. 20.
[418] See Van Donk/Pieterse (2004), p. 47.
[419] See Habib/Kotzé (2002), pp. 3-5.
[420] Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 11.
[421] Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

mocracy and Social Capital in Segmented Societies'). Harrison (2002) outlines that reference to social capital is made in South African policy (e.g. in the White Paper on Local Government, 1998) but has not been translated into practice. She argues that social capital could be a useful resource for local government. However, she puts forward that Putnam's concept of social capital (see chapter 2.3.1) needs to be reconfigured in the South African context. Harrison feels that social capital in South Africa is illustrated by informal survival or coping mechanisms in the absence of local government delivery. To build on this existing social capital as a development resource, the author recommends, local government should first of all gain an understanding of its citizenry and proactively identify opportunities for interaction and relations between state and society.[422]

Later a Norwegian-South African research partnership focused on trust relationships in South Africa. The collection of empirical studies edited by Askvik and Bak (2005) analyses the trust between citizens and public institutions. A key outcome was that distrust from the apartheid era continues and lack of trust characterises the interactions between citizens and public institutions. Moreover, non-delivery on promises being made (around land, housing or services) by the political leadership has contributed to increased distrust of the new government.[423]

> *"[…] the findings point to the importance of efficient and effective service delivery by public institutions and their role-bearers in generating experiential trust among the public."*[424]

Further, Robins argues that social capital is not always normatively good and moreover left open to interpretation. He illustrates that the perception of poor communities in South Africa shifted from a normatively good to a negative connotation of social capital and community solidarity in the context of dysfunctional, violence and crime-ridden communities and patronage networks.[425]

In 2005 a discussion paper by Robinson and Friedman summarised results of a research project on the contribution of civil society organisations to democratisation in Africa. With regard to the characteristics of South African civil society organisations the authors

[422] See Harrison, K. (2002).
[423] See Bak/Asvik (2005), pp. 16f.
[424] Bak/Askvik (2005), p. 22.
[425] See Robins (2003), pp. 92f; Robins (2005b), pp. 125f.

point out the following finding[426]:

a) Less than 10% of civil society organisations (CSOs) are engaged in empowerment and promotion of democracy and participation.

b) The majority of CSOs are urban-based.

c) CSOs reflect social cleavages and are mostly middle-class.

d) CSOs are mostly exclusionary for poor and unemployed.

e) Few CSOs have achieved important policy influence.

f) Mass membership or internal democracy are not pre-requisites for policy influence but are helpful for resource mobilisation and leadership accountability.

g) A close proximity to the state can have contradictory effects.

h) CSOs depend on internally generated resources receiving income via membership fees or private donations.

Robinson and Friedman put forward that few civil society organisations have a stable level of involvement and few make a difference to policy outcomes. Instead the internal governance of CSOs to empower citizens and their relationship to the state are more decisive factors. The authors therefore promote to differentiate democratic influence between a) direct policy influence and b) enhancing democratic practices:

> *"Its capacity to offer citizens a say in decisions and to enhance pluralism may be as important as the ability to influence decision-making and demand accountability from state actors."*[427]

Pieterse argues that civil society should not be used to explain their democratic value but as a sociological and descriptive concept to study collective practices and interactions which intend to pursue group interests vis-à-vis the state. He therefore calls for an empirical understanding of social patterns and argues:

> *"The value of civil society as a conceptual construct is first and foremost to help us understand better what is actually going on and, secondarily, how social dynamics can be shaped to advance more equitable and socially just policies."*[428]

[426] See Robinson/Friedman (2005), pp. 21ff.
[427] Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 40.
[428] Pieterse (2004), pp. 336f.

Jenkins (2002) also takes a broader perspective on African civil society. He stresses that in contrast to Europe two forms of public realms prevail: one dominated by a state elite, the other traditional based on ethnic or religious horizontal ties. Jenkins's criticism is that by predominantly funding formal institutions such as NGOs the international donor community misses to tapping into the potential of the other part of horizontally aligning civil society.[429]

2.3.2.1 Changing role of NGOs in South Africa

In South Africa NGOs were interpreted as a vehicle for the development of civil society embedded in an anti-apartheid identity. The civic movement's resistance was supported by progressive planning academics and professionals who founded Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) by the mid to late 1980s such as *Planact* in Johannesburg, the *Built Environment Support Group* (BESG) in Durban and the *Development Action Group* (DAG) in Cape Town. At the time the number and size of these urban sector organisations increased due to international funding.[430] Hundsdörfer (1994) outlines the dilemma for NGOs at the time to provide professional competence and thereby threatening self-organisation and empowerment of civics.[431]

Harrison (2001) refers to the connection between the planning NGOs and the civic movements as a 'progressive planning movement'.[432] He stresses their role for shaping official policy in the post-1994 democratic elections and for discussing local government and planning issues.[433]

Since the mid 1990s structural changes affected NGOs with staff moving over to government and with decreasing international donor funding. NGOs at the time were forced to commercialise their activities[434] or reduce staff and activities if not to close down. Beck and Demmler (2000) assert NGOs became the losers in the transition.[435]

Pieterse puts forward that the professionalisation, which was induced by donor funding, led to hierarchical organisational structures of NGOs. Instead he promotes more horizon-

[429] See Jenkins (2002).
[430] See Smit (2001), pp. 237f.
[431] See Hundsdörfer (1994), p. 218.
[432] Harrison (2001), p. 183.
[433] See Harrison (2006a), p. 193.
[434] See Reddy (2003).
[435] See Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 149.

tal structures as nodal points which would allow decentralisation and flows of information (see figure 2.10).[436]



Fig. 2.10: Re-conceptualisation from a hierarchical to a decentralised NGO structure
Source: Pieterse (1995), p. 17.

Moreover, the political changes in 1994 implied that NGOs had to reposition themselves in their relation to state and society.

> *"It is only by ensuring that there is a strong civil society, and by co-operation between the state, CBOs and NGOs, that the development challenges facing South Africa can be adequately tackled."*[437]

Urban sector NGOs shifted from an exclusive advocacy role to a development and support role of community organisations in housing development. For them the projects represented a vehicle to increase community empowerment.

In 2000 there were between 2000 – 20,000 active NGOs. The NGO sector represented the second largest employer in the country.[438] In the development discourse two key concerns were revealed: in how far do NGOs represent the values of those they claim to represent and to whom are they accountable?

The various research reports on the state of civil society in South Africa outlined that it is mostly the urban middle class represented in NGOs, whereas the urban poor remain ex-

[436] See Pieterse (1995), pp. 17f.
[437] Smit (2001), p. 247.
[438] See Beck/Demmler (2000), p. 51.

cluded. The recommendation by many was therefore to focus on the community level for representation of local interests.[439]

The collaboration with the state resulted in a dilemma for NGOs how they could play a role in political opposition whilst cooperating with the state. The close ties to government allowed a degree of policy influence. However, when government became more interested in implementation, NGOs "[…] were caught between their role as contracted agents to implement programmes and their accountability to their constituents".[440]

2.3.2.2 The role of the grassroots in South Africa

Huchzermeyer differentiates between two types of community organisations concerned with everyday development issues: Firstly, civic organisations as representative and elected committees which are active in entire settlements and organised in smaller structures (in block and street committees). Secondly, membership-based structures represented by the Federation aligned to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI). The latter presents local structures based on daily saving practices (see chapter 2.3.2).[441]

Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) have a strong tradition in South Africa as they had a leading role in the anti-apartheid struggle. Jenkins (2001) stresses that the resistance against removals and awareness of social issues led to a transition from community level to wider social movements.[442] Smit (2001) puts forward that this influenced the emergence of a specific political CBO type as 'organisations of resistance' in the early 1980s known as civic associations. These were democratically elected organisations which functioned both as Grassroots Organisation and part of the liberation civic movement.[443]

Smit (2001) contradicts the general assumption that civics were representative of the existing diversity within the entire community. Nevertheless, many scholars agree that the leadership of civic associations was recognised and accountable to the communities. Their lack of legitimacy was perceived as secondary in the aim to unify against apartheid.[444] Since non-whites did not have access to government their self-organising structures and

[439] See Neubert (1992), pp. 49-51; Robinson/Friedman (2005).
[440] Wallace/Bornstein/Chapman (2007), p. 83.
[441] See Huchzermeyer (2004b), pp. 186ff.
[442] See Jenkins (2001).
[443] See Smit (2001), pp. 234f. For a detailed description on township resistance see Seekings (1991); Christopher (1994).
[444] See Smit (2001), p. 237; Schmidt (1992); Fitzgerald/McLennan/Munslow (1995), p.106.

collective practices of bargaining and disobedience substituted government and represented alternative power structures in many communities.[445]

With the political changes since the 1990s government negotiated with civic associations in local forums.[446] Mabin argues that the civic movement faced difficulties in influencing discussions due to the increasing expertise and time needed to participate in the forums.[447]

In 1992 civics formed the *South African National Civic Organisation* (SANCO). They had to fundamentally redefine their role either as 'watchdogs' or development agents. Many civics shifted from lobbying activity to community-based non-profit organisations with a development focus.[448]

SANCO adopted a centralised, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure. This setup was criticised for a lack of democratic elements and for excluding local branches from decision-making. Leadership struggles and co-optation by government finally led to a decreased role of civics.[449]

After the first democratic local elections in 1995-1996 the role of civic associations further complicated. They were either integrated in institutionalised participation systems (development forums) or sought to become autonomous.[450]

Alexander regrets the roll-back of civic structures as the basis for grassroots democratic practices and indicates that new social movements might be able to recall these practices as a learning platform.[451] For Swilling (1998) the decreased role of civics has a positive aspect as it allowed a return of local associations and an emergence of new independent structures as "[…] indications that a new and diverse civil society is emerging."[452]

Pieterse suggests using the opportunity to re-conceptualise hierarchical community-based

[445] See Pieterse (1994), p. 60; Fakir (2004), p. 125.
[446] For more detail on the local negotiation process see Coovadia (1991).
[447] See Mabin (1995), p. 188; Smit (2001), p. 243.
[448] Smit argues that people boycotted partly to protest against the state and partly because they could not afford to pay. Therefore even when civics agreed to return to payments they were not able to convince the communities. See Smit (2001), p. 240.
[449] See Jenkins (2001); Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 28. For a detailed discussion of role of civics in postapartheid see Zuern (2006).
[450] See Smit (2001), p. 237.
[451] See Alexander (1994), p. 207.
[452] Swilling (1998), p. 299.

structures to horizontal structures (see figure 2.11).[453]



Fig. 2.11: Re-conceptualisation from traditional to horizontal structures of CBOs
Source: Pieterse (1994), p.16

One prominent new structure was represented by the Federation groups. They constituted self-organised Grassroots Organisations with a development focus. In contrast to civic associations these grassroots were women-driven, non-political, with a voluntary membership, and a housing delivery focus (see table 2.11).

	Civics	Federation
Issues and interests	Civics mobilised around local socio-economic demands as front against apartheid	Federation seek to realise socio-economic demands within new democratic political context
History	Emergence through local context of oppression	Inspiration from international discourse
Political context	Affiliation with ANC through SANCO	Political autonomy: Loosely connected network of autonomous local groups
Organisational form	Hierarchically organised with elected representative committees	CBO autonomy and equal participation of all members

Tab. 2.11: Comparison between civics and the Federation
Source: based on Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003), p. 463

2.3.2.3 New social movements in South Africa

The anti-apartheid movement has been a focus of interest for many scholars. Thörn even argues that it represented an early emergence of transnational social movements by organising its opposition internationally.[454]

Since many civics and unions allied with the ANC government post 1994, they were no

[453] See Pieterese (1994), pp. 16-18.
[454] See Thörn (2006).

longer in a position to represent interests outside the state.[455]

Although demobilisaton of civil society was assumed after 1994, Robins (2005) argues that South Africa is no exception from global trends towards globally connected, multi-level new social movements (NSM). [456] Local-global activism in South Africa is exemplified by *Abahlali Base Mjondolo* (ABM), the *Landless Peoples Movement* (LPM), *Anti-Privatisation Forum* (APF) and the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) (formerly know as 'South African Homeless People's Federation').

Government reacted with hostility when confronted with the new movements. Robins (2005) argues that the state interprets the solidarity of new social movements as a threat to government.[457] Some of the movements have therefore been stigmatised as 'ultra left' and undemocratic although the majority of the movements are focused on survivalist, local struggles and single issues and not driven by ideological interests.[458] Housing and basic services is a key aspect in this context. The movements withdraw both from the constitutional right towards adequate housing as well as government's commitment to participatory democracy.

Activists and academics on the other hand tend to colour the new social movements as spaces for participatory democracy and organisational alternatives to party politics.[459] Desai (2002) for instance draws a very positive imagery of the emerging community movements as poor people unite around bread-and-butter issues and practice solidarity confronted with neoliberal state practice.[460] Ballard et al are less optimistic, but assert that the emergence of NSM has provided a new political climate for a more responsive South African government.[461]

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[455] For instance the Anti Privatisation Forum (APF) in 2000, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) in 1999, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign in 2000, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) in 2001, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in 1998, Jubilee SA in 1998 and a range of environmental movements. See Ballard et al (2006), p. 2; Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 397.
[456] See Robins (2005c), pp. 9ff.
[457] See Robins (2005b), p. 126.
[458] See Ballard/Habib/Vaolodia (2006b), p. 397.
[459] See Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 397.
[460] See Desai (2002).
[461] See Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 414.



Fig. 2.12: The reinvention of South Africa's social movements, Source: Ballard et al (2006), p. 15.

Many authors increasingly question the assumptions of a hegemonic movement. They rather stress that the new movements are characterised by heterogeneity, diversity of issues, various forms and scales of organisations and activism.[462] Fakir stressed:

> *"Many organise at the local level, some in non-formal, non-traditional formations, others as community-based structures which have a distinct leadership and membership. Their modes of organisation are different, with some functioning as survivalist agencies while others are more politically oriented […]."*[463]

Against this background Ballard et al offer the following definition:

> *"Social movements are thus, in our view, politically and/or socially directed collectives, often involving multiple organisations and networks, focused on changing one or more elements of the social, political and economic system within which they are located."*[464]

Ballard et al (2006) argue that the movements can be distinguished in two ideological streams: right-based with the aim for state reform and counter-hegemonic opposition with the aim for fundamental transformations.[465]

But beyond direct action Fakir (2004) also asserts a 'quiet encroachment' as households are driven by 'bread and butter issues'. According to Fakir, these are not the working-class but the 'lumpen proletariat', arising as part of the movement to boycott service

[462] See for instance Ballard et al (2006); Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b); Fakir (2004); Oldfield/Stokke (2006).
[463] Fakir (2004), p. 148.
[464] Ballard et al (2006), p. 3.
[465] See Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), pp. 403f.

charges.[466]

Ballard et al (2006) argue that community struggles lack the ideology of other social movements. Their aim is rather direct relief on specific issues. As they do not focus on opposing government's economic agenda, they might also engage with the state in certain circumstances:

> *"Struggles in post-apartheid South Africa respond, in the first instance, to particular manifestations of exclusion, poverty and marginality. They are very often local and immediate; they are pragmatic and quite logical responses to everyday hardships […]."*[467]

Nevertheless, the authors conclude that these local struggle movements can still challenge existing power relations. They argue that in contrast to the international new social movement discourse, in the South African case, both identity and distributional questions are drivers for the movements.[468]

> *"Social movements are thus an avenue for marginalised people and those concerned about their interests to impact on material distribution, and social exclusion, and to claim a certain degree of influence and power over the state itself."*[469]

Deriving tactics are characterised by a continuum of engagement with the state. Whereas some movements apply 'in-system collaborative interactions', others are aligned to 'out-of-system adversarial relations'. However, the distinction between in-system and extra-system tactics cannot be drawn in reality. Oldfield and Stokke illustrate with the case of the *Anti-Eviction Campaign* that within one movement different groups apply a coexisting mix of different strategies and tactics.[470]

Fakir outlines the juxtaposition of social movement activities characterised by cooperation with government for improvements in the communities and simultaneous opposition against privatisation and liberalisation. The latter is illustrated by community-based and citywide campaigns against local government politics particularly around service charges."[471] Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) question the legitimacy and capacity of such movements. Key questions which need to be resolved for movements are, according to the

[466] See Fakir (2004), p. 143.
[467] Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 402.
[468] See Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), pp. 409f.
[469] Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 413.
[470] See Ballard/Habib/Valodia (2006b), p. 405; Oldfield/Stokke (2006).
[471] Fakir (2004), p. 130.

authors, how they link their mobilisation tactic with the basic needs of members and if they are able to open a democratic space.[472]

2.3.2.4 Civil society alliances in South Africa

The interdependence of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-based or Grassroots Organisations is also stressed in the South African context. With regard to the urban sector Smit concluded:

> *"Strong civil society needs to consist of autonomous CBOs, supported by strong NGOs, operating in a voluntary pluralist mode, sometimes co-operation with and sometimes acting in opposition to the state."*[473]

However, the political divide between NGOs working within the system and CBOs who challenge it, has led to a neglect of their interdependence in reality:

> *"NGO's need to recognize that they only have a seat at the systemic table because rulers and elites fear the CBOs that threaten or have the potential to ultimately undermine the system. CBOs need NGOs seat at the systemic table to facilitate the reforms that they so need to sustain their mobilization in the long term."*[474]

Bond and Guliwe (2003) argue, that effective civil society alliances have merged like the *Jubilee* movement (focused on apartheid debt), the *Landless People's Movement* (LPM) and the *Environmental Justice Networking Forum* (EJNF).[475]

Against the assumption that NGOs demobilises masses, Bond and Guliwe argue, in South Africa many NGOs work with grassroots and movements and are "organically connected to social movements".[476]

The SDI affiliated federations and support NGOs similarly constitute an alliance across different organisational forms. NGOs themselves have aligned in coalitions such as SANGOCO (South African National NGO Coalition). In the urban sector the *Urban Sector Network* (USN) was active as an umbrella body for NGOs until 2005.

2.3.2.5 Interface between civil society and the state in South Africa

During apartheid black civil society organisations (CSOs) were suppressed and discour-

[472] See Pieterse/Oldfield (2002), pp. 7f.
[473] Smit (2001), p. 247.
[474] Habib/Kotzé (2002), p. 21.
[475] See Bond/Guliwe (2003), p. 324.
[476] Bond/Guliwe (2003), p. 326.

aged.[477] Post-1994 civil society-state engagement shifted to a collaborative relationship. The state introduced institutionalised participation for civil society organisations and funding through the *National Development Agency*.[478] The Constitution provides for the right to free association (Chapter 2, Section 18) and the *Non Profit Organisations Act*[479] outlines the environment for non-profit organisations to emerge.

However, Habib and Kotzé outlined that the ANC understood its role as taking control over development. This attitude contradicted World Bank and IMF thinking at the time and is referred to as 'South African exceptionalism'. As a result, CSOs were sidelined and people-centred development remained rhetoric, according to the authors.[480]

Forums to integrate civil society have declined since government moved away from policy formulation to implementation.

> *"This go-it-alone stance, especially on policy issues, seems to be the dominant mode of the last few years. While after 1994 many NGOs were closely involved in developing policy in areas such as housing and justice and reconciliation, these days they are mostly estranged from government."*[481]

The South African state is confronted with the contradictory approaches of delivery and downsizing the state. It is characterised by 'pragmatic manoeuvres' which civil society actors use for local governance.[482]

Shearing and Wood (2005) understand this improvisation as innovative use of 'governance disparity' in South African society. Harrison (2002) shows that there exists an increasing informalisation of governing outside of and in competition with formal management systems of local government.[483]

Given the background that integration into formal processes has not been realised, Simone and Abouhani argue to focus on the differentiated social practices and organisations which constitute the survival strategies and identities in cities.[484] The authors assert that ephemeral institutions for collaboration and more effective formal governance arrange-

[477] See Robinson/Friedman (2005), p. 8.
[478] See Ballard et al (2006), p. 1.
[479] RSA (1997d).
[480] See Habib/Kotzé (2002), pp.7-9; Habib/Kotzé (2003), pp. 252f.
[481] Meintjes (2004), p. 310.
[482] See Robins (2005c), p.11.
[483] See Harrison, K. (2002), p. 224.
[484] See Simone/Abouhani (2005b), p. 1.

ments emerge:

> *"Distinct groups and capacities are provisionally assembled into surprising, yet often dynamic, intersections outside any formal opportunity the city presents for the interaction of diverse identities and situations."*[485]

With regard to the dynamics of urbanisation, Simone criticises that development and governance interventions hardly take into account informal practices and institutions. Instead of analysing the capacity of urban management, he calls for understanding of the overall social arrangements or "knowing how cities are lived".[486]

Simone argues that new urban social formations became important for urban management. These formations are "[…] being rehearsed, revised, discarded, renewed, collapsed into conventional associations, mobilised to collapse conventional associations." The aim is to realise and move on "before positions can be solidified and manipulated, before officers are elected, membership forms distributed […]". This process refines "a new generation of urban capacities".[487]

This is aligned to a shift from a state-centred to nodal governance. Shearing and Wood argue that concepts of 'citizenship' do not comprise this shift and suggest a less state-centred conception of 'denizenship' as power beyond the state is expressed in new forms of 'communal space'. They characterise the shift from citizens to denizens as follows:

> *"People now live within a world of criss-crossing memberships that operate across and through multiple and layered governmental domains."*[488]

Zuern argues that while literature on social movements tries to distinguish them as indirect or direct challenges to the state by non-institutional and autonomous spaces, in reality social movements as well as civil society actors in general are not that distinct from the state.[489]

Also, Mhone and Edigheji (2003) call for transcending "the divide between civil society and political society" by "politics based on alliances".[490]

> *"[…] what is without doubt required is the need to transcend the false divide that has*

[485] Simone/Abouhani (2005b), p. 23.
[486] Simone (2002), pp. 294f.
[487] Simone (2002), p. 299.
[488] Shearing/Wood (2005), p. 101.
[489] See Zuern (2006), p. 180.
[490] Mhone/Edigheji (2003b), p. 352.

emerged between opposition and engagement in South Africa. For without this transcendence, civil society is going to remain divided, and perhaps incapable of developing the sophistication to deal with advancing the interests of marginalized communities in today's neoliberal global environment."[491]

Swilling argues the search to maintain a coherent sense of community is contradicted by the broad cross-community networks which are highly fluid and changing. Instead of seeing state and society as separate entities, he suggests that:

"Those lines that formally define the outlines of "weak" administrative functions and civil society organisations may instead act as "internal" markers of rather solid arrangements that take place over a broad set of diverse actors, territories and identities." [492]

2.3.2.6 Federation discourse in South Africa

There is an ongoing debate in South Africa on the relevance of the Federation aligned to SDI. The considerable growth of federation activities in sub-Saharan Africa[493] has called the attention of international agencies and government.

Urban problems such as poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, lack of infrastructure and HIV/AIDS relate, according to Federation perspective, to limitations in local organisations. Local organisations, it argues, include formal organisations such as government and civil society organisations as well as informal associations. The challenge is seen in organising the poor to influence decision-making. Federations in this context are understood as a mechanism to strengthen horizontal networking and creating pro-poor institutions.

„Perhaps more than anything else, as a first stage, what is needed in urban areas in Africa are strong examples of how to support the development of pro-poor organizations that address poorer groups' needs and are accountable to them."[494]

Pieterse and Oldfield (2002) suggest that the Federation in South Africa gives an example how movements can link mobilisation with the needs of members.[495] Millstein, Oldfield and Stokke analysed strategies and capacities of the *South African Homeless People's*

[491] Habib/Kotzé (2002), pp. 20f.
[492] Swilling/Simone/Khan (2002), p.310
[493] South Africa since 1991 with about 100,000 members, Zimbabwe since 1993 with about 45,000 members, Namibia since 1998 with about 13,000 members, Kenya since 2000 with about 25,000 members, Malawi since 2003 with about 20,000 members. See Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 35f. Uganda since 2006 with about 3,000 members. See SDI (2007b). Tanzania since 2004 with about 2,000 members. See SDI (2007c).
[494] Bolnick et al (2006), p. 60; See also Satterthwaite (2005).
[495] See Pieterse/Oldfield (2002), pp. 7f.

Federation (SAHPF) and concluded that it has the ability to function as a social movement and thus has the capacity to promote and negotiate their aims.[496]

> *"[…] Homeless People's Federation seem to be more adept at understanding the use value of direct action to shape agendas and make room for provisional solutions that will in future become the focus of further mobilization, renegotiation and even incorporation by the state […]".*[497]

It is argued that the Federation's methods create a more equal relationship between poor communities and other agencies. They demonstrate the capacity of urban poor groups and their possible contributions to making government initiatives more effective.[498]

The federation's practices are not supposed to substitute the state. Instead of autonomous development the federations seek to engage with government around redistribution.[499]

Although they, similarly to right-based positions, criticise the hostile mentality of government towards the urban poor in implementing its housing policy, they stress that this derives from a technocratic and inadequate urban governance system.[500]

> *"This hostility, however, is not political, intellectual, or emotional: it is systemic. There are very few bureaucrats or politicians who actually do not want to serve the poor. They honestly believe they are doing so, even when they evict slum dwellers or tear down their unauthorised dwellings."*[501]

Therefore engagement with the state, according to SDI, has to be created outside the formal and dysfunctional institutional spaces and oriented towards changing the system. The argument is that social learning through development projects can increase democratic citizenship and further the understanding of how the state functions. Practices such as information gathering are interpreted as an indicator of the federations' profound understanding of the mechanisms of the modern state. Robins stressed:

> *"By appropriating these rituals of bureaucratic state power, the Federations acquire leverage in their negotiations with the state to secure resources such as housing and health."*[502]

Moreover, the federations are assumed to demonstrate alternatives to the state.[503] This

[496] See Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003).
[497] Pieterse (2005b), p. 153.
[498] See Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f.
[499] See Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f.
[500] See discussion in chapter 2.1.
[501] SDI (2006a).
[502] Robins (2005b), p. 130.
[503] See Pieterse (2005a), p. 156.

practice is believed to shift institutional arrangements:

> *"Don't confront authority head on. Instead of storming the citadel, infiltrate it…Play judo with the state – use its own weight to roll it over".*[504]

Representatives from right-based or radical democratic approaches argue that the federation's non-confrontational politics reduces resistance and enables co-optation of leaders.[505]

Swilling agrees that cooptation is a constant threat for the federation, but a "tiger that's being ridden".[506]

Bolnick et al stress that the avoidance of political affiliation creates disadvantages for the federations. Politicians prioritise support to those community groups affiliated to their party. Nevertheless, by its apolitical position, according to the authors, the federation remains independent and open to everyone. Its 'politics of patience' by negotiating and building alliances "[…] allows them to negotiate and work with whoever is in power locally or nationally."[507]

Robins instead outlines that despite its apolitical ideology in reality Federation leadership tends to be aligned to the ANC. The South African federation perceived government as "[…] a powerful patronage machine that could be accessed through party political contacts and channels". Moreover, the members believed in a technocratic state which is contradictory to the SDI agenda of resisting the expert – client relationship.[508]

Furthermore, Khan and Pieterse (2006) specifically stress, that the federation enhances a neoliberal rationality by idealising self-help approaches. They take the *People's Housing Process* (PHP)[509] as a case in point for a "colonisation of civil society" by the state. With PHP, they argue, the state has taken over an innovative participatory practice into its policies and then reworked it to its own values.[510]

SDI instead holds that constant mobilisation and self-organising through savings is the

[504] Quoted from Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 162.
[505] See Khan/Pieterse (2006).
[506] Swilling (2006c).
[507] Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f.
[508] See Robins (2005b), p. 131.
[509] PHP was inspired by federation practice and adopted in 1998 by the National Housing Policy which extended the housing subsidy scheme with an option of sweat-equity contribution by beneficiaries.
[510] See Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 172. For a review of PHP see chapter 2.1.

key "to build the critical mass" and to capacitate negotiation as the basis for state engagement. According to SDI, continuous mobilisation prevents institutionalisation and dominance of the formal system: "In other words, […] for the SDI model to achieve change, it has to institutionalise change itself […]."[511]

NGO-Federation alliance – conflicting ideologies at play

Bolnick et al argue that the local groups face difficulties in ensuring their leadership role, because dynamics in development practice tend to re-shift control to the state. Given this context, local federations and their support structures need to cooperate to ensure that the federation members are empowered to negotiate with the state. [512]

Millstein, Oldfied and Stokke (2003) stress that NGOs mediate to the formal system. Thereby "[…] local Federation groups can maintain their informal and flexible character."[513]

Key for the SDI alliance is to limit dependencies of grassroots groups on NGOs. NGOs are supposed to scale up, allow autonomy of federations and facilitate their horizontal networks.[514]

Robins focuses on the discrepancy between SDI ideology and reality of practices and cleavages with the *South African Homeless Peoples Federation* (SAHPF) and its support NGO (People's Dialogue) in Cape Town. The two structures showed a competing understanding of development which resulted in conflict. The SDI/ People's Dialogue ideology of avoiding state product-driven housing delivery and conventional NGO-CBO relations was not shared by Federation members, refer Robins.[515]

Social capital in the face of competition and conflict

SDI ideology particularly stresses the relevance of social capital which is created by federating. Savings schemes are assumed to build social capital instead of a house product. Wilson and Lowery (2003) for instance assert a building of deep democracy through a process of changing awareness by federation members.[516]

Robins (2005) critically reflects the assumption that organisational structures and strate-

[511] SDI (2006a).
[512] Bolnick et al (2006), p. 44.
[513] Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003), p. 464.
[514] See for instance Bolnick (2008).
[515] See Robins (2005b), p. 132.
[516] See Wilson/Lowery (2003), p. 62.

gies of the federation enable trust relations (and thereby social capital) amongst the poor. He instead criticises the normative conception of social capital as it "[…] fails to acknowledge the embeddedness of local hierarchies and patronage networks".[517]

The centralised *South African Homeless People's Federation* (SAHPF) leadership resulted in patronage and gatekeeping networks, according to Robins. This caused distrust amongst Federation members and contributed to the collapse of many saving schemes.

> *"Despite the creative and sustained efforts by SDI Federations – from Cape Town to Calcutta – to build social capital and communities with long-term commitments, the urban poor often have to deal with high levels of distrust and conflict that undermine these social ties and solidarities."*[518]

A general contradiction persists between the NGO which promotes social capital whilst SAHPF members are more interested in the house product. Unlike the Federation in India, they did not practice daily savings or other rituals.[519]

Huchzermeyer argues that the individual entitlement through the state's capital subsidy system has reduced the Federation to house construction and "[…] distracted the Federation's collective and radical development activities into endeavours to achieve the largest possible individual housing product […]."[520]

The pledge by the national housing minister of 6,000 subsidies to the Federation is therefore seen to exacerbate the focus on numbers and construction of houses. It is argued that by entering the 'politics of deal-making' the Federation has abandoned its collective approach.[521]

The NGOs recognise the deficiencies to aim at creating solidarity whilst working within the subsidy system.[522] Bolnick et al acknowledge that the federations, as any large-scale movement by poor people, have had failures or limited successes such as the break-up of community organisations and loan-repayment schedules. However, the authors stress that an essential role of the federations is "to learn how to cope with these problems, and how

[517] Robins (2005b), p. 124.
[518] Robins (2005b), p. 134.
[519] See Robins (2005b), p. 131.
[520] Huchzermeyer (2004b), p. 121.
[521] Personal communication with Marie Huchzermeyer, 04.09.2006 and with Ahmadi Vawda, 05.10.2006.
[522] See Bauman/Bolnick (2001), p. 110.

to avoid them in the future."[523] The extension of its development agenda beyond housing has been acknowledged as a primary challenge by the Federation itself.[524]

[523] Bolnick et al (2006), pp. 43f.
[524] See FEDUP (2006), p. 5.

2.4 Theoretical perspective and conceptual model

The previous discourses have revealed a shifting understanding of housing, governance and civil society which can be summarised as follows:

1. Planning and housing issues are increasingly discussed as a governance matter. Approaches have become less regulatory and project-oriented and more participatory and comprehensive. In this context, the role of the state has shifted from a providing to an enabling role. Deriving strategies in the development context have turned out to be more complex interpreting governance differently: Poverty reduction frameworks return to neo-rational and interventionist strategies and interpret governance in terms of efficiency and rule of law. From a pro-poor perspective governance has become a central concept in the form of partnerships and alliance-building with non-state actors and particularly the poor. Against this background, self-help is seen as building the collective capacity of the poor to interact with the state. In South Africa the juxtaposition of state-driven interventionist, market enabling as well as community enabling approaches, results in governance gaps. Thus the translation from policy into practice leaves space for interpretation. It depends on its willingness and institutional capacities, if local government enhances community-enabling self-help approaches.

2. Coordination functions shifted from central to local government and from government to horizontal governance. The governance discourse revealed that in terms of horizontal governance the inclusion of civil society leads to new governance arrangements. The state resorts to ideal and normative governance models. In reality, complex, multi-tiered and heterogeneous links are at work. The dysfunction of formal mechanisms (as in the housing field) has resulted in an increased relevance of informal structures – some of them private or illegal initiatives; some of them referred to as organised civil society. This fragmented landscape of players requires multi-player and relational models for analysis. In South Africa decentralisation in terms of 'developmental local government' and the emergence of new civil society structures lead to new forms of interfaces also characterised as relational webs.

3. Given this context, it seems to be relevant to understand the role of civil society organisations in the habitat field. Particularly in housing processes Grassroots Organisations (GROs) and grassroots movements use Non-Governmental Organisations

(NGOs) as intermediaries to influence policy processes. There has been a general shift from NGOs to grassroots structures and to alliances between the two as development partners. A general concern is the dominance of NGOs over grassroots initiatives. However, the boundaries between grassroots and NGOs are increasingly seen as blurred. Thus focus is given to relationships within alliances. There are tensions between different concepts of the role of civil society actors in development: the one position stresses the role of civil society organisations in reforming interventions to enhance development efficiency whereas the other holds the relevance of people-centred initiatives for structural change in development. Self-help approaches in the latter context are criticised for being politically irrelevant. From an alternative development perspective collective self-help is seen as the interface between efficiency and people-centred perspective. According to this view, collective action builds the basis for negotiating with the state. South Africa is characterised by extensive transformations in the civil society sector. A general shift from drivers for democratic change to implementing agents was noted in the post-apartheid period. Since the late 1990s opposition against neoliberal policies has gained momentum by the emergence of new social movements. They influenced the return of democracy related concerns. The goodness of civil society actors is questioned and the focus on organised structures criticised. Instead, two observations are being made: firstly, an increased relevance is given to informal structures outside of and in competition with formal management systems; secondly, boundaries between the state and civil society become fluid and are rather characterised as nodal governance.

Obviously each domain of discussion exposes specific aspects of transformation. Nevertheless, the three discourses share a central concern in new roles for actors and new inter-agency relationships. Deriving concepts and strategies have in common a focus on access to decision-making for the poor, new arrangements and relationships between the state and civil society actors. Constraints involve inadequate institutional channels for participation, a lack of capacity or arising new forms of exclusion. Given this context, network governance is seen as more flexible and a solution to the governance crisis. It is assumed that new actor networks expand the degree of citizen involvement.

Multi-organisational relations between grassroots, intermediary NGOs and others are

fairly complex. The research will therefore take a sociological perspective deriving from an actor-centred institutionalism and network theory in the field of housing. The challenge is to adopt a concept that integrates the structuring effects of organisations (as collective actors) and networks for their interaction with the state.

Categories for analysis are:

a) Organisations as collective actors

b) Networks as relations between collective actors

2.4.1 Organisations as collective actors

Actors are characterised by capabilities (to achieve outcome), perceptions and preferences with regard to a policy problem (action orientation).[525] Precondition to resort to organisations as collective actors would be that they are intentional actors whose interests and control of resources are determinable. Jansen (1997) argues that there is empirical evidence that organisations and not individuals are powerful actors and shape society.[526]

From a sociological institutional perspective organisations are defined as social entities with membership and differentiated roles which are oriented towards a purpose and organised systematically.[527]

According to Mayntz, organisational development derived from specific preconditions in modern society (such as technical progress and social differentiation). Sociology is therefore interested in the correlation between the specific characteristics of an organisation and the realisation of goals.[528]

This allows organisations to be described as intentional actors. Moreover, Mayntz stresses that the term also includes informal organisations and therefore applies to voluntary associations as much as to bureaucratic structured institutions.[529]

This understanding complies with Weber's assertion of the existence of illegitimate power. According to Weber, the state is one formal framework of decision-making in society that enables the deployment of interests through the social relations of "power"

[525] See Scharpf (1997), p. 43.
[526] See Jansen (1997).
[527] Mayntz (1963), p. 36; Etzioni (1973), p. 12.
[528] See Mayntz (1963).
[529] See Mayntz (1963).

("means of administration"). He stresses that beyond this formal framework there exist separate and powerful associations ("conjuratio") as a result of political socialisation despite or against the legitimate power.

The integration of informal organisations as collective actors will help to analyse beyond formal organisations such as local government or Non-Governmental Organisations, also voluntary associations. Thus, following Scharpf, different organisational structures can be analysed as collective actors in the political process:

> *"This allows us to simplify analysis by treating a limited number of large units as composite […] actors with relatively cohesive action orientations and relatively potent action resources."*[530]

2.4.2 Networks as relations between collective actors

Organisations (as a collective actor) present clear system boundaries. According to network theories networks present no organisational boundaries. Instead, they are formed by individual network relationships and are characterised as informal, decentral and horizontal self-controlling mechanisms which have a degree of openness.[531]

Thus networks consist of relations between a set of elements (nodes). They are defined as:

> *"A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events […]. The set of persons, objects or events on which a network is defined may be called the actors or nodes. These elements possess some attribute(s) that identify them as members of the same equivalence class for purposes of determining the network of relations among them."*[532]

Bommes and Tacke (2005) disagree that system boundaries dissolve with networks. Instead they argue that networks are a secondary form of order in society. Precondition for their formation would be other social systems such as organisations.[533]

Furthermore, Bommes and Tacke argue that organisations provide necessary resources and signal inclusion for networks.[534] On the other hand organisations can capitalise on networks. For instance they use networks for their problem dimension, since networks

[530] Scharpf (1997), p. 12.
[531] See Dirk Messner (2000).
[532] Knoke (1991), p. 175.
[533] Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 284.
[534] In the case of scientific community they state: "[…] an organizational address that signals to others their inclusion in a scientific achievement role". Scientists outside these organisations are perceived as less relevant. See Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 294.

provide knowledge relations and reduce risks. This is achieved by 'double inclusion' of individuals as members of organisations and participants of networks. Double-inclusion, the authors put forward, is the basis for coupling networks with organisations. Coupling they argue, means that networks influence organisations and vice versa.[535]

These positions reveal the interdependency between networks and organisations. Moreover, they refer to networks as distinct to organisations. The distinction, however, is rather inaccurate when considering attempts to set boundaries between the notion of organisations and networks.

Altvater (2000) differs networks between a) a permanent and stable institutionalised cooperation and b) a situational alliance system. He therefore refers to relations between a confined number of established actors with a specific issue-focus and homogeneity as 'organisation-like' networks (such as associations).[536]

Bommes and Tacke, on the other hand, stress that networks that function on the basis of universal criterion of participation (e.g. membership of organisation) are not totally open. Associations are then organisations which serve the objective of networking.[537]

Therefore it needs to be stressed that networks are not that clearly distinguishable as assumed by idealised abstractions.

2.4.3 Research assumptions

The focus of the research is on an in-depth understanding of civil society organisations, their alliances (intra-relationships) and their interrelationship with government institutions. The research is rooted in the understanding that actors and relationships shape policy, policy-making and policy implementation. Grounded in theories of actor-centered institutionalism and network theory the guiding research assumptions are as follows:

1. Policies and political opportunity structures are dynamic. The local contexts are characterised on the one hand by a change of political opportunity structures through institutional reform and decentralisation of functions to local government and, on the other hand, by shifting opportunities for participation at local level such as between delivery

[535] Taking the case of alumni networks they illustrate that the position in organisations make network participants relevant. See Bommes/Tacke (2005), pp. 297-299.
[536] Altvater (2000), pp. 15ff.
[537] See Bommes/Tacke (2005), p. 297.

focused and people-centred development in housing policy.

2. Policies and institutions shape one another. Civil society organisations and their networks form different constellations confronted with the political opportunity structures. Thereby they constitute different institutional mechanisms to influence policy and the mode of governance. Vice versa policies influence the institutional mechanisms of civil society actors.
3. Different patterns of organising coexist. Both networks and organisations have structuring effects. Instead of distinct networks and organisations, it is assumed, the reality is closer to hybrid structures which cannot be clearly assigned to the one or other concept.
4. Organisations and networks are dynamic. Different levels and phases of governance result in dynamics of networks and organisations. Collective actors become 'moving targets' in flexible relationships.
5. Actors interlink in sometimes network-like, sometimes organisation-like arrangements in the context of changing relationships and modes of governance. As a result, this is the hypothesis, structures are oscillating in governance arrangements.

From these assumptions a range of questions derive to analyse the South African case study:

1. What are the political opportunity structures for participating in the housing process?
2. What approaches are characteristic for civil society actors who try to influence the mode of governance?
3. What organisational structures and relationships are characteristic of civil society alliances?
4. How do these civil society alliances organise internally and relate with government on a strategic level?
5. How do they organise internally and relate with government on a project-based level?
6. How do these relationships shift between levels (strategic and project-based) and phases (land, project preparation, housing development)?

2.4.4 Conceptual model

The units of analysis are local policy processes in the field of low-income housing exemplified by the interface of local government and organised civil society in Cape Town.

The research is based on four concepts:

1. The first research topic is aligned to the housing discourse and examines the planning and housing issues with a specific interest in policy gaps. Inquiry focuses on housing challenges, policies and strategies and their implementation.
2. The second research topic is local governance revealing both the level of decentralisation and institutional frameworks for horizontal inclusion.
3. A third topic is aligned to the role of civil society as illustrated by the actors involved in the housing process.
4. The fourth topic is on actors and networks at work. Focus of analysis is on organisations as actors, their relationships and interactions with the state. The inquiry focuses on how they perform and function on strategic levels and in different phases of settlement processes.



Fig.: 2.13 Research framework, Source: Own design

3. Methodological considerations

The previous chapters have revealed the relevance of actors and networks within governance structures. Based on this understanding, this chapter will introduce the research methods applied for analysis. The intention is to clarify the specific organisational logic of civil society actors, their alliances and their relationships in governance processes. Thus, focus is given to an institutional perspective on governance and to a specific field of governance (housing process) in order to avoid misleading generalisations and to establish differentiated findings.

The research involves an analysis of civil society alliances (organisations and networks) that are involved in people-driven housing processes through case study research. The research is faced with the challenge of analysing actors and their relations on different levels and to understand process-related changes of these elements. The aim is to reveal the actors' perceptions of the emerging relationships and processes. Therefore analytical strategies based on qualitative research methods were chosen for data collection and evaluation.

3.1 Selection criteria for case studies

Cases are civil society alliances active in local and people-driven housing processes. The case study selection was based on the criteria that the alliances have similarities in terms of being **active in people-driven housing processes** in the same locality and likewise **interface with the same municipality**. Further, cases were chosen which exposed reasonable access to data given the constrained time schedule of the field studies.

Two cases have been selected. One is an alliance between community-based grassroots organisations and NGOs (Alliance Type A). The other is an alliance between federation groups aligned to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) and NGOs (Alliance Type B). Both alliances are analysed in terms of their internal relationships and interaction with local government. Here, relationships and interfaces with the City of Cape Town were chosen as a common point of reference. This meant restricting the time frame to the period after the year 2000 when the Unicity of Cape Town as one municipal structure was in place.

Micro-cases as reference points within the larger two case studies have been identified which illustrate situations of interfaces between local government and the two civil society alliances. Micro-cases were selected to facilitate a **differentiation between strategy-related interfaces and project-based interfaces**. Further, project-based interfaces have been **structured along three phases of the housing process** (access to land, project preparation and development) to illustrate the dynamics at work.[1]

The project-based interfaces are further **differentiated into Greenfield and upgrading projects** since this has an important impact on the constitution of Grassroots Organisations (for arrangement of case studies see figure 3.1).[2]



Fig. 3.1: Arrangement of case studies, Source: Own design

[1] The particular process phases are aligned to the definition of phases by the City of Cape Town. The land process comprises: need identification, land identification, land release and project approval. The project preparation process entails housing finance (subsidy application submitted and approved) and planning (urban layout submitted and approved). The housing development process is confined to land bulk servicing, site surveying, internal servicing, house design, house construction, house occupation, building approval and transfer of title. See City of Cape Town (2006d).

[2] Upgrading projects involve established area-based community organisations and Greenfield projects involve more dispersed issue-based community organisations.

3.2 Methods of data collection

The data collection focused on three aspects: firstly, the political opportunity structure; secondly, the organisational structure and intra-relationships of civil society alliances and thirdly, changing intra-relationships and inter-relationships between the two types of alliances and local government.

In the first part (Chapter 4) statistical data was used for an analysis of the local housing and governance context. This was supplemented by qualitative data from secondary literature and from expert and key stakeholder interviews to capture how actors perceive the **political opportunity structures** in the housing process.

The second part (Chapter 5) is introduced by a **stakeholder analysis**. Some statistical data and secondary literature was used to give a background of local government and civil society organisations as actors. In-depth interviews with key actors of the organisations were then carried out to understand the relationships within an alliance of civil society organisations.

A further section focused on a **process analysis** to reveal how these alliances function in housing projects when interfacing with government. Secondary literature was used for background facts on the particular micro-cases. Emphasis was given to in-depth interviews with key stakeholders to understand their perception on the specific interface problematic and evolving interrelationships.

Field studies were conducted during March 2006 and from September to November 2006. During this period 52 interviews were held. Questions depended on the role of the informant in the relevant process. A leading questionnaire ensured that the broader themes were covered during the interview (see Annexure).

The key informants included the councillor who chairs the portfolio committee for housing, local and provincial government officials (12 interviews), representatives of NGOs (19 interviews) and leaders of community organisations and federation groups (9 interviews). As the focus was not on the community perspectives, the interviews are limited to leaders within the community organisations who were involved in negotiations with local government. Each interview lasted for about an hour and was tape recorded with the agreement of the respective respondent.

Furthermore, 12 experts were interviewed (in the form of informal personal communication) who as academics and consultants were familiar with the field and could give an outsider perspective. This also entailed research both at the University of Cape Town (UCT) and University of the Witwatersrand to access local publications and connect to the scholarly debate in South Africa.

In order to triangulate the findings from the interviews and the secondary literature review, research methods also included visits to each of the organisations, local government departments as well as 9 site visits to settlement-based projects and 15 participatory observations at meetings of stakeholders.[3]

In March 2008 the findings of the field study were reflected by meetings with the directors of the key NGOs involved.

3.3 Data interpretation and generalisation

The analysis of the data collection is based on the Grounded Theory approach by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) which generates theory from empirical data not in a linear research process but through a circular research model. Thereby theoretical presumptions are used which are reflected and expanded in an iterative process through empirical data.[4]

The proposition was that new forms of interaction and relationships (phenomenon) amongst civil society actors and between them and the local state would emerge. The units of analysis therefore comprise:

1. An analysis of the political opportunity structure
2. An actor analysis which comprises the quality of the organisational form (meso 1) and the quality of the intra-relationship within civil society alliances (meso 2)
3. A process analysis which refines the aspects of relationships in terms of dynamics at work and the quality of the inter-relationship with the state (meso-macro).

[3] See annex for the leading questionnaire and the detailed list of respondents, meetings observed and site visits.
[4] See Flick (2006), pp. 69ff.



Fig. 3.2: Framework for data interpretation, Source: Own design

3.3.1 Analysis of political opportunity structures

In a first step the evaluation will describe the institutional frameworks in place as they influence inclusion of other actors into decision-making. Institutional frameworks differ according to policy domain, level and context. This analysis will focus on local level institutional frameworks in terms of housing policy-making which is also influenced by national and regional government regulation.

The institutionalised channels of public participation within the housing field are provided through *City Development Strategies* (CDS) and *Integrated Development Planning* (IDP) in terms of strategic planning and the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) in terms of implementation. Both policy areas highlight aspects of participation at the local level. Hence, they well illustrate to what extent the integration of local actors has been institutionalised. Recent research and evaluations showed some of the successes and pitfalls between policy and reality. In the following this will be complemented by the perceptions of key stakeholders in the local context of Cape Town. Moreover, it will take into account aspects above the formal institutional system and integrate further elements of political opportunity structure.[5] The analysis intends to reveal differences in the understanding and perception of requirements in the housing process. The aspects for analysis include:

1. Institutional frameworks in housing
2. Intergovernmental aspects (contestations within political sphere, relation between the political sphere and administration and the state capacity)

[5] For a discussion on political opportunity structures see Törnquist (2002), p. 12; Stokke (2002), p. 17.

3. The perception of participation and of the civil society actors by local government representatives
4. Civil society actors' understanding of inclusion through institutional channels

Further, the analysis will differentiate between different policy domains within the housing process (land, project preparation and housing development) to illustrate how governance varies within these institutional frameworks and affects the level of inclusion of civil society actors.

3.3.2 Stakeholder analysis

Organisations as collective actors

The second aspect will be specified by an analysis of actors revealing the orientation and setup of organisations. Stakeholder analysis will be applied to differentiate between organisational characteristics such as background, relation to target group, members and staff. The orientation of organisations will be framed by characteristics as vision and mission, kind and field of activity. To classify the different organisations a typology of civil society organisations will be applied which is based on Neubert's embeddedness to society. The classification is according to two central categories: a) who benefits from their activity (members/ non-members) and b) what kind of activity they pursue (advocacy / development activity).[6]

The South African definitions of civil society organisations are less comprehensive (see Chapter 2.3.2). This could result in misunderstandings when applying civil society terminology. The research is interested in analysing NGOs beyond the narrow understanding of the term in South Africa (as service organisations) but in contrast to the notion of membership-based and partly informal Grassroots Organisations (GROs). Therefore some Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in the South African terminology could (based on their characteristics) be classified as local NGOs.

To not confuse terminology (South African versus international notion of NGOs and GROs/CBOs) I will apply the differentiation used by Kirsch (1994). Kirsch refers to NGOs at the primary organisational level as People's Organisations (PO). He differentiates self-help organisations (SHO) from People's Organisations at grassroots level. Ac-

[6] Classification according to Kirsch (1994), p. 70; Neubert (1992), p. 30.

cording to Kirsch POs integrate both intermediary, advocacy and self-help functions. NGOs are then secondary (NGO-South) and tertiary organisations (NGO-North) which support structures at grassroots level.[7] This leads to the application of the following typology:

	Type of Civil Society Organisation	Characteristics
Grassroots level	Self-Help Organisation (SHO)	Community-based, member-oriented/ primarily development
	People's Organisation (PO)	Community-based, member-oriented/ development and advocacy
	Association of People's Organisations (APO)	Member-oriented (POs)/ primarily advocacy
NGO level	Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO)	Non-member beneficiaries/ advocacy and/or development (empowerment)
	Service-Oriented Non-Governmental Organisations (SONGO)	Non-members beneficiaries/ service-delivery focus
	Association of NGOs (ANGO)	Member-oriented (PONGOs) and primarily advocacy

Tab. 3.1: Typology of civil society organisations
Source: Own design based on Neubert (1992); Kirsch (1994)

Intra-relationships of civil society alliances

Furthermore, the focus is on the relationships and form of organisation between different organisations which align in an alliance confronted with a hierarchical bureaucratic state and the formal housing institutional framework. Emphasis is given to whether these alliances can be assigned to a specific organisational structure. This requires an explanation of these intra-alliance relations which will be differentiated according to the following criteria:

1. Continuance of alliance (permanent or situational)
2. Strength of link (weak or strong)
3. Key influence organisation (NGO-centered or Grassroots-centered)

[7] See Kirsch (1994), p. 70.

3.3.3 Process analysis

The third analysis concentrates on the relation-building at strategic and project-level in the local housing process. The focus is given to the dynamics of the civil society alliances and to the interface between the alliances and local government.

Dynamics of intra-relationships within alliance

Firstly, the analysis of the process shows whether dynamics of the civil society alliances can be identified between the strategic and project-level and between different phases of the housing process. The question is whether the constitution of the civil society alliances changes at different levels and during the process

Dynamics of inter-relationships with the state

This leads to the second aspect of the influence of the form of the alliance on the relational webs with the state. The focus of analysis is on interfaces between the civil society alliances and the state.

The description of the micro cases will be evaluated by:

1. Identifying the (changing) roles of the stakeholders in the process
2. Characterising the (changing) relationships between the actors
3. Evaluating the closeness of civil society organisations and alliance to state institutions[8]

3.3.4 Generalisation

According to Glaser and Strauss theoretical sampling consists of a selection of respondents which would allow theoretical saturation. The selected case studies, however, cannot arrive at a theoretical sampling and saturation.[9] Nonetheless, the selection of two case studies allows a high degree of density in description.

Since the field study reveals the perception of the process, it does not allow generalisations about outcomes in terms of effectiveness or degree of inclusion. Instead, the research intends to explore the quality of organisational form and relationships in the process. Internal validity within the case study is to be achieved by reappearance of responses

[8] The categorisation of roles withdraws partly from Hamdi/Goethert (1997). See tables in annex for evaluation criteria.
[9] See Schambach-Hardtke (2005), p. 23.

which permit a degree of generalisation of the case itself. The external validity is achieved by an interpretative step whereby the case study is analysed in terms of its similarities with and deviations from general trends. It thereby allows generalisations to deal with the theoretical assumptions and some conclusions about the implication for governance arrangements in the context of housing discourses.

3.4 Political and ethical implications

Housing represents a sensitive, controversial politicised topic in South Africa. It is sometimes used for patronage or causes conflicts within communities and against state institutions. Reviewing housing policy and its implementation can be misinterpreted as taking sides against government. Therefore, it was important to stress the exclusive academic research focus during the fieldwork.

Moreover, although all respondents were willing to record the interviews, I am committed to protect their identity. Their answers could compromise the fragile relations between actors. Identity is only revealed where the position is aligned to one identity and it is a representative function. Also, comments made during meetings that I attended as an observer were kept as minutes to understand perceptions and interrelations, but were not quoted.

My position at a German university and department with a focus on related issues, as well as my previous work in Cape Town, allowed me to get easier access to City officials and NGO staff. However, it also meant that interviewees were expecting that one would take their side or that specific perceptions need not be explained explicitly.

With regard to community and federation leaders it was clearly my international background and link to the relevant NGOs which facilitated access. My investigations, however, required some effort to clarify that I was not representing a donor agency and could not offer anything in return for their time and effort to give insights. However, my age and gender allowed a degree of trust by the exclusively female leaders which was revealed by giving insights to their personal situation. Also, my position as a foreigner helped that matters were explained in a mode of teaching and revealing perceptions, since I was not assigned to one specific (ethnic) group.

3.5 Limitations of study

Concerning data generation the inquiry included a number of constraints. Firstly, the Federation alliance could not be observed with one and the same micro case throughout the three phases of the housing process. The Federation had split in 2006 and in the time before (about 2003-2006), projects had been stalled. Alternatively, different micro cases were chosen which were characteristic for the Federation approach and therefore could reduce the constraint by representing typical interface situations within the three phases.

Secondly, the field research was carried out at a time of political instability in Cape Town. The executive mayor system was to be expelled through interventions by provincial government. Councillors were engaged in meetings and debates confronted with this situation and were therefore not accessible for interviews. To capture their perception about housing issues and involvement of civil society, information was generated by following statements in newspapers, by attending a housing portfolio committee meeting and by interviewing the chairman of the specific committee.

Thirdly, interviews with community organisations and federation groups were confined to leaders. It must be acknowledged that thereby not the views of all members were captured. Nonetheless, the interviews were attended by other members. Thus a certain degree of safeguarding the adequacy of statements can be assumed.

In terms of data interpretation and generalisation this study does not attempt to reveal neither impacts nor a universal representation of local governance. Instead, it is rather explorative and provides general lessons and validity with regard to the framing questions. Since it is restricted to an indepth understanding of the organisational structures, relationships and interfaces on local level and within a specific period of time, it must be stressed that the same study in a different locality or at another time would have led to other results. The general lessons generated therefore require further research to be more indicative outside one specific context.

Also, the specific account is interpreted along aspects of organisational structures and relationships. Other aspects of interest to governance are left untouched. These include important questions about trust, legitimacy and accountability exposed in the interface situations.

4. Housing, governance and civil society in Cape Town

4.1 Housing challenges, strategies and practice

This chapter will introduce the context of Cape Town as a basis for the following case study exploration. It will present some of the key urban development trends and strategies and then introduce governance aspects with particular interest to housing and the options for participation which are given through the institutional frameworks. Moreover, it will bring about some of the views of key actors in local government and civil society organisations on the implementation of housing strategies and the options for participation. The section on civil society in Cape Town will reflect on the key positions of civil society actors in the housing field towards state engagement. It will illustrate that civil society actors strategise on other areas of engagement within local housing projects. Finally, the chapter will reflect on some of the key factors which influenced the relationship between the City administration and civil society organisations during 2006. This is seen as an essential background to understand particular aspects of state-civil society relations revealed in the case studies.

4.1.1 Urban development trends of Cape Town

With the postapartheid transition the requirement to restructure the built environment was high on the agenda for planners in Cape Town. They were confronted by interrelated challenges: the urban context was rapidly changing with a globalising economy, increasing poverty and social differentiation.

Current urban development characteristics and trends in Cape Town have a reciprocal relation to housing and governance related issues. Five (historical, demographic, economic, social and spatial) of these are outlined here which have a particularly important influence.

4.1.1.1 Historical context

The urban environment in Cape Town continues to be affected by the legacy of apartheid planning. Cape Town was established in 1652 as a provisioning station for the Dutch East India Company and evolved to be the first permanent urban settlement in South Africa. Due to the impact of intercontinental trading Cape Town’s population derived from very

heterogeneous backgrounds. Already prior to apartheid, especially since the early 20th century, Cape Town was characterised by spatial segregation between different ethnic groups. Municipal housing for coloureds and Black Africans was established and restrictive legislation, for instance concerning labour policy, was implemented. When the National Party came into power in 1948 apartheid became an official state policy and segregation a means of ensuring the separation of different racial groups.

The Group Area Act (1950) enabled a remodelling of Cape Town's residential quarters. Spatial zoning was imposed and non-white residents relocated from proclaimed 'white' areas to the distant Cape Flats. Relocated families were exposed to both a decline of quality in housing and physical location as well as loss of community cohesion. Western argues that the experience of removals has still today filled Cape Town residents with fear for their physical safety.[1]

After having completed most of the group area removals the municipality then turned to give priority to eradication of squatter settlements. In the 1950s Cape Town was declared a *Labour Preference Area* for 'Coloureds' and since 1966 no further housing was supplied for Black Africans.[2] As they had to illegally find space within the city, informal settlements expanded in the Greater Cape Town area. Crossroads is a significant case in point and known for having established its own self-government and informal economy. In a response, the apartheid government decided to develop new Black African townships and move the Crossroads community there. Khayelitsha is a prominent example which at the same time exposed the strategy of large site-and-service schemes. Haferburg (2007) stresses that during this period state intervention and planning were central to implement the social and spatial segregation.[3]

The city-scale apartheid planning slowly lost momentum from the late 1980s. According to Haferburg the transition in Cape Town was characterised by a new suburbanisation of well-off citizens and the decline of the inner city.[4] Informal settlements were tolerated by then as 'transit camps'.[5]

[1] See Western (1996), p. 235.
[2] See Bickford-Smith (1999) p. 182.
[3] See Haferburg (2007), p. 164.
[4] See Haferburg (2007), p. 150.
[5] See Saff (1998), pp. 91ff.

Although official transition to democracy was not until 1994, the transition from the apartheid to postapartheid city started in 1990/91.[6] Group Areas were abandoned and homelands abolished. In the following, postapartheid city planning tried to reorient development by promoting integration, confining urban edges and promoting activity corridors. However, Saff questions the reality of integration. New elites, according to Saff, influenced the emergence of class-based city structures which continued the unequal and racially distorted socio-economic urban environment.[7]

Residential segregation perpetuated outside political enforcement infused by high property values and 'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) syndrome. Gated communities and isolated shopping and office buildings as well as migration to low-income areas further disintegrate and reinforce the spatial division between the well-off and poor.[8]

Time	Characteristics
Apartheid city (1950s-1970s)	Racial-based city structure, Group Areas, forced removals, municipal housing
Period of transformation (1970s- 1990s)	Expansion of informal settlements, relocation into new townships on the periphery, site and service schemes
Political transition (1990-1994)	Suburbanisation, decline of inner city , integration ideal, class-based city structure, tolerance of transit camps
Postapartheid City (since 1994)	Suburbanisation, gated communities, shopping malls, expansion of informal settlements, inner city renewal, mass-housing delivery

Tab. 4.1: Transitions of Cape Town – key trends and state responses, Source: Own design

4.1.1.2 Demographic trends

Demographic changes impacted on the urban development characteristics of Cape Town. In 2006 Cape Town had a population of about 3.2 million[9]. Cape Town cannot be considered an emerging Megacity with regards to its number of inhabitants. Nevertheless, it accounts for 64% of the population of the Western Cape Province[10] and, in the period between 1996 and 2006, it had to accommodate a population increase of 700,000 at a dy-

[6] See Haferburg (2007), p. 150.
[7] See Saff (1998).
[8] See for instance Turok/Watson (2001); Robins (2003).
[9] See Romanovsky (2006), p. 9.
[10] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 8.

namic annual growth rate of about 3%.[11] When influx control to Cape Town was finally done away with a large number of unemployed Black African migrated from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town. Cape Town had the highest net migration of all major urban areas in South Africa in the period from 1997 to 2001 with an average of 3,638 persons per month moving into the city.[12] Demographic pressures at such a scale produced large informal settlements in the Cape Flats. Migration still has a high impact since 58% of population growth is constituted by migration. However, informal settlement growth is currently predominantly constituted by growth inherent to the city itself.

A slow down of population growth can be noted with a growth rate in 2006 of 1.6% p.a.[13] The declining rate of population growth is due to the impact of HIV/AIDS[14], decreasing migration[15] and reduced fertility.[16] As projections for urban growth trends are highly uncertain, scenarios of population sizes range from 3.4 to 4.1 million for 2021.[17]

Two factors, however, need to be taken into consideration: Firstly, population growth is not distributed evenly between different ethnic groups. In future the Black African and Coloured population will grow at a higher rate than the white group and thereby change the proportional makeup (see figure 4.1). Since previous residential segregation continues to shape the location of specific ethnic backgrounds, population growth will therefore primarily take place in the Metro South-East (Cape Flats) and thus poorer part of the city.[18]

Secondly, household numbers are increasing more dynamically than population numbers. In 2001 the household size was at 3.6 with 760,000 households.[19] A further 300,000

[11] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 14.
[12] See City of Cape Town (2006e), p. 18.
[13] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 14.
[14] HIV/AIDS will be the cause of deaths for 50% of the deaths in the City by the year 2013. See Dorrington (2006), p. 18.
[15] High in-migration was informed by out-migration from the Eastern Cape Province. The pool of potential group to out-migrate from the Eastern Cape has diminished. See Romanovsky (2006), p. 5.
[16] See Dorrington (2006).
[17] See Dorrington (2006), p. 14.
[18] The Black African population group constitutes 35% of Cape Town's population. With an annual growth rate of 0.7% p.a. it is projected to make up 36% by 2021. Similarly the Coloured population will grow at 0.6% p.a. and will constitute 47% (46% in 2006) by 2021. The white group is projected to decrease from 18% (2006) to 15% in 2021. See Romanovsky (2006), pp. 9f.
[19] See Dorrington (2006), p. 17.

households are projected up to 2021.[20]



Fig. 4.1: Graph population projections per ethnic group
Source: adapted from Dorrington (2006), p. 15.

4.1.1.3 Human and social development characteristics

South Africa is faced with a declining Human Development Index (HDI). In Cape Town there is an increase of poverty within the city with about 38% of households living below the household poverty line in 2005.[21] Also, the unemployment rate (at 21% in 2005) is increasing.[22] De Swardt et al (2005) stress, that poverty in Cape Town is related to migration from the Eastern Cape. This migration, they argue, appears not only due to the pull factor of jobs but as a strategy to reduce vulnerability.[23]

Living conditions are impeded by an increasing HIV prevalence and tuberculosis incidence rate.[24] Furthermore, the social situation is affected by high levels of violent crime, especially murder and rape cases. Cape Town ranks among the 'high-risk' cities accord-

[20] See Romanovsky (2006), p. 13.
[21] Compared to 25% in 1996, see City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32.
[22] Compared to 13% in 1997, see City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32.
[23] See De Swardt et al (2005).
[24] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 32.

ing to UN definition.[25] Dramatic increase is recorded in drug-related crimes which is associated with deteriorating socio-economic conditions.[26]

Although Cape Town has a high economic growth rate its pattern of inequality persists. A number of scholars therefore suggest that the social polarisation of the apartheid era is reproduced by globalisation trends and reflected in a continued spatial division of the city.[27]

The social disparities are characterised by differences in income distribution, work status, health status, housing quality and access to services and housing. For instance inequality is reflected in income distribution with a large number of people living with a little over R12 a day (17%) and about the same number living with over R90 a day (18%).[28] Inequality within the city becomes further apparent taking into consideration that 20% of the worst off areas, which comprise 40% of the population, have an unemployment rate of between 40-58% (68% of total unemployed).[29] Poorer areas also have a higher rate of tuberculosis incidence and of HIV prevalence due to unsanitary conditions, higher vulnerability and increasing risk-taking behaviour in a context of social disintegration.[30] Moreover, the number of households in informal settlements has increased to about 115,000 in 2005 (compared to 23,000 in 1993).[31] About 14% (448,000) of all population is classified as living in informal settlements.[32] These settlements are affected by lack of services. Although all formal and 74% of households in informal settlements have access to safe drinking water, only 37% of informal households have access to sanitation services and are therefore more likely to be affected by diseases.[33] The spatial differences in living conditions are illustrated in the map below (see figure 4.2). It illustrates that poverty is concentrated in the Cape Flats in the South-East of the city.[34]

[25] See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 27.
[26] See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 54-56.
[27] See for example Beall/ Crankshaw/Parnell (2002); Saff (1998); Bond (2003b); Wilkinson (2004).
[28] See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 40.
[29] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p.32
[30] Whereas in average Cape Town has a HIV prevalence rate of 15.7 highest prevalence can be found in Nyanga (28.1) and Khayelitsha (27.2). See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 33.
[31] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p.15.
[32] See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 32.
[33] See City of Cape Town (2005c), pp. 30f.
[34] The socio-economic status index is based on a composite indicator which includes the proportion of households earning less than R19,200 p.a., the proportion of adults (20+) with highest educational level less than matric, the proportion of the economically active population that is unemployed and the proportion of the labour force employed in elementary/unskilled occupations. See Smith, K. (2005), p. 33.



Fig. 4.2: Socio-economic status index per suburb, Source: City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 16.

4.1.1.4 Economic development characteristics

Cape Town has a high and increasing economic growth rate with an average annual growth in GGP (Gross Geographic Product) of about 4% since 1993 according to the Cape Town Sustainability Report. However, the report stresses that it needs 6-7% to reduce unemployment.[35] It is an important economic driver generating 76% of the region's and 11% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[36] Osmanovic (2000) stresses that 75% of Cape Town's GDP is related to domestic demand. Foreign markets therefore do not represent the export basis for the city.[37] Economic drivers are primarily small businesses.[38]

Although it represents a diversified economy, Cape Town follows the general trend of growth of the service sector whilst other sectors, such as the manufacturing sector for low-skill employment, are declining.[39]

As a result of its booming economy, Cape Town is attracting people. However, it provides mostly formal employment in the high-skilled sector. A large share of the workforce remains unutilised as about half of the population has not completed matric.[40] Thus many lack skills and education for high-skilled jobs.[41] As the urban economy fails to provide formal employment to them, they are accommodated by an informal economy which, nevertheless, is also linked to a formal job market.[42]

However, official statistics and strategic documents do not cover this issue. Wilkinson (2004) indicates that in 2000 22% of the economically active population were employed in the informal sector.[43]

The following figure illustrates that the gap between economic growth and unemployment rate in Cape Town is widening.

[35] See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 38.
[36] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 8.
[37] See Osmanovic (2000).
[38] 50% of economic output and 40% of employment are generated by the 93% small businesses. See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 37.
[39] In 2004 the largest contributor was the finance and business sector (33.7%). Manufacturing (19.4%) and construction (3.7%) are declining in proportional terms. See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 38.
[40] Final exam at high school level in South Africa
[41] See City of Cape Town (2005b), p. 36.
[42] See De Swardt et al (2005).
[43] See Wilkinson (2004), p. 219.



Fig. 4.3: Unemployment and economic growth rate,
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 38

4.1.1.5 Spatial development characteristics

Since the mid 1980s there has been a 40% increase in the developed land area characterised by large new shopping centres, new industrial areas and new residential suburbs.[44] Cape Town develops at an average rate of 1232 hectares p.a. This is associated with its low-density peripheral development and urban sprawl.[45] With about 2644 people per square kilometre Cape Town has a relatively low urban population density. Highest densities associated with overcrowding are found in the low income areas in the Metro South-East.[46] These areas lack access and respectively imply long commuting distances to job opportunities. The 'Planning Future Cape Town' draft report even goes so far as to indicate:

> *"This is resulting in huge internal tensions within communities and reinforces the patterns of exclusion and polarisation between rich and poor. Ongoing tensions and pressure arise from the continual densification of poor areas through in-migration. The competition for access to public land, housing and resources is intense and sparks regular conflict."*[47]

The report highlights that Cape Town's expansion potential has reached its limit. It indi-

[44] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 14.
[45] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 25.
[46] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 26.
[47] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 42.

cates that with this continuous pattern of settlement development, all land suitable for housing will be developed in a 50-60 years time frame. [48]

These spatial development trends impact upon the ecological capacity of the city. Growing land and resource consumption as well as the dominating use of private cars and inadequate public transport contribute to waste accumulation and account for the deteriorating air quality, water scarcity and pollution.[49] Furthermore, the constraints in water and electricity consumption over the last years have illustrated the limited capacity of the metropolitan area to cater for its growth.[50]

Influence	Characteristics
Historical influence	Racial zoning during apartheid resulted in segregated communities Relocation destroyed social cohesion
Demographic pressure	Urban growth rate at 1.6% p.a. (declining) Population growth rates not distributed evenly Increasing numbers of households
Socio-economic disparities	High (and rising) poverty rate at 38% (2005) Increasing violence and crime rate Worsening health situation: e.g. HIV- prevalence rate at 15.7% Inequality and highly segmented living conditions Growth of poorly-serviced informal settlements
Growth without employment	Strong economic growth Economic growth does not meet need for employment opportunities Tertiarisation of city economy: jobs mainly in highly skilled categories Low skill levels Strong informal sector – 22% work in informal sector
Sprawling city and urban disintegration	Continuing fragmentation and segregation Low-density urban sprawl, limitation of expansion potential Overcrowding in low income areas Lack of access, long commuting distances Increasing resource consumption and pollution (waste, water, air)

Tab.4.2: Key urbanisation characteristics of Cape Town, Source: Own design

[48] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 41.
[49] For detailed data see City of Cape Town (2006c); City of Cape Town (2005b).
[50] See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 41-42.

4.1.2 Housing trends of Cape Town

4.1.2.1 Housing backlog and demand

The housing backlog in Cape Town has increased continuously from 150,000 (1998) to 245,000 (2002)[51] to 300,000 in 2005.[52]

New household formation which occurs due to natural population growth and migration, results in an estimated increase in housing needs at 18,500 units p.a.[53] There are about 8,000 housing units p.a. provided through the state subsidy scheme. Thus the backlog is increasing by about 10,500 units annually.

The housing backlog is made up of households in shacks in informal settlements and households in inadequate housing conditions such as in shacks on serviced (formal) sites, in over-crowded housing and in backyard shacks.

Due to high migration rates informal settlements have increased rapidly since 1996. By 2005 there were more than 200 informal settlements accounting for approximately 98,031 shacks housing about 400,000 people (13% of total population).[54] The majority of informal settlements are still concentrated in former Black township areas. Khayelitsha for instance comprises 13 informal settlements with 42,170 shacks.[55]

A comparison of the backlog composition between 2002 and 2004 reveals that whilst the number of shacks in informal settlements is declining, the number of inadequately housed families is increasing. A new phenomenon has occurred: the growth of informal settlements is no longer aligned primarily to migration of newcomers into the city. Instead, it is aligned to the spill-over from existing settlements. These households occupy vacant land within the existing areas and, not as previously, adjacent to them. A senior housing official stressed:

> *"We have to understand the spatial implications to the numbers and how it [informal settlement growth] has moved from what was previously a migration-driven process it is now inherent to the city's growth process."*[56]

[51] See City of Cape Town (2002), p. 89.
[52] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 15.
[53] See City of Cape Town (2006e), p. 67.
[54] See City of Cape Town (2006a), pp. 5ff.
[55] See City of Cape Town (2006a), p. 6.
[56] City official 2

	2002	2004
Shacks in informal settlements	100 000	+/- 96 200
Shacks on serviced sites (or inadequately housed)	25 000	+/- 28 600
Households in over-crowded housing stock	51 000	+/- 59 800
Backyard shacks (or inadequately housed)	64 000	+/- 75 400
Total	**240 000**	**260 000**

Tab. 4.3: Composition of housing backlog in Cape Town
Source: Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p.32 and City of Cape Town (2006a), p. 6

Whereas 13% of all households in Cape Town live in shacks in informal settlements, the share of households within the subsidy bracket is much higher. 41.6% of all households in Cape Town fall into the subsidy income category and are therefore eligible for housing subsidies. A further 16.1% of households fall into the so-called 'gap' since they are not eligible for subsidy, but do not qualify for housing loans. With the expected growth of incomes the share of households eligible for subsidies will decrease while gap-housing increases.[57]

Again this situation is mostly concentrated in the former Black but also Coloured communities. Cape Town, unlike Johannesburg, has few inner city slums and is more characterised by poor living environments on the Cape Flats periphery. Davis even refers to the whole of this area with a population of 1.2 million as a 'megaslum'.[58]

However, not all households making up the backlog are looking for a physical structure. For many of them location and provision of services are more important. In terms of physical structures the most pressing housing issues named are provision of low income housing, upgrading, housing quality and access to land.[59] People sell state provided RDP houses and move back to squatter camps – an evidence that the formal structure is not the priority need, but survival which is often interlinked with well-located land close to income opportunities.

[57] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 28.
[58] See Davis (2006), p. 28.
[59] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 35.

4.1.2.2 Housing conditions and density

The physical condition of housing is characterised as poor and deteriorating.[60] 14% of the housing stock in 2005 was classified as informal.[61] However, uneven distribution accounts for suburbs in the Cape Flats having up to 100% informal dwellings.[62]

Low-income housing areas are differentiated between informal settlements, public housing areas and low-income (state-subsidised) private housing areas. In the formal housing areas informal dwellings in backyards or on smaller pockets of land are also included. Generally, the socio-economic conditions in informal areas and backyard shacks are worse in comparison to other low-income areas. The disparity becomes specifically evident in basic service provision. About half of the households in informal settlements are not serviced whereas the majority of households in formal housing areas have access to services.[63]

For those in backyard shacks the situation is even more difficult as they mostly do not appear in official statistics and often do not profit from upgrading projects. One City councillor explained:

> *"[...] in the informal community living in the backyard – those people are the most desperate because they are not seen as a squatter community. They are hidden away."*[64]

4.1.2.3 Land availability for housing

The need for strategic land developments has become a concern since current housing projects have shown to be unsustainable in terms of settlement patterns and inappropriate to households in housing need.[65] A government official outlined the challenge:

> *"[…] the only land that is available is at the outskirts of the city. If the poorest people live at the outskirts, you are going to have problems in terms of transport, in getting them to job opportunities. If you do not have transport you are actually exacerbating the economic need of those people."*[66]

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[60] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 43.
[61] This figure is estimated to be higher in reality. Informal housing is defined as according to building standards and includes serviced and unserviced structures as well as backyard shacks. "An informal house is defined as a wood and iron structure which does not meet basic standards of safety in building." City of Cape Town (2006e), p. 67.
[62] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), pp. 16-17.
[63] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), pp. 19-20.
[64] Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006.
[65] See City of Cape Town (2006b), pp. 41-42.
[66] City official 8

However, City officials perceive the shortage of land for Greenfield developments as the biggest housing constraint.[67] A situational analysis on the status of land for housing revealed that Cape Town has some of the highest land prices in South Africa. Between 2000 and 2005 house prices increased by 20% p.a. and buyers of land realise profits of up to 100% within a year.[68]

The land market in Cape Town is characterised by strong inequalities where most of the well-located land is owned by affluent (mostly white) South Africans and foreigners. The booming land and property market impacts on the allocation of land for low-income housing which continues to be located on the periphery.

Although 48% of land available for housing is in public ownership, this supply will only last for another 3-5 years. The development of suitable land parcels in well-located areas is, however, often met by resistance from local residents (NIMBY) against low-income housing.[69]

Informal settlements are predominantly situated on public land. However, the City is confronted with an increasing invasion on privately owned land and faced with the dilemma of holding no land for relocation.[70]

Characteristic	Tendency
Housing backlog	High (and increasing): 300,000 (2005)
Quality of housing	Poor (and deteriorating): 14% informal
Cost of land	High (and increasing)
Availability of land for low-income housing	Low (and decreasing)

Tab. 4.4: Key housing characteristics of Cape Town, Source: Own design

4.1.3 Strategic planning documents

Cape Town is facing interrelated challenges of social inclusion, service and housing delivery, urban economic development, poverty reduction, spatial restructuring and environmental sustainability.

[67] See Graham (2005), p. 49.
[68] See DAG (2007), p. 16.
[69] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003), pp. 23-25.
[70] In 2005 informal settlements were located on land which was 25% in private ownership, 65% in City of Cape Town ownership and 10% in the ownership of the Western Cape/State. See van Niekerk (2006).

The required institutional responses on a city-wide level were first addressed by the Unicity Commission.[71] It specifically stressed the socio-economic deficiencies in Cape Town as a result of social divisions and promotes:

> *"[…] to build a unified city and take bold and innovative steps to significantly improve our position as a relevant, socially just and globally competitive city."*[72]

4.1.3.1 City-wide Spatial Development Framework (SDF)

In 2006 a long-term *City Development Strategy* ('Cape Town 2030') and its spatial component ('Future Cape Town') were still underway. A draft document ('Planning for Future Cape Town') was published to inform city-wide and district Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs) as part of the *Integrated Development Plan* (IDP).[73] Through spatial planning the City seeks to identify constraints and to suggest priority location for upgrading and restructuring thus giving direction for future investments in terms of transport, environmental and settlement development.[74]

Planning Instrument	Content
Cape Town 2030	City Development Strategy
Future Cape Town	Long-term spatial component of Cape Town 2030
Spatial Development Frameworks (SDF)	Spatial component of the IDP
District Spatial Development Plans (SDPs)	Application of SDF strategies and policies at district scale, e.g. identification of new development and urban upgrading areas

Tab. 4.5: Spatial planning instruments for Cape Town, Source: Own design

With the *City Development Strategy* spatial perspectives are integrated into a broader understanding of development objectives. The draft document 'Planning for Future Cape Town' pays tribute to intergovernmental and institutional constraints and comprises an understanding of social and economic forces. It moves away from isolated single projects and a spatial concept of nodes and activity corridors which was formerly outlined in the

[71] The Unicity Commission was established in 1999 as a multi-party body to supervise the transition to the Unicity and give recommendations for its strategic direction. For an overview of the evolution of the Unicity model see Pieterse (2002a).
[72] The Unicity Commission (2001), p. 3.
[73] The City is divided into eight planning districts which have individual Spatial Development Plans (SDPs) under a broader Spatial Development Framework.
[74] See City of Cape Town (2008b).

Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF). Instead, the CDS aligns different strategies and understands the city within its region beyond municipal boundaries. Furthermore, it suggests economic zones and containment of urban growth as well as identification of infill sites and of open and public spaces as spatial elements (see figure 4.4).[75]



Fig. 4.4: Proposed integrated settlement plan for Cape Town
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 40.

[75] See City of Cape Town (2006b).

The *City Development Strategy* and its spatial component represent a continuity of rational planning approaches. In the 1990s the *Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework* (1996) and *Municipal Spatial Development Framework* (1999) were based on the consensus that the city was to be reconstructed according to new spatial planning ideals (compact city with activity corridors) and in line with redistribution aims of the national *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP). However, in reality the spatial framework failed and has not been fully endorsed by council. One key deficiency was that it tried to direct private investment to the poorer areas in the Metro South-East.[76] Critics state that the spatial framework demonstrated an interventionist, technocratic and simplified approach based on a dual city conceptualisation between areas of opportunities and lack of opportunity. Watson specifies that the rational planning of an ideal urban future was superimposed and inadequate.[77] Moreover, a number of scholars stress that institutional constraints were not taken into consideration. Watson illustrates that spatial planners were sidelined and had to redefine their role given the shift to *Integrated Development Plans* and intergovernmental competition and power games. Scholars also stress that the planners overlooked social, economic and political realities in Cape Town.[78] Market-driven development processes and not planning determined the urban development character.

The new draft spatial perspective of Cape Town has to a large extent moved away from simplified strategies and taken into account many of the institutional and market-driven constraints. It, however, still lacks reference to the dominating informal processes at work and therefore leaves open how the long-term spatial plan can be implemented.

In this context, Harrison's identification of competing rationalities shaping South African cities still hold true and can be used to describe Cape Town with its urban integration ideal contrasted by the reality of decentralised shopping malls and gated communities, its compact city focus contrasted by low density urban sprawl and, more generally, by its spatial design contrasted by informal activity. Harrison's conclusion still has relevance: The spatial frameworks represent only ideals neglecting the reality of everyday lives.[79]

[76] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 29.
[77] See Watson (2002a); Watson (2003a), (2003c).
[78] See for example Wilkinson (2004); Haferburg (2007); Pieterse (2006); Watson (2002a).
[79] See Harrison (2002).

4.1.3.2 Integrated Development Plan (IDP)

While the *City Development Strategy* (CDS) and spatial frameworks are still underway institutional responses to the urban development challenges are summarised in the *Integrated Development Plan*. The IDP is the strategic document for guiding planning and investment within a five year time frame. For the financial year 2006/2007 it promotes five interlocking strategies that translate in strategic documents[80] and lead themes:

- Integrated economic development and jobs
- Integrated access and mobility
- Integrated communities
- Integrated settlements
- Environment

Criticism is raised in terms of the adequacy of the *Integrated Development Plan*. The overall criticisms stated in terms of IDP instrument (see Chapter 2.2.3) also allude to the Cape Town IDP document. Concerns raised are around the inadequacy of New Public Management approaches in a context of administrative restructuring, political instability and lack of cooperative governance as well as the lack of political will for meaningful institutional participation.[81]

Criticism has been also raised around the content and orientation of the Cape Town IDP. Scholars stress the contradictions of municipal strategies arising from both economic-growth orientation and developmentalism. It is envisioned that in terms of its economic development Cape Town will become a globally competitive city. This is to be achieved by investor friendly initiatives, public private partnership approaches and increasing access to economic opportunities for the poor.[82] With an increasing understanding that economic growth takes place without a 'trickle-down' effect benefiting the poor, the City has shifted to a call for shared economic growth.[83] It is, however, argued that the contradictions between a pro-growth and pro-poor orientation have not been resolved in the IDP.

[80] The strategic documents comprise: Economic Development Strategy, Building Strong Communities, Integrated Human Settlement Strategy, Transport/Mobility Plan, Infrastructure and Development Plan, Financial Plan. See City of Cape Town (2006e).
[81] This aspect will be further detailed in the chapter on governance in Cape Town.
[82] See City of Cape Town (2001a), p. 10; City of Cape Town (2006c).
[83] See City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 4.

> *"It seems self-evident that commitments such as that to alleviating poverty will be likely to sit somewhat uneasily alongside, for instance, the commitment to promoting tourism as development priorities and that, inevitably, some trading-off between them will be required. A collective political rationality to govern the terms of that trade-off is exactly what appears to be missing from the current situation so that the inherent tensions between "pro-growth" and "pro-poor" agendas in the city will tend to persist rather than to be resolved."*[84]

Key stakeholders in the City fear that economic disparities will increase despite institutional aims of integration.[85] According to Osmanovic, the 'Going Global' strategy and the investments made in corresponding infrastructure have lead to the neglect of poverty. He cautions against the threat of a vulnerable specialised industry such as tourism, structural instability due to loss of social cohesion and aligned distribution struggles.[86]

Seekings (2006) argues that although one can observe a neoliberal urban regime in Cape Town it does not mean that the municipal practice is only growth-oriented. Instead he asserts redistributive elements in service provision and illustrates his argument taking property taxes as a case in point.[87] Moreover, he argues, that existent boycotts and non-payment of service charges represent a massive redistribution to the poor. Furthermore, he points out that welfare initiatives by local government are even exceeded by national government grants and pensions representing a massive cross-subsidisation. As a consequence, he concludes, that Cape Town is still developmental but with "a poor understanding of what effective and integrated development would mean".[88]

This ambiguity is reflected in IDP documents which lack setting of priorities with aligned budgets. One provincial official therefore commented that the first cycle of IDP in Cape Town was not strategic: "Strategy does not mean nothing, if it is not able to shift resources."[89]

[84] Wilkinson (2004), p. 225.
[85] See Haferburg (2007), p. 307.
[86] See Osmanovic (2000).
[87] Property taxes are raised according to property market value. Therefore none of the informal settlement household and almost none of the formal township areas pay any property related rates.
[88] Seekings (2006), pp. 11-15.
[89] Provincial official 2

4.1.3.3 Integrated Human Settlement Strategy (IHSS)

Housing management had been a fragmented responsibility within the administration until 2002 with the release of a draft first city-wide housing plan.[90]

The first *Integrated Human Settlement Strategy* (IHSS) was published in 2005. The plan is one of the strategic documents as part of the IDP. Its aim is to give strategic direction to the housing process and investment. Furthermore, the document is aligned to the national housing policy 'Breaking New Ground' and other provincial frameworks such as the *Western Cape Spatial Development Framework* (see following figure).



Fig. 4.5: Alignment of government housing strategies in Cape Town
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 7.

Key objectives of the City's housing strategy are summarised as follows[91]:

- to reduce the number of people in informal settlements between 2004 and 2014
- to address housing needs of people in backyards and overcrowded conditions
- to improve living environments

[90] See Western Cape Housing Consortium/DAG (2003a), p. 4.
[91] See City of Cape Town (2005d).

- to locate new low-cost developments closer to the urban core
- to create an enabling environment for developing settlements
- to support communities and enable participation

It proposes in terms of spatial planning the strategic identification of land and the development of an urban core by densification and mixed use. Housing delivery itself is to be accelerated through increasing the number of new developments (from 8,000 to 20,000 p.a.) and through an *Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme* (UISP) with a focus on insitu. 35% of informal settlements are supposed to be relocated and all others are to be upgraded by 2014. These initiatives are supposed to be accompanied by an increase in financial allocation and diversifying of funding sources.[92]

A shift in the political orientation is reflected through the *Integrated Human Settlements Strategy*. Firstly, the City now also focuses on gap housing. Its target group are people with an income above the subsidy eligibility but who cannot access credit.

Secondly, the City now officially admits that it cannot provide a housing unit for everyone. Instead of delivering housing units, the City intends to provide a larger number of housing opportunities as outlined in the *Upgrading of Informal Settlement Programme* (UISP). This programme provides serviced sites through an area-based, not subsidy beneficiary, approach.

> *"With the old subsidy programme if people did not qualify for a subsidy – what did you do with them? You could not integrate them to the project. The UISP says everyone qualifies for the minimum of a site. Not a house."*[93]

The shift to site-and-service schemes seems to be a return to previous practices. Nevertheless, this shift is appreciated within the municipal administration. One City official commented on the necessity of site-and-service programmes:

> *"Certainly there has been a shift from the mayor's point of view in saying the priority is not to give people brick and mortar houses, the priority is to give people housing opportunities so to give them land and services and give them a kick start. […]People laugh, because that is the kind of old methodology. But I think it is the right thing."*

This new mechanism is hoped to increase the subsidy-based housing opportunities.

[92] See City of Cape Town (2006f), p. 22; City of Cape Town (2005d).
[93] City official 4

> *"If we can only do sites, we can probably do two sites […) per subsidy and then come with the housing later. Maybe people will build their own houses, maybe some consolidation subsidy later on for those people who do qualify."*[94]

The innovativeness of the approach could also be interpreted as giving up looking for other alternatives. One official expressed:

> *"But the reality is that the site-and-service scheme is the only option for the poorest of the poor and that means it is large tracks of land at the edge of the city. […] The tragedy is that when you do site-and-service it will always be very far away. But I suppose it is better than nothing. "*[95]

A fear of city councillors is that previous RDP beneficiaries will move into these settlements and then benefit a second time.[96]

One critical aspect highlighted by scholars is the technical and standardised approach to site-and-service schemes which are often implemented as roll-over schemes instead of in-situ upgrading. The upgrading approach seems to neglect that site-and-service schemes have failed before and many of these settlements have not consolidated. The experience made by the communities therefore fuels resistance to the approach. One councillor outlined the dilemma:

> *"We cannot provide RDP type of housing for people on the waiting list. We simple do not have the financial resources to do that. In situ upgrading of squatter communities therefore is not only an option; it becomes a necessity. There are quite a lot of individuals in the squatter communities who do not appreciate that. Their demand is at least a RDP house"*[97]

In terms of the housing challenge the *Integrated Human Settlement Strategy* has introduced a paradigm shift to more integrated approaches. It moves away from standard responses to the housing problem and promotes two key interventions with informal settlement upgrading and social housing. Nevertheless, in reality the majority of public housing projects are still low-cost delivery on the periphery. More innovative approaches are tested as pilots, but these have not yet been translated on a higher scale.

[94] City official 4
[95] City official 7
[96] Comments at portfolio committee workshop, 13.10.06.
[97] Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006.

4.2 Local governance in Cape Town

Given the planning and housing challenges in Cape Town, governance related questions become essential as to what contributes to the failure of policy implementation within the sphere of government and as to what opportunity to influence policy-formulation and practice is given to other actors.

4.2.1 Intergovernmental cooperation

Housing functions are dispersed over all levels of government – both in the political and administrative spheres (see table 4.6). National government pursues housing provision as a poverty reduction strategy and therefore gives an interventionist role to the local state level. At the same time higher spheres of government hold vested powers and determine housing policy and finance. As discussed before, the autonomy of local government is therefore limited in terms of delivery pressure from higher spheres of government. The central state can affect local policy-choice by transferring functions and by limiting or providing financial resources (see Chapter 2.1.3). The devolution of responsibility for housing delivery is therefore characterised as 'unfunded mandates'. Local government is limited in strategically selecting and prioritising projects as the subsidy procedure dominates the housing process. Nevertheless, with the multi-year planning process and a housing chapter in the IDP, option of accreditation and taxation the scope for municipal action is broadened.

Level	Government	Administration
National	Minister of Housing, Parliament	Department of Housing (DoH)
Provincial	Member of Executive Council (MEC), Council	Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing
Metropolitan Council	City of Cape Town Municipal Council/ Mayoral Executive Committee (MAYCO), Executive Mayor/ Portfolio committees	City of Cape Town Municipality (CCT) / Executive Directorates / Directorates / Branches
Areas	Subcouncil, Subcouncil chairperson	Regional offices, Subcouncil manager
Ward	Ward Council	Regional offices

Tab. 4.6: Different levels of government with housing functions, Source: Own design

The need for intergovernmental alignment and cooperation has been addressed since 2006

by an *Intergovernmental Relations Policy* and an action plan.[98] Vertical governance issues become also more evident for housing. Improvement of intergovernmental coordination is seen as the key for urban renewal, settlement planning and housing management tasks. An important initiative by the City was the accreditation for administering housing funds by end of 2006.[99] Beforehand it refrained from accreditation as this required extensive administration for the identification of beneficiaries, payment of subsidies and management of the housing stock.[100]

Therefore, the City of Cape Town acts as the developer on behalf of the Province and the Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing administered the housing programmes. The funding for housing of about R 400-500 million comes from national level via the Province. This finance covers 8,000 housing units per annum. In addition to this housing budget the City is responsible for providing underground services and has to finance this from its own municipal budget (about a further 120 million Rand).[101] The ward councillor submits beneficiary names to the municipality which forwards the list to the provincial level for subsidy application. In terms of the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) projects are financed from Province and the City acts as account administrator.

This dependency on finance from national and provincial level causes resource constraints for the City of Cape Town concerning its delivery responsibility. One official explained:

> *"If you look at our track record we are required to build between 20,000 and 22,000 houses a year to address the backlog. The availability of funding has actually caused us to build less than 7,000 houses average a year. So the backlog is growing."*[102]

The dependency is particularly difficult in Cape Town since the different levels of government are affiliated to different parties. The difference is that the *Democratic Alliance* (local government) is more demand-driven whereas the ANC (provincial and national government) is more supply-driven when it comes to housing.[103]

Of specific concern to the administration is that higher sphere of government are taking over local government competency.

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[98] See City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 60.
[99] Although accreditation has not been finalised in 2008. See SACN (2008).
[100] See Graham (2005), p. 48.
[101] See interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006.
[102] City official 8
[103] City official 7

> *"Sometimes Province has land on the edge of a city and […] what they used to do is to develop a housing project and say to local authority: "Right. Here it is. You do the water, sanitation, refuse removal." […] There is quite a struggle because the City will have its own plans, but provinces hold actually the strings at the moment."*[104]

A case in point for taking over local authority's competency was highlighted by the contested N2 Gateway project which is a presidential lead housing project. In 2006 the project was handed to an agency aligned to national government. It was suspected that the project was taken away from the City when it became apparent that the ANC might not win local elections.[105]

Political conflicts also delay approval processes. One Housing official outlined:

> *"It takes us eight months to get a project approval by Province and since the DA is in power the Province has not given us <u>one</u> project approval. Housing and politics just do not go together."*[106]

Given these power games, national and provincial housing strategies are not translated into municipal practice. One City official stated that:

> *"No, for me it is high in the sky and has not filtered down where I am. Provincial and national government are very good at coming out with new strategies. Wait another two years and they will have another strategy."*[107]

Since housing is on the political agenda, the implementation of the strategy is also challenged by the relations between the administrative and the political sphere in the City. The reality of political decision-making illustrates that strategic approaches by the administration often lack a corresponding political commitment. The IDP plan therefore remains a generalised document. Specific recommendations outlined by the officials will be generalised once it has to go through Council approval. One City official stated:

> *"[…] it [the IDP draft] goes to the portfolio committee which is the first set of political body for housing […]. They look at it and they generalise it even further. Then it goes to the mayoral committee which is the senior politicians. They again generalise it. By the time all the specifics have been cut out, just so it does not offend absolutely anyone. Then it hits the press and then it goes in the public domain and everybody giggles, because it does not say very much."*[108]

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[104] Interview with Mark Napier, 7.11.2006.
[105] City official 3
[106] City official 1
[107] City official 3
[108] City official 1

The housing portfolio committee is the monthly forum where officials and councillors come together. Moreover, informal committees have been established to facilitate communication between the political and administrative sphere. Three councillors and the mayor meet the key senior officials from various departments in a 'Housing Action Committee' every second week. Also, the councillor responsible for the housing portfolio meets the senior housing officials on a monthly basis in a kind of 'shadow meeting'. These informal meetings are perceived as critical to enhance the interface between politics and administration.[109]

The relationship between officials and sub-council level, however, was characterised by a lack of communication. In 2006 officials were therefore located to specific sub-councils.

Differences between the political and administrative sphere continue to determine the practice on the ground. One key aspect is the political resistance against upgrading approaches whereas the administration opts for a paradigm shift to in situ upgrading and area-based approaches with regard to informal settlements.

> *"We need to reconfigure the problem. Because delivering units is not going to solve the problem. […] Informal settlements are part of the urban environment and will remain so."*[110]

This understanding, however, has not yet been fully translated into the political sphere. Initiatives are resisted particularly by ward councillors who rather opt for augmenting delivery rates of RDP houses to expand their constituency. Specifically the shift from an individualised to an area-based approach is highly contested. Instead, council still states it can house all the people and that it will eradicate all informal settlements by 2014. This contradicts positions within administration towards in situ upgrading and security of tenure. One housing official states his concern:

> *"Eradication of informal settlements is the wrong approach. It is anti-developmental and a middle-class attitude towards the poor. Informal settlements are networks of survival."*[111]

The delivery approach to housing promoted by council is perceived as failure also to City planners.

[109] Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006.
[110] City official 6
[111] City official 2

> *"The council, when they come in they say: we need another Mitchells Plain. Where do we find another Mitchells Plain? We find another Mitchells Plain out there and if there is another kak place to be, it is out there, because there is no public transport, there is no nada."*[112]

Dewar even refers to government's delivery agenda as a "Religious belief to provide people with development".[113] This delivery approach puts government officials under such pressure to concentrate on outcomes that more strategic approaches are sidelined. One City official recalled:

> *"Every single politician was shouting at us about land. They were screaming at Planning. They were screaming at Housing. It was just manic. Every single official in the building was mobilising around finding land and finding information on land and bugger all else. It was a disaster."*[114]

Proactive approaches are also threatened by political patronage. City officials are frustrated with promises made during election periods:

> *"I am always coming back to the issue of politics causing more problems than anything. Just before the time of elections a lot of people are allowed to invade, […] because they are going to vote in a certain way. […] But it leaves us with a big problem. We must babysit all this."*[115]

Additionally, the implementation of municipal housing strategies is constrained by lack of coordination and capacity within the administration. The importance of inter-departmental coordination in order to integrate aspects such as economic development, job creation and transport and mobility, is increasingly acknowledged.[116] One critical aspect is around capacity constraints. As one housing official put it:

> *"I am battling to find people to run critical projects. […] Isn't housing top of the agenda of government? If it is, then allocate the proper resources to do that. […] The resources are there. It is just that they are not distributed correctly."*[117]

As a result of the capacity constraints, housing officials feel reduced to crisis management. Another housing official stated:

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[112] City official 7
[113] Personal communication with David Dewar, 27.03.2006.
[114] City official 7
[115] City official 3
[116] See City of Cape Town (2006f), p. 22; City of Cape Town (2005d).
[117] City official 3

"Just because of the shear work load that I have currently got I am just seriously not coping with all the projects. […] It is crisis management which is far from ideal."[118]

Given this context, the housing backlog is growing while capacities to deliver are decreasing (see following figure).



Fig. 4.6: Housing backlog and housing delivery in Cape Town
Source: adapted from City of Cape Town (2006b), p. 43.

The lack of resources also translates into a competition between different departments for their share of the budget.[119] Particular internal tensions emerge between departments that hold the revenue services and those having to receive finance for their operations.[120]

This aggravates the already existent silo approach within the administration. Therefore the managerial approach of the IDP has been specifically questioned by Wilson. He stresses that in reality local government continued to work in line function which contradicts the integrated approach of the IDP.[121]

[118] City official 5
[119] The City of Cape Town has only 20% of its capital budget (about 250 million Rand) to play with. See City official 6.
[120] City official 3
[121] See Wilkinson (2004), pp. 224ff.

As a consequence, IDPs in Cape Town were rather a compilation of what was happening anyway in the line departments than to come to an agreement on strategic priorities. As a provincial official outlined, Cape Town was specifically characterised by it's failing intergovernmental and interdepartmental relationships.[122]

Therefore the IDP did not serve as a strategic direction for housing officials. Instead, they felt reduced to provide reports on delivery rates. One official commented:

> *"To me the IDP was a static thing that I just fed into. And I did not know further than that. Whoever processed that info was able to monitor and evaluate on progress and that was not fed back to me to see if we are on target or falling below."*[123]

The restructuring of local government further aggravated the silo approach. This also complicated an integrated approach for servicing of informal settlements. Whereas previously one official was in charge for a whole area, this task was now divided into line functions. For instance the directorate for water would now exclusively look at water servicing. One housing official criticised:

> *"You can not go into a settlement and only deliver one service. This restructuring meant a move back to the silos. We are back to where we were 10 years ago."* [124]

The silo approach also complicates interdepartmental communication. This results in doubling of work. The same official indicated that statistics, particularly on informal settlements, vary between different departments.

> *"We would count from aerial photographs the number of households and we mapped the informal settlements. But Human Settlements would also do their own counting […]. Province also have their own stats. Even before we go to Province let's just go next door to Solid Waste and just go around the corner to Water Services. They would do their own counting. Now which is the official number?"*

In 2006 the importance of working relationships between the different directorates has increasingly been acknowledged. An interdepartmental task team aligned to the IDP was established consisting of representatives from each directorate. Interdepartmental task teams have also been created for housing:

[122] Provincial official 2
[123] City official 3
[124] City official 3

> *"It was really a good impetus to bring in a structure to coordinate and it is at its infancy stage but I think it is a very important tool and a lot of us are really committed to pushing it and making it work. Because it is a joint thing and it is about getting a proper understanding about what the housing need is and then coming up with a programme […]."*[125]

The same official expressed the hope that the interdepartmental cooperation towards a joint housing program would reduce political patronage:

> *"That is why it is so important to have a very clear articulated housing program, so it cannot be influenced by politics, which is probably naive but ideal."*[126]

Nevertheless, tensions persist also between officials within the Human Settlement Directorate. Often different professional approaches (engineers, community facilitators and inspectors) lead to conflict. A housing official explained:

> *"It is a big simplification that an official is an official and they are always part of the state. We have got project managers, often civil engineers. We have got community facilitators, they […] really deal with people, they speak the local language. […] They are quite happy to tell the project manager to get lost. […] And then we have the third kind of guys working: the […] kind of inspectors. Making sure when we put out contracts, before we pay the bills, they go and check that it was done accordingly. […] Between these three functions there is a lot of tensions."*[127]

4.2.2 Horizontal integration of civil society

Land and housing plans and budgets are determined by the IDP (with the housing strategy as one component) which is required to provide citizen participation. Participation on project-level takes place through sub-councils, ward committees and project steering committees.

4.2.2.1 Participation within the IDP Process

With the establishment of the Unicity, opportunities expanded to the participation in the *City Development Strategy* and the *Integrated Development Planning* (IDP) process.[128] The IDP process is the formal channel to influence the priorities for land allocation within the city. Housing and well-located land set out as priorities in the IDP should guide the budget spending of the line departments.

Participation mechanisms within the IDP process have shifted considerably due to politi-

[125] City official 7
[126] City official 7
[127] City official 1
[128] Limitations of CDS participation are further discussed in Pieterse (2002a) and (2005b).

cal instability. Since the two parties which alternately take over local government favour different participatory approaches, administration is left with having to constantly shift the engagement processes. One official explained:

> *"That makes it a bit difficult in planning our public engagement processes, because there is a distinct difference between the ANC way of engagement and the DA's way of engagement itself. So we have been redefining our engagement virtually every year […]."*[129]

The ANC prefers to engage larger groups of people especially in the marginalised and poorer communities. The first cycle of IDP (2000/2001 – 2005/2006) process was structured at ward level and debates centred on service delivery. This was organised by a public engagement office through participation of ward committees and large public events ('Mayors Listening Campaign'). There people could raise their issues which were then fed into the IDP process. This approach was highly criticised by officials as the outcomes were predictable and defined by local issues. One City official commented on Cape Town's listening campaign:

> *"The tendency was that aunty Bloem […] would still complain about the shebeen next door, focused on local issues in-my-street type of thing, whereas we would try to focus on citywide corporate issues."*[130]

With the change in local government in 2006 both the 'Listening Campaign' and ward committee participation was abandoned. Instead the DA-led government established a system of sub-councils. Public engagement mechanisms in that year were not in place yet. However, council decided that in future multi-stakeholder forums would be the space for participating within the IDP process. A government report stressed:

> *"The challenges facing the city will only be adequately addressed if there is an effective system of governance in the city, based on the concept of 'city' leadership by all relevant stakeholders in the city, rather than leadership by the City of Cape Town only."*[131]

Multi-stakeholder engagement is supposed to be facilitated through each of the sub-councils which will provide participation by civil society organisations and business. The focus will be on citywide issues instead of sectoral or local issues. Participation is facilitated by invitation. The municipality has therefore established a database of all NGOs and CBOs in the city. The outcome of this process will then go for comment to the public on

[129] City official 8
[130] City official 3
[131] City of Cape Town (2006c), p. 62.

ward-based levels. After consultation the key strategic issues decided upon will go into council for approval. Then the City will develop a strategy and draft budgets which will be given to the public for comment and then for final budget approval by council. The budget is then made available to the public and monitoring and reporting systems are initiated.

A provincial official commented on this shift to multistakeholder forums: "Currently the City is starting to move out of its shell." At the same time, criteria as to who is invited to participate and who is excluded, is not transparent. With the first IDP process in 2001 the City counted about 4,900 non-governmental entities which included both business and social organisations with very different sizes of staff or members. The bulk of these entities were civil society organisations active in environmental and social issues. However, the same official indicated that the City could not manage the multistakeholder process. This will in future affect the legitimacy of decisions being made in these forums. The same official asked: "What kind of forum do we have which can officially be viewed as ratifying the IDP?"[132]

4.2.2.2 Participation in the housing process

Horizontal coordination with affected communities in housing projects is outlined as 'Integrated Community and Human Development: Partnership Building Support'. This comprises the improvement of community communication and cooperation between officials and ward committees.[133]

The resistance against participation in decision-making is also reflected in the City's policy for participation in the housing process. It requires participation only after a project has been approved, funding has been allocated, beneficiaries have been identified and their subsidy application approved. Once all these steps have been covered, local government invites beneficiaries to a meeting. A project facilitator organises the public participation process, working closely with the ward councillor and the committees. These facilitators are often private consultants. At the meeting the beneficiaries elect representatives for a 'Project Steering Committee'. Thus project steering committees are the link to the community on project-level in housing developments. The objective of the committee is

[132] Provincial official 2
[133] See City of Cape Town (2006f), p. 22; City of Cape Town (2005d).

to agree upon the allocation of sites, to discuss problems during project implementation, to ascertain at the end if the original beneficiaries occupy the houses, and hand over 'happy letters'[134].

Local government does not provide any earlier participation to avoid community conflicts. One housing official explained:

> *"So there is no fight about who gets in and who does not. That is usually the worst fight that we leave well before the creation of the committee. Then it is just a case of: There is the lay-out plan; there is my list of people, who is going where […]."*

The same official indicated that previous experience has shown that early participation with the community leads to blocked projects:

> *"I don't know how many projects are on our capital budget but it must be close to about eighty which are just dead, they are not moving. Why are they not moving? Because we involved community politics way too early."*[135]

Other City officials claim that blockages emerge particularly due to the lack of early participation. They question the accountability of ward councillors and the legitimacy of project committees and feel frustrated as they have to deal with political-driven housing conflicts. Ward councillors, as the legal community representatives, select who in the community is going to be a beneficiary. Therefore ward councillors are referred to as 'entry points' or as 'gate keepers' to the community. As a result housing developments are politically driven since many ward councillors put their supporters on the beneficiary list and exclude other residents from both the project and project committee. This leads to conflicts within the community and blockages of housing projects. Groups which are left excluded will break away and oppose the development taking place.

> *"To kick-start a housing project through project committees is not always the best way of doing things. […] We know a ward councillor is a member of a political party. […] Now those people that belong to another political party tend to be excluded from the beneficiary list. So housing becomes a political vehicle to achieve an ends."*[136]

One senior official outlined the shift in participation envisaged for area-based upgrading:

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[134] "Happy letters" are signed declarations that the house is complete according to building inspection and accepted by beneficiaries. Thereby beneficiaries become homeowners and take over responsibility for service fees and to look after the property.
[135] City official 1
[136] City official 3

> *"We survey and register as early as possible and try to engage with communities. So they realise that there must be cooperation. […] If there is a group in a community that will not be part they will destabilise the whole project."*[137]

City officials feel restricted in their communication with the communities and question their role.

> *"It is so difficult to define our role with communities. I believe in being partners with the communities. So if we ourselves cannot have formal lines of communication with the communities and struggle with other bodies within government on a horizontal level, it is difficult."*[138]

Therefore, City officials agree with initiatives by the mayoress to take away power from the ward councillors when it comes to housing projects.

Some City officials try to overcome the limitations of the prescribed participation. One way is to address problems with ward councillors at sub-council meetings.

> *"So if there is any problem that we have with that councillor we can at least take it up to that subcouncil to state our side of the story […] the subcouncil chairman can call that ward councillor to order or take other steps."*[139]

Another option to ensure participation is through 'Community Development Workers' (CDWs). Two to three community development workers are located per sub-council structure and are under supervision of an area manager. The CDWs are from the local communities and nominated by the people. They are employed to connect citizens with government concerning any level from local projects to strategic processes. Focus is given to poor areas "[…] where more local conflicts are and more disinformation and more non-understanding what the game is about, because the people in that area are not very mobile, do not have access to information […]."[140] According to officials they are playing a pivotal role in housing since they can prevent projects from blockages. [141]

Beyond these regulative steps some officials even take proactive measures. One approach is to organise participation in different phases which would not only start with the ward councillor and project committees. As a first step City officials would consult the community about the subsidy application.

[137] City official 2
[138] City official 3
[139] City official 3
[140] Provincial official 2
[141] City official 8

> *"We would do a beneficiary list, we screen it, we workshop the people, we tell them what the housing subsidy is and how do you qualify, what it is for and what you can get out of it."*[142]

Another attempt is to try to constitute a broader project committee by inviting all representative bodies within a community.

> *"It takes much longer, but at least you do it right the first time. […] He [one housing official] knew that he was not breaking the law but extending it. He was not allowing the ward councillor to lead the way."*

Taking alternative approaches constitutes a risk for officials. One City official stressed that it is difficult for local government officials to work outside the ward councillor system as the legitimate forum for participation "[…] because you would easily be accused of giving preference to one group and excluding another group."[143]

Participation through *Project Steering Committees* is also seen as a capacity problem. The City therefore had moved away from regular interaction. Officials also feel that they have to comply with regulations and therefore decisions in the committees might contradict policy. One City official explained:

> *"The intensity of the interaction is too great. At the end of the day myself as a council official I have to comply with the Municipal Finance Management Act and the Procurement Processes. […] That is why it is quite stressful because you get squeezed from the community and the politicians and you get squeezed from the technical as well as administrative side."*[144]

The *People's Housing Process* (PHP) is understood to be a vehicle in this regard. One hope aligned to a PHP process is to shift development responsibility to the people themselves. This attitude is reflected by the statement of a City official who stressed the advantages of PHP:

> *"It takes some pressure of us. We are so totally flooded with housing demand and hotspot all over the city […]. If there are groups that can do their own thing and organise themselves and we with minimal input can assist them that would be useful."*[145]

However, assistance and participation through the PHP process by the City has been limited and a PHP unit was not operative until 2007. Firstly, the City lacks criteria to select and prioritise PHP applications. One senior official outlined:

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[142] City official 3
[143] City official 7
[144] City official 5
[145] City official 4

> *"[…] how do we evaluate and prioritise different PHP applications from different saving groups? […] do we for instance prioritise a group that has savings above a group that does not save?"*[146]

Secondly, there is disagreement between higher sphere of government and local government about the participative nature of PHP. City officials fear the red tape aligned to PHP. A senior housing official stressed: "People would just be concerned how you can work around it."[147] Another official indicated that problems with PHPs are aligned to lack of capacity to support the community groups. He stressed that NGOs are an option to technically support the groups.

Also, City officials are worried that the PHP policy will insist on self-building. They argue that this form of PHP would fail due to a lack of technical capacities within the communities:

> *"We have seen it time and time and time again. […] They have got four houses and the rest of the group will never get a house. Or they built twenty large houses and only to wall heights and the house is never finished […]."*[148]

More progressive officials agree that this kind of self-help approach is inadequate, but instead promote a community-managed process. A senior official outlined:

> *"It is a romantic ideological approach to think that people are building their own houses. […] but they are in charge of the process. They decide who is going to be the brick layer, where I will buy my cement, what roof am I putting on, how is my front door going to look like. They take those decisions, they decide on the design of their house, but they would not do the work physically."*[149]

In general local government is very reluctant to work with the PHP process. It however holds discretionary power in terms of promoting contractor-built against people-driven housing projects, to hold back or release subsidies and to insist on the compliance with building regulations or to also approve lower standards.

4.2.2.3 Role given to civil society organisations

The City runs a public engagement office. This office is responsible for linking with civil society and for facilitating workshops and capacity building. Housing officials would re-

[146] City official 4
[147] City official 2
[148] City official 5
[149] City official 4

ceive information on which groups to contact in an area.[150]

However, since participation in the housing process is organised through ward councillors, the role for community organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations has not been taken seriously.[151]

City officials working on project-level would try to integrate and cooperate with Community-Based organisations. According to them this initiative causes conflict with the ward councillors.

> *"The ward councillors do not want them there. […] they [community organisations] want everything to be equitable. So the ward councillors become threatened by their presence."*[152]

Furthermore, local government fears that if they give too much voice to local organisations these will try to exclude outsiders from planned developments within the community. A councillor explained:

> *"The problem with Community-Based Organisations […] is that they become very territorially. So that if you have […] got a piece of land that you wish to develop or you wish to do an in situ upgrade, the local community will always say we don't want outsiders [from the waiting list]."*[153]

With regards to NGOs, the role given to them is limited to technical assistance, mediation or as research consultants. Some officials show a high degree of mistrust towards NGOs. A housing official even accused them of causing blockages:

> *"In fact the NGOs just cause more confusion and false expectations. That is what I mean by these eighty [blocked] projects. There are expectations on those projects which are simply impossible."*[154]

A further constraint to cooperation with NGOs is the fear that competition between NGOs will block progress of projects. A housing official gave an example:

> *"The one quasi NGO and the other proper NGO were always on the other's toes. And the City then was involved in sitting in the middle. We were just trying to get the project going for the sake of our politicians, because that was the instruction."*[155]

Other officials are more sceptical about the empowerment agenda of NGOs. Therefore,

[150] City official 3
[151] Personal communication with Marie Huchzermeyer, 04.09.2006.
[152] City official 3
[153] Interview with Neil Ross, 24.10.2006.
[154] City official 1
[155] City official 1

they are of the opinion that NGOs should only provide technical assistance to communities as this is where they can add value to the housing process.

Cooperation with NGOs in the field of policy and research is characterised by contractual arrangements. The contractual arrangements are seen by officials as an opportunity to overcome the lack of capacity within the municipality. However, one City official also critically remarked that NGOs are commissioned so that money can be spent:

> *"We would use them to say we are too busy doing what we must do – deliver on service. You come in as an independent observer and just take a bird's eye view of how we are doing things, looking through all the four regions and put together a report and sit down and discuss it. But sometimes reports are commissioned to spend money."*[156]

On a project-level NGOs are often just invited to mediate in conflict situations. The N2 Gateway project is taken as a case in point by officials:

> *"Only when it gained momentum […] they were called in. They had a big problem: The City has already planned everything, the framework is already set. I remember that Joel Bolnick was very involved saying: "Why do you need us? Do you just want us to rubberstamp decisions that you have already made? To say that you have consulted with civil society?""*[157]

[156] City official 3
[157] City official 3

4.3 Civil society organisations in Cape Town

As outlined in the chapter on civil society in South Africa the political changes resulted in shifting positions within the civil society sector (see Chapter 2.3.2). During apartheid resistance by civic structures in the black communities was assisted by NGOs particularly in the urban sector. In Cape Town the *Development Action Group* (DAG) is a prominent example of these professional NGOs. With the political transition in the 1990s civics and NGOs became supportive of the state and experienced a changing role. As a result the former civic movement is now aligned to the ANC government. Other civic associations formed Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and focused on development work. Given this context, urban sector NGOs such as DAG shifted from an exclusive advocacy role to a support role of CBOs in housing development. For them the projects represented a vehicle to increase community empowerment. They supported the communities with organisational development, technical advice and project management.

When the *South African Homeless People's Federation* started in the early 1990s it followed a non-collaborationist approach. Non-collaboration, according to Federation leaders, was significant at the time as it enabled mobilisation around a shared identity, and the emergence of a movement of the urban poor.[158] This approach was characterised by land invasions and resistance to removal. In the mid 1990s the Federation then shifted towards a partnership approach with government.[159]

Furthermore, since the late 1990s new urban social movements emerged which operate outside geographically defined areas, are issue-based and have voluntary memberships. Most of these social movements such as the *Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign* follow a radical tradition with a focus on opposing state politics.

Also, there are numerous organisations, often affiliated to Northern NGOs such as 'Habitat for Humanity', which follow a welfare approach to housing delivery.

Then there are a number of NGOs in Cape Town which aim to contribute to the development debate like the 'Isandla Institute', the 'Sustainability Institute' or the 'Foundation for Contemporary Research' (FCR).

In the housing sector two further positions became apparent: a right-based represented by

[158] See Pieterse/Khan (2003), p. 7.
[159] Federation member at focus group, Piesang River, 02.11.2006.

the *Development Action Group* and an alternative development view held by the Federation and its support NGOs.

	Radical	Right-based	Alternative development	Welfare
Grassroots level	Landless Peoples' Movement Western Cape Eviction Campaign	SANCO Community-Based Organisations	FEDUP Poor People's Movement	
NGOs		The Kuyasa Fund DAG	uTshani Fund CORC	Habitat for Humanity Rooftops Canada Nial Mellon Township Initiative

Tab. 4.7: Classification of orientation of civil society organisations in Cape Town, Source: Own design

4.3.1 Ideology and positions

Both right-based and alternative development advocates share the common understanding that the City has a redistributive responsibility. They differ in what conclusions they draw for their engagement vis-à-vis the state. NGOs like DAG take a right-based position and started to integrate watchdog and advocacy role vis-à-vis the state beyond their direct support to communities in housing projects. For them resource inequality represents the key problem. DAG argues, that since the City becomes economic growth oriented and attracts further people, local government has an obligation to plan for its citizens.

> *"If you want the magic 6% [economic growth] you have to accept that there is a growing city and then you have to plan for it and don't say you don't have resources to plan for the people. […] if you want a growing city, if you want to grow the economy, you must find the resources to house the people. Otherwise you will have a big city, making money and you drive in an armed vehicle."*[160]

For DAG it is essential that people organise to counter-balance the influence of elitist groups and to influence the state in order to enable development.[161] A prerequisite in this respect is that people are enabled to use the space of engagement.

[160] NGO member 11
[161] See DAG (2006), pp. 8f.

> *"[…] in order to claim and exercise rights, people require an understanding of their rights, be provided with opportunities to become actively involved in the development and implementation of laws and policies, and have the confidence, skills and know-how to hold elected representatives accountable."*[162]

DAG's strategic objectives for 2006-2008 are: a) inclusive participatory development through capacity building within civil society to influence practice, and b) pro-poor urban development praxis to influence state praxis by demonstrating alternatives and critical partnership.[163]

> *"So the house itself that is built at the end of the day or the land that is occupied is not the issue to DAG. What we are about is to build strong citizen, we want to build people and communities that are able to enforce their rights, they are able to protect those rights and they are able to participate and lead in an informed development process."*[164]

In contrast to the right-based position the Federation (the *South African Homeless People's Federation*, later *Federation of the Urban Poor*) and their support NGOs are oriented towards an alternative development approach. They agree with the right-based position that the state has redistributive responsibility. However, in their perception both state and civil society have rights and responsibilities. Similar to the right-based position they also realise that the state is influenced by an aggressive private sector and that interests need to be balanced. Nevertheless, they disagree with sole claim-making vis-à-vis the state. According to the coordinator of a FEDUP-aligned NGO the state is not committed to transfer resources to the poor. Insisting on balancing resource distribution, he argues, makes people remain reluctant to take their own initiative as they believe that the state will eventually deliver. He stressed:

> *"The problem is the resources are there to keep this developmental and paternalistic state going, but it is not enough to solve the problem. They say: "Stand in the queue and you get a house." In Pakistan they would laugh about it. But here people still believe in what they are saying. The bureaucracy creates its own world view."*[165]

Also, claim-making, the Federation argues, will result in formal sector interventions which often do not work for the lowest-income category and moreover diminish the social organisation of the poor.[166] Critical (claim-making) engagement with the state, so the

[162] DAG (2007), p. 8.
[163] See DAG (2006), p. 3.
[164] NGO member 9
[165] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006.
[166] See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), p. 21.

Federation, is run by professional NGOs sidelining grassroots civil society. If grassroots organisations make claims, then government will use a welfare approach and drive the development. As a consequence, technical and inadequate solutions further disempower the urban poor.

Instead, the Federation-centred alliance argues that beyond the resource inequality, power inequality represents the key problem. Alternative development practice involves the need for resource-building to strengthen empowerment. The Federation thereby stresses the interrelationship of housing and governance. Positive ties with government, according to the Federation, have the two-fold aim of sharing the burden of development and bringing redistribution of power. The Federation and its support NGOs are therefore committed to form partnerships with state institutions as a means of interacting with formal institutions especially at local government level.

The vision is to enable solidarity, capacities and collective learning amongst poor communities, so that they will be empowered to interact with the formal world. Housing represents an entry point for learning and engagement with the state. The strengthening of access to the political sphere should result in pro-poor solutions which can only evolve through building-up the self-reliance and self-organisation of the poor.[167]

The Federation advocates working from grassroots levels and seeing the entry point through the everyday practices of Federation members. By means of the methods practiced by Federation members they believe they can influence the institutional arrangements which determine the implementation of policy.[168]

4.3.2 Perception of political space

4.3.2.1 Grassroots perspective

The interviewed community organisations and local federation groups generally have a low perception of government capacity and accountability. Often they have experienced long delays in the housing application. A grassroots leader outlined:

> *"When I moved here, the next year I put myself on the waiting list. Those eight years on the waiting list were eight years of being in the struggle. […] Sometimes you die and your name*

[167] See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), pp. 29ff.
[168] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006.

is still on the waiting list."[169]

According to grassroots groups the delays are aligned to the inability of the state to deliver.

> *"I think the housing backlog they cannot go on with that. They can never give people the houses what they say they are giving. […] For me it is like this: They are making the rules and they cannot even obey their own rules."*[170]

Many felt that the communities are misused as vote banks for election purposes. Specifically ward councillors are perceived as not accountable to their constituencies. A Federation leader stressed:

> *"The process of elections is corrupt and South Africa is no exception."*[171]

The dominant perception is that government is not delivering on promises being made. One grassroots leader explained:

> *"[…] they [government] only use the people when it was voting time. Ministers and whoever, councillors, went into people's houses and speak to them. […] after they made a cross, they moved out and people will never see them."*[172]

Often councillors are also blamed for not informing the people about development plans.

> *"You don't need a workshop to teach you to respect people. Because calling people and letting them know: "I am going to put a pipe here next to your houses" - it is just an issue of respect and accountability and letting people know. This is sometimes lacking with some of our councillors here in South Africa […]."*[173]

4.3.2.2 NGO perspective

From the NGO and movement perspective a number of reasons are given for the lack of accountability of government's commitment to participation in the housing process. First of all, housing is a highly politicised matter.

Secondly, political leaders are not trusted as they are perceived to be gate keeping and corrupt.

> *"[…] often there is lots of gate keeping [by the councillors] and all sorts of trading that takes place. If I say trading, I mean it in the literal sense of the word: money gets passed from hand*

[169] PO member 1
[170] PO member 1
[171] Interview with Patrick Magebula, 2.11.2006.
[172] PO member 2
[173] Interview with Patrick Magebula, 2.11.2006.

to hand. I know that on the N2, only just to get your name on the [beneficiary] list or move up the list there was money going around."[174]

Thirdly, politicians interested in being re-elected want short-term delivery of houses and not a participative process.[175] The director of DAG outlined:

"[…] it is typically that the ward councillor and his cronies meet and then they say they have consulted their ward and move on."[176]

Moreover, the *Development Action Group* (DAG) questions the effectiveness of public engagement as responsibility for participation constantly changed within local government.

"[…] the last few years the City every five minutes has changed its mind about who is responsible for consultation or stakeholder engagement. […]. We reach the point where we do not get excited about public engagement. It becomes very whimsical which is why it is not very effective."[177]

Furthermore, there is criticism that participation is increasingly realised through 'Imbizos' which are perceived to not improve inclusion of people in decision-making.[178] The 'Mayor's Listening Campaign' in Cape Town is seen as a typical example of this. The limitation of the listening campaign, according to the organisations, is that it only addresses parochial interests of the people. A staff member of DAG explained:

"Every night for a few weeks there will be a meeting where people come to and people say their problems like "I don't have a house" or "no school" in the area and then the officials will analyse that and say 53% of the comments were about housing, 23% about schools. There is nothing anybody can engage with."[179]

DAG stresses that the channels for influencing the IDP and city-wide planning are very narrow.

"But directly influence the content and the strategic direction of the IDP is very difficult because it is so detached from civil society. It happens in the corridors of officials."[180]

Given the political delivery mandate, innovative housing policy, many argue, has not trickled down to the administrative level which has to implement the policy.

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[174] NGO member 11
[175] NGO member 6
[176] Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006.
[177] Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006.
[178] DAG (2005), p. 11.
[179] NGO member 6
[180] NGO member 8

> *"In the name of speedy delivery, policy and common sense are too frequently set aside. This fixation on the delivery of numbers leads to the ongoing creation of concrete slums."*[181]

DAG particularly claims that the new City housing plan lacks commitment for community participation and that in many projects communities are not consulted about developments.[182] It specifically stresses that the N2 Gateway project in Cape Town is indicative of reduced options for participation in general.

> *"The lack of space for community participation in planning and decision-making with regards to the N2 development points to a bigger, more systemic political problem, that of limited – and shrinking – space for citizens' engagement in development processes."*[183]

In housing processes, they argue, the welfare approach by the local administration translates into a paternalistic approach to development. Therefore, they question government's commitment to participation also in housing development. The director of DAG stressed:

> *"But at a practical level what we have realised is that the government is trying to implement a certain approach to development. We see that is not necessary the development that maximises the capacities and experiences of our communities."*[184]

The coordinator of the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) outlined the problem:

> *"The problem is rather the developmental state which thinks it must deliver solutions to problems. Take the policy around PHP. What is PHP all about? It is about people responding to the failure of the state and the market. Now the developmental state tries to appropriate what civil society does."*[185]

Therefore, local government officials would be very reluctant to work with civil society structure with an empowerment agenda. Again the CUP coordinator disclosed:

> *"The officials are also not pro our approach. They still support the welfare approach. They do not necessarily support the political leadership. But they do not believe in the people's participative approaches. They believe in the welfare approach and "We will do things for you. We will build you the old RDP houses and you should be thankful for that.""*[186]

Instead, local government would favour mostly constructor-built RDP housing development to ensure fast track delivery. According to the director of People's Environmental

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[181] DAG (2005), p. 11.
[182] DAG (2005), pp. 20ff.
[183] DAG (2005), p. 7.
[184] NGO member 8; NGO member 9
[185] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006.
[186] Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006.

Planning (PEP):

> *"Local authorities do not want the Peoples Housing Process to work in their area. It is a hell of a lot easier for them to get their buddy, the local contractor, in to build a hundred houses."*[187]

DAG also criticises the prioritisation of contractor-built houses by local government.

> *"The model for government is a very simple model: handing over the project to a contractor and few months down the line handing over the keys to the beneficiaries."*[188]

This constructor-driven model has also infiltrated PHP projects. The organisations claim that these 'managed PHP' reduce participation to a limited choice in house design and sweat equity. As a consequence of the 'managed PHP' and contractor-driven model communities remain passive beneficiaries. The director of DAG explained:

> *"Way back then and even now it [government] sees housing as a technocratic, technically driven process. Where it is about identifying the biggest piece of land, putting in services and then providing mass housing using a contractor driven model. People are not at the centre, but the recipients of housing."*[189]

Moreover, some argue, progressive approaches by individual officials are hindered by the bureaucracy. According to DAG only a few officials work outside the bureaucratic restrictions.

> *"There are obviously individuals in the City and in the province that are playing a positive role, but you don't see them when you are outside.[…]there are lots of people that fall into the classic paper pushing bureaucratic kind of role."*[190]

The director of PEP stressed the risks for officials to act outside the prescribed routine:

> *"The city officials do have their hands tight to a certain extend. They have to work within certain parameters, they do have certain rules. If they give us the space to do things slightly differently and it all goes wrong, they are the ones who are ultimately responsible. No civil servant anywhere in the world is rewarded for innovation and risk taking."*[191]

[187] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.
[188] NGO member 8
[189] NGO member 8
[190] NGO member 11
[191] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.

4.4 Influencing factors

4.4.1 Political instability in Cape Town

Power struggles and political instability also impacted on the analysed housing projects. Interviewees often referred to challenges and blockages of projects due to political leadership conflicts within the communities.

While the ANC is in power nationally since the first democratic elections in 1994, there has been a constant change in terms of which party is governing the Western Cape Province and Cape Town (see table 4.8). The change of ruling parties results in political dynamics displayed between the different spheres of government. If these spheres of government are of the same political party or not, determines whether the spheres are closer linked or characterised by contestation of power.

Year	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06
National	ANC												
Province	NNP					DA		NNP & ANC			ANC		
City	X	X	ANC				DA		NNP & ANC		ANC		DA

Tab. 4.8: Political Dynamics in the three spheres of government, Source: Own design

Also at City level there is a constant contestation of local power between the ANC, representing the more disadvantaged sectors of the population (primarily black South Africans), and the Democratic Alliance (DA), seen by many to represent the white and wealthier coloured sectors of the population.[192] Between 2004 and 2006 the City was governed by ANC-mayoress Nomaindia Mfeketo, who was accused of unauthorised spending and corruption.[193] This aggravated the disenchantment with politics of primarily black voters who were already disillusioned by local government delivery.[194] During the third local elections in March 2006 voter turnouts in the black township areas such as Khayelitsha were very low.[195] After the elections the City almost faced a hung council.[196] Finally, in a coalition between the DA and six smaller parties, a DA-led government was formed under

[192] See Wilkinson (2004), p. 223.
[193] See Joubert (2008).
[194] Makuzeni (2006).
[195] See Cape Argus (2006), p. 18.
[196] The DA won 42% of all votes, followed by the ANC with 37% and the Independent Democrats (ID) with 11% of the votes. See Essop/ Phillip/Bailey (2006), p. 1.

Helen Zille as mayoress. Subsequently, the political situation remained unstable since the majority in council had been threatened by floor-crossing[197] or smaller parties being expelled from the ruling coalition.[198]

Furthermore, the local government system was highly contested. The DA changed the system from ward-based to a system based on redemarkated sub-councils. The ANC accused the DA of redemarcating the sub-councils along racial lines.[199] It raised concerns that the executive mayoral system is not representative of the majority of coloureds and blacks. In September 2006 the ANC-led provincial government therefore attempted to change the local government system from a mayoral executive to an executive committee system in Cape Town.[200] With an executive committee system the ANC would have regained a position of power. Whereas some argued that the executive committee system can help to overcome political divisions[201], others questioned the political motivation behind it and accused the ANC of interfering in local government autonomy[202]. It was feared that a change in the mayoral system would lead to an executive paralysis in the context of almost power balance in Cape Town.[203]

In the following month various protests were held in favour of one or the other position and political party. At the same time violent taxi protests broke out. Taxi drivers barricaded roads, buses were stoned and people attacked.[204] Following this, the DA accused the ANC of being behind the concerted action, whereas ANC leadership claimed that the protests reflected the dissatisfaction of citizens with local government's service delivery.

The conflict around the local government system was later resolved with an agreement, that the ANC would receive two additional sub-council's chairmanships in ANC controlled areas. In return the mayoral system was retained.

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[197] Floor-crossing allows local and national government representatives to change to another political party without losing their seats.
[198] See Merten (2006a), (2006b); Mail & Guardian online (2007).
[199] See Dentlinger (2006b).
[200] Ironically, the executive mayoral system was adopted by the ANC and at the time criticized by the ID and DA for lack of transparency and giving too much power to the mayor. Whereas with the mayoral system the mayoress is empowered to draw up legislation and by-laws, the executive and decision-making power is with the committee in an executive committee system.
[201] See Parks (2006).
[202] See Essop/Dentlinger (2006), pp. 1f.
[203] See Essop (2006).
[204] See Mnyakama/Nicholson (2006).

Whereas these power struggles rather reflect on disputes between different parties and parts of the City, other struggles were aligned to inner ANC factionalism and translated into conflicts within ANC dominated areas. Power struggles within the ANC at the time, both nationally and provincially, had lead to a division in the ANC-camp. One division was along supporters of President Thabo Mbeki and supporters of former deputy president Jacob Zuma. The friction in the alliance between the two leaders emerged in June 2005 when Mbeki laid off Zuma due to allegations around corruption and rape. This caused power struggles within the party and was only partly resolved with the election of Zuma as ANC president at the party congress in late 2007.[205]

The leadership struggle also filtered down to provincial and local level. In 2005 Ebrahim Rasool (in support of Mbeki) as provincial Premier was not re-elected as ANC leader in the province. Instead Mcebisi Skwatsha (in support of Zuma) became the Western Cape provincial secretary. This split led to a conflict between a Rasool camp and Skwatsha camp amongst ANC councillors in Cape Town and highly impacted on local housing projects. A government official stressed:

> *"So the critical political divide I would call the Skwatsha - Rasool divide. We have got an Africanist approach to development which is aligned with Skwatsha whereas Ebrahim Rasool is more inclusive. […] The strength of me is that I am managing politics a lot of the time. Is that my role? But if you are the one who is stuck with the contractional claims, where the contractor can't work. So you are the one with the pressure and you have to find a solution."*[206]

The power struggles in 2006 illustrated the fragile political stability in Cape Town. Moreover, the dispute about who has power over the local government system was aligned to housing and service delivery issues and arguments about racial discrimination. Development, primarily service delivery and housing, seem to be the issues against which local government performance is measured. Political disputes thus translated into conflicts within the communities and blockages of housing projects.

According to local government officials this has made Khayelitsha almost unmanageable. The tension has extended to the development forums which were supposed to be apolitical. In theory the development forums report to the 'Khayelitsha Development Forum' (KDF) which is supposed to stabilise and ensure development implementation. But with

[205] See FES (2008), p. 2.
[206] City official 5

municipal elections in spring 2006 new ANC councillors emerged who, according to some officials, are more aligned to one ANC camp (Skwatsha) and tend to destabilise by not recognising the development forums and the KDF. Local government officials have to mediate between the new councillors and development forum representatives in the steering committee meetings.

> *"So you have got these huge fights and all these project committees have been a disaster. […] So these groups are now demanding the disbandment of that group. Now who do you work with? […] What happens is that we get stuck in the middle, the project gets stuck in the middle and the projects gets used as battle ground for power."*[207]

Officials feel they are constrained by the dynamics taking place in Khayelitsha. The political instability impacts negatively on service delivery and the confidence of officials.

> *"As officials we get caught in between. Some of us are accused of wrong doings. We get accused of not expediting the process. This is to ignorance sometimes and deliberate political game for particular ends. So we are battling to get where we want to get to. And those conflict [SANCO] in the community impact on the work of the whole government. We cannot say as officials: It is not our business. That would be a lie because it will impact. Before you get physical onto the ground, you must have spoken to the groups."*[208]

4.4.2 Administrative complexity and restructuring

The administration of Cape Town is under constant transformation and characterised by institutional restructuring which affects both service delivery and council transformation.[209] The restructuring process was delayed several times by political changes in local government and opposition by City officials, and in 2006 the transformation process had still not been fully completed.

> *"We had three cycles of restructuring now with the City with 24.000 staff and even as we speak the final integrities of this 6-7 year process has not really sorted itself out."*[210]

Furthermore, the administrative system was affected by political changes. From 1999-2006 Cape Town experienced four changes of government which is linked to the removal of city managers and senior officials from their positions. Also, changes of government often imply shifting of priorities of projects and changing modes of delivery and partici-

[207] City official 5
[208] City official 9
[209] For a detailed account on the administrative restructuring process see Pieterse (2006).
[210] Provincial official 2

pation. As a result of the restructuring and politisation of the administrative process, the administrative structures are characterised by instability. This again affects local government functions such as housing and service delivery. The constant reorganising in the City of Cape Town obviously also impeded the relationships between officials and civil society organisations. An NGO member commented on the situation: "At the moment I do not have a lot of confidence in the bureaucracy to deliver."[211]

4.4.3 Civil society restructuring

In 2006 the civil society sector active in the housing process was highly characterised by weaknesses of the organisations and shifts of leadership and networks.

The years 2005 and 2006 were a time of considerable restructuring and rebuilding within the civil society sector. Organisational structures around two key players in the housing sector dissolved.

The *Development Action Group* and the People's Organisations were affected by the break-up of the *Urban Sector Network* and the *People's Housing Networking Forum* as their inter-organisational structures.

The *Urban Sector Network* (USN) dissolved in 2005. USN consisted of affiliated South African urban sector NGOs with a right-based understanding of housing such as the *Development Action Group* in Cape Town, *Planact* in Johannesburg or the *Built Environment Support Group* (BESG) in Durban. The network was funded by the European Union and operated from an office in Johannesburg. It became a vehicle for the various NGOs to access resources from government and international donors.[212]

Although referred to as a network it was rather a formal association of like-minded NGOs. Membership was confined to a specific number of NGOs and relationships between them under the USN umbrella remained formal. In 2005 USN dissolved due to mismanagement. As a consequence, funding discontinued and NGOs under its umbrella suffered high losses of financial resources. A DAG member commented that in future these NGOs intend to rebuild a less bureaucratic and less formal network, which can

[211] NGO member 11
[212] In 2002/2003 26% of DAG's income derived from USN. See DAG (2003c), p. 27.

lobby collectively about urban development issues.[213]

Also in 2005 the *People's Housing Networking Forum* (PHNF) dissolved after only three years of activity. It was established by DAG as a platform for 58 People's Organisations which were active in housing projects affiliated to DAG. The aim of the platform was to facilitate lobbying and advocacy in the housing sector.[214]

PHNF also did not present a network in the conceptional understanding of the term. It was based on an elected leadership and formal organisational set-up with office and secretariat. The People's Organisations themselves were supposed to lobby and advocate their concerns and claims with DAG offering leadership training and assisting in exchanges. PHNF closed down in 2005, because it was not functioning effectively. Elected leaders had faced problems in dealing with the dynamics of the different organisations and to get them to cooperate.[215] A key problem was that DAG was driving the platform instead of it evolving from the grassroots.[216] One DAG staff member recalled:

> *"We did not approach it in a way that people felt it was their network. It was what we wanted to discuss. It was a very structured network. So it did not develop organically out of what people wanted."*[217]

The organisations aligned to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* in South Africa experienced vigorous transformations. Here the split of the Federation and closure of *People's Dialogue* led to a resolution of the Alliance between the Federation, uTshani Fund and People's Dialogue.

Originally, the South African Federation emerged in 1991 as the *South African Homeless People's Federation* (SAHPF). Since 2002 internal conflicts increased because a system of patronage had developed. Leaders with access to power and money misused their position as gate keepers.[218]

A report by *People's Dialogue* revealed that the organisation was in crises in terms of accountability. As a consequence, the director of PD started a process of democratising the federation. A former Federation leader recalls:

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[213] NGO member 6
[214] See DAG (2004), p. 22.
[215] NGO member 6
[216] See Heyns (2007).
[217] NGO member 9
[218] See FEDUP (2006), p. 5.

> *"[…] we used to serve as leaders of the Federation but have not been democratically elected by the Federation […] we have been linked with a stipend from the NGO Peoples Dialogue. Because of that we were not accountable according to the people […]."*[219]

In 2003 therefore elections were introduced and new leaders came forward. In the following conflicts emerged around financial management. The Federation tried to employ their own fulltime positions to be more independent from the NGOs. Therefore, according to the view of a former Federation leader, an agreement was made that the Federation needs to be registered. However, one faction opposed this move and challenged the decision arguing that bottom-up systems were not in place yet.[220]

The Federation then separated into two wings – a Cape Town based 'Patricia faction' (later the section 21 company) and the 'Patrick and Rose faction' (later FEDUP). Each claimed to be the real Federation and have the real savers.[221]

The coordinator of the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) even argues that it is misleading to speak of a split since it was rather a small number of leaders, detached from the grassroots group, who tried a 'hostile takeover' of the Federation's resources.[222] The other faction accused CORC of having interfered in the internal governance of the Alliance between PD, uTshani Fund and the Federation by providing support to only one faction.[223] Others argue that the South African federation model was based too much on the Indian model and did not take into account differences in democratic tradition and culture.[224]

In 2005 one faction of the Federation aligned to one leader (the 'Patricia faction') established a section 21 company under the name of the *South African Homeless People's Federation*. The other faction perceived this as hijacking their name and capital fund.[225]

In 2006 it therefore established the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) and reintroduced the SDI model and practices. FEDUP is perceived as the successor of SDI practice and Federation-building in South Africa. Some argue that the promotion of FEDUP

[219] Interview with Patricia Matolengwe, 25.10.2006.
[220] FEDUP (2006), p. 4.
[221] Interview with Jackqui Boulle, 30.10.2006.
[222] See SDI (2006d); Bolnick (2008), p. 330.
[223] Interview with Patricia Matolengwe, 25.10.2006.
[224] Interview with Jackqui Boulle, 30.10.2006.
[225] See Bolnick (2008), p. 330; uTshani Fund (2006a).

against the other faction is based on strong relationships between the FEDUP leaders and the coordinator of the *Community Organisations Resource Centre* (CORC).

> *"[…] FEDUP has become the prominent partner because those leaders are very close to Joel and the split group always had a very conflictual relationship with Joel and has been alienated."*[226]

The Western Cape Federation is in the process of rebuilding since the split of the Federation. Established local federation networks like in Site C and Ekupumleni which are mostly affected by the Federation crisis are less present at regional level. Instead, there has been a shift to new established groups in Macassar, Athlone, Strand, Stellenbosch and Manenberg.

In the 1990s *People's Dialogue* (PD) facilitated the space for exchange with Indian SDI members and thereby had a key role in establishing the Federation in South Africa. PD formed the legally registered body which was responsible for fund raising for Federation activities and represented a channel to the formal political system. Millstein, Oldfield and Stokke stress the importance of PD's intermediary role:

> *"PD plays a key role as a mediator between the Federation and the formal political sphere, making formal political procedures, politics and bureaucracy intelligible to local Federation groups while also communicating and explaining the Federation's grievances and practices to politicians and bureaucrats […]."*[227]

Leadership and financial management crisis within the Federation led to a reassessment of goals and structures in 2002.[228] Confronted with the factions, PD set an ultimatum to the Federation to unify saying it would otherwise close down which then happened in 2005. The coordinator of CORC subsequently questioned the motivation behind closing PD:

> *"Did the People's Dialogue Board really have the bigger picture in mind when they decided to close the NGO, or were they simply tired of being out of their depth and had run out of ideas as to how to resolve the governance and financial management problems that had begun to bedevil the agency?"*[229]

He criticises that the closure involved the termination of donor funding to the Federation which meant that members were cut off from resources.[230]

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[226] See City official 7
[227] Millstein/Oldfield/Stokke (2003), p. 464.
[228] See Wilson/Lowery (2003), pp. 52ff.
[229] SDI (2006d).
[230] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006; SDI (2006d); Bolnick (2008), p. 330.

According to some City officials and NGO representatives, the closure of People's Dialogue had left a vacuum for social facilitation of housing projects aligned to the Federation. Also, it affected the role of CORC. One City official indicated that whereas CORC had previously been open to any group, it now concentrated on the Federation and had taken over the role of *People's Dialogue*.[231]

The split of the Federation and closure of *People's Dialogue* led to a restructuring of goals and practices of the Alliance. In terms of organisational structures this was perceived as an opportunity by many within the organisations. A former PD member commented:

> *"That split was inevitable. In terms of the organisation of the Alliance itself, it was a healthy split at the time."*[232]

However, even after the split the leadership conflicts resulted in power dynamics and instability within the local communities. In 2006 uncertainties emerged around legitimacy and accountability both within the community as well as for other institutions such as local government. Officials commented that they were unsure which faction to approach as the successor of SAHPF. Often both frictions claimed to be the successor and accordingly the representatives of specific projects and housing funds.

[231] City official 7
[232] City official 7

5. Actors and networks at work

5.1 The actors

Governance aspects of the housing process can only be understood against the background of how local government and civil society organisations in the development process are constituted. Therefore the following analysis outlines the present political and administrative structure of the City of Cape Town as well as two key alliances of civil society organisations active in securing land and housing in Cape Town.

The first alliance is connected to the right-based positions and consists of development NGOs and People's Organisations with elected committees. The second alliance is aligned to the SDI model of alternative development and comprises the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) as a social movement organisation, its affiliated local saving schemes and its support NGOs.[1]

5.1.1 The City of Cape Town

Local government has to be understood against the background of the re-demarcation process. The 69 independent and racially-based municipalities in the *Cape Metropolitan Area* (CMA) were restructured in the 1990s into a two-tier local government structure with 40 *Transitional Local Councils* and a *Transitional Metropolitan Council*. The re-demarcation process continued in order to enable cross-financing and redistribution of tax revenue by bringing together affluent and poorer areas of the City. This process was finalised in 1996 when six *Metropolitan Local Councils* (MLCs)[2] and an overarching *Cape Metropolitan Council* (CMC) came into being. Following the national decision to establish single-tier metros (see Chapter 2.2.3) in December 2000 a further amalgamation took place and the *City of Cape Town* as a single-tier (Unicity) structure was established.[3]

5.1.1.1 Political structure

The City is made up of 105 wards which are clustered in 23 subcouncil areas. The sub-

[1] For a detailed account of the individual organisations see stakeholder analysis in annex.
[2] Blaauwberg Municipality, City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Helderberg Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality, South Peninsula Municipality
[3] A detailed overview on Cape Town's local government evolution is given in Pieterse (2002a).

council entity was established as a decentralised municipal structure[4]. Subcouncils consist of both ward and proportional councillors. Their function is to make recommendations to Council and power can be delegated from Council to subcouncil level. A subcouncil is managed by a local government official (subcouncil manager) and chaired by a councillor (subcouncil chairperson).[5]

The City of Cape Town Municipal Council consists of 105 proportional and 105 directly elected ward councillors. The council is chaired by an Executive Mayor who has extensive decision-making powers. The mayor is supported by a Deputy Executive Mayor and a *Mayoral Executive Committee* (MAYCO) on which all seats are held by the ruling city coalition. The eleven MAYCO members hold portfolios according to the administrative structure. They are supported by advisory portfolio committees.



Fig. 5.1: Political structure of Cape Town, Source: Own design

5.1.1.2 Administrative structure

The municipality is run by about 24,000 staff members.[6] In 2006 the municipality was made up of nine Executive Directorates which are supervised by a City Manager as the head of administration. Executive Directorates comprise various Directorates which operate a number of branches.

[4] Subcouncils are substituting the previous ward committee system.
[5] See City of Cape Town (2008a).
[6] See City of Cape Town (2005c), p. 5.

Housing related interventions are located within the ‘Human Settlement Services Directorate’ or ‘Special Programmes’ (such as Urban Renewal and Development Support) under the ‘Operations Executive Directorate’ (see figure 5.2).

The Directorate of Housing has been renamed *Human Settlement Services* (HSS). In 2006 this directorate was under way to being pulled up to an Executive Directorate (ED) and former branches to move up to directorates.



Fig. 5.2: The administrative structure of the City of Cape Town (highlighted the location of responsibility for housing interventions), Source: Own design based on City of Cape Town (2005c)

The branches comprise New Settlements, Existing Settlements (old rental housing, flats), Policy and Research, Land Restitution and Finance. Within the ‘New Settlements’ branch the City is divided into four regions which are managed by regional coordinators. Under the regional coordinators individual project managers manage specific projects where the

City is the developer. The 'New Settlements' branch comprises above the regional-based units also three issue-based units (social housing, informal settlements and, since 2005, a PHP unit).[7]



Fig. 5.3: The organisational structure of the Human Settlement Services directorate, Source: Own design

5.1.2 Civil society alliance A

5.1.2.1 Development Action Group and The Kuyasa Fund

Development Action Group

The *Development Action Group* (DAG) was established in 1986 by professional planners, architects, engineers and academics that were linked to the democratic movement at the time.[8] It works primarily with poor community groups. DAG sees its own role as a catalyst in a collaborative engagement with the state. DAG's strategic objectives are inclusive participatory development through capacity-building within civil society to influence state praxis by demonstrating alternatives and critical partnership.[9] In line with a strategic shift in 2006 work is organised in impact areas which comprise:

- Informal settlement upgrading (promoting incremental upgrading and in situ),
- Municipal-wide planning (promoting participation and an integrative approach),
- Medium density housing (promoting mixed-income medium density on well-located land),

[7] The People's Housing Process (PHP) unit however was not operative in 2006. City official 4
[8] See DAG (2008a).
[9] See DAG (2006a), p. 3.

- Value capture[10] (promoting value capture instruments by the state) and
- Citizenship and participation (promoting CBO networking and participation in urban development issues).[11]

DAG specifically stresses that it is committed to social justice and therefore to a research, advocacy and watchdogs role.[12] Since 2005 it also outlines its catalyst role for development. However, it realises that this role can imply a broad continuum of activity from community mobilisation to cooperation with government in delivery. The different kinds of activities comprise:

- Advocacy and lobbying
- Assist communities in doing their own advocacy and lobbying
- Research and setting precedents through projects to influence government with regard to policy and implementation
- Consulting and training for different levels of government concerning the housing process
- Training, information, technical and social support in community housing projects

Following Neubert's typology of civil society[13] DAG can be classified as both an advocacy NGO and development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (advocacy and development activity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-members of DAG). Therefore the term Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO) can be applied.

The Kuyasa Fund

The Kuyasa[14] Fund was a project established in 1999 by DAG in order to support poor households which are excluded from access to credit in the formal banking sector. At the time DAG promoted savings groups in its projects as the basis for a loan scheme.[15] Since 2003 the Kuyasa Fund is a non-profit organisation independent from DAG. The aim of

[10] Value Capture mechanisms such as fiscal and regulatory instruments are used so that the state can generate additional resources and direct development. A share of benefit from land development is captured for community benefit. See DAG (2007), p. 16.
[11] See DAG (2007), p. 3.
[12] See DAG (2004), p. 5.
[13] See Neubert (1992), p. 30.
[14] Kuyasa means „New Dawn" (Xhosa).
[15] See The Kuyasa Fund (2004), p. 8.

the Kuyasa Fund is to develop a financial sector for the poor. Therefore, Kuyasa provides access to housing finance for low-income households. As an end-user micro-finance organisation it promotes savings and provides credit for housing improvements.

Following Neubert's typology of civil society[16] the Kuyasa Fund can be classified as a development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (mostly development activity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-members of Kuyasa). It will therefore be termed as a Service-Oriented Non-Governmental Organisations (SONGO).

Characteristics of the Non-Governmental Organisations

The organisational characteristics of DAG and Kuyasa Fund are very similar: Both are registered as associations not for gain incorporated under Section 21 and registered as non-profit organisations with the Department of Welfare.

Both have similar organisational structures with professional staff, executive management and board of directors interlinked in a bureaucratic-like manner.



Fig. 5.4: Organisational set-up of the Development Action Group, Source: Own design

Both have similar staff size, similar donor dependency and both stress that they self-generate income.

Also, until recently their scale of activity (mostly Cape Town) has been similar. Since the Kuyasa Fund is moving to work nationally this has changed slightly.

Concerning their orientation both organisations are based on the same right-based phi-

[16] See Neubert (1992), p. 30.

losophy and could be described as like-minded organisations. However, whereas DAG has a pro-poor community-centred perspective and is concerned with urban development matters, the Kuyasa Fund is mostly concerned with the financial sector for the poor. Its target groups are primarily individual clients taking a loan. DAG's target groups are entire communities.

	Development Action Group	**The Kuyasa Fund***
Historical Background	Established in 1986 Anti-apartheid movement	Established in 1999 by DAG (since 2003 independent)
Total income (2006)	About R 4,33 million (increasingly dependent on consultancy work for government due to decreasing donor funding)	About R 12,85 million (85% self-generated, continuous donor funding and finance through formal banking sector)
No. of Staff (2006)	20 (with high staff turnover)	23 (high staff increase)
Scale of activity	Cape Town and Western Cape	Cape Town and Western Cape (recently also nationally)
No. of housing projects (2006)	7	6000 savers (1200 loans)
Type	PONGO (DAG)	SONGO (Kuyasa Fund)
Mission	Community-centred settlement development and pro-poor policy promotion	Establish a financial sector for the poor for housing improvements
Field of activity	Informal settlement upgrading Municipal-wide planning Medium density housing Value capture Citizenship and participation	Housing finance
Kind of activity	Advocacy and lobbying Research and setting precedents Consulting and training Technical and social support	Promote savings and provide loans

Tab. 5.1: Characteristics of the Development Action Group and the Kuyasa Fund
Source: Own design, *The Kuyasa Fund (2006), p. 23

5.1.2.2 People's Organisations

People's Organisations working with DAG are situated in communities within the Western Cape Province. In 2006 DAG was working with seven housing projects in Cape Town.[17]

The organisations have evolved by themselves either as an organised land invasion claiming for tenure rights and upgrading (as with the Freedom Park project), as organised backyard dwellers to negotiate with the state for land (Netreg) or as organised domestic workers to pressure for inner city housing (as with the Rainbow Housing Cooperative).

The People's Organisations working with DAG are formalised and registered organisations. Their members are predominantly previous backyard shack dwellers. They rely on the same activities such as representing the community in negotiations with government officials and mobilising the community.

The *Netreg Housing Project* (NHP) and *Freedom Park Development Association* (FPDA), which will be analysed further, are community-based and membership-based organisations. Their organisational aims are both development and issue-driven advocacy oriented. They aim at organising the communities around their claims for land, housing and social development. They consist of elected committees which represent the community at negotiations with government.

Background	**Goal**	**No. of member households (2006)**	**Internal organisation**	**Kind of activity**
Backyard dweller (NHP) Informal settlement residents (FPDA)	Issue-based: land, housing and social development	150 (NHP) 300 (FPDA)	Registered voluntary association with elected executive committee and sub-groups	Negotiations Representation of community Mobilisation

Tab. 5.2: Characteristics of People's Organisations, Source: Own design

[17] Nomzabalazo (Wallacedene); Netreg (Bonteheuwel); Freedom Park (Tafelsig); Lavender Hill/ Cuban Heights; Ndabeni; Rainbow; Delft

5.1.2.3 Intra-alliance relations

Relations between People's Organisations

The People's Organisations interact from time-to-time when the *Development Action Group* (DAG), organises exchanges and common seminars. A more formal structure for interaction has disappeared (People's Housing Networking Forum, see Chapter 4.4). Nevertheless, DAG stresses the value of networks between the People's Organisations to advocate for their interests. It regards the establishment of networks as its third approach above research and project implementation.

> *"So as a third leg of the pot is that type of building a movement that can be representative of the poor, that can speak for the poor and advance the agenda of the poor. Because what is up against the poor is organised middle class corporate class […]. So through the CBO network we hope to counter that [elite interest] or at least tip the scale a bit in our favour by getting people to be able to respond to these lawyers and these town planners and architects that speaks from a value system that is different."*[18]

Since PHNF dissolved in 2005 DAG supports community networking and horizontal learning on a project-basis. 'Project Partners Network' workshops have been introduced to enable the exchange of experience amongst representatives of communities with a focus on housing and mobilisation related issues. DAG stresses horizontal learning leverages mobilisation and focuses on facilitating the space for horizontal exchanges which will eventually lead organically to a grassroots forum. The focus of DAG is therefore less on setting-up an organisational structure, but to strengthen relationships between groups and build up more platforms for a CBO network to evolve.

> *"So our aim is not to get a chairperson and a media spokesperson for the network and then get an office. Our aim is to […] to create the frame within which this energy can be channelled or brought to the fore."*[19]

The executive director stressed the change of focus of DAG towards a more strategic approach. Amongst the impact areas, it wants to establish both a network of poor communities to lobby the state and a network of role-players which lobbies pro-poor urban development.[20]

In 2006 it therefore employed an expert on social mobilisation to find out how to mobilise

[18] NGO member 9
[19] NGO member 9
[20] Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.3.2006.

people on the ground to start engaging with their own voices. For DAG this means a stronger valuation of establishing networks. The loose network which has been operating since the closure of PHNF, however, continues to be dependent on DAG and participation in the network has not yet been made transparent.

> *"It is difficult to determine who represents communities, and DAG is in the uncomfortable position of becoming a gatekeeper through determining criteria for participation in the network."*[21]



Fig. 5.5: Horizontal interrelations between People's Organisations

Over and above the horizontal exchange of experience DAG wants to connect this everyday experience to the strategic level where it can affect politics and policy. According to DAG this would contribute to overcoming the lack of legitimacy NGOs face when mobilising people for their own cause. In 2006 DAG organised an event with regard to the UN *World Habitat Day* and provided a platform for community groups to report on their experiences.

> *"Often these things [empowerment] are undermined by the way NGOs approach it. Often we try to mobilise people at the bottom end but we do not give them any autonomy, we do not really empower them, we just want them to pitch up. We call this "rent a crowd" – where there is an issue and people are behind you and they go back to their normal life tomorrow and they do not grasp the issue. The important part of our CBO network is that people can connect their everyday experience at a high strategic level."*[22]

Relations between Non-Governmental Organisations

Since the closing of the *Urban Sector Network*, the cooperation between the two NGOs is characterised by the personal relations. DAG and Kuyasa Fund refer to themselves as sis-

[21] Heyns (2007), p. 4.
[22] Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006.

ter organisations and support each other on strategic levels in terms of advocacy for policy change. On the local project level they are working within the same communities but DAG with a focus on community organisations and Kuyasa working with individual households. Working relations on this level only emerge from time-to-time where there are overlaps.

Relations between Non-Governmental Organisations and People's Organisations

The orientation of the NGOs and People's Organisations differ in that the NGOs envisage broader aims such as a financial sector for the poor or community-centred housing development. The People's Organisations goals are more issue-driven. They are concerned with access to land and housing for their constituencies.

All People's Organisations working with DAG share that they have first organised and started the negotiation process before approaching DAG for assistance. DAG stresses that it works in partnership with communities.[23] DAG works on a request basis when these communities seek assistance to access land, housing, tenure and services.[24] The Kuyasa Fund only enters later and for a specific period into a relationship with these organisations in order to promote savings. Later these relations are limited to individual households (as clients).

The NGOs are aware of the differences in interest between NGOs and communities and therefore do not represent the communities. A DAG staff member explained:

> *"CBOs and NGOs you need to see them as different types of civil society organisations with own agendas. They do overlap in some ways. DAG has its own strategy and communities have their own strategies. We try to align them in some ways. Both have interest in community driven development. […] Communities are involved in broader long-term process with a whole lot of different organisations. We may not be involved in all aspects and relationships. […]We have to accept that communities have their own strategies, own interests, own relationships."*[25]

Some POs were unsure of the motivation of NGOs and presumed a profit for them in the support for communities. Relations take place on local project level but are not taken up to strategic level.

[23] See DAG (2004), p. 7.
[24] See for example DAG (2002), p. 8 and p. 16.
[25] NGO member 6

5.1.3 Civil society alliance B

5.1.3.1 Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC), uTshani Fund and People's Environmental Planning (PEP)

Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC)

The *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) comprises approaches from enabling learning and advocacy to development support. This is either handled by CORC itself, through project management teams or through contracted support organisations and consultants.[26] Since 2005 CORC has also housed the secretariat for *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI).

CORC's philosophy is based on the principle that the poor themselves direct development, engage with the state and exchange on horizontal levels. Consequently, the role for an NGO was seen as creating the opportunity for exchange and learning and that investments would go to the establishment of networks instead of delivery outcomes.[27]

It works through two grassroots networks of poor communities – the *Alliance of Rural Communities* (ARC) and the *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP); primarily with the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) as part of CUP. Its target groups are the local affiliates of the Federation. Activities are centred on building relationships within the social movements and between them and formal institutions such as the state. As the relationship-building is greatly focused on accessing housing subsidies, these activities have also been labelled 'pragmatic'.[28] The different kinds of activities comprise:

- Finance administration
- Facilitation of exchange between social movement affiliates
- Facilitation of exchange between social movement affiliates and state institutions
- Facilitation of strategic working groups in housing development projects

CORC is registered as a voluntary association in terms of the Non Profit Organisation Act, 1977.[29] As a formal organisation CORC consists of a board and an employed professional staff team.

[26] CORC (2006a).
[27] See Wilson/Lowery (2003), p. 50.
[28] See for example Khan/Pieterse (2006), p. 158.
[29] CORC (2006b).

Following Neubert's typology of civil society[30] CORC is both an advocacy NGO and a development-oriented NGO according to its kind of activity (advocacy and development activity) and according to who benefits from its activity (non-members of CORC). It could therefore be classified as a Policy-Oriented Non-Governmental Organisation (PONGO).

However, it reveals a very specific kind of internal organisation. Work is organised in administration and overall coordination as well as in seven greatly independent programmes within CORC. These operate from decentralised programme offices and receive their own funding, but are administered through CORC and are managed through mutual decision-making. They are therefore independent to a degree, but rely on overall coordination and gain legal status through CORC.[31]



Fig. 5.6: Organisational set-up of the Community Organisations Resource Centre, Source: Own design

[30] See Neubert (1992), p. 30.
[31] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006.

Moreover, outside this polycentric organisation CORC also emphasises that it comprises both professionals and grassroots activists "[…] who think independently yet plan and act collectively. It is the hub of a new synergy between intellectual pioneers and collective action."[32] Given this context, CORC also employs grassroots activists as social facilitation field staff to interact with the social movements.[33] This synergy represents an overlap between the NGO and membership based grassroots structures.

The uTshani Fund

In 1995 the Federation established the *uTshani Fund*[34] as a revolving fund for housing and later micro-business loans and which was subsequently institutionalised as a Section 21 Company incorporated to the NGO *People' Dialogue*. In 2002, after a financial and management crisis, uTshani was restructured and became an independent entity.

Its aim is to build and protect financial assets for the Federation. It provides a financial tool to groups practicing savings in order to leverage state and donor resources.

Until 2006 it exclusively provided services to Federation groups. It then (in theory) extended its services to all groups practicing savings. The *uTshani Fund* is subdivided into accumulated funds, an operating fund and a project and revolving funds. The latter is not owned but administered by the *uTshani Fund*.[35] This revolving fund is capitalised by state and donor grants and member contributions.

In 2006 it was decided that the revolving fund would be managed in new regional funds to avoid conflicts amongst regional federation leaders around one national fund.[36] The regional funds will gradually contribute to a national *Urban Poor Fund*. The amount of capital in regional funds will be doubled by uTshani. The *uTshani Fund* administers both regional and national funds.[37]

After an internal management and accountability crisis saving practices have only been revived after FEDUP structures were put into place in 2006. Data on the total number of active saving groups are still being captured. In 2006 there were six FEDUP groups in

[32] CORC (2006c).
[33] See CORC (2007), p.26. According to NGO member 3 the payment of grassroots field staff dates back to old contracts and is not further practice of CORC.
[34] "uTshani" is a Zulu word for „grass".
[35] See Utshani Fund (2005a), p. 8.
[36] People's Dialogue (2003).
[37] See FEDUP (2006).

Cape Town active with savings (Athlone, Macassar, Manenberg, Site C, Eerste Rivier, and Strand).

Formally the *uTshani Fund* is an association not for gain incorporated under Section 21. The *uTshani Fund* consists of a board of directors and an employed professional staff team managed by an executive director.

Following Neubert's typology of civil society[38] the *uTshani Fund* could therefore be classified as a Policy-Oriented NGO (PONGO) according to its kind of activity (development and advocacy activity) and according to who benefits from their activity (non-members beneficiaries).

However, the *uTshani Fund* is a particular entity and cannot easily be associated with a support NGO as it, at the same time, functions as a membership-based association for the Federation. FEDUP national leader, Patrick Magebula, referred to the *uTshani Fund* as being the formal side of the Federation:

> *"uTshani is actually the formal side of the federation. It is like a coin: Utshani is the other side of the coin. On the other side of the coin you have someone who talks nice English and uses the right words."*[39]

A professional staff member pointed out that the fund belongs to the Federation. Therefore, they as professionals would only interpret the decisions made by FEDUP:

> *"The Fund is the Federation and we are just employees of the fund. They are actually the fund. They are the board members in the majority. They are the decision makers; they are the fund raisers in their informal way. We as professionals only put all their needs in nice words in the reports but they are the fund."*[40]

However, the fund is still controlled to a large extent by professional staff to ensure accountability:

> *"If they can change their mindset around not control, but ownership of the fund, the fund would benefit. There is still too much control by professionals. For good reasons in terms of accountability and rules and regulations set up by the donors. But there is a much bigger role for the Federation to play in the fund if they would take more ownership."*[41]

[38] See Neubert (1992), p. 30.
[39] Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006.
[40] NGO member 13
[41] NGO member 13

People's Environmental Planning (PEP)

People's Environmental Planning (PEP) started in 1998 and was officially registered as a public benefit organisation, NGO and educational trust. PEP provides technical support, training and advice around appropriate housing technology. It specifically stresses the division of labour: CORC is responsible for social facilitation and PEP addresses technical issues. It refers to its target group as clients which are primarily FEDUP groups.[42]

PEP could be referred to as a Service-Oriented NGO (SONGO) following Neubert's typology of civil society[43] as it is development-oriented and non-members benefit from its activities.

However, it is rather a quasi independent organisation. It is referred to by CORC as a CORC programme. PEP sees itself as independent from CORC. However, it acknowledges its dependency on the close relation to CORC and SDI as an opportunity to secure funding.[44]

Characteristics of support organisations

The NGOs supporting the Federation share organisational characteristics such as staff size, donor dependency and scale of activity (nation-wide). Whereas CORC is organised polycentric with decentralised programme offices and a coordination office in Cape Town, the uTshani Fund operates from a head office in Cape Town with branch offices in different provinces. PEP, smaller in size and functioning more as a non-profit company, has a single office in Cape Town operating nation-wide. The organisations could be described as like-minded organisations with their roots in the work of *People's Dialogue*. PEP and the *uTshani Fund* evolved out of PD, CORC is coordinated by a former PD director and took over intermediary functions of PD after its closure.

All NGOs share an intermediary role in the way they work with FEDUP. However, whereas CORC focuses on the establishment of networks and learning, PEP and the *uTshani Fund* are, in addition, involved in project-based technical and financial management support. Their target groups are primarily Federation groups and their saving schemes. Inter-organisational relations between the NGOs are strong both in terms of strategic posi-

[42] See Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.
[43] See Neubert (1992), p. 30.
[44] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.

tions and in project contexts.

All NGOs acknowledge that their organisational structures have formal elements but also overlap with other organisational structures, and therefore, in a way lack clear boundaries.

	CORC	uTshani Fund*	PEP
Background	Established in 2002 Catholic Church	Established by People's Dialogue in 1995, since 2002 independent	Started by People's Dialogue in 1998, independent since 2000
Total income (2006)	R 7,910,358 (constant)	479,853 R (donor and self-generated) - 3928780 R (debt)	Unknown
No. of Staff (2006)	13 (high staff turnover)	8	6
Scale of Activity	Local-national	National (head office in Cape Town)	National (Cape Town based)
No. of projects in Cape Town (2006)	9	Unknown	9
Type	PONGO+	Hybrid	SONGO+
Mission	Enable networks amongst poor communities and interaction with formal world	Social capital formation	Community ownership of housing process
Field of Activity	Land Programme Sustainable Development Project Community Microfinance Network (CMN) Sizakuyenza New Media For Social Change Co-Connected Waste Programme	Finance	Housing design and construction
Kind of activity	Finance administration Facilitation of Federation exchanges Facilitation of exchange between FEDUP and state Strategic working groups	Account administration and loan finance	Training and design workshops, assistance in business plan, house modelling and construction, consultation, intermediary

Tab. 5.3: Characteristics CORC, uTshani Fund and PEP, Source: Own design, *UTshani Fund (2005a)

5.1.3.2 Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP) and Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP

Coalition of the Urban Poor (CUP)

The *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) is an umbrella body of Grassroots Organisations and social movements such as the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) and the *Poor People's Movement* (PPM). In 2006 CUP included about two hundred affiliates across South Africa.

CUP is based in Cape Town at CORC offices and represented by one coordinator. Besides own donor funding, other finance is being sourced through CORC and the *uTshani Fund*.

Members of CUP are encouraged to organise within their own communities. CUP stresses that it does not intend to set up a hierarchical leadership structure. Decision-making is realised through action plan meetings. The member organisations set goals, evaluate progress and make recommendations to CORC, community stakeholders and funders.

> *"We encourage community groupings to meet in their own networks and not to meet in networks of the coalition. Because […] when you start a new structure like CUP people tend to forget about their own house where they come from and want to join this new castle and be part of the leadership."*[45]

CUP's intention is to empower communities by enabling exchanges and enumeration. Both networking and gaining information are seen as a basis for interaction with the state.[46]

However, CUP is still evolving and in reality the cooperation is mostly limited to FEDUP. FEDUP is linked to CUP through a 'Strategic Learning Group'. CUP has largely facilitated the promotion of SDI methodology within the Western Cape. This was due to the internal leadership conflicts within the Federation which resulted in activities stalling locally. Since the Federation has restructured, CUP activities represented a conflict of roles and responsibilities amongst CUP and FEDUP. FEDUP leaders stress that CUP needs to withdraw from its approach because it is FEDUP which constitutes the principal Federation mobilisation activities. CUP, according to both Federation and affiliated professional organisations, has to redefine its role and establish a network between the Federation and

[45] Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006.
[46] Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006.

other groups.[47]

CUP can be classified as an Association of People's Organisations (APO) as Grassroots Organisations are members and its aims are both development and issue-driven advocacy oriented. However, its membership base is not clear. Some critics even argue that CUP simply functions as an instrument of CORC. In any case a strong organisational overlap between CUP, CORC and FEDUP can be seen.

Federation of the Urban Poor (FEDUP)

The *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP)[48] is aligned to the transnational movement of *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) (see chapter 2.3.1.6). Since 1991 the SDI approach has been replicated in South Africa with the *South African Homeless People's Federation* (SAHPF). After a substantial crisis and subsequent rebuilding process, in 2006 FEDUP was initiated as a successor of SDI practice in South Africa. FEDUP is active in all provinces; primarily in urban areas. It is made up of saving schemes.[49] Since its rebuilding process accurate numbers are not available. Nevertheless, estimates indicate a membership of about 40,000 in about 700 settlements around the country.[50] Members are 85% women earning less than R1,000[51] per month.[52] Federation members were mostly from site-and-service schemes. This has been shifting towards increasing number of landless members joining the Federation.[53]

For the Federation the delivery of tangibles such as housing is perceived as an entry point for mobilisation of the poor, but not as an organisational goal as such. The aim of the Federation is to establish a network of local groups which is empowered to negotiate with the state.

FEDUP is organised at different levels with a flat leadership structure. It is based on local leadership with regional and national structures which have a facilitating and advocacy role. Since the leadership crisis within the Federation the need for more transparent work-

[47] See for example NGO member 3
[48] This abbreviation by the way is no coincidence as it is time and time again used when challenging government representatives with the slogan "We are FEDUP!".
[49] After the crisis of UTshani savings practices had to be reintroduced and are only slowly advancing again.
[50] See for example Podlashuc (2008), p. 8 and SDI (2007a).
[51] About 107 Euro
[52] See Bay Research and Consultancy Services (2002), p. 12.
[53] See Bay Research and Consultancy Services (2002), p. 15.

ing structures and less monolithic and centralised leadership has been acknowledged. The director of CORC considers the decentralised leadership as "the popcorn-popping effect as opposed to centralised leadership".[54]

At the same time these requirements result in a dilemma for the Federation: on the one hand it aims to prevent centralised decision-making and leadership structures by promoting bottom-up processes. On the other hand, there is the need (in terms of accountability requirements imposed by donors and the state) for a structured decision-making process with clear roles and responsibilities.

At a national Federation meeting in August 2006 the internal networking in terms of reporting/ planning and resource allocation was outlined as follows:

At community level the mobilisation into the Federation is based on the formation of saving groups. Through daily savings members are enabled to provide credit to other members. They also pay into an *Urban Poor Fund* (UPF) which pools external resources and local contributions for the Federation. Members pay R750 and R5 monthly into regional UPFs which will contribute to a national UPF. The fund is administered by the *uTshani Fund*. An uThshani project coordinator stressed the relevance of UPF as a mechanism to show affiliation to the Federation:

> *"They are not allowing you to go on exchanges or travels or meetings if you are not in the Urban Poor Fund. It is like saying: Here we draw the line. Here you show your true affiliation to the federation."*[55]

FEDUP facilitates the horizontal exchange of groups and enables them to scale up their activities. The Federation stresses that they differ from microfinance self-help groups since it is not the financial aspect, but empowerment and changing relations to one another and the state, which is fundamental. A common slogan they use is: "We collect people, not money." Saving schemes consist of 10-20 members. These saving schemes have legal status as voluntary associations and thereby can enter into contracts and administer member's savings. Often members of the local FEDUP networks were members of other local stokvels saving schemes, community groups or women's associations before and they continue to participate in other local structures.

[54] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006.
[55] NGO member 13

Local networks are composed of groups of savings schemes which are also referred to as 'Centres of Learning'. Saving groups interact in quarterly coordination meetings and support each other in negotiations. Planning is based on action plans which express needs and priorities agreed upon in the local networks.[56] Coordinators are identified by savings schemes and accountable to them. Their responsibility is to monitor implementation, ensure networking and communication between regional and local networks.

In 2006 local networks affiliated to FEDUP were situated in different communities within Cape Town such as Site C (Khayelitsha), Ekupumleni (Philippi East)[57] and increasingly in coloured communities such as Macassar (Sommerset West), Manenberg, Athlone and Strand. In 2006 these networks were involved with about nine housing projects in Cape Town.

Local Network	Background	Goal	Estimated No. of member households (2006)	Internal organisation	Activity
Klipfontein Glebe (Crossroads)	Residents of informal settlement, FEDUP since 2005	Establish networks (strategic) and land, housing and social development (issue-based)	200	affiliated to FEDUP, some saving schemes but non-operative	Negotiations Mobilisation Internal networking Exchanges Savings Data gathering
Macassar (Sommerset West)	Backyard dwellers or subtenants, FEDUP since 2006		200	Organised in 20 active savings schemes	
Site C/ Kuyasa (Khayelitsha)	Residents of site-and-service scheme, FEDUP since early 1990s		250	25 (estimated) saving schemes	
Ekupumleni (Phillippi East)	Former residents of site-and-service scheme, FEDUP since 1994		200	20 (estimated) saving schemes	

Tab. 5.4: Characteristics of selected FEDUP local networks, Source: Own design

[56] See FEDUP (2006), pp. 5ff.

[57] The Ekupumleni group though was highly affected by the split in the Federation and did not consider itself at the time of the research to be part of neither of the two structures. However, it continues on the SDI practices.

On a regional level FEDUP is organised in nine regions. Local networks identify representatives for regional coordination meetings where their local action plans are handed in for approval and resource allocation. Regional meetings in the Western Cape take place on a monthly basis. Also, regional coordinators (four in the Western Cape) and programme coordinators (e.g. for the *Urban Poor Fund* and savings activities) are appointed at these meetings. Regional coordinators produce reports as feedback to local networks and pass on prioritised action plans to national level programme coordinators. The regional networks identify where their local affiliates need support in their process to access land or housing subsidies.[58]

On a national level coordination is divided in coastal (Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal) and inland (Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North Western Province, Free State and Limpopo). National programme coordinators collect reports from regions, give feedback to regions and report to a treasurer. They also visit local networks on a monthly basis to assist with report preparation. Programme and budget decisions for Federation activities are made at national forum meetings. The national forum consists of three savings scheme representatives per region.

At national level FEDUP has a trust referred to as *uDondolo Trust* which finances activities such as advocacy, exchanges and documentation. The trust consists of the two national coordinators and eight trustees from NGO and government and private sectors backgrounds. The trust is managed by a treasurer.

At an international level the Federation is aligned to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International*. Federation members within this global network of federations visit each other on exchanges which are used as a vehicle for horizontal learning. SDI addresses international organisations and institutions. It also opens doors for FEDUP members to participate and advocate at an international level. SDI is, for instance, a member of the Cities Alliance to promote strategies for urban poverty reduction.[59]

The figure below seeks to depict the governance structure and mechanism of the network. Characteristic elements for network coordination are action plans, reporting and resource flows. However, the organigram only reflects an abstract understanding of the organisa-

[58] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 13.03.2006.
[59] See Cities Alliance (2005).

tional set-up. It highlights a bureaucratic organisation and fails to illustrate the network characteristic and organisational overlaps inherent in the organisational structure.



Fig. 5.7: Organigram Federation of the Urban Poor, Source: adapted from FEDUP (2006), p. 9.

The legal status of the Federation causes confusion for outsiders. Saving schemes have a legal status as voluntary associations and can enter into contracts and administer member savings. But the Federation itself has no legal standing. It is rather a governance mechanism to decide upon resource distribution within the network.

Still it is a confined network of local saving schemes and organised on various levels. Its local networks of saving scheme members are, in terms of size and scale of activity, similar to People's Organisations and their aims are both development and issue-driven advocacy oriented. The inaccuracy of terminology and difficulty of description is further com-

plicated when taking into account that activities within the network go beyond its accountability process of action plans, reporting and resource flows. Links within the network are also informal and circumscribed by the term 'federating'. The membership-base is also difficult to define since it is officially based on saving schemes which in reality are often not active. Furthermore, the formal organisational element of the Federation shows organisational overlaps with other organisations. The Federation constitutes of the *uTshani Fund*, NGOs are members of the *uDondolo Trust*, the Federation is a member of CUP and SDI, which are both located at CORC offices.

FEDUP is not formalised or registered as an organisation. Its organisational setup as a social movement is characterised by horizontal and vertical networks of federation groups which go up to transnational level through its affiliation with SDI. Interorganisational relations between local networks are therefore strong. Their members are saving schemes as the formal registered units which are constituted by urban poor with various housing tenure backgrounds.

FEDUP is critical of the deficiencies of state housing delivery. However, instead of making claims, the groups adopt a collaborative strategy and mobilise communities to Federation practices such as savings and exchanges. Through these practices the Federation intends to create strong networks as a basis for negotiation with the state. The model for mobilisation and negotiation is based upon alternative development strategies which comprise:

- 'Federating' by establishing horizontal connections in and between communities
- A multiscalar organisation building from Shack/Slum Dwellers international to local communities
- The construction of an autonomous space by savings and loans by slum dwellers, exchanges between slum dwellers and setting precedence
- The construction of a non-class identity by "rituals" which bind the members together

The relationships between Federation groups are determined by the set-up of FEDUP itself which, as outlined above, is neither exclusively an organisation nor a network. As explained the establishment of the network and the form of governance within the network

constitutes its aim and function. FEDUP structures mobilise communities on the ground which then constitute saving groups as the basic unit of mobilisation. Horizontal exchanges and continuity in relations are characteristic element of the activities.

Principal underlying understanding is that saving schemes are in need of a collective structure and local organising process. This structure and process represents a mechanism to overcome the isolation of individual communities and forms the basis of engagement with local government.[60]



Fig. 5.8: Horizontal relations within FEDUP, Source: Own design

5.1.3.3 Intra-alliance relations

Relations between support organisations

The NGOs supporting the Federation have no formal cooperation structure but very strong working relations both in terms of project implementation as well as strategic planning. The *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) is at the core of this polycentric configuration and seen as a network of NGOs with different degrees of affiliation.

CORC sees itself as:

> *"[…] best positioned to become the core of this new configuration, bringing together urban development specialists from various agencies to form a new pro-poor platform. […] However relationships will be more fluid with a focus on sharing experience, knowledge and capacity in contrast to an emphasis on organisation building and structure."*[61]

This fluid configuration comprises relatively independent programmes within CORC which gain legal standing and often financial resources through CORC as well as *uTshani Fund* and *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) as independent partner organisations of CORC. In practice this fluid relationship is reflected in mutual strategic meetings, shar-

[60] See for example: Bolnick et al (2006), p. 64.
[61] See CORC (2006c).

ing of office space with, for instance, CORC staff sometimes being accommodated at uTshani offices as well as staff members often working in teams within local projects.

Moreover, as has been shown above, the NGOs share organisational overlaps. These can be summarised as follows:

- Representatives of each NGO sit on the others board of directors.
- The executive manager of the *uTshani Fund* simultaneously acts as a supervisor to the *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN) which is a CORC programme.
- PEP constitutes both as an independent NGO and a programme of CORC.

Relations between support organisations and the Federation

The federations are assisted in their bargaining and financial management process by NGOs. The NGOs and FEDUP groups have a fragmented understanding of the housing challenge (e.g. upgrading vs. single free standing house). This is specifically revealed in local projects where Federation groups are more issue-driven. Nevertheless, they share a common understanding that the key challenge lies in power inequality. They are therefore together committed to resource building by grassroots with the long-term aim of empowerment ("power is knowledge and money").

The relationship between NGOs and the Federation is characterised by two shifts: firstly by a shift from exclusive relations to a continuum of partnerships. Secondly, by a changing approach of CORC from direct funding and social support in projects to supporting networking.

Shift from an exclusive to an open alliance

Firstly, for a long time NGOs supporting the Federation worked exclusively for the Federation. This working arrangement of mainly three components (the Federation, *uTshani Fund* and *People's Dialogue* at the time) was referred to as the 'Alliance'. It represented a new relationship between NGOs and social movements in South Africa.[62] However, as Bolnick outlines, with the financial mismanagement and leadership struggles within the *South African Homeless Peoples Federation* at the time, People's Dialogue withdrew its support and closed down. As a result the Federation was cut-off from donor funding. Bol-

[62] See Ballard et al (2006), p. 17.

nick, stresses, that this demonstrates a particular constraint inherent to all SDI alliances: donor regulations get transmitted through NGOs. The resource control by NGOs contradicts the federation's search for independence and autonomy, thus Bolnick:

> *"For the Federation we as professionals tasted sweet, but were poisoning. We are neither community nor state."*[63]

Therefore, FEDUP embarked on a reform of CBO-NGO relationship. It established a trust which puts it in a position to decide whether to continue or close contracts with their support NGOs. The difference, according to Bolnick, is that the Federation now has leverage over the NGO and moreover, that it will result in dynamic decision-making in a continuum of partnerships.[64]

The shift might better reflect a changing mindset than yet a new practice. In 2006 almost all NGO activities where aligned to Federation projects and almost all Federation groups used CORC, *uTshani Fund* and PEP as their professional support structures. For instance the *uTshani Fund* stresses that it extends its support to all groups practicing savings. In reality it is still primarily confined to Federation groups. And even if the professional support arm of the uTshani Fund expands its target group, uTshani and the Federation cannot be understood as independent entities since the *uTshani Fund* is constituted by FEDUP.

Also, CORC officially supports a variety of grassroots networks, but in reality its activities are centred on FEDUP. In the same way the *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN) is meant to combine all savings-based social movements and their NGO supporters in the field of microfinance.[65] The CMN savings coordinator stresses that:

> *"[…] savings is a ritual of SDI and the federation, but CMN works also with other groups that are saving with the aim of assisting them and then they can join the FEDUP as well."*[66]

The statement that CMN seemingly mobilises savings groups into the Federation is part of a general concern that microfinance institutions and initiatives undermine their different approaches by taking over the support for groups. As a result there is a great reluctance to

[63] Interview with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006.
[64] See Bolnick (2008), pp. 229ff.
[65] See CMN (2006).
[66] NGO member 4

collaborate in networks like CMN.[67] Obviously this tendency also characterised CMN which, in 2006, was largely affiliated to *uTshani Fund* activities.

Shift from direct funding to support of networking

Whereas the *uTshani Fund* acts as an intermediary in terms of financial management and technical support (assisted by PEP) and therefore employs professional field staff, CORC has changed its approach. The partner organisations to CORC specifically stress the difference from CORC to *People's Dialogue*'s approach. CORC provides support through learning centres and networks, not through funding of local groups.[68]

In 2005 CORC in some ways took over PD's intermediary role and activities when it came to fund raising and handling administrative matters. However, it does not employ field staff interacting with housing development projects. This is partly realised through the set-up of various programmes under the CORC umbrella. However, there are concerns that the PD closure left a capacity vacuum for social support.[69]

Within the different CORC programmes activities are centred on building relationships within the Federation and between the Federation model and professionals. CUP, or FEDUP as its main constituent, receives support from CORC in two different ways: One form of support is through learning and advocacy. CORC facilitates experience sharing through exchange programmes between these affiliates or by bringing them together to engage state institutions to secure resources. The second way NGOs are engaged is around delivery. In terms of decision-making within this configuration of NGO-Federation a 'Strategic Learning Group' has been established which is constituted by CUP, FEDUP, CORC and the *uTshani Fund* and sometimes other professional support organisations. This forum lacks decision-making power, but provides strategic alignment and identifies synergies amongst the stakeholders.[70]

Furthermore, NGOs and Federation are linked through their affiliation to the international SDI network and common activities and exchanges coordinated from the secretariat which is based at CORC. This relationship entails multiscalar and multilevel activities. Also, there is a direct link through employment of grassroots activists by CORC. It must

[67] See Interview with Tony Florence, 18.10.2006.
[68] See Utshani Fund (2005b).
[69] NGO member 13
[70] NGO member 3

be stressed that this is a sensitive issue. In the past employment has caused friction within the Federation. Therefore the NGOs aim to cease employment. In reality, however, some old contracts see to an employment of FEDUP national coordinators. Also, CUP is financially dependent on CORC. As a result its facilitator seems to be more in a quasi freelance position.

Over and above the working relations NGO staff and Federation activists often share personalised relations. These informal connections are sometimes referred to as being part of the 'SDI family' which reflects a common identity and more complex interface beyond project-based cooperation.

Bolnick stresses the importance of NGOs as intermediaries, but as a determining condition the autonomous position of SDI federations. This independence, according to Bolnick, has to evolve from below. While savings groups grow stronger, they increasingly take over more tasks which Bolnick refers to as a 'value-laden progress'. This progress in empowerment implies that the relationship between the groups and their support NGOs is also in flux.

> *"Part of the relationship is a shared understanding that the collective experience and perspective of the urban poor is central; as a result the specific roles within the relationships are in permanent transition."*[71]

Therefore, the working relation can only be summarised on a general level. Its characteristics will only come into effect in specific arrangements.

[71] Bolnick (2008), p. 328.

5.2 Perceptions of the housing process

Both from a right-based and alternative development point of view the urban trends in South Africa are characterised by the effects of HIV/AIDS, the growing unemployment, an increasing housing backlog and restricted land availability.[72] Also, both positions share the understanding that the urban challenge is determined by increased social inequality. They argue that whilst the integration of the South African economy into the global market has contributed to economic growth, it has not provided resources to overcome the uneven urban development. Instead, the social fabric is characterised by a widening gap between rich and poor which progressively undermines the stability of the country.[73]

As a result, both sides argue, dynamic urbanisation in Cape Town is characterised by informal survival mechanisms and the incapacity of governments to regulate a more even development path.

Both right-based and alternative development supporters stress that the political instability has an impact on housing delivery. Firstly, the different spheres of government block each other and thus cause delays in housing development. The coordinator of the *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) explained:

> *"So it is difficult to get a housing development on the ground, because the land that should be provided should come from the local authorities and the subsidies come from the national and provincial government. It is quite difficult to get them around one table. One would block the other."*[74]

According to both positions the growing informality does not emerge due to a lack of housing, but as a component of poverty which is linked to low incomes and unemployment. They therefore criticise government for its large scale slum eradication efforts and mass low-income housing delivery. The mode of implementation is criticised for its quantitative and technocratic approach based on formal institution delivery as it further marginalises the poor as objects of development.[75]

[72] DAG (2002), p. 6.
[73] See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001) and (2004); DAG (2004), pp. 4f.
[74] Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006.
[75] See DAG (2004), pp. 6f; DAG (2007), p. 10; Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2004).

5.2.1 Accessing land

The first phase of the formal proscribed housing project cycle is referred to as 'Land Identification Phase'. Here data is made available on vacant land for housing development, land is released, consultants conduct an analysis of the site which includes a geotechnical survey and cost estimates and finally, if needed, land is purchased.

Local government perceives land identification for low-cost housing as an exclusive responsibility of the state. Since pressure for housing delivery is high, the tendency is towards identifying Greenfield sites on the periphery. Any proactive initiatives such as occupation, identification or private acquisition are perceived as outside the formal process and illegitimate. Government officials fear that negotiations will open the channel for jumping the queue on the housing waiting list.

On the other hand the NGOs aligned to DAG or the Federation see the access to well-located land as one of the primary challenges for a successful housing approach. They criticise the effects of the housing subsidy system which links access to subsidies to the proof of legal tenure and reinforces housing development on the periphery.[76]

DAG criticises inequality in the land market and argues that it is government's responsibility to ensure access to well-located land for low-income housing.[77]

> *"Public land is public land and has to be used for the public good. If we do not have the vision how […] to make the city accessible to the poor, that opportunity will get lost. The kind of informality we see now is nothing compared to what we will see in ten years time if we do not do something now."*[78]

DAG argues that local government should increase its resource base to address the issue of land inequality.

> *"If they [government] say they do not have the resources, it means they are not taxing properly […]. In a situation where we have a rampant property market and we have the very upmarket areas there is something wrong with our revenue base."*[79]

The Federation agrees that government has responsibilities in terms of accessing land. However, faced with the reality of the incapacity of the state to fulfil its mandate, the pri-

[76] See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), p. i.
[77] See DAG (2005), p. 21.
[78] NGO member 11
[79] NGO member 11

mary option for poor households would be to take own initiative by accessing land outside the formal route and then finding ways to negotiate further development.

Both stress that the reluctance to engage with communities, forces these communities into illegal activities because local government refuses to include them in decision-making around land allocation.

For the Federation groups as well as the People's Organisations working with DAG, access to land was perceived as the only option to overcome the overcrowded conditions they have been living in. They are particularly interested in accessing land within their community or in a location close to job opportunities.



Fig. 5.9: Problem perception of accessing land for housing development, Source: Own design

5.2.2 Project preparation

The formal project preparation phase comprises the site planning process, the project approval process (including beneficiary approvals), the rezoning process and the tendering and appointment of contractors.

NGOs criticise that this phase, particularly the subsidy application process, is often delayed and represents a bottleneck. For PEP the political divide between provincial and local government in Cape Town had particularly impacted on the approval of projects. According to PEP it is not a technical, but a political issue as to why the provincial government refused to approve and release the subsidies.

The NGOs hold that poor people are excluded both from subsidy and credit-linked hous-

ing. Also, they argue, that the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries are too narrow.

A further technical constraint stressed is that owners of an RDP house find it difficult to trade their house in order to climb up the housing ladder. The *Kuyasa Fund* argues that RDP houses do not have a value in the property market. Microfinance for home improvements would enable access to mortgages and the property market and thus contribute to poverty eradication. Home improvements, Kuyasa argues, creates a bridge between the subsidy beneficiary market and the affordable housing market.[80]

A more social constraint is emphasised with regard to the delivery of a housing product which does not take into account the wide range of community concerns. DAG agrees in principle with the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) policy but criticises the variations of how it is implemented on the ground. DAG acknowledges that the new national housing policy includes a different approach, but that this would require an advocacy approach to hold government accountable to implement it.[81] DAG stressed:

> *"I want to emphasise the point that DAG does not see the house as the thing. […] in the pre project phase and during the project there is a type of consciousness that we want to create around what are the other elements to make this community be a community."*[82]

An *uTshani Fund* staff member underlined the development concern:

> *"The role of the local authority for me is to work very closely with communities. […] For me development is not a product. There is a process to the product. "*[83]

The *uTshani Fund* sees the challenge in finding solutions which take into account the livelihood strategies as an asset and in enabling communities to participate in decision-making.[84]

The grassroots organisations were interested in participatory housing development both due to lack of finance and to interest in community empowerment. The chairperson of one committee explained their reasons for opting for PHP: "We want homes, not houses."[85]

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[80] See The Kuyasa Fund (2004), p.16; van Rooyen/Mills (2003), pp. 5-6, The Kuyasa Fund (2006a), p.8f.
[81] See DAG (2005), p. 17.
[82] NGO member 8
[83] NGO member 12
[84] See Baumann (2003b), pp. 85ff.
[85] PO member 2



Fig. 5.10: Problem perception of project preparation, Source: Own design

5.2.3 Housing development

The formal housing development process comprises land bulk servicing, site surveying, internal servicing, construction, house occupation, building approval and transfer of title. Participation of community organisations is confined to project steering committees to facilitate implementation.

A general concern is the fixation on a house product which distorts any efforts for in situ upgrading to so-called 'rollover' schemes. DAG sees the delivery focus in the political patronage of housing:

> *"They [politicians] want to see houses. Houses you can cut ribbons and you can get recognition. […] Even if you only build ten houses it gives you more mileage than a thousand people having access to water and sanitation."*[86]

The *People's Housing Process* (PHP) prescribes a standardised intervention framework for people-driven development which largely reduces NGOs to technical support organisations and the participation of community organisations to house design, management workshops and self-built developments.

In reality, many of the interviewed local People's Organisations and federation groups stressed their preference to implement PHP as a community-managed, but not necessarily self-built process.

Also, from an NGO perspective a number of critical points were raised. For them housing should be a people-driven process which is believed to enhance social capital and build

[86] NGO member 11

capacities in the communities. Criticism around PHP arises largely around its local implementation. A key criticism by NGOs is that participation is not facilitated upfront.

Firstly, the NGOs disagree with the 'managed PHP' approach and criticise that the City contracts consultants who do not have the capacities to enable participation.

> *"We started to get involved in a lot of blocked projects which were set up by private companies as PHP projects – a managed PHP. Those companies never did proper participation so the project has gone to a hold."*[87]

In the view of the Federation alliance government had copied the PHP process from the Federation but then had become antagonistic to the process itself. They relate the managed PHP to both the delivery pressure of government and personal gains to be made by contracting developers.[88]

Secondly, NGOs argue that there are capacity constraints and lack of commitment at local government level. PEP argues that local government is very reluctant to work with the PHP process.

> *"At the project level we always fight with local authority officials to make the process inclusive. It is from simple things as making information available, getting communities to be part of a technical team to looking at different house types, different options and so on."*[89]

The *uTshani Fund* accuses government of misinterpreting the role of the NGO support organisation. As a result federation groups would become too dependent and then accuse uTshani for not driving the development. One project coordinator pointed out:

> *"They [government] want to see someone there who can speak their language. I am saying:" […] If I am there it is […] Utshani's Housing Process but not the People's Housing Process." They just don't get that. […] In an ideal situation we would be the support organisation and our role would only be to facilitate the accessing of the subsidies, ensure that supplies are paid and it is used to construct houses. Everything else should be done by the federation."*[90]

Thirdly, a concern which all NGOs raised was that households struggle to meet building standards requirements. According to DAG, technical requirements put beneficiaries in a dependency to external builders in construction related decision-making.[91]

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[87] NGO member 6
[88] NGO member 5
[89] NGO member 8
[90] NGO member 13
[91] See DAG (2006), pp. 13f.

Also, the Federation experienced that inspectors had become more insistent that people-driven development has to conform to norms and standards. The federation groups face difficulties in complying with regulations. An NGO member warned that the people-driven process is stifled by instituting bureaucratic requirements.[92] An *uTshani Fund* project coordinator maintained that it is particularly difficult for Federation projects since many units had been constructed upfront and then they have to comply with formal requirements afterwards. The project coordinator referred to the difficulty they face as "putting a square box into a round hole".[93] For *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) rigorous insistence on regulations seemed absurd in a situation of people-built houses.

> *"This is a report from the local building inspector […] These houses were built five to six years ago. People have been living in them. Now they won't sign them off. […] For God's sake they are holding back the subsidy because there is no window sill in the kitchen!"*

Approval depends to a large extent on the willingness of building inspectors. PEP even stressed:

> *"If you get the guys on your side, they will go out of the way and make life very easy for you – the local authorities building inspectors."*[94]

An uTshani Fund project coordinator also stressed the flexibility inspectors have:

> *"Your one inspector in one municipality wants the beneficiary to write an affidavit that they are aware that the house is not built according to plan. […] Then he will issue the occupation certificate. His colleague in the same municipality will not accept that."*[95]



Fig. 5.11: Problem perception of housing development, Source: Own design

[92] NGO member 5
[93] NGO member 13
[94] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.
[95] NGO member 13

5.3 Interfaces between the State and Alliance A

Alliance A is concerned with both strategic level interfaces and project-based interfaces with the state. Whereas strategic engagement is revealed by the diversity of activity areas, at project level relationships are illustrated through case studies. The Netreg project exemplifies negotiations and interfaces in Greenfields developments. The Freedom Park project illustrates the variety of engagements in informal settlement upgrading.



Fig. 5.12: Map of Cape Town with location of People's Organisations[96], Source: Own design

5.3.1 Perception of alliance A by local government

The *Development Action Group* (DAG), the *Kuyasa Fund* and People's Organisations are not perceived as one alliance. State actors perceived People's Organisations working with DAG as any issue-based Community-Based Organisations aligned with the corresponding opportunities and limits of partnerships with them (see Chapter 4.2.2.3).

The *Development Action Group* (DAG) and *Kuyasa Fund* are referred to as urban sector NGOs. In general officials felt that local government has good relations with them. They specifically stressed DAG's contribution to research and to technical support of the communities. A government official pointed out that DAG is the most actively involved NGO with local government.[97] Some housing officials are of the opinion that NGOs should only provide technical assistance to communities as this is where they can add value to

[96] Highlighted are the micro-case studies.
[97] City official 1

the housing process. In this context DAG is seen to be providing this technical assistance. Its 'empowerment agenda', however, is questioned in terms of its relevance for the people on the ground. Some commented that empowerment is superimposed on groups.

> *"In Khayelitsha with the first kind of PHP project that DAG ever did […] the community turned around saying: "We are sick and tired of your projects. We actually just want houses."*[98]

Another official specifically pointed out that the advocacy role of DAG often leads to blockages in housing projects. Taking a project in Kuilsriver as a case in point he felt that DAG exaggerated possibilities and that this lead to a standstill of the project.[99]

> *"If DAG is advising the community group then DAG gets trusted, my project managers don't. And then it just stalls, it does not go anywhere. It would be good if the NGOs in general had a funnel effect whereby they organise all the pre project politics and conflict and then eventually organise it into clean and neat development projects."*[100]

5.3.2 Strategic advocacy by Alliance A

There are three entry points how the *Development Action Group* (DAG), the *Kuyasa Fund* and its affiliated People's Organisations seek to influence the housing process on a strategic level: Advocacy, establishing a network of People's Organisations (CBO network) and setting precedents. Their strategic influence on different levels of government is characterised by the *Development Action Group* (DAG) as the driver of activities.

5.3.2.1 Advocacy

The *Development Action Group* (DAG) tries to establish a 'critical engagement' or 'critical partnership' with government.[101]

> *"[...] for us to play an effective role in urban development a robust advocacy and lobbying approach must be adopted. This can move from being decidedly aggressive, to engaging more collaboratively from time to time as is dictated by project needs."*[102]

DAG and the *Kuyasa Fund* make policy recommendations to national, provincial and local level of government. They influence policy debates to promote access to land and the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) or to address property-market related issues. DAG ob-

[98] City official 5
[99] City official 1
[100] City official 1
[101] See DAG (2006a), p. 10.
[102] DAG (2004), p. 17.

jects particularly to 'managed PHP' projects and advocates for a community-managed housing approach.[103] Advocacy activities are based on research findings which inform proposals and comments on policy, position papers and presentations.[104]

At national level DAG was involved in the evaluation of the *Housing Subsidy Scheme* and in the *National Department of Housing's Policy and Research Agenda* process in 2003/2004. In 2005 DAG played a central role in the development of new PHP guidelines and reconstitution of the *People's Housing Partnership Trust* (PHPT)[105]. It participated in the *NGO PHP Reference Group* and *Extended Interim Policy Working Group* at the national Department of Housing to revise PHP.[106]

DAG has strong and stable relationships also with provincial government. The executive director was a member of the *Western Cape Housing Partnership Council* which was initiated as an advisory body to the housing minister.[107]

In 2005 DAG was part of the provincial and national land summit and of the *Human Settlements Reference Group* (a provincial advisory board). This was followed in 2006 by participating in the writing team for the *Western Cape Sustainable Human Settlements Strategy* (WCSHSS).[108] The partnership with the Province released R 24 million in subsidies for twelve blocked PHP projects.[109]

A DAG staff member commented that on local government level within recent years opportunities to influence policy have arisen. However, on a local level and particularly in housing projects, relationships are still limited:

> *"Our relationship is better the higher you go [in the hierarchy]. There are a lot of conflicts which arise in the actual projects [...]. Our relationship with senior level people [in local government] is quite good; on the research and policy side very good. But [...] often policies and relationships does not arrive down on the ground to the people who we are working with in the projects. So they often don't buy to any of the things the senior people are writing."*[110]

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[103] See The Kuyasa Fund (2006a), p. 15; Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.2006.
[104] See for instance Thurmann (1999); USN (1998); Manie (2004); Western Cape Department of Housing (no date).
[105] PHPT is an agency set up by the National Department of Housing to support self-help housing.
[106] See DAG (2006a), p. 21 and DAG (2007), p. 7.
[107] See for example DAG (2004), p.22; Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.06.
[108] See interview Anthea Houston, 15.03.2006 and Western Cape Department of Local Government and Housing (2006).
[109] See DAG (2007), p. 6
[110] NGO member 6

Therefore, DAG explicitly decided to improve their relations with local councillors and officials and to focus on strategic partnerships.[111]

DAG collaborated in the formulation of the *City of Cape Town Housing Plan*. It also aimed to strategically influence policy-making through the value capture programme by identifying champions within local government for this approach.[112]

DAG's relationships to government are also often determined by personal relations to government actors. Staff turnover at DAG is seen as an opportunity to have like-minded professionals in key positions at local and provincial government level.[113] In 2006 former DAG staff and board members were found in such positions as the mayoress of the *City of Cape Town*, the Deputy Director for Provincial Department for Community Safety, a senior official and a regional head at the municipal housing department.

Generally, DAG finds itself increasingly in a contractual relationship with government working as consultant in research, evaluation and training. DAG directly shares its views and experiences with government officials by providing training courses, information seminars and manuals to different levels of government.

DAG describes this involvement as an opportunity to advocate for its housing aims and integrate them to policy and strategies. This, according to DAG, will eventually filter down and open up the municipal *Integrated Development Plan* process.

> *"What we are trying to do as a NGO is to influence policy. And hopefully policy will guide decision-making on an IDP level. That is why our work in the Western Cape Sustainable Human Settlement Strategy was an important advocacy and lobbying platform."*[114]

However, contractual relationships represent a shift from donor to state dependency. As NGOs are in need of alternatives to donor funding, their policy work increasingly becomes commissioned research. The *Kuyasa Fund* is less affected by this tendency than DAG. Studies commissioned by government to DAG include the right-based approach to housing policy for the *National Department of Housing Policy and Research Agenda*, case studies of PHP projects for PHPT, situational analysis of housing trends and a study

[111] See DAG (2006a), pp. 10f, DAG (2008a) and (2008b).
[112] See DAG (2007), p.16.
[113] See DAG (2002), p. 4.
[114] NGO member 8

of best practices for the City *of Cape Town Housing Plan*.[115]

5.3.2.2 Establishment of a CBO network

Over the years the *Development Action Group* (DAG) and the *Kuyasa Fund* experienced contradictions in partnerships with government. They became increasingly aware of the pitfalls of critical engagement:

> *"So we realise at a theoretical level it is quite a leap to try and ask government to engage differently. Maybe the thing to do is to use the space that there is and through the use of that space demonstrate the value that engagement with the community has […]."*[116]

By the end of 2006 DAG openly questioned its collaborative approach and addressed the need for pressurising government through networks.

> *"The more impatient we become, the more responsible government can become. If we do not shout, ask and demand, then it will not happen."*[117]

Given the decreasing options for community participation, DAG has further emphasised the need of claim-making and putting pressure on government. The innovation is that DAG intends to increasingly build networks between communities to enhance their chances for inclusion in decision-making. The difference to previous approaches is that DAG itself would not be the driver of this process:

> *"There is a general awareness in the organisation, that we have not been aggressive enough. [...] We want to do it more differently. We have always been in the frontline to do that. We want to get communities to do that."*[118]

Through networks of People's Organisations (CBO networks), DAG believes, people will be enabled to pressure at a local level and influence policy-making on a strategic level.

> *"Our influence can only be through the relationship we have with the communities on the ground. […] If we have a very strong civil society, a very organised civil society and informed civil society, that will automatically happen. Through that process we will hold officials and politicians more accountable and the level of engagement with communities will be far more strategic. […] That is for me the turning point. It is going to be a grass thing, a bottom up thing."*[119]

The UN World Habitat Day on 2 October 2006 was one such occasion. DAG organised a

[115] See DAG (2004), p. 20.
[116] Interview with Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006.
[117] Anthea Houston at World Habitat Day, 02.10.06.
[118] NGO member 11
[119] NGO member 8

seminar for policy makers and representatives of civil society. At the event the different groups gave an account of their struggle to access land and housing.[120]

Fig. 5.13: People's Organisations at World Habitat Day, Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006

Since the dissolution of the *People's Housing Networking Forum* (PHNF) networking opportunities have been limited to the workshops facilitated by DAG (see Chapter 4.4.3). These are irregular platforms for communities to exchange experiences on their housing process.

> *"DAG would take us to trips where we would interact with other communities and projects – especially in black areas and with women building themselves."*[121]

DAG sees a CBO network as an opportunity to shift from consultation by NGOs (for instance to favour the PHP route) to direct exchange of experience and mutual advice between community groups.

> *"[…] there are communities out there who have been through that and they understand and*

[120] See DAG (2007), p. 8.
[121] PO member 1

they are far better to advocate, than we are."[122]

A case recalled by both DAG and the People's Organisations is about a group of backyard shack dwellers who needed assistance in how to access a piece of land.

> *"Yes, Grace and Auntie Helen [names changed] encouraged the other community of Lavender because they were scared to put shacks up on the field there. They said: "Don't be scared. Get the community together and put up shacks. They [government] cannot put you off." Then they did that and now they have 5,000 shacks there. We meet each other on the leadership trainings by DAG. There you can tell about your experiences and DAG gives information."*[123]

However, DAG is interested in impacting beyond the project itself when facilitating an exchange between People's Organisations:

> *"Getting Freedom Park and Netreg and other projects to work is just a small drop in the ocean in terms of what is required. So how can we upscale and have effect on a far more strategic level? […] maybe there is a CBO network that plays a role of doing all the training and access their own funding."*[124]

Since these networks are not in place yet, People's Organisations are limited to claim-making on a day-to-day basis.

5.3.2.3 Setting precedents

The *Development Action Group* (DAG) increasingly uses projects as precedents to demonstrate alternatives and through them inform policy-making:

> *"I think we should concentrate more on disseminated lessons learned of projects. We are planning to do more case studies in the year or two ahead, document those and to try and lobby and get more commitment to people-driven processes."*[125]

In 2006 it started a pilot project for in situ upgrading through a partnership with the Informal Settlement Upgrading Department at the *City of Cape Town*. DAG assessed planned upgrading projects in Cape Town. As a result it identified one informal settlement community to pilot an in situ approach.[126]

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[122] NGO member 8
[123] PO member 1
[124] NGO member 8
[125] NGO member 6
[126] See DAG (2007), p. 10.

5.3.3 Accessing land projects by Alliance A

5.3.3.1 Request to release land in Netreg (A1)

1992	Identification and request to release land
1996	DAG gets involved
2000	Provincial administration agrees to release bulk of land
2000	Land alienation process and first plan for social housing development
2000	Land release process reopened as new findings provided that land is owned by municipality
2001	Municipality links land release to the condition that it will act as developer
2001/02	DAG facilitates negotiation process
2002/03	Preparation of PHP project application
2003	NHP addresses Minister of Housing for support
2004	Final approval of housing development (and thereby land release)

Tab. 5.6: Timeline of land access in Netreg, Source: Own design

Landownership	Local Government
Housing	Backyard shack dwellers
Size of area	3.6 ha
Project	Request for land allocation for Greenfields housing development
Members	150 households

Tab. 5.7: Key facts of the Netreg project, Source: Own design

Netreg is part of Bonteheuwel situated on the Cape Flats. Bonteheuwel has a population of about 55,707[127]. Because of its proximity to the airport, central Cape Town and other job opportunities in the area, it is described as a well-located area. It was established in the 1960s as part of a new residential township for the coloured working class at the time. The housing conditions are characterised as dense and overcrowded. There are poorly maintained municipal-owned rental housing units and numerous backyard shacks.[128]

The living conditions are characterised by social problems such as gang related crime,

[127] See City of Cape Town (2001).
[128] See Wicht (1999), p. 9.

violence, rape and drug abuse.[129] The unemployment rate is high: 37.5% of the population in Bonteheuwel is economically inactive and of those considered economically active another 33.87% are unemployed.[130] Those with formal employment work in low paid jobs. Many work in the informal sector selling goods or providing services such as sewing or collection of recycle material.[131] The poorest households have to rely on grants and social networks to survive.[132]

The *Netreg Housing Project* (NHP) represents 150 backyard shack dwellers from the area which identified a 3.6 ha piece of land along the Modderdam Road/N2 interchange (see figure 5.14). Since the 1990s they have addressed government to release the land for housing development. Initially the local administration rejected the request and suggested providing land in a low-cost housing development at the periphery. The *Netreg Housing Project*, however, objected to the proposal and decided to prepare an alternative plan and feasibility study for housing development to readdress local government.[133]

Fig. 5.14: Satellite image of Netreg Housing Project, Source: adapted from Google Earth (2006)

[129] See Wicht (1999), p. 10.
[130] See City of Cape Town (2001b).
[131] See DAG (2004), pp. 24f.
[132] 65% of the households have at least one grant recipient. See DAG (2004), p. 26.
[133] See Wicht (1999), pp. 10f.

In 1996 the group approached the *Development Action Group* (DAG) for assistance to secure the land for development. DAG conducted an initial feasibility assessment of the project and a survey on the community conditions. Meetings were set up with the Tygerberg Local Authority[134], Netreg community and DAG to negotiate further procedures.[135]

However, the group often did not agree with DAG's development facilitator about how to engage with government. Instead the Netreg community organisation arranged appointments without the facilitator:

> *"[…] there were a lot of fights because she was not doing what we would like and we could not get response from government. So we organised and made appointments without her and go there and speak to someone and she was teaching us otherwise."*

In 2000 the provincial administration agreed to release the bulk of land for housing. Subsequently, DAG was involved in the land alienation process and appointed an architect and engineering consultant to prepare development plans and infrastructure design. In the meantime provincial government rectified its previous findings and reopened the land release process by declaring that land ownership was with local government.

From 2001 onwards the land request was made contingent upon approval of housing development. The municipal department responsible for land release informed the *Netreg Housing Project* that housing development could only take place, if integrated to other housing projects with the administration acting as developer.

At the time the assistance of DAG lost momentum due to staff turnover and a lack of motivation and interest by the group.[136]

Furthermore, at the time the Netreg group was affiliated to a local SANCO branch which is aligned to the ANC. Showing this political affiliation proved to be problematic. Conflicts arouse because the ward councillor was from a different political party and refused to support the project.

The negotiations between the group and local government were very tense. The account of the chairperson of the Netreg Housing Projects reveals the tensions and aggressive claim-making at the time:

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[134] Tygerberg was one of six Metropolitan Local Councils between 1996 and 2001.
[135] See Wicht (1999), p.10.
[136] PO member 2

> *"We thought: We are coming from the struggle. It takes too much time. […] everything was standing still. We wanted pressurising government. So we set up meetings over the phone and if the secretary hinders us, we would just go there."*[137]

However, the group realised that their claim-making needed a lot of follow-up to achieve a response. The chairperson recalls:

> *"It was constantly fighting. When you come there, they [government] would make promises. We understand that it was not only Netreg. When they took too long with the promises, we would follow up. And then after second or third time follow-up, we would get a reaction."*[138]

During the negotiations with the City the group even took one official hostage. As a result the Tygerberg municipality refused further negotiations and took the project off their priority list. It revealed that project development would have to be postponed until 2004/2005 due to capacity constraints.

DAG then got involved again to mediate between the City and the Netreg community. In 2002 a further DAG staff member came in to facilitate organisational and individual capacity-building for the community. In the following DAG organised leadership workshops and assisted the group to develop a constitution and formally register as a voluntary association. DAG sees its role as advising the committee:

> *"DAG staff go out almost every day. The community organisations have lots of meetings like frequent general meetings, executive committee meetings, subcommittee meeting, savings meetings, workshops around project issues. […] We are just participating and attending. […] We would raise concerns. Ultimately our role is assisting community organisations. It is the committee who takes the decision. If there is a decision which is fundamentally impossible for us we would look at partying ways."*[139]

The group formally constituted as a voluntary association in 2002.[140] Since then, members elect a committee at annual general meetings. The committee works on a voluntary basis and is chaired by a chairperson.[141]

> *"We have a constitution where we set out the rules and regulation how to behave and what we would like to do as the committee and the beneficiaries."*[142]

Leadership in the group has not been without conflict. Leaders often did not receive rec-

[137] PO member 2
[138] PO member 2
[139] NGO member 6
[140] See DAG (2006b).
[141] PO member 2
[142] PO member 2

ognition in the community. Also, decision-making in committee meetings and who is representing the community presented a struggle amongst the committee members.

> *"In going out a lot and speaking to the people I learned a lot. I knew more than they [the committee members] knew. I am taking in and I am using in the community. They did not like that very much, because it would cause conflict. There were times when I resigned and came back many times."*[143]

DAG advised the *Netreg Housing Project* to use different strategies to engage with government and remain apolitical to avoid further blockages. The chairperson explains:

> *"Sandra [name changed] would say […] we must not focus on one thing. If we write a letter to this one, we must check out some other way which would get the same result. Which worked well. […]. We decided let's keep politics out because that is where the blockages come from. Let's do this non political. We are different people with different political views. It is not going to benefit us, if we go there thinking politics."*[144]

During long periods of negotiations the group, with the assistance of DAG and appointed technical experts, prepared its own project application for the *People's Housing Process* (PHP) to speed up the process. However, they were confronted with reluctance and scepticism on the part of the local administration.

Finally, the leadership of the *Netreg Housing Project* decided to approach the national and provincial government and lobby for their interests. They were blamed for undermining the minister's authority. The chairperson recalled that the group reminded the Housing Minister of voting promises which had been made and seemingly achieved some concessions.

> *"I wrote a letter direct to the minister and she was so angry. Because we accused her of not being interested in our project, because it is in an area where they are not interested as ANC. […] She set up a meeting with us. […] So she said I am undermining her – how can I write her like this? […] But it did not stop me and I was not scared, because it was still right. Netreg has been existent for 40 something years and in that years nothing went on. That is also what I said: they only use the people when it was voting time. Ministers and whoever, councillors, went into people's houses and speak to them. […] after they made a cross, they moved out and people will never see them. That is what I said and she did not like that. That is when we started seeing results."*

The change of commitment might also be a result of the ambitious aim of the Unicity at the time to foster the N2 Gateway project and use the Netreg project to demonstrate inno-

[143] PO member 2
[144] PO member 2

vations in infill land development.[145]

> *"He [advisor to national housing minister] was also the guy that came to Netreg saying: "I know that this was not part of the N2 but we will hijack this project and make it part of the N2." What can we do? It was very depressing to hear that. After all the hard time – the community appealed for 20 years to get that piece of ground."*[146]



Fig. 5.15: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A1), Source: Own design

5.3.3.2 Land occupation in Freedom Park (A2)

1998	Planned invasion of site and eviction order by the City
1998	Appeal to eviction order by Legal Resource Centre (LRC)
1998 – 2003	High Court order and mediation process
Since 2000	Involvement of DAG
2003	Withdrawal of eviction order and decision for in situ upgrading

Tab. 5.8: Timeline of land access in Freedom Park

Landownership	Local Government
Housing	Squatter settlement
Size of area	ca. 6 ha
Project	Security of tenure
Members	about 300 households

Tab. 5.9: Key facts of Freedom Park project

[145] DAG (2003), pp. 11f.
[146] NGO member 11

Freedom Park is an informal settlement in Tafelsig located on the Cape Flats in approximately 30 km distance to Cape Town's Central Business District (CBD). It is part of Mitchell´s Plain which was established as a coloured township in 1975. Families were relocated there under the Group Areas Act (see Chapter 4.1.1). There are about 47,540 people in Tafelsig of which about 1,375 people live in temporary shelters in Freedom Park.[147]

The socio-economic conditions in Freedom Park are characterised by a high rate of unemployment (74%). Most people (64%) depend on government grants or pursue other income generating activities such as begging, low-wage factory work, domestic work or subletting. Social vulnerability is aggravated by single parenthood, domestic violence and alcohol and drug abuse.[148]

Fig. 5.16: Aerial photography of Freedom Park in 1998
Source: MCA Urban and Environmental Planners (2005)

In 1998 seven hundred backyard shack dwellers from Tafelsig occupied a vacant piece of municipal land in the area which had been earmarked as a school site. The occupation of

[147] See Bender (2005), pp. 40f.
[148] See Bender (2005), p. 31; PO member 1.

Freedom Park[149] was supported by the neighbouring community which wanted to prevent further social deterioration of the area by criminal activities. The invaders setup their own criteria for who was allowed to occupy land to ensure stability and to enhance chances for government support: People had to be from Tafelsig and registered on the City's housing waiting list. Furthermore, the occupiers organised the invasion to conform to layout principles concerning emergency access, the size of plots and arrangements of shacks.[150]

The City took a hard stance against the unlawful occupation as it feared weakening its authority and inspiring further invasions. It applied for an urgent eviction order which was granted by the High Court. The eviction itself, however, was prevented by the residents and their supporters. The squatters then appointed the *Legal Resource Centre* (LRC)[151] which advised the group to formally register. Subsequently, the *Tafelsig People´s Association* (TPA) was formed. The LRC then represented the group and put in an objection to the eviction order. Finally, the High Court allowed the objection and the matter was transferred to a mediation process between the City of Cape Town and the occupiers as prescribed by the regulations of the *Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land* (PIE) Act. By the end of 1998 a sociologist from the University of Cape Town was appointed as an external mediator.[152]

Subsequently, a five year (1998 – 2003) mediated negotiation process between the City and the community followed. This process was supported by the *Legal Resources Centre* (LRC) for legal advice and representation of the community. Also, the City appointed a private attorney for its legal representation. The LRC at the time tried to delay the process as a tactic. The previous case (Grootboom) had shown that the longer a group stayed on the field, the more difficult it was for the City to evict them.

In 2000 both parties agreed to appoint the *Development Action Group* (DAG) to conduct a feasibility study for housing development. DAG recommended PHP delivery but outlined that implementation would depend on the access to available land through the City and

[149] Name was given with regards to the day of occupation which was Freedom Day (27th of April)
[150] See Bender (2005), p. 46. The following account is based on more detailed descriptions in Bender (2005); DAG (2006b).
[151] The LRC has a right-based approach and was established in 1979. It provides legal services to marginalized communities and individuals. It is a non-profit law clinic and with offices in several South African cities. The Cape Town office has about 18 staff members. See LRC (2008).
[152] See Bender (2005), pp. 48f.

subsidy approval by the provincial housing board.

By the end of 2000 the mediator suggested approaching the newly formed Unicity for servicing of the site. Subsequently, the residents of Freedom Park submitted a compilation of reports and asked the *Unicity Executive Committee* to reconsider decisions by the previous administration. In June 2001 the Council agreed to provide temporary emergency services and garbage collection, but continued to decline housing development.

At the time internal conflicts and power struggles in the community emerged when a further community organisation, the *Freedom Park Squatters Association* (FPSA), was established, claiming to represent the community.[153] Thus, in 2002 DAG and the City's urban renewal coordinator of Mitchell's Plain advised the adversarial community groups to elect a new, more representative, committee which would consist exclusively of people residing in Freedom Park.[154]

Following this, a substantive change occurred: the urban renewal coordinator invited the newly constituted Freedom Park committee to participate in the meetings of the *Urban Renewal Programme* (URP)[155]. The chairperson recalls how they were invited to give their opinion:

> *"He [urban renewal programme coordinator] sent us a letter and said that every time other people come in from the outside and are talking on behalf of Freedom Park and he didn't like this […] So he asked why don't Freedom Park people come in and talk for themselves. He would like to hear from them what is the situation. […] And then we went to him and told him what we want."*[156]

A window of opportunity for the initiation of housing development in Freedom Park opened when the City identified Freedom Park as a possible development for low-cost housing.[157] DAG used the opportunity and conducted a survey on community needs which was presented at a *Multi Sectorial Action Team* (MSAT) meeting of the *Urban Renewal Programme*. Furthermore, in a progress report to the City, DAG advocated that the site be rezoned for housing. This request was supported by the mediator who suggested

[153] See Bender (2005), p. 53.
[154] See DAG (2002), p. 17.
[155] The Urban Renewal Programme was initiated in 2001 by national government focusing on ten urban renewal nodes nationally. Mitchell's Plain constitutes one of the Urban Renewal Projects.
[156] PO member 1
[157] See Bender (2005), pp. 69f.

implementing an upgrading project.[158]

At the time DAG also provided various workshops in the community on leadership, organisation building and communication skills. The chairperson outlines the empowering effects of the workshops:

> *"I think we could not have made it without DAG. I didn't know nothing about taking on the City for housing and things like this. I used to work on the taxi. So what did I know about fighting for houses and going to the City for this piece of land? Then DAG came in by giving us leadership workshop. I would say the conflict resolution workshops were great, because people living in poverty has all this anger and we had to deal with all this anger. […] We became self confident that we can do this."*[159]

At the end of 2002 an urban renewal strategy was released which prioritised, amongst other items, housing development in Freedom Park. In February 2003 at a meeting between the City officials, DAG and the LRC the officials suggested that they would advise Council to give up on eviction and instead opt for in situ upgrading. After further negotiations around the specifications of housing development, both the community and the City accepted the proposal. Subsequently, the City withdrew its eviction order in June 2003 and the Council made the land available for housing development. The outcome has been critically reflected by one City official as follows:

> *"It's not a win-win situation. It's a situation where the city has been compromised and the land invaders have won."*[160]



Fig. 5.17: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A2), Source: Own design

[158] See Bender (2005), p. 68.
[159] PO member 1
[160] Quoted from Bender (2005), p. 69.

5.3.4 Project preparation by Alliance A

5.3.4.1 Speed up project preparation in Netreg (A3)

2001	Municipality only willing to support housing development on the condition that it is integrated to larger housing developments with administration as developer
2002	Decision to construct individual housing units via PHP The Kuyasa Fund conducts savings workshops and provides individual loans
2003	Netreg project is re-drafted Development proposal and PHP business plan are submitted Officials are lobbied to speed up approval process
2003-2004	Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is concluded and approved
2004	NHP and DAG conduct livelihood study Final approval of layout planning and of subsidies by provincial government

Tab. 5.10: Timeline of project preparation in Netreg

At the request of the *City of Cape Town* the Netreg community, with assistance of the *Development Action Group* (DAG), re-drafted their development plans.[161] At a workshop on tenure options the group opted for individual housing through the *People's Housing Process*. The decision was influenced by the need for additional funds for construction and by the strong wish to be more empowered. The chairperson recalls:

> *"That is also when we decided to go PHP because we wanted to have a say in how we want our houses and the planning and all that kind of stuff. We were thinking not only developing the piece of land but also develop ourselves. People have lived there for 40 years, but nothing is changing inside. We come from shacks where most of the people pay rent, but they don't know the difference of being a homeowner and the responsibilities around them. We thought of developing us. We want to move in there with a totally different frame of mind."*

Subsequently the community interviewed various professionals such as engineers and planners to design the development plan. However, it had to find professionals who were willing to work at their own financial risk.

> *"We thought because of so many struggles to manage the project ourselves. But we did not have the experience. So we had to find someone with experience and who was going to work for us without payment first. […] we went around to speak to different companies and then we decided on one and asked him to be our project manager. He was so kind and he worked several months without any payments from us."*[162]

[161] See DAG (2002), p. 19.
[162] PO member 2

The backyard shack dwellers set up a database of beneficiaries with the assistance of DAG. The council argued that it would cost too much to develop the difficult piece of land. The technical experts therefore advised them to put more people on the beneficiary list to make the land viable for housing development. As a result the committee decided to extend the list from 156 to 190 beneficiaries and to reduce the individual plot sizes. The *Netreg Housing Project* then contacted households in the area to join the project.[163]

Furthermore, since about 2002 the *Kuyasa Fund* has been giving workshops about savings. Savings are a precondition for individual households to access loans with the *Kuyasa Fund*. A saving sub-group was formed with a treasurer and collectors. The NHP chairperson refers to the change in attitude towards savings:

> *"If you would ask me two years ago about the difference of getting something and being borrowed, I would have taken the give."*

The *Netreg Housing Project*, together with DAG and the appointed town planner, readdressed local government. The officials at the municipality, however, were very reluctant and questioned if the community would be in the position to implement a PHP project. The group perceived this scepticism as arrogance.

> *"[…] he was so arrogant [City official] – would we be able to pull this thing through and how are we going to pay, are we going to pay services? He was concerned we would end up failing. We gave him the insurance that we will, if they will give us the piece of land."*

As the local authority lacked the capacity it suggested that DAG took over the role of the implementing agent in the development. DAG, however, stressed that it was neither in a position to do so, nor was it in line with their social development aims, to pursue this role.[164]

During the long period of waiting for project approval by the *Provincial Housing Development Board* (PHDB), the professionals started to proactively enter into the rezoning and tendering phase and conducted the *Environmental Impact Assessment* (EIA), set up tenders for construction and drew up the business plan. By mid 2003 the community also managed to get a private company to take over the role of an implementing agent. The chairperson recalls that they had perceived the process being delayed by government:

[163] PO member 2
[164] See DAG (2003), pp.11f.

"[…] things went so slow, because we would send out stuff and they [government] would delay them."

The private consultants and DAG helped to pressurise for the process to be sped up.

"[…] the project manager, he would not take No for an answer. If they [government officials] said you must go there tomorrow, he would go there tomorrow. [...]we would go with [DAG staff member] to some other high authority and speak to them to speed up the things."[165]

In 2004, DAG conducted a livelihood study together with the *Netreg Housing Project*. The aim was to establish a more detailed understanding of household types and their livelihood activities in Netreg.[166] DAG points out:

"Already, the local residents involved in this assessment have a richer understanding of the problems in their community and have started working with its preliminary findings."[167]

Also, in 2004 DAG organised so-called 'Project Partners Network workshops' which were supposed to enable an exchange between community groups in regard to their experiences of accessing land, services and engaging with government.[168]

At the end, through lobbying at ministerial level, the group received approval for project development. In 2004 the development plan and PHP business plan were submitted and *Provincial Housing Development Board* (PHDB) approved the project for PHP subsidy funding.[169]



Fig. 5.18: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A3), Source: Own design

[165] PO member 2
[166] See DAG (2004), p. 24
[167] DAG (2004), p. 27.
[168] See for example DAG (2005).
[169] See DAG (2006b); NGO member 10.

5.3.4.2 Influencing project preparation in Freedom Park (A4)

1999	Introduction of savings schemes and collapse after 3 months
2000	Reintroduction of saving schemes and support by the Kuyasa Fund
2001	DAG takes over role as PHP support organisation
2002	Collapse of saving schemes because of power struggles DAG conducts housing workshops and beneficiary survey
2003	Council agreement for in situ as part of the Urban Renewal Programme Establishment of Freedom Park Housing Committee Consultants appointed Beneficiary subsidy application
2004	Superblock negotiations Agreement to integrate additional 193 families Approval of general layout plan

Tab. 5.11: Timeline of project preparation in Freedom Park

In 1999 the residents of Freedom Park established the first saving scheme which collapsed short after inception as a result of limited trust between the saving groups. In 2000 the community reintroduced the savings scheme with the assistance of the *Kuyasa Fund*.[170]

In 2001 the *Development Action Group* (DAG) was approached by the *Freedom Park Development Association* (FPDA) to function as the PHP support organisation[171] in housing development. DAG prepared a report to the Executive Committee of the Unicity of Cape Town outlining the options for PHP delivery.

Subsequently, the *Freedom Park Development Association* (FPDA), assisted by DAG, conducted a survey to find out how many residents would qualify for a housing subsidy. Through various workshops DAG provided information on the housing subsidy and tenure options. Also, first layouts were drafted with the community.

In the meanwhile, the conflicts between the two committees in Freedom Park (see Chapter 5.3.3.2) made it "[…] almost impossible for external organisations to work with the

[170] The following account is based on Bender (2005) and PO member 1
[171] PHP support organisations are contracted by beneficiaries and required to establish a housing support centre and give technical, financial and administrative assistance. See also the glossary and annex D.

community of Freedom Park. "[172]

Since the opposing committees contributed to divisions within the community, the saving scheme collapsed again in 2002. As a result the confidence in savings was undermined.

In 2003 City officials proposed in situ development for Freedom Park. The *Legal Resource Centre* (LRC) consulted with the community which agreed, with reservations, that the City would later accept PHP housing delivery. Additionally, the City decided to integrate a further eighty beneficiaries from the housing waiting list into the development. FPDA accepted the proposal on condition that the current inhabitants of Freedom Park would receive the same beneficiary status. The City agreed on condition that those without beneficiary status would get the opportunity to purchase a plot and that those occupying a plot after May 2002 would have to vacate the site. DAG discussed this proposal with the community. However, after trying to obtain further information about the planned development, it felt excluded from information and feared reservations by the responsible City official. The City seemingly perceived DAG as having a biased position in favour of PHP which would subsequently influence the beneficiaries.[173] Therefore, DAG requested the LRC to continue the discussions with the City. Finally, the decision on in situ upgrading[174] as part of the *Urban Renewal Programme* passed Council.

In 2003 a multi-stakeholder forum, the 'Mitchell´s Plain Phase 1 Housing Project' committee, was established which consisted of Freedom Park and three sites within the Tafelsig area. As its decision-making competence had been perceived as limited, an agreement was reached to set up an additional *Freedom Park Housing Committee* with the City, DAG and FPDA as members. However, roles and responsibilities had not been clarified upfront. The City perceived the committee as an institutional space with advisory function whereas DAG and FPDA understood that the committee had its own decision-making competence. The resulting conflict was resolved when the City outlined that it did not have the capacity for a separate project. It argued that it would make the project more cost efficient if it were integrated into the larger development. Both parties then agreed to leave decision-making with 'Mitchell´s Plain Phase 1 Housing Project' committee.

[172] See Bender (2005), p. 65.
[173] See Bender (2005), p. 92.
[174] Freedom Park is not in situ but a roll-over type of development.

A further misunderstanding emerged when FPDA felt it had been given authority to appoint their own consultants. Instead, the City had already appointed consultants. A compromise was found: The City approved that the community would appoint a town planner for the layout planning whereas the other consultants were appointed by the City.

This was followed by further negotiations as the town planner advised against in situ development. He argued it was unaffordable within the subsidy amount and suggested a Greenfields development. As a result, discussions between the town planner, FPDA and the City continued. The City then suggested building superblocks[175]. The community felt that their needs had not been taken into consideration. The chairperson of FPDA recalls how they were approached in a paternalistic manner:

> *"They did not know how to work with communities. […] But here they have to work closely with communities on the ground. At the beginning they told us: "If you don't take this, then there is nothing."*

The superblock solution was refused by the community with the support of the DAG. But the *Freedom Park Development Association* (FPDA) feared that the City would not give the community an alternative.

> *"The committee even felt they want to give up. They don't want to go on with this and forget about DAG and tell DAG thank you for your help, but we just are thinking about our community, because if we tell the community that they are not going to get houses, it is going to be bad."*[176]

Also, the FPDA committee felt that DAG had tried to influence them. It meant quite an effort on the part of the FPDA to decide against DAG's advice:

> *"I told them: You cannot tell us anymore what to do. We will set up a meeting and decide on our own. Then we decided to take the superblock. We called DAG in and thanked them for all their help. But we are thinking that the community is relying on us as leaders."*[177]

Thus DAG was confronted with balancing to empower but not to superimpose their advice. The director recalls:

> *"Freedom Park is an example of DAG's approach. DAG would not speak for the community but help them articulate for themselves confronting government."*[178]

[175] See Huchzermeyer (2003c).
[176] PO member 1
[177] PO member 1
[178] Interview with Anthea Houston, 15.03.06.

In Freedom Park DAG advised the committee not to give in right away, but to wait and see what the City would suggest to them at the next meeting.

> *"Then they said it is our decision, but before we go in there don't say anything. Let them first talk. If they still have the same attitude you can do your thing. Then they [City officials] said it is fine. […] You can go on with your PHP."*[179]

Obviously the bargaining had in the end contributed to a solution in favour of the community's needs. However, the community also made concessions since it was agreed that an additional 193 families from the housing waiting list were to be integrated into the development.

The beneficiary application was finalised by 2003 after two investigations by the City's Informal Settlement Unit and a survey by FPDA/DAG. By 2004 both the town planning and beneficiary list were submitted and approved.[180]



Fig. 5.19: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A4), Source: Own design

[179] PO member 1
[180] See Bender (2005), pp. 80ff.

5.3.5 Housing development projects by Alliance A

5.3.5.1 Controlling housing development in Netreg (A5)

2004	Appointment of project manager by City DAG takes over role as PHP support organisation Establishment of steering committee Tender of infrastructure delivery Appointment of civils contractor PHP workshop and house design workshops
2004/05	Skills development Agreement on allocation criteria by members Conflict resolution in saving groups
2005	Support by Niall Mellon Township Trust (NMTT) Infrastructure and housing development
2006	Houses finished and handed over

Tab. 5.12: Timeline of housing development in Netreg

Following the subsidy approval in 2004, the *Netreg Housing Project* (NHP) addressed the municipality which agreed to the prioritisation of Netreg for housing development. NHP proposed appointing those consultants as project managers who had been working with the community since 2003. While this was accepted by the municipal procurement committee, the City was adamant that one of its officials was appointed.[181]

The *Netreg Housing Project* could still make a number of its own decisions: it employed a marketer to work with the beneficiary list and to assist in accessing services. It also appointed the *Development Action Group* (DAG) as its support organisation.[182]

In 2004 the City established a steering committee for all stakeholders. The committee consisted of NHP representatives, the City project manager, the development facilitator from DAG, the engineer, planer and marketer.[183] The idea was to coordinate the land development and construction process and discuss the progress of the development through weekly meetings.

[181] The account is based on DAG (2006a), pp. 13f.; DAG (2006b); Moodley (2005); NGO member 10, PO member 2 and direct observation from a steering committee meeting.
[182] PHP support organisations are contracted by beneficiaries and required to establish a housing support centre and give technical, financial and administrative assistance. See also the glossary and annex D.
[183] PO member 2

> *"[…] we wanted everybody on board who will take the project forward. We as the [NHP] committee, who did not have the necessary abilities, would like to have other people so we can learn."*[184]

In 2004 DAG provided workshops about the *People's Housing Process* (PHP). At the time the *Netreg Housing Project* agreed upon the criteria of allocation of the plots; owners of horses and carts for instance were allocated larger sites close to open spaces. NHP also decided to self-manage the development, but not to self-build the houses.

> *"Our people are not used to PHP. With the help of DAG we wanted people to help us to set up, so beneficiaries would not need to go out themselves physically. Because we knew it would never work out and we would never finish the project, if it depends on them."* [185]

Furthermore, the role of DAG entailed facilitating the participation of beneficiaries in the house design process. Following an agreement in the community to build semi-detached houses, DAG submitted the house designs to the municipality. Related to this process DAG criticised the insistence of the municipality to adhere to disproportionate submission requirements.[186]

DAG also provided information to the beneficiaries on what they could expect from professionals. Moreover, in 2004 skills training was provided in partnership with the national *Department of Labour*. Subsequently, 104 jobs were created for members of the community.

> *"With the project there are opportunities for the people: They got training and they got jobs. […] We as the housing committee registered ourselves as a CBO. So we are going out to tender and use that to create jobs in the community. So they can be able to pay their rates and services."*[187]

DAG set up a *Housing Support Centre* (HSC) with construction controllers[188] and local *Community Liaison Officers* (CLOs). Learning from experiences in other projects the *Netreg Housing Project* agreed upon a CLO who was not a beneficiary in order to avoid conflict in the community.

During the infrastructure development in 2005 the project was confronted with long de-

[184] PO member 2
[185] PO member 2
[186] See DAG (2007), p. 21.
[187] PO member 2
[188] These construction inspectors were Cuban engineers and based at DAG through a bilateral agreement between the Western Cape Province and the government of Cuba.

lays which were caused by tight regulations, a lack of supervision by the municipality and a number of repairs which were needed. DAG and the *Netreg Housing Project* had to pressurise the City project manager to hold the contractor accountable for the completion of outstanding infrastructure development.[189]

> *"In a normal contract, in a civils contract, […] they [government] must be on site when the electrical guy comes, so they can monitor and make sure that the work is not damaged. […] They give all these strangest conditions for housing, but they would not apply it to their own infrastructure."*[190]

From 2005 the *Niall Mellon Township Trust* (NMTT) joined in as a partner of the development. NMTT is a house building charity, which was established in 2002 by an Irish property developer who resides in Cape Town. Netreg represented the second project which the charity had been involved with. The NMTT approach, referred to as 'Township Challenge', involves volunteers from Ireland who raise funds and participate in an annual 'Building Blitz' which is a week of house construction in the townships of Cape Town.[191]

The house construction process started in 2006: In January builders from Imizamo Yethu, a settlement where NMTT had implemented its first project, transferred their skills to builders from Netreg. In March, the rugby club of the University of Cape Town (UCT) volunteered for a day laying foundations for nine houses.[192]

NMTT also provided additional funding so that the quality and size of the housing units were improved using higher quality material and providing geysers and solar panels. The chairperson of the *Netreg Housing Project* reflected the initiative:

> *"That is a great thing that Niall Mellon initiative. […] we are fortunate because we don't need to pay back the money."*

However, she mentioned shortcomings of the approach and critically remarked:

> *"If I had to choose to educate our people, as I see the many difficulties now, I would like them to rather pay back. Give them some sort of loan, […] so they would be more responsible. It adds value to that house. I am not complaining. But I would like to see Niall Mellon initiative to change the charity."*[193]

Furthermore, DAG later outlined that this partnership compromised community control of

[189] See DAG (2007), p.21.
[190] NGO member 11
[191] See NMTT (2006).
[192] See NMTT (2006).
[193] PO member 2

the project. In its 2006/07 annual report it openly addresses:

> *"Although the material gain was substantial, the loss in terms of the empowerment of the community was substantial too. Throughout the period, we witnessed how the role and responsibility of community leaders reduced as the partnership became increasingly disempowering."*[194]

Moreover, the resource transfer through NMTT seemingly discouraged saving groups. At the same time problems occurred with accountability within the saving groups. As a result savings discontinued in 2006.

Community approaches were also neglected since the project was under extreme time pressure. The construction schedule had to be shortened because subsoil drains and foundations had to be finished before the winter season. In April 2006 the first two homes were handed over during a ceremony with the Minister of Housing. She stressed that government had taken so long to match their commitment and pledged further subsidies to the community.[195]

Fig. 5.20: Finished semi-detached houses in Netreg, Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006

[194] DAG (2007), p. 21.
[195] See DAG (2006a), pp. 13f.

By October 2006 all 191 houses were completed and occupied. At the time the steering committee continued its meetings to discuss unresolved finishing problems. A key concern was the outstanding building approvals. Only if both the beneficiaries and the City's building inspector signed the so-called 'happy letter', would subsidies be released from Province. However, building approvals were not signed as the water meters connection was lacking. The steering committee was concerned that connection of the water meters would be delayed if the billing sub-system was not in place.[196] The steering committee was in complete agreement that they had to search for alternatives to ensure subsidy release. It discussed different options to either fast track the installation as soon as the subsystem is in place or to put in temporary connections so that the inspector would agree to sign the 'happy letters'.



Fig. 5.21: Interfaces in Netreg project (micro case A5), Source: Own design

5.3.5.2 Rollover development in Freedom Park (A6)

2004	Start of rollover scheme Plot allocation process
2005	PHP workshops by DAG PHP prioritisation process
2006	NMTT provides financial support to PHP House design workshops and construction-related training by DAG

Tab. 5.13: Timeline of housing development in Freedom Park

[196] The problem with the water meters exists because the City needs people's details on subsystem. But on the list of beneficiaries there are no street addresses. So council does not know where to send the bill to. This problem exists all over Cape Town. The previous government did not look at the payment but the DA is very strict with the water meters. The payment system is now holding up the project.

Fig. 5.22: Satellite image of Freedom Park at time of rollover development, Source: Google Earth (2006)

In 2003 land was made available for housing development in the Freedom Park informal settlement. The project was supposed to accommodate 493 households with 300 living on site at the time. In 2004 the *Freedom Park Development Association* (FPDA) registered as a non-profit organisation. In 2006 its executive committee consisted of twelve members working on a voluntary basis.[197] Members of FPDA also organised in different sub-groups which comprised housing related issues and broader community needs.[198]

Since FPDA decided to self-manage the project, one of the executive committee members was selected as the *Community Liaison Officer* (CLO). The CLO was responsible to link up with the municipal project manager and monitor progress of implementation and the quality of work by contractors. The *Development Action Group* (DAG) took over the role of the support organisation for the housing development. DAG focused on capacity building and community empowerment. The project coordinator of DAG perceived herself as a link between the City, the donors and the FPDA. Together with the *Kuyasa Fund* she as-

[197] See DAG (2006b); Freedom Park Housing Project (2006).
[198] Sub groups active in 2006: Housing Support Centre, Savings, Community Safety, Materials Supplier, PHP Application, Freedom Park Profile/Newsletter, Solid Waste & Recycling, Abuse Project, Beneficiary Information, Construction Skill Training and Disaster Management.

sisted with the building of saving schemes.[199] There are about ten active saving groups. Members either pay in weekly or monthly to a savings group coordinator.

The City had appointed private consultants such as a land surveyor and an engineer for infrastructure delivery. Project management was carried out by City officials. The initial project manager was perceived as a gate keeper both by FPDA and DAG. He was accused of denying access to key information such as the beneficiary list and of not integrating the community to decision-making. In 2006 he left and other City officials took over his function as interim contact persons. Although at the time no project management was in place, the contact persons were perceived as more open and making an effort to take up community concerns. The DAG project coordinator highlighted that they would sign applications within a day and willing to hand out information. She stressed:

> *"Cooperation means that not everyone just wants to accomplish their own interests."*[200]

In 2004 the sites were surveyed and pegged. Then the rollover scheme was implemented. The community had to move some of their shacks to free the way for service delivery. DAG assisted to develop principles for plot allocation to limit the relocations and maintain community networks. DAG stressed the deficiencies of rollover projects and criticised the unwillingness of the City to pursue in situ upgrading projects. In its 2004/05 annual report it stated:

> *"Whilst an in situ upgrade in Freedom Park was possible, professionals and City officials were unwilling to consider it, putting forward technical reasons such as the need to do earthworks and the high cost of infrastructure, should the layout not be reconfigured. As a result, all households on the site will have to break down and rebuild their homes at least once and some would have to do this several times before eventually moving into their new homes."*[201]

While road construction was under way, temporary toilet facilities and water stand pipes were provided by the City. Soon the community complained about the companies contracted by the City. The delivery of temporary services was progressing slowly and turned out to be defective. FPDA reported the claims to the *Legal Resource Centre* (LRC) which advised the community to negotiate directly with the contractors.[202] A leader of FPDA re-

[199] NGO member 7
[200] NGO member 7
[201] DAG (2005).
[202] See Bender (2005), p. 64.

called the tensions in the community caused by the delays:

> *"For us not having sanitation, electricity and water – this would have been people's comfort zone. They would have been more relaxed than they are at the moment."*

She stressed the importance to raise awareness by City officials:

> *"They had to put themselves into our shoes. They [contact persons at City] came out a lot and could see the conditions we live in […]. We said the process got delayed and they already had tell us to start this month. We said we have already given feedback. You come out and face these people and tell them, because tomorrow the community is not going to believe the leaders they put into place."*[203]

Fig. 5.23: Temporary services in Freedom Park, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

The DAG project coordinator recalled that the community was strong in negotiations. DAG and FPDA would sometimes split their roles in good cop/bad cop in negotiations.

> *"One has to be very conscious of which compromises one would allow. A clear idea about the own aims are most important."*[204]

While FPDA was strong in negotiating with outside actors, internally its committee was

[203] PO member 1
[204] NGO member 7

affected by leadership conflicts. According to the DAG coordinator, this often influenced their cooperation. Also, at the time the community was confronted by numerous endeavours by ward councillors to influence the development.[205]

During the infrastructure delivery phase DAG provided a number of workshops on the *People's Housing Process* (PHP), house design and office management and offered leadership seminars and construction-related training. One key outcome was that DAG had influenced FPDA to opt for medium-density, row and semi-detached housing.

Nonetheless, PHP became unaffordable to most households due to material price increase and inflation. Therefore, only two hundred beneficiaries opted for PHP housing delivery whereas the other three hundred chose conventional contractor built homes. In 2006 the set back of PHP negotiations was overcome by a private initiative. The *Niall Mellon Township Trust* (NMTT) signed a multi-stakeholder partnership agreement with FPDA and offered financial support to PHP housing. The support included the provision for larger houses (42m²) with improved finishing and solar panels and influenced all beneficiaries to reconsider their housing delivery choice in favour of PHP.

NMTT further offered a loan to those who were not eligible for housing subsidy. DAG and FPDA executive committee members consulted the eleven affected households to form small saving groups in order to prove their track record. However, the project coordinator stressed that it was difficult to promote savings in a situation where the households were aware that they would not be forced to repay.[206]

The PHP business plan and application had to be amended several times since all households had opted for PHP through the NMTT initiative and since costing had to be recalculated with increased material price costs. Also the call for tender for marketer and constructors had to be re-advertised. During this period the DAG project coordinator held irregular meetings with the City to speed up the tender processes.

The FPDA at the time had started numerous other projects such as home-based crèches, neighbourhood watch, a waste programme and food gardening.[207]

Also, the Mitchell's Plain urban renewal programme provided income generation oppor-

[205] See Bender (2005), p. 87.
[206] NGO member 7
[207] PO member 1

tunities to FPDA and in 2005/06 eighteen beneficiaries were employed as labourers.[208]

Although bulk earthworks and infrastructure were envisaged to be completed by September 2006, slow progress and the liquidation of the contractor contributed to a nine month delay.[209]

According to the DAG coordinator, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) was very good at keeping up relations with the contractors and the City officials and at the same time pointing out deficiencies and requesting them to take over responsibilities for delays.[210] FPDA asked the engineer to join a meeting with the community. The CLO recalled the negotiations:

> *"We told him: "You come out and tell them". He said in two weeks time [work will restart]. I said to the community: "Don't take the two weeks. Leave it for a month.""*[211]

Fig. 5.24: Meeting with engineer in Freedom Park, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

By end of 2006 infrastructure development was almost complete. Also the PHP business

[208] See DAG (2006a), p. 15.
[209] NGO member 7
[210] NGO member 7
[211] PO member 1

plan and application and tender had been finalised and approved. Housing construction was about to start in 2007.



Fig. 5.25: Interfaces in Freedom Park project (micro case A6), Source: Own design

5.4 Interfaces between the State and Alliance B

Alliance B pursues pragmatic interfaces with the state both on strategic and project level. Strategic engagement is characterised by a variety of partnership agreements. Case studies at project level illustrate the extent to which these relationships filter down. The Macassar and Ekupumleni projects exemplify negotiations and interfaces in Greenfields developments. The Klipfontein Glebe, Site C and Kuyasa projects illustrate the variety of engagements in upgrading and consolidation of settlement projects.

Fig. 5.26: Map of Cape Town with location of local FEDUP networks, Source: Own design

5.4.1 Perception of alliance B by local government

Many housing officials tend to give a technical support role to NGOs. In this context NGOs aligned to the Federation are questioned.

> *"The kind of the question to the FEDUP group is […]: Where are you getting the technical assistance from? The technical assistance is so vital in sense of empowering the community to have a successful housing project."*[212]

Some officials were sceptical about the exclusive relationship that the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) and the *uTshani Fund* have with the *Federation of*

[212] City official 5

the Urban Poor (FEDUP).[213] Their poverty focus which sees housing as a by-product is questioned. A City official stressed that in reality it is the house itself which attracts people into the Federation:

> *"[…] they join the Federation to get a house. You can bet that they are on all the other lists as well and whatever comes up first they go for it. Some people do engage with the Alliance in terms that they gain so many skills and opportunities to empower and build social capacity. […]But it is really the dye hards which stick around afterwards. Once they have got a house there is this genuine kind of: Now I have to rest and now I have to focus on other things."*[214]

City officials were also sceptical about the resources allocated to the Federation and questioned its capacity to deliver. CORC was specifically criticised for not implementing a project to its end.

> *"I would love for him [CORC coordinator] to just run one project, so that he gets the sense of – "yes the world is messy and there is lots of things" – but at the end of the day you have to stabilise things and you have a sequence of actions you have to pull through."*[215]

By attracting subsidies and land, it is feared; resources will be blocked to go for other developments. Government officials argue that the Federation lacks capacity and is constrained by internal conflicts to develop the sites. Thus it would be irresponsible of the Federation to hold on to the sites instead of relinquishing them to government.[216]

> *"If they don't have the capacity for 6,000 subsidies, the subsidies are not going somewhere else. Now you cannot really complain about it in Cape Town, because government is not delivering either."*[217]

Outsourcing tasks to the Federation such as enumerations would mean first building capacity within the Federation and, consequently, that local government shifts from a delivery orientation to building social capital:

> *"The principle is good: Poor people talking to poor people to mobilise. […] it depends on what the governments approach is. Is government about building social capital?"*[218]

Also, there is the perception of undemocratic practices and patronising leadership. Some officials felt uncomfortable to be aligned to the Federation and criticised its claim for ex-

[213] City official 7
[214] City official 7
[215] City official 1
[216] City official 7
[217] City official 7
[218] City official 7

clusive partnerships with the City:

> *"You cannot just go in partnership only with the Alliance. And that is what the Alliance always wanted is that exclusive flagship partnership with the Cities. But the reality is that Cities cannot do that. They can say: Yes, we are going into partnership with you, but we are also going into partnership with any other community that comes along and wants to engage with us. But of course a partnership like the Alliance which has resources and international contacts and kind of profile will command more from local government, because it has the capacity, not like the local communities, to lobby for attention."*[219]

Moreover, the engagement with the local Federation groups is perceived as difficult as they do not represent an entire community. Officials feared that by favouring FEDUP groups they would sideline other organisations. Particularly in the housing process there is a concern that local Federation groups are exclusionary and do not want to participate in a housing project with other people outside the saving groups.[220] A City official stressed:

> *"Smaller groups can become quite marginalized in the face of all this international Hoo-ha […] that comes with the Alliance. It makes me a bit uncomfortable. They do embrace bully tactics. They strategise and that is their strength, but that means that your other organisations that are not on board are pulled on the wayside. Maybe that is life. For government it is difficult."*[221]

Furthermore, there were statements about irresponsible practices of the Federation. Officials accused the Federation of having built too large PHP show houses at the cost of infrastructure connection and thus raised unrealistic expectations.[222] There is a feeling that local government should hold the federation accountable; particularly in face of the changes within the Alliance.

> *"I suppose as local government you don't really have the time to understand what the hell is going on there. So you just kind of engage with whoever wants to engage with you. But […] we should start – maybe that is patronising – but holding the Federation to account saying you have got some significant land holding. […] Cape Town allocated budget to the Federation and whether this has been drawn down I don't know. I doubt it. So there would need to be a level of accountability."*[223]

[219] City official 7
[220] City official 4
[221] City official 7
[222] City official 1
[223] City official 7

5.4.2 Strategic partnerships by Alliance B

The Alliance B seeks to gain strategic influence on access to land, subsidy allocation and housing development outside the formal route. FEDUP pursues a relational logic: It tries to develop its social ties with various levels of government. The strategy is to single out those in government who are interested in engagement. The strategic tools can be summarised as: Learning, resource mobilisation and partnerships. The interventions have in common multilevel interfaces with external actors and a focus on grassroots autonomy.

> *"You have to work through the community, municipal, provincial and national level and the same with the church. You have to work with all of them; and levels change as people are dynamic."*[224]

In terms of grassroots autonomy CORC stresses its role of facilitating meetings with government, but of leaving the lead to the Federation:

> *"If I go to a meeting alone and I keep all the information to myself, it does not empower. You just open the door and let them take the lead after that."*[225]

5.4.2.1 Learning

Key is to capacitate Federation members to gain their own understanding of the housing situation. The Federation compiles its own data on informal settlements, proactively identifies land and assesses viability of sites. In 2006 national government financed a profiling of informal settlement in the Cape Town metropolitan area. This research exercise was conducted by the *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) and primarily FEDUP as its affiliate. The profiling team, made up of sixteen young local slum dwellers, was assisted by CORC. The objective was to build capacity through information gathering and report compiling. Moreover, the exercise was meant to give ownership of information to the poor and address deficiencies of official data as a tool to influence policy decision-making and engage with government on upgrading processes.[226]

> *"This document [informal settlement profile] was used for lobbying and advocacy. With the support of SDI, because Jockin [SDI leader] works very closely with the ministers and the provincial departments."*[227]

[224] NGO member 5
[225] NGO member 4
[226] See CORC (2006a).
[227] NGO member 5

Fig. 5.27: Informal settlements profiling team, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

CORC stresses the difference to official data being sourced. The objects of research become researchers on their own situation which CORC refers to as 'radical subjectivity'. This, according to CORC, provides new insights about how the poor themselves perceive their situation.[228] The head of housing of the *City of Cape Town* acknowledged the approach as a vehicle for partnerships between the City and the communities:

> *"The Community Organisation Resource Centre's project of profiling 200 informal settlements within the Cape Town Metropolitan is a giant step towards the laying of a solid foundation of a partnership between the City and the informal settlement communities."*[229]

Although the document was made available to local government, it hesitated to take it up. The exercise rather led to suspicions that the profiling was part of the political power games between the different levels of government. City officials stressed:

> *"I think it is a problem for an organisation to secure funding from national government and march into a local government context […] So from local government perspective it feels like they are interfering in our competencies. On the other hand for the reality check we do not have the capacity and should take up what someone else is doing. One should not really fight*

[228] See CORC (2006a), p. 7.
[229] Maqethuka in CORC (2006a), p. 6.

about that. Our aerial photograph informations are very good on the informal settlements; together with the Federation stuff it would be interesting to match the two."[230]

5.4.2.2 Resource mobilisation

In 1996 partnership agreements with the state led to a grant of ten million rand by the *Department of Housing* and to an agreement with the *National Housing Board* that the *uTshani Fund* would act as a conduit for housing subsidies ('uTshani Agreement').[231] However, the *uTshani Fund* claims that difficulties emerged with provincial governments not paying out the subsidies which still constitute a large share of uTshani's debt situation.[232]

In 2005 the *uTshani Fund* administered 13.5 million rand[233] in subsidies for government. The share of housing subsidies by the Western Cape Province amounts to a total of 6.3 million[234] of which 2.3 million was disbursed in 2005.[235] The government subsidies are under the jurisdiction of the uTshani Trust which consists of government representatives, two Federation members and seven representatives of affiliate organisations. Release of trust funds to the Federation must be approved by a majority of the trustees.[236]

In February 2006 FEDUP, SDI, and the *uTshani Fund* negotiated a deal with the *National Housing Board* to provide one hundred subsidies. Part of the agreement was to prove that through the *People's Housing Process* they could build one hundred houses in a month as long as national level could apply enough pressure on provincial and local authorities in the Western Cape to remove all obstacles.

"The normal bureaucratic things submitting plans, having plans approved before you start building, ensuring that there is infrastructure on site before you start building houses and all of a sudden when it came to a crunch not even national housing board get the provincial and local authorities to meet those demands."[237]

In May 2006 an international slum dwellers conference organised by *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) and the *Department of Housing* took place in Cape Town. At the occasion the national Minister of Housing committed 6,000 subsidies per annum (at a cur-

[230] City official 7
[231] See National Housing Board/uTshani Fund (1996).
[232] uTshani Fund (2006b).
[233] See uTshani Fund (2005a), p. 14.
[234] About 674,100 Euro.
[235] See uTshani Fund (2005a), p. 20.
[236] See Baumann et al (2001), p. 9.
[237] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.

rent value of US $35 million) from national and provincial governments to the Federation (referred to as 'the Pledge').[238]

The pledge and hundred-houses pilot constitute a pressure to scale up delivery for the *uTshani Fund*. With the pledge finance the *uTshani Fund* aims to move away from PHP as a self-build process. The *uTshani Fund*, CORC and the national Federation leaders decided not to comply with the formal PHP route. Instead of PHP support centres they intend to work through the saving schemes. The idea is to implement a *Community-Construction Management Team* (CCMT) model whereby saving schemes and the Federation constitute a housing association. This housing association then contracts a technical supervisor and community contractors. Community contractors hire building teams. An important aspect is that board members of the housing association are not allowed to act as community contractors in order for them not to profit from the development.[239]

The *uTshani Fund* is of the view that it can showcase a new kind of community-led process which the City can take up to shape policy. Therefore uTshani intends to speed up the process and prove to government that the Federation is able to build one thousand houses a year.

The Federation also promotes donations by private land owners. The *Methodist Church of Southern Africa* (MCSA) has committed itself to dispose of land as part of their reconciliation vis-à-vis impoverished communities. Subsequently, FEDUP members conducted a land audit and assessed the viability of vacant sites for housing development. In Cape Town the focus is on the development of a 67ha site in Klipfontein Glebe (see Chapter 5.4.2.2).[240]

A point being stressed in terms of resource mobilisation is that the initiatives are not meant to leverage resources exclusively for Federation members. Concerning the land agreement therefore, access to land would be opened to all homeless and landless groups.

> *"Even if the MoU is signed with the church and FEDUP, we will not limit it to federation members that would be unfair. […] That is a type of unspoken agreement with the church. We formalized it with the federation, but not exclusively for the Federation."*

[238] See SDI (2006c); uTshani Fund (2006b); CORC (2007)
[239] FEDUP meeting, 04.10.2007.
[240] See Bolnick/Rensburg (2005); Centre for Civil Society (2006).

Also concerning the pledge, the *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) sees itself as ensuring that the resources will not be used exclusively for FEDUP:

> *"We have managed through our networking with SDI and with FEDUP to attract local resources to FEDUP and we have used the coalition and its affiliates also to support FEDUP in this process. […] To that extend that FEDUP is prepared to also share the subsidies with other affiliates with in the coalition."*

Finance is also generated locally within the Federation through an *Urban Poor Fund* (see Chapter 5.1.3). The fund is used to finance securing land, housing, water and sanitation or for access to locally circulated low-cost loans for income generation and shelter improvements. The fund receives contributions from federation members as a way of showing accountability. Thus the fund also functions as a mechanism to access state subsidies and donor grants. Basically the fund pools financial assets of the federations and is managed by FEDUP. An uTshani staff member indicated that the fund is the key to reducing the dependency of the Federation on the *uTshani Fund*:

> *"[…] it [Urban Poor Fund] is something out of uTshani's control and something out of the funder's control but it is something the Federation wants to build in order to attract additional resources, that their dependence on uTshani is not so much."*[241]

The *uTshani Fund* stresses that the Federation needs to be in the driver's seat during developments. They understand their role as support organisations to facilitate access to subsidies and ensure that suppliers are paid. Everything else should be managed by the Federation in order to release them from NGO dependence. Thus in the construction process the *Urban Poor Fund* is supposed to constitute a strategic mechanism to facilitate progress outside the control and regulation which the *uTshani Fund* is restricted to. In the FEDUP inland provinces it is already functioning whereas in Cape Town, as part of the coastal region, in 2006 it was still in the constitution process. An *uTshani Fund* project coordinator outlined the relevance of the *Urban Poor Fund* to reduce the dependency on uTshani in the building process:

> *"They must send me a "Please call me" if they need a packet of screws. They can use that Urban Poor Fund. […] It is a leverage of which they have control. It is not sitting in uTshani and is not regimented by all the rules and regulations. It is much more flexible and it is with them and controlled by them and it is for them."*[242]

[241] NGO member 13
[242] NGO member 13

5.4.2.3 Partnerships

In the early 1990s the Federation used land invasions as a tool for negotiations. This approach has subsequently been replaced by joining in partnership agreements with local governments. Nonetheless, there is continuous internal contention within the Federation how best to gain a position to negotiate with the state. Although officially the Federation turned away from land invasions; internally there exists a disagreement as to whether to use the threat of planned invasion as a basis for negotiation. A FEDUP leader outlined the importance of invasions to enhance a position of power for negotiations:

> *"You have to negotiate from a position of power. […] They saw that if we want ten thousand people there, we can have ten thousand people there. With that they know they stand to loose more, if they do not engage and talk. […] These are the games we have to play and people are not playing them enough. We felt too comfortable that this is the new dispensation and the new government, forgetting that the government is also looking for answers after years and years of not doing anything."*[243]

Partnerships are perceived as options to make government accountable on agreements and to accelerate project approval and funding. Partnership agreements entail that the Federation discontinue land invasions in exchange for the support of people-driven housing processes.

The Federation's activities have lead to outcomes such as the partnership and social contract with the Department of Housing. On City level the Federation claims to have partnership agreements with numerous local authorities (Ethekwini, Ekhureleni, Johannesburg and Cape Town).[244] Often partnerships provide a mechanism to expose government officials to exchange activities with SDI partners and government counterparts in other countries. Champions within local government are perceived as essential drivers and partners for innovative solutions.

The Federation contests the formal *People's Housing Process* (PHP) and stresses that pure self-build projects are infeasible. The *uTshani Fund* supports this position. It particularly stressed that self-build housing and resource transfer to communities groups had created specific problems within the Federation which contradict empowerment aims.

[243] Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006.

[244] Often these agreements are not formalised as signed agreements which cause confusion for outsiders. One national leader explained that for the federation it is enough proof of a formal relationship when there exist minutes of regular meetings and when government officials participate in exchange programmes. See Interview with Patrick Magebula, 02.11.2006.

The *uTshani Fund*, however, does not believe in giving recommendation to policy reform as it sees the problem within the provincial and local government bureaucracies.[245] Instead its approach is to change the state housing system from working within it.[246] The *uTshani Fund* therefore promotes partnerships with government. For instance it facilitates support to Federation groups to engage with the housing Ministry to access subsidies and through them have the ability to work differently on project-level.[247]

In order to translate the pledge into projects, the Federation was urged to upscale its activities and negotiate with provincial and local government to approve projects, subsidies and allocate land. The process requires a high degree of social mobilisation and organisational input and has been supported by CORC. Obstacles with provincial governments remain around disbursing the pledge subsidies. The *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) realises that the allocation of subsidies is delayed by government.

> *"The only problem […] is to get the money out of government. The politicians promised the money and we struggle now with the bureaucrats to release the money."*

To proactively confront implementation obstacles the national FEDUP leaders and the CORC director have approached the provincial and national Head of Departments (HOD). They have agreed to form a national working group to discuss implementation issues.[248]

Also at local government level partnerships are perceived as a way to overcome implementation difficulties. According to *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) it depends on the ability to single out officials to overcome problems of regulations at settlement level:

> *"What we are trying to do now is instead of banging our heads against local authorities and officials, as we used in the past, is to try and set up partnerships and working relationships with the various authorities. If we have you on our side, we will do everything we have to. Where we have problems, you can maybe assist us. If it is your colleagues that are causing the problems within the City, you can see the problems we have and you can see the effect that that is having on the entire benefit. Maybe you can assist us in removing the obstacles and kind of push the process through."*[249]

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[245] This retreat from policy involvement has been commented on by various academics and urban sector NGOs as negatively impacting on attempts by right-based groups to achieve policy change. See personal communication with Marie Huchzermeyer, 04.09.2006 and Anthea Houston, 25.10.2006.
[246] Utshani Fund (2006b).
[247] Meeting at uTshani
[248] NGO member 5
[249] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.03.2006.

Furthermore, CORC facilitated a partnership between FEDUP and the *Methodist Church of Southern Africa* (MCSA) in terms of transfer of land. In 2006 this partnership has led to an initiative to form a land trust which would comprise representatives of the church, the national housing ministry and FEDUP. This initiative was agreed upon through a meeting between the national housing minister, Federation members, the CORC land programme coordinator and the presiding bishop of the Methodist church.[250]

The NGOs see their own role as door openers for the Federation so that the Federation gets into a position to establish relations with government on various levels. Nonetheless, there are also direct relationships between the NGOs and government. The NGOs regard pragmatic influence of politics as central instead of participating in advisory function in government forums.[251] To leverage pragmatic influence the NGOs establish partnerships and close links to champions at various levels of government. State resources resulting from this engagement are then intended to be used to produce alternative concrete results in projects. Relationships are established by the alliance through integrating government representatives to Federation/NGO bodies; for instance:

- Government representatives are part of uTshani Trust,
- A mutual land trust initiated by the alliance comprises representatives of the Methodist church, the national housing ministry and FEDUP,
- The Director of Housing of the City of Cape Town is member of the board of CORC.

[250] NGO member 5
[251] PEP being an exception as it engages in advisory function to the board of PHPT.

5.4.3 Accessing land projects by Alliance B

5.4.3.1 Request to release land in Macassar (B1)

February – July 2006	Initiation of groups and formation as a FEDUP group
August 2006	Land identification and land survey Land request at Council
September 2006	Negotiation with ward councillor
February 2007	Approval by Council

Tab. 5.14: Timeline of land access in Macassar

Landownership	Local Government
Housing	Backyard shack dwellers
Size of area	Unknown
Project	Request for land allocation for housing development
Members	about 200 households

Tab. 5.15: Key characteristics of the FEDUP project in Macassar

Fig. 5.28: Satellite image of identified land in Macassar, Source: Google Earth

Macassar is part of Somerset West and a predominantly coloured community with about 24,500 inhabitants[252]. The Macassar group aligned to the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) represents twenty savings groups. They came together as they identified their common need for land and tenure. The group rapidly extended membership from its inception in February 2006 with twelve members to one thousand members (about 200 households) in September 2006. During this period they were advised by the facilitator of the *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) who put them in contact with FEDUP. In March members of the Macassar groups participated in exchanges with established Federation groups to learn about the savings process.[253]

Subsequently, a savings coordinator of the *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN) advised the groups on savings administration. Also, CMN conducted a survey of savings groups in Macassar as part of a national survey of all savings groups. This information is compiled in a database of FEDUP membership. The savings coordinator stressed that this information will enhance the power of local groups to negotiate with government.[254]

By becoming members of FEDUP the savings groups agreed to practice daily savings and to meet on a regular basis as part of establishing an organised local network. The Macassar savings groups sent representatives to regional meetings within the Western Cape. Information is given to the local savings groups at weekly meetings.[255]

After its official launch as a FEDUP group in July 2006, the group addressed the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) for assistance in their process to access land. As the Alliance cooperates in terms of land allocation with the Methodist church, a CORC consultant subsequently checked the church inventory for land options. However, as no church land was available, the group was advised by CORC to conduct an assessment of land options as a basis for engagement with the state.[256] Therefore, the Macassar group appointed a private company for a land survey. Based on the information, the group identified a piece of municipal land and addressed a land allocation request to Council. This activity constituted the first interface with the state. They received a letter confirming the

[252] See City of Cape Town (no date).
[253] NGO member 5
[254] NGO member 4
[255] Federation member 1
[256] NGO member 5

entry of their request and leaving open time lines for further steps. Some members addressed the local ward councillor directly and agreed to join in a Council meeting. On the day of the Council meeting however they were declined participation and advised to first go through subcouncil. This experience has fuelled disappointments to interacting with government.

> *"And after we sit the whole day one of the ladies […] asked him: "What is going on? When is it our turn?" Then he said it was not the day for us to come in. We were very disappointed. […] We were so excited because we were thinking he is going to lift a point to other councillors and say: "There is land for these people."*[257]

In the following the group shifted its approach by inviting the councillor to their meeting and asked him to explain the situation. About one hundred members of FEDUP came together in and outside a small 25 m² transit house in a non-serviced area of Macassar. No representatives of CUP, CORC or *uTshani Fund* were present. The CUP facilitator outlined the importance that the groups themselves have to be the drivers of the process:

> *"[…] with this kind of meetings I prefer them to do alone. I don't want it to be seen as Joel and I are driving the process."*[258]

The group was celebrating and mobilising itself through constant shouting and singing. For them, it already represented a success that the councillor had to come to them instead of their going as petitioners to him.

An interesting aspect is that they started the meeting with prayers. Later they stated that this also forces the councillor to bow his head in front of a higher authority and to acknowledge that somebody outside will judge his actions.

At the meeting two positions were unfolded: the group argued that it is government's responsibility to allocate land to them for free. The group stressed that they cannot afford the high rents and that housing conditions are inadequate. Thus their claim should have priority to private sector interests. Later, instead of exclusively stressing government responsibility, the group used arguments in terms of legitimacy of government (they representing the constituency). The group stressed their affiliation with FEDUP and revealed that government is not dealing with one single grouping, but with a larger organisation.

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[257] Federation member 1
[258] Interview with Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006.

The councillor on the other hand had to accommodate diverse interests. Different groups and businesses were interested in obtaining the piece of land. He feared being accused of undue preference. He tried to cross the divide by stressing the liability of higher levels of government for delays.

Following the discussions with the councillor, FEDUP summoned a meeting to inform all savings groups.

Fig. 5.29: Meeting of FEDUP group in Macassar, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

The leader pointed out that conflict within the group was hampering the land negotiation process. Some of the savings groups had started fund raising which is against the savings objective. Furthermore, not everybody was practicing daily savings.

> *"It is so important to do daily savings as it brings the community together. So **they** know what is the need in the street, **they** know what to do, how to help one another. Instead of going to wait for the government to do things, people in the street can change the government!"*[259]

[259] Federation member 1

Also, the existent saving groups had been asked to restructure and to reconstitute in closer proximity. Since the Macassar savings groups had grown rapidly, FEDUP intended to re-build the savings groups on a localised neighbourhood level to enhance community building. This initiative met resistance from some groups. They put forward that their group is based on friendship and they are not willing to reconstitute. The leader outlined that FEDUP had learned that savings groups of friends often end up with somebody running away with the money.

The land request was still unresolved at the time of interviewing. In February 2007 the group, however, announced it had been allocated the land.



Fig. 5.30: Interfaces in Macassar project (micro case B1), Source: Own design

5.4.3.2 Donation of land in Klipfontein Glebe (B2)

2001	Methodist church agrees to handover land
	Government suggests to sell-off land and relocate Community conflict
2005	CORC mediates between community groups CUP mobilises for enumeration and daily savings
2006	Mediation process fails Consultants negotiate with government about parcelling of land and development approval

Tab. 5.16: Timeline of land access in Klipfontein

Landownership	Methodist Church
Zoning	Agricultural
Housing	Partly informal, partly formal. Not serviced
Size of Area	45-63ha (ca. 350 plots)
Project	Housing provision, title deeds, secure tenure
Members	about 200 households

Tab. 5.17: Key facts of the Klipfontein Glebe project

Fig. 5.31: Site plan of Klipfontein, Source: adapted from CndV africa (2006)

The land in Klipfontein is in close proximity to the Cape Town International Airport and belongs to the Methodist church. Approximately six hundred families live there. It is a mixed, predominantly coloured community. The Klipfontein community has been negotiating for the land to be developed for more than a century. The land was already occupied, but black or coloured residents at the time could not register land. Therefore, it was transferred to the Methodist church in 1901 and used as an outstation.[260]

Fig. 5.32: Existing housing on Klipfontein Glebe land, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

The majority of residents are on a waiting list for housing. In 2001 the Methodist church agreed to handover the land and local government consented to the land being developed. But the application for residential development was turned down by the authorities based on the high noise levels. Alternatively, government suggested selling the land and offered alternative sites 25 km north of Cape Town. This plan has caused friction within the community. One part is interested in the sell-off and relocation represented by the *Klipfontein Communal Property Trust* (a Section 21 company). Another part wants to remain represented by the *Klipfontein Communal Committee* (linked to FEDUP).

[260] Glebe land means that it is overseen by church.

In 2005 the church appointed the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) to facilitate a mediation committee. However, no consensus could be reached and the mediation process failed in 2006. Thereafter the *Klipfontein Communal Committee* tried to get an interdict which would prevent the Trust from selling the land. At the chambers they were advised to re-elect the trustees as the church would need a legal body to transfer the landownership.

The *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) linked the Klipfontein committee with the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP). The Federation assisted in conducting an enumeration and in introducing daily savings schemes. The saving groups interact with the coordinator of the *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN) and a FEDUP leader. However, FEDUP members in Klipfontein were sceptical as to whether saving schemes would be successful as they were faced with the mistrust in the community.[261]

In 2006 private consultants were contracted by CORC to investigate opportunities for housing development. The noise contour plan, according to the consultants, allows developing a portion of land for housing, another portion can only be developed if insulation is provided and a third portion of land is not suitable for housing at all (see figure 5.31).[262]

CUP (through CORC) appointed the same consultants to negotiate the project approval with the authorities on behalf of the community. The FEDUP group appreciated the involvement of consultants:

> *"We put our trust in consultants to sort out local government."*[263]

The consultants represented the link between the project team and government. They stressed that they, as consultants, could use their strong relationship to officials to facilitate the process. One consultant outlined his intermediary role:

> *"We have got a good relationship with them [government]. We can understand what they want. […]. For the community to go directly to the Province – unless the community members are very knowledgeable about the processes and the technical issues – it is normally a bit of a problem. […] they would have a meeting with us present so we can translate if required."*[264]

[261] Federation member 3
[262] Interview with Nigel Titus, 16.10.2006; Theunisen Andrews, 13.09.2006; CndV africa (2006).
[263] Federation member 3
[264] Interview with Nigel Titus, 16.10.2006.

At the same time the CUP facilitator formed links at a political level and to the departments at Province. A CORC staff member outlined the division of labour between the consultants and the CORC facilitator:

> *"[…] the project management team looks at the design; [the CUP facilitator] then tries on a political level to link up with the department at province. […] So even though those things have not formalised in terms of written agreements of support, on another level the support is there having formed those linkages at the provincial level […] and the premier's office[…]."*[265]



Fig. 5.33: Interfaces in Klipfontein project (micro case B2), Source: Own design

[265] NGO member 5

5.4.4 Project preparation by Alliance B

5.4.4.1 Post-development project preparation in Ekupumleni (B3)

1994	Formation of Federation group
1998	Land acquisition
2000- 2003	117 houses built upfront
2003	Geotechnical survey
2005	Rezoning and subdivision approval
2006	Submission of general plans to Surveyor General Office

Tab. 5.18: Timeline of project preparation in Ekupumleni

Land ownership	uTshani Fund (until transfer of titles to Hazeldean Housing Association)
Housing	Members from site-and-service scheme to Greenfields
Size of area	6.5 ha
Project	208 houses to be build, 117 built upfront – conflict with formal regulations
Members	200 households

Tab. 5.19: Key facts of the Ekupumleni project

Fig. 5.34: Satellite image of Ekupumleni, Source: adapted from Google Earth (2006)

Ekupumleni[266] is part of Philippi East which is situated in the Cape Flats around 20 km from the Central Business District of Cape Town. Philippi was established at the beginning of the 1980s as a site-and-service scheme. The area is therefore characterised by a high percentage of informal dwellings – either backyard shacks or shacks on serviced sites (55.3% in total Philippi and 29.6% in Philippi East). About half of all households have no access to water, sanitation, electricity and waste removal.[267]

The demographic situation features a very high population increase (48.6% between 1996 and 2001). 2,245 of the 110,315 residents in Philippi live in Philippi East. Philippi has an almost exclusive black population (94.3%). The socio-economic situation is characterised by high and increasing unemployment (from 15.1% in 1996 to 43.1% in 2001) and low and decreasing income levels.[268]

In Ekupumleni the majority of members are from Site C, a site-and-service settlement in Khayelitsha (see Chapter 5.4.3.2). In 1994 they were introduced to the *South African Homeless People's Federation* and started savings schemes. They identified a large piece of farm land in Philippi East and negotiated land acquisition with the assistance of the *uTshani Fund* and *People's Dialogue*. In 2000 the farm was purchased through an uTshani loan and divided into three parts: communal farming, residential housing and the farm house itself which was later turned into a resource centre. Today the farm belongs to the well-known Federation projects in Vukuzenzele, Victoria Mxenge and Ekupumleni which at the beginning formed a triangle committee.

To speed up the process for housing development this committee registered as a *Communal Property Association* (CPA) so that the land could be transferred from the *uTshani Fund* to communal ownership by the CPA as a legal entity. This form of tenure was also favoured in terms of saving costs to survey and register each individual plot.[269]

The Federation then proactively started housing development with members who had saved their own money. The Federation with support by *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) decided on a basic pre-approved layout.

[266] Ekupumleni means "rising star".
[267] See Urban Matters (2008), pp. 23f.
[268] See University of Stellenbosch/Transformation Africa (2005), p.9.
[269] Later communal ownership caused problems once families wanted to sell since they did not own an individual plot. Therefore, later individual titles were registered. New developments with the federations are since then directly going for individual ownership. See Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.

PEP at the time established an office on the farm to run workshops from there and a private engineering firm was appointed to design the infrastructure.

In 2000 Federation members started to build first houses through uTshani bridging finance. Some of them were designed and built through the *uTshani Fund* and some by individual households. Up to 2003 more than one hundred houses had been completed.[270]

One of the main obstacles in Ekupumleni was that government does not tolerate house construction before township establishment. The approval of township establishment after construction was hindered. A land survey revealed that a lot of the houses had been built over the boundary lines. The PEP director promoted adapting boundary lines to the existent situation, instead of putting down houses. He stressed:

> *"My sort of attitude is: then we shift the boundary lines and if that plot is a little bit smaller than this plot – so be it. If those two neighbours are happy, it is a hell of a lot easier solution than breaking down half of the person's house or a metre of his house to bring it back in."*[271]

Basically, non-conforming developments had to be individually negotiated. For instance one unit had been built on land reserved for a turning circle. Local authority was willing to ignore the construction until the land was eventually needed for its original purpose. The unit would, however, be left without services. The adjacent neighbour consented to informally connect electricity, sanitation and water lines to serve the unit.

As this process entailed lengthy negotiations, rezoning and subdivision approval was only received by 2005 and the general plans submitted to the Surveyor General Office in 2006.



Fig. 5.35: Houses built over boundary lines in Ekupumleni, Source: adapted from VPM Surveyors (2006)

[270] See PEP (2007), pp. 8f.
[271] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.09.2006.

Although the Federation had already started building, government could not disburse subsidies as long as the land belongs to the *uTshani Fund*. But problems with the core leadership of the Federation affected the community. The dilemma is that both the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) and the *South African Homeless People's Federation* (SAHPF) claim to be legally entitled for the land.

Therefore the Ekupumleni community sidelined Federation leaders and took over its own management. The group decided to form an independent *Hazeldean Housing Association* (HHA) which then could enter into an agreement with the *uTshani Fund*. New elected leaders continued the development. In this process the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) took over the social facilitation and PEP addressed the technical issues.[272]



Fig. 5.36: Interfaces in Ekupumleni project (micro case B3), Source Own design

[272] Federation member 4

5.4.4.2 Of resizing plots and drawing up business plans in Site C (B4)

Since mid 1990s	Formation of Federation group
2006	FEDUP and uTshani Fund agree to cooperate in pilot project
	uTshani and CMN field worker support business plan application
	PEP conducts house modelling workshops
	Conflicts between local Federation group and uTshani Fund

Tab. 5.20: Timeline for project preparation in Site C

Land ownership	City of Cape Town
Housing	Site-and-service scheme
Size of area	unknown (1,700 plots planned)
Project	Request for subsidy allocation (consolidation subsidy)
FEDUP group	250 members (192 subsidy beneficiaries)

Tab. 5.21: Key facts of the Site C project

Fig. 5.37: Satellite image of Site C, Source: Google Earth (2006)

In the 1980s people had been relocated from various places like the Crossroads squatter camp to a transit camp in Site C, Khayelitsha. However, the transit camp evolved as a

permanent settlement. It is made up of 3,468 sites which had been serviced for twice the amount of households.[273] Consequently, formal housing needs to be provided in a double plot setting.

> *"But what is very abnormal in Site C is that there are two families on one plot and this has been like this for the last 20 years. That is why we are busy with a re-planning programme."*[274]

Since 2003 Site C is a provincial and local government priority for housing development. The area is divided into four blocks. For each block pilot areas have been earmarked where development will start. Field workers, known to the community, are appointed from the specific blocks. The field worker is under the supervision of a local government official and assists in the promotion of subsidy applications and relocation. After consulting with the community a first plan to provide every household with a site and house within the area had been dismissed.

> *"[…] the community said that it is nonsense because it means that we are going to build a very small house."* [275]

Subsequently, an agreement was reached in the development forums, outlining that every two plots would be subdivided to make three and a fourth household had to agree to relocate to Kuyasa[276] (see figure 5.38). This means that about 2,000 out of 7,400 households would have to leave Site C. The City had reserved sites for saving groups from Site C who are willing to participate in PHP development. The remaining households would receive titles once they have infrastructure and once they have followed the legal requirements.[277]

For local government officials this agreement is binding as it has been reached through representatives and thus legitimate structures. Nonetheless, saving groups did not want to relocate. Local government was surprised when local residents opposed relocation. Officials insisted:

> *"It is a must. If no one moves it will remains what it is. We reached an agreement with all the RDP structures that one out of four have to go to Kuyasa to make Site C developable."*

[273] See Zonke (2006), p. 53.
[274] City official 9
[275] City official 9
[276] Kuyasa is a large housing project in Khayelitsha where beneficiaries from different areas of Cape Town have been accommodated.
[277] City official 9



Fig. 5.38: Plan to resize plots in Site C, Source: adapted from City official 9

People, however, remained reluctant to move to Kuyasa as it does not offer proper infrastructure and only provides for small plots. It is also perceived as inaccessible to transport and shopping centres.[278]

The complex process was also affected by local political conflicts in Khayelitsha. These conflicts are aligned both to national and provincial level political cleavages which filtered down to local level and resulted in a community division between two ANC camps (see Chapter 4.4.1). The situation has also affected the re-planning of Site C. Some councillors are trying to convince people that they have a right to stay in Site C. As a result

[278] See Zonke (2006), pp. 54ff.

people hesitated to apply for relocation or ignored the letter for relocation.

> *"Some people say to other people: "You are here since '85 so you are stupid to move to Kuyasa, because you leave your legacies behind." That impacts negatively with development because we agreed with all the RDP structure this is what needs to happen for Site C to develop. But power politics is causing all these constraints."* [279]

Furthermore, people do not comply with the planning and shacks are rebuilt on sites where people have been removed.

> *"Some of them who are moving to Kuyasa are not demolishing their shacks. They deliberately sell those shacks and yet we need that space. […] We requested SANCO to cooperate. We have requested every individual member to spy on people who have not relocated. Because it is in the interest of the whole community that this person needs to go."*[280]

The situation impacts on subsidy allocation. Local government is required to present a general plan of Site C which outlines the number and size of plots. Only after approval of the general plan, will application for title deeds be possible. In other words: Without the general plan, government cannot transfer the plots.

Local government project managers and facilitators who are dealing with the leadership in Site C are trying to resolve this on a project basis by asking the leadership not to interfere in the projects for the sake of the housing situation.

> *"We are saying: "For Site C purposes lets forget the politics here. This is for the project and it will improve the people's housing situation." […] In some cases we do get progress but slow."*[281]

In this conflict ridden situation local government officials increasingly realised that they needed to involve the community in the decision-making:

> *"Site C is not homogenous. People don't think the same. […] That is why it is imperative to embark on a continuous participation. […] Some people want to be leaders so there is power mongering which is another catalyst. And that delays. People can convince each other. They are powerful. Always involve people in the process."*[282]

Given this context, the Federation and the *uTshani Fund* agreed to cooperate with government in the housing process. The Federation had been active in Site C since the middle of the 1990s and is made up of 250 Federation members.

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[279] City official 9
[280] City official 9
[281] City official 4
[282] City official 9

In 2006 the Federation members in Site C were involved in establishing a business plan, technical report and layout. Some had agreed to be moved on site and some to be relocated to Kuyasa. Federation groups are scattered around the four blocks of Site C which represented a problem to local government.

> *"Let's assume this is a pilot project and FEDUP people are mostly distributed here and a few of them are here. Then there could be anger because they don't belong to this group. It creates another elephant. Ach, we see when we get there."*[283]

Local government officials also questioned the apolitical nature of the Federation groups and argued that they influence and are influenced by political organisations such as SANCO. One housing official explained his mistrust:

> *"[...] what is their effective SANCO alignment? Are they [FEDUP members] saying […] the FEDUP holds greater value in terms of their approach or will they listen to what SANCO is saying? It is political."*[284]

The difficulties with the layout plans impacted on the project approval process since they are required to be finalised beforehand. Also, business plans have to be submitted for project approval. *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) was therefore contracted by the *uTshani Fund* to compile the business plan and subsidy application which involved preliminary house plans for costing. In 2006 PEP facilitated house modelling workshops with Federation members where it displayed three house types and the quantities and costing. PEP stressed its technical support role:

> *"I have been asked to deal with all the technical side, provide all the technical information, cash flows, building programmes, building plans etc. […] So I am in a nice position doing the technical stuff and CORC and the rest of them take care of the social stuff."*

Staff members of PEP, *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN) and the *uTshani Fund* joined for site visits. The manager of PEP explained that eleven slopes had already been constructed informally. The problem emerged that slope sizes might be too large and that the subsidy would then not be enough for top-structures.

The progress of the business plan, subsidy applications and layout plans was discussed at a meeting at the *uTshani Fund* in September 2006. PEP, *uTshani Fund*, CMN staff and a City official were present. The majority of Federation members had complied with the

[283] City official 9
[284] City official 5

conditions of the beneficiary list and title deeds were on their way. Since plot sizes differ, the City official suggested calling in a meeting to look at those households who need to swap their sites according to the house sizes they require.

Concerning the business plan, tensions had, however, arisen between the Federation members and the *uTshani Fund*. The *uTshani Fund* was confronted by Federation members who thought that uTshani was responsible for the fact that no applications had been made. Therefore *uTshani Fund* requested the municipal project coordinator to clarify to the community that subsidy applications had been delayed since the layouts were not finalised.

A further problem was aligned to previous Federation practice: In the past the Federation gave a free choice of house types and built house sizes which the subsidy did not cover. This was part of the cause for the *uTshani Fund* crisis. Therefore, in 2006 the *uTshani Fund* insisted on a limited number of house types which makes it easier to estimate the costs.

The *uTshani Fund* and CMN field staff stressed that they have to deal with gate-keeping leaders who already have houses but do not want to loose power. They mobilised the Federation members to not co-operate in the house design exercise whereas the *uTshani Fund* insists that there needs to be an agreement on housing types, if to pursue further development.

Local leadership was affected by the split in the Federation. A CMN staff member explained:

> *"They have been sending a message to the community that uTshani Fund built big houses for people and that is not correct. […] They still want to do the same thing which has not worked out in the past. We have done a survey in Site C trying to assess if the savings that they are keeping aside can actually match up with the amount of subsidy that they are going to get."*[285]

The local Federation network accused *uTshani Fund* of not cooperating, not attending meetings and not giving reasons to the group. They saw themselves marginalised by *uTshani Fund* and ultimately dismissed it as their PHP support organisation in a meeting held in October 2006. This meeting was also attended by the national coordinator of

[285] NGO member 4

FEDUP who mediated between the *uTshani Fund* and the group, as well as local and provincial government officials. Interestingly, the municipal coordinator functioned as a translator. However, he stressed his observer role:

> *"I said to them very clear that I will not be drawn into their infights. […] as an official my status was an observer not taking sides. […] Patrick [FEDUP coordinator] kept on saying: People give us directions: do you want to continue to work with Utshani? When they said No it was a democratic decision. They were dismissed without my input."*[286]

Fig. 5.39: Negotiations between local FEDUP group and uTshani Fund
Source: Astrid Ley, October 2006

The *uTshani Fund* field worker stressed that from their point of view communities can take informed decisions.

> *"Sometimes it might happen that they need a space to think and see how they can operate without us which is a good idea in terms of development […]."*[287]

The field worker stressed that the expectations are too high in terms of what they as field workers are supposed to do in the communities. She expressed her frustration:

[286] City official 9
[287] NGO member 12

"They always expect more than the capacities that you have. […]The [business plan] application that they are going to submit now, the groundwork has been done by me and [CMN coordinator]. I don't expect them to appreciate this but to acknowledge it."[288]

The local government official believed that the group will appoint another organisation as account administrator or support organisation. He even assumed that local government would in a better position to provide this support.

"It could be a consultant, a NGO or they use us as local government as their account administrator so that the money from provincial government goes straight to local government and from there straight to the supplier and the supplier builds. Some feel it is safer this way, because the money remains in the hands of government."[289]



Fig. 5.40: Interfaces in Site C project (micro case B4), Source: Own design

[288] NGO member 12
[289] City official 9

5.4.5 Housing development projects by Alliance B

5.4.5.1 Unlocking stalled development in Ekupumleni (B5)

Since 2000	Ongoing negotiations for services
2003	Electricity supply
2003	Communal toilet blocks
2006	Post conforming to general plan (road layout)
2006	uTshani and FEDUP “100 Houses Project” stalled due to community division
2006	Cleavage about occupancy of 20 new houses

Tab. 5.23: Timeline of housing development in Ekupumleni

The Ekupumleni Federation group had neglected the formal development process by building upfront (see chapter 5.4.4.1). As a result they were confronted with resolving problems around allocation and servicing of the sites years after construction had been finalised. Only electricity had been brought in soon after construction.[290] In 2006 the *Hazeldean Housing Association* was still negotiating with the City to bring in further infrastructure. In the meanwhile they had self-provided interim communal toilet blocks with the assistance of *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP).

In 2006 road construction was supposed to be initiated. However, the finished floor level of some houses was below road level exposing these to possible floodings. Thus the entire road system would have to be dropped below the lowest level of the finished floor.

Moreover, the *Hazeldean Housing Association* (HHA) was faced with continuing the stalled development during continued community division. Land transfer had not been finalised in 2006. Nevertheless, HHA started to build further units on *uTshani Fund*'s property. This was part of an agreement between the *uTshani Fund*, the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP), *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* (SDI) and the national housing ministry to showcase its ability to construct one hundred houses in one hundred days (see also Chapter 5.4.1.2). Subsidies through the project were supposed to be used for Ekupumleni to revive stalled development there.

However, while construction started in February 2006 with project management by the

[290] Federation member 4

uTshani Fund and PEP, the conflict between the 'old' Federation leaders and *uTshani Fund* disrupted the project. The *South African Homeless People's Federation* section 21 company objected to the development at the provincial housing department. It claimed that the *uTshani Fund* was implementing developments which were linked to their group and therefore demanded compensation.[291]

Fig. 5.41: Houses built through pilot project in Ekupumleni, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

The *uTshani Fund* accused the leaders of gate-keeping and of objecting in "NIMBY fashion" against the construction of the smaller neighbouring houses.[292] As a result of the objections, the provincial MEC of housing stopped the project. At the time only twenty houses were finished and could not be occupied since the community division continued on the question who is eligible for allocation.[293]

To overcome the blockages caused by the conflict the *Community Organisation Resource*

[291] See Interview with Patricia Matolengwe, 25.10.2006.
[292] See uTshani News (2006d).
[293] See uTshani News (2006c).

Centre (CORC) consulted FEDUP to consent to SAHPF paying out the *uTshani Fund* to develop the land. This suggestion met with resistance from FEDUP and the *uTshani Fund*. CORC outlined:

> *"But we have the advantage that we are not affected by the choices and therefore can give it a different spin. It is a strong position by doing something weak – it will at the end of the day strengthen your position. Professionals should be outside of dynamics."*[294]

The cleavage had not been resolved by the time of interviewing. Instead, the internal dynamics had stopped Federation members practicing savings. Only in 2006 when new reporting systems were in place and saving groups organised at street level, did members reconsider taking up their savings practice.[295]



Fig. 5.42: Interfaces in Ekupumleni (micro case B5), Source: Own design

[294] Personal communication with Joel Bolnick, 26.10.2006.
[295] Federation member 4

5.4.5.2 Completion of unfinished houses in Kuyasa (B6)

ca. 1999	350 families access sites in Kuyasa
ca. 2000	PHP Workshop and House Design Workshop by PEP
2000/2001	House construction
2003	Approval of Consolidation Subsidy
2006	Costing for unfinished houses by PEP

Tab. 5.23: Timeline of housing development in Kuyasa

Land ownership	City of Cape Town
Housing	Greenfields development
Size of area	Unknown
Project	Completion of unfinished houses
FEDUP group	350 members

Tab. 5.24: Key facts of the Kuyasa project

Fig. 5.43: Satellite image of FEDUP houses in Kuyasa, Source: Google Earth (2006)

In 2006 *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) was involved in a number of projects to complete unfinished Federation houses throughout South Africa (75% in the Western

Cape).[296] Federation houses in Kuyasa, Cape Town, were a case in point. Kuyasa is part of Khayelitsha and had been identified as a housing development area (100ha) for about 5,000 units in the *Khayelitsha Spatial Development Framework* (1999).[297] The *South African Homeless People's Federation* had negotiated sites for about 350 households within the development.[298] PEP had been offering house modelling workshops to enable Federation members to select from a set of house types based on cost and affordability. However, many overestimated their ability to top the subsidy in order to build larger units. Furthermore, the *uTshani Fund*, responsible for subsidy administration on behalf of the Federation, had previously handed over the full amount to one group. Federation members then started to build large houses. Due to this lack of financial management, all projects half-way through the building process ran out of money and houses remained unfinished for years.[299]

Fig. 5.44: Half-finished house in Kuyasa, Source: Astrid Ley, September 2006

[296] See CORC (2007), pp.18f.
[297] See City of Tygerberg (1999).
[298] See Baumann et al (2001), p.13.
[299] Interview with Shawn Cuff, 20.03.2006.

The further blockages of the projects were boosted by a triangle of accusations. The *uTshani Fund* accused old Federation leaders, who had registered as the *South African Homeless People's Federation Section 21 company*, of unlawfully seeking control of subsidies held in trust by the *uTshani Fund*. Furthermore, the *uTshani Fund* stressed that these leaders are gatekeeping and profiting by having constructed too large units at the cost of other Federation members.

The Western Cape Province made the *uTshani Fund* responsible for finishing the houses. The *uTshani Fund* felt treated as a developer and accused government of superimposing formal delivery responsibility for plan approval or construction monitoring to the *uTshani Fund*.[300] The *uTshani Fund* sees itself rather as the financial intermediator between the subsidy scheme and the Federation groups. It argued that other professional technical services would cut down the subsidy amount. Instead, this could be handled by the groups in a people-driven process.[301]

Local government accused the *uTshani Fund* of not conforming to regulations. Officials put forward that the *uTshani Fund*, as the facilitator, had left the Federation groups without technical assistance. According to them, projects need technical support in a number of aspects such as materials ordering, payment, running the housing support centre and managing the budget. One official stressed:

> *"To me technical assistance is too critical for them. They are a passionate group of people. But I have seen it time and time again with various PHP initiatives particularly in Khayelitsha. […] If that is not in place those projects are going nowhere."*

And last but not least the Federation split gave rise to accusations by 'old' Federation leaders that it is uTshani's responsibility to finish the houses and to release outstanding subsidies.

As these projects had not received a completion certificate ("happy letter"), provincial government refused to pay out the full subsidy amount. The *uTshani Fund* decided not to get into a legal process and instead contracted *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) to document all the affected projects and do a costing to finish the houses. The PEP director explained:

[300] See uTshani Fund (2006b).
[301] uTshani Fund (2005b).

"So what we have to do is take these bigger houses, find the most practicable and cost effective point to cut them off and then finish that part of the house and say when you got money you can finish that yourself. Right now you will be able to move in this. […] You sign your 'happy letter' and then it is no longer uTshani's responsibility."

In Kuyasa out of thirty-one houses only nine were finished, nine were incomplete and a further thirteen had not been started at all. In this situation the uTshani Fund had to make additional finance available to finish the houses. Through PEP the *uTshani Fund* tried to find the most cost efficient solution to finish the construction. It also tried to top up the insufficient consolidation subsidy amount by applying for additional grants.[302]

The incomplete houses were not finished at the time of interviewing.



Fig. 5.45: Interface in Kuyasa (micro case B6), Source: Own design

[302] Site visit to Site C and Kuyasa , Khayelitsha, 26. September 2006

6. Emerging structures of organisations and networks

The aim of this chapter is to summarise the case study findings and link them back to the research questions introduced in chapter two. Firstly, what are the political opportunity structures for participating in the housing process? Secondly, what organisational structures and internal relationships are characteristic of the civil society alliances? Thirdly, how do the alliances organise internally and relate with government on a strategic as well as project-based level? Finally, how do roles and relationships shift between levels (strategic and project-based) and phases (land, project preparation, housing development)?

This chapter then refers back to the research assumptions and explores to which extent theories on organisations and networks are applicable to understand the local processes.

6.1 Insecure political opportunity structures

6.1.1 Institutional frameworks: conflicting strategies and lack of implementation

The empirical findings show that institutional responses to the housing challenge are highly contested. Corresponding frameworks present a juxtaposition of pro-growth and pro-poor orientation which has led to '**competing rationalities'** with regard to the *City Development Strategy* and the *Integrated Development Plan*.

Additionally, the findings reveal a disconnection between proactive and comprehensive strategies on the one hand, and **isolated project-based interventions** on the other. The latter often emerge as an immediate response to the housing crisis. This has been particularly stressed as a difficulty with regard to the *Integrated Human Settlements Strategy*.

Although institutional frameworks have considerably moved away from technocratic approaches, they are still linked to a **normative and neo-rational understanding of planning**. Confronted with the reality of extensive informality, this approach is challenged and criticised for its neglect of the relevance of community assets and practices. This observation is particularly relevant with regard to the *Integrated Human Settlements Strategy*.

6.1.2 Intergovernmental aspects: a political-driven housing agenda

The analysis points to three governance-related aspects which greatly affect the translation of institutional frameworks into practice: Power games within the political sphere, contestation between the political and administrative sphere and the lack of capacity within local government.

The findings indicate that the implementation of policy in Cape Town is constrained by contestation within the political sphere. Higher spheres of government still hold vested powers and control the type of housing development taking place within the City. **Power games** and conflict of competencies between different levels of government (which are aligned to different political camps in the case of Cape Town) complicate the implementation process for City officials. Much the same can be said of the influence of red tape by higher spheres of government on the mode of local government housing delivery.

Moreover, at local government level strategic approaches often lack political commitment. Whereas there is an emerging process-orientation within the administration, the political sphere continues to be outcome-oriented in terms of housing delivery. The politicised housing agenda translates into **delivery pressure** for the municipal housing department which faces difficulties to implement its more progressive upgrading strategies.

Further, the **lack of administrative capacity** (evidenced by a scarcely resourced and understaffed housing department) and lack of interdepartmental relationships undermine innovative approaches. Often this situation is worsened by a scarce communication or cooperation between senior level and project level housing officials.

6.1.3 Participation: changing opportunities in the housing process

Participation in local housing projects can be differentiated along the three phases: access to land, project preparation and housing development. Each phase allows for a different extent of participation. Therefore, opportunities for participation are shifting. As a result actors are at times integrated into and at other times excluded from decision-making.

No participation during accessing land

Since participation in the formal process (land identification through the *Integrated Development Plan* process and land allocation through the housing waiting list) contains a great deal of bottlenecks, poor households find alternative ways to access land. Activities to access land can comprise unlawful occupation of land in order to negotiate post-allocation (micro-case Freedom Park), acquisition of private land (micro-case Ekupumleni), negotiations with the state about land allocations (micro-cases Netreg and Macassar) as well as donations or allocations by private owners (micro-case Klipfontein). As alternative practices are perceived as **'jumping-the-queue'** in housing allocation, local government is reluctant to negotiate with all kinds of pro-active groups.

Restrictive participation during project preparation

The standardised and formal preparation phase for housing development (including subsidy application and settlement layout) presents a number of constraints and is characterised by red tape. There is no institutional space for participation of beneficiaries. There are only three options to influence the development process: to either agree to the development approach and try to speed it up by own initiatives (micro-cases Netreg and Site C), to negotiate so that own preferences and priorities are integrated (micro-case Freedom Park) or to operate outside the formal development route and negotiate post-approval (micro-case Ekupumleni). As development has already been agreed upon and it is just the form of intervention as a negotiable, local government is more willing to interact but **hesitant to give preference to local choice** fearing community conflicts and disputes with local politicians.

Standardised participation during housing development

The participation of Grassroots Organisations during housing development is confined to project steering committees. The related *People's Housing Process* (PHP) prescribes a **standardised intervention framework for people-driven development** which largely reduces NGOs to technical support organisations and the participation of Grassroots Organisations to workshops on house design and management in order to facilitate self-built developments.

Options are therefore limited to either work within the institutional channel (micro-case Netreg), to additively organise other more comprehensive community-managed initiatives (micro-case Freedom Park) or not to accept the self-build limitation and prescribed roles and thus risking to not conform to regulations (micro-cases Ekupumleni and Kuyasa).

6.1.4 Actors' understanding of political opportunities: mutual mistrust

Local government's reluctance in participatory approaches

While local government has created institutional frameworks for participation on strategic and project-level in housing, the resultant practice, according to the findings, is characterised by a shifting interpretation of engagement, by institutional resistance against participation in decision-making and by political patronage.

Participation in strategic planning is central to influencing decisions on land allocation. In reality participation, particularly within the IDP process, was characterised by **shifting engagement opportunities**. The findings revealed that the previous mass meetings re-

sulted in a disbelief in the effects of participatory approaches by all stakeholders. However, neither is the current shift to multistakeholder forums welcomed. Instead, it is felt that as long as transparent criteria for participation are lacking, these forums are questioned in terms of their legitimacy. Experts were critical of the lack of agreement on the institutional mechanisms for vertical and horizontal integration which thus became prone to political party preferences.

At the housing project level, the findings demonstrate a great **resistance by officials** against participation. Pro-active community initiatives are confronted with a strong attitude by councillors and officials that there is no necessity to interact as development is to be pursued through the administrative process of housing allocation. Beneficiaries were not supposed to 'jump the queue' and make claims or even access land or build houses upfront. Also, once development has been approved, participation in decision-making is avoided in order to **prevent community conflicts and blockages** in housing projects. Thus participation in housing processes is only provided at the implementation stage confined to a consultative role in project steering committees.

Self-help approaches are highly contested and also disapproved of by many officials as being a superimposed empowerment agenda against the primary need of shelter. Participation, following this understanding, can be of use when communities take over development responsibility during and after the construction phase.

Similarly, much the same has been revealed concerning the attitude of officials towards civil society organisations. Activities of Grassroots Organisations and NGOs are promoted in terms of taking over development responsibility in housing projects as opposed to influence decision-making. Deriving from this understanding there are clear roles assigned to them: Grassroots Organisations are supposed to contribute to community-managed housing projects and NGOs are supposed to furnish corresponding technical assistance, mediation or research.

Process-oriented activities with a focus on empowerment are viewed rather sceptically by many officials. Civil society organisations are perceived as a threat to delivery. Specifically with regard to grassroots initiatives officials fear that exclusionary practices by some of these organisations might cause conflicts and blockages on project-level. NGOs, on the other hand, are mistrusted in terms of their agenda and their influence on local groups.

This mistrust in participation is contrasted by other housing officials who have experienced blockages in housing projects as a result of the lack of early participation. Thus

they pursue a different attitude in favour of a comprehensive participatory approach and seek to extend the limited participation by proactive measures. The findings, however, reveal that such interpretation of participation exposes a risk to officials. As housing is prone to political patronage, **inclusion to decision-making is opposed by many ward councillors** who try to gate keep housing delivery to their constituencies. Also, officials willing to pursue extended participation beyond the conventional route face **lack of capacities for the more time-consuming approaches**.

All in all the findings indicate that institutional and governance-related shortcomings of participation are exacerbated or reduced depending on the willingness, capacities and risk-taking of office holders.



Fig. 6.1: Summary of governance challenges, Source: Own design

Civil society's low motivation to participate

The findings reveal that civil society organisations have a detailed understanding of the shortcomings of the institutional channels for policy influence.

From a civil society perspective there are hardly any opportunities for participation in decision-making at substantial level in the housing process. The study indicates critical aspects which have been raised with regard to the political space for engagement: ineffective participation in strategic planning processes, a perceived lack of accountability of local politicians and a paternalistic attitude by the state in housing development.

The low motivation to participate in the IDP process is a result of a perceived **ineffective public engagement process** and little trust that government will perform adequately.

Lack of accountability by local politicians (using the poor as vote banks, gate keeping, and corruption) seems to be a primary concern which translates in low expectations and increasing frustration about unfulfilled promises.

The limited institutional channels for participation in housing projects have been further reduced by political instability and by a perceived **paternalistic approach** to housing development by local government.

Nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement that some officials take the risk to work outside restrictions (these are referred to as 'progressive officials', 'champions' or 'change agents').

6.2 Approaches in influencing policy: right-based and alternative development

In the people-driven housing sector two positions are prevalent: a right-based and an alternative development view. A major finding of the research is that the different positions highly affect the core activities of both alliances.

Both alliances hold the view that government has a redistributive responsibility. Also, both share a common criticism regarding the limitations and deficiencies of the state housing approach. The ultimate aim for both is empowerment. However, the Alliance A is historically rooted in a right-based approach to housing, whereas Alliance B is driven by a pragmatic approach and an alternative development agenda. From a right-based position empowerment is central to **counterbalance resource inequality** and to advocate for redistribution; the alternative development standpoint is that empowerment is central to

counterbalance power inequality and to reduce voicelessness and powerlessness of the urban poor.

Therefore they differ in the strategies and tactics to accomplish their empowerment aims. Whereas Alliance A claims for **citizens' rights** to be fulfilled, Alliance B is less interested in legislative rights and rather addresses **institutional deficiencies**. Whereas Alliance A wants to change policy/state action by **advocacy and lobby** (claim-making) to expand formal housing delivery to the poor, Alliance B aims to change policy/state action from inside by integrating their **non-formal practices** into the state framework.



Fig. 6.2: Right-based versus alternative development position, Source: Own design

Alliance A aims to fulfil housing rights and uses **networks as an entry point for advocacy** to influence housing policy and in the long run politics and polity. Alliance B aims to balance power inequality and uses **housing as an entry point to establish networks** to influence politics and polity and, in the long run, policy.[1]

As a consequence the emphasis of NGO support differs in terms of the *Development Action Group* providing more **direct professional expertise**, whereas the *Community Or-*

[1] By applying this terminology the difference in governance is stressed of: policy as specific political strategies and actions, politics as the negotiation process and polity as the structural capacity within institutions. See: Benz (2004), p. 21.

ganisation Resource Centre offers more a **platform for networking**.



Fig. 6.3: Focus of activity by Alliance A and B, Source: Own design

6.3 Civil society organisations and alliances

6.3.1 Organisations as collective actors: coexisting and overlapping structures

Whereas Alliance A (*Development Action Group*, The *Kuyasa Fund* and local People's Organisations) works with a conventional NGO setup operating from a head office with hierarchical working structure, NGOs in Alliance B (*Community Organisation Resource Centre*, *uTshani Fund*, *People's Environmental Planning*, *Coalition of the Urban Poor*, *Federation of the Urban Poor*) are decentralised and characterised by the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) being a joint coordination of independent programmes.

NGOs in Alliance A are clearly distinguishable with **clear boundaries** and are exclusively formal structures. The NGOs of Alliance B instead show **organisational overlaps** and contain informal structures. A key finding is therefore that the NGOs within Alliance A can be clearly classified, whereas a classification as NGOs in case B would reduce them to a formal and confined entity which in reality they are not.

On grassroots level the organisations working with Alliance A can be clearly classified as People's Organisations since they are development and policy-oriented and based on membership. Their members have other affiliations (such as savings schemes) but these do not constitute a precondition for membership. Moreover, they have a **formal hierarchical structure** grounded in registration, elections and setup of committees which oper-

ate on a local level.

In case B the Federation is constituted by saving schemes. Members might have other affiliations, but the affiliation to a saving scheme is the entry point to membership of the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP). Savings schemes are small and local self-help groups. They constitute the local networks of FEDUP. These local FEDUP networks are similar to People's Organisations in terms of numbers, but they are not registered hierarchical organisations. Nevertheless, the Federation exposes **organisation-like formal and vertical accountability structures**. Saving schemes, local, regional and national networks are affiliated by a formalised reporting, resource flow and accountability structure. Still it cannot be classified as an Association of People's Organisations. Firstly, the organisational structures of FEDUP and NGOs overlap (FEDUP constitutes *uTshani Fund*, FEDUP is member of CUP and FEDUP activists are employed by CORC). Secondly, the Federation is more than an organisation by constituting **informal horizontal networking** arrangements through the "federating" practices of local groups. As a result the Federation constitutes a hybrid organisational form sitting in-between or combining characteristics of organisations and networks.

These findings from the research point to the following classification of civil society organisations (see the following table).

Type	Alliance A	Type	Alliance B
SHO	-	SHO	Saving schemes
PO	Registered organisations, elected committee	Hybrid	FEDUP (local, regional, national organisational structure and network)
APO	-	APO	CUP (umbrella for social movement organisations, but overlap with FEDUP and CORC)
PONGO	DAG	PONGO+	CORC (registered, independent programmes, overlap with uTshani, FEDUP and PEP)
	-	Hybrid	uTshani Fund (professional staff and FEDUP board members)
SONGO	The Kuyasa Fund	SONGO+	PEP (registered, clear boundary, but dependent on CORC/uTshani)

Tab. 6.1: Classification of civil society organisations within Alliance A and B, Source: Own design

6.3.2 Basic alliance formation: multi-organisational and hybrid structures

The analysis of the two civil society alliances provides entry points for a distinction in terms of their internal governance practices between a more NGO-centred, situational and multi-organisational alliance (Alliance A) and a polycentric, permanent and hybrid constellation (Alliance B).

Type A	Type B
Clear boundaries	No clear boundaries
Multi-organisational cooperation	Polycentric network
Additive	Overlapping
Separate entities	Complex interfaces
Formal organisation	Formal/informal (organisational cores)
NGOs outside partners of People's Organisations with irregular interface	NGOs with special relationship to Federation and regular interface

Tab. 6.2: Basic alliance formations, Source: Own design

Alliance A: a multi-organisational, NGO-centred and situational alliance

The constellation of organisations in Alliance A is characterised by occasionally emerging loose working relations of independent organisations (separate entities). It can therefore be referred to as a situational alliance which is mostly confined to project contexts.

On a grassroots level the relations between the People's Organisations are weak and sporadic. Their platform for engagement is loose, free-for-all and dependent on the initiative of the *Development Action Group* (DAG). This dependency represents a dilemma for DAG as it puts the NGO in the uncomfortable position of unwillingly driving the relationship-building whilst wanting to enhance an autonomous grassroots network.



Fig. 6.4: Alliance A: multi-organisational, NGO-centred and situational, Source: Own design

From a case to case basis the entities within this alliance practice networking, however, the individual organisation is prevalent. The composition of actors within the Alliance A is therefore additive. Networks as secondary forms hardly exist. The organisational form is oriented at bureaucratic hierarchical structured institutions.

Alliance B: a hybrid, polycentric and permanent alliance

The NGOs and the Federation in case B stress that they embark on a less exclusive relationship than in the past. They foresee a more independent role of both the NGOs and the Federation. This would entail that the Federation contracts NGOs on a situational basis. Nonetheless, the shift has yet not been translated into practice. Their relationship continues to be characterised by a permanent alliance structure. The organisations as actors within this alliance constitute organisational cores of the broader structure. Centre of decision-making or power cannot be clearly defined. Therefore, Alliance B can neither be classified as NGO nor Grassroots-centred, but could rather be referred to as polycentric.



Fig. 6.5: Polycentric overlapping composition of Federation alliance, Source: Own design

This alliance is driven by a relational logic based on strong ties between the organisations up to a degree of symbiosis in a form of organisational overlaps (constituting a hybrid so-

cial organisation). Moreover, it comprises less formalised structures which in the same way constitute the constellation. For instance relationships between the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP) groups are strong beyond the formal accountability structure. Furthermore, the *uTshani Fund* was referred to as having two-sides of one coin with a professional arm and a grassroots board. One could say that the Alliance B is constituted by formal and informal elements (see figure 6.5).

6.3.3 Relationships between both alliances: dialectics of positions

Basically both alliances buy into the savings methodology and share a common understanding of the deficiencies of the housing process in the City. However, their different positions on how to engage with the state create a degree of mistrust, suspicion, competition or even rivalry. This is mostly revealed in comments from NGOs, whereas the Grassroots Organisations are less aware of the differences. Comments were made about Alliance A being focused on delivery, disempowering and NGO-driven and about Alliance B cutting deals with government in their self-interest, misusing the community for an outside agenda and sidelining right-based initiatives.



Fig. 6.6: Dialectics of right-based and alternative development positions, Source: Own design

This discrepancy is enhanced by a competitive situation between NGOs working in the same field. There are similar donors involved; some of them seemingly are not supportive of complementary approaches. This, according to criticism from the NGOs, is a result of the limited understanding of the differences in their approaches. The wish was expressed that both approaches could be accommodated and acknowledged. Instead, unintentionally,

a situation is created where the one is played off against the other.

Nevertheless, the antagonistic attitudes are partly overcome in the day-to-day business when the NGOs in both alliances share information and cooperate on a situational basis.

On a more general level it seemed that both alliances were to a degree learning from each other. Since both were in a process of rebuilding their structures, it became obvious that Alliance A was putting more emphasis on informal and horizontal networking as a basis for empowerment. This was part of the experience being made with the failure of previous more bureaucratic and NGO-driven structures. At the same time Alliance B had to deal with a legacy of mismanagement and lack of accountability and rebuild structures and processes so as to regain trust both within the Federation as well as with government. In a way this represented a form of checks and balances as both alliances would comment on the progress being made and reveal deficiencies by the other (see figure 6.6).

6.4 Dynamic interfaces

6.4.1 Strategic level state engagement: towards grassroots networks

Both alliances see a need to organise the poor and to build their capacity for lobbying and advocating the state to further their interests. Both also try to cultivate relationships with local government and to sensitise officials to people-driven housing processes.

Alliance A: NGO-driven advocacy and commissioned work

Within Alliance A the *Development Action Group* (DAG) is driving the strategic agenda. DAG and the *Kuyasa Fund* both see policy as deficient and are seeking **policy-influence** to improve practice on the ground (right-based, top-down change). The NGOs therefore create a situational alliance on a strategic level; specifically with regard to the *People's Housing Process*. The interfaces to the state by Alliance A are characterised by NGOs practicing a critical engagement. This translates in a dualism of relations: in terms of being **integrated to institutional spaces** (stakeholder relation in forums and committees) and being **contracted by government** (principal-agent relation).

The role of NGOs in the engagement with the state shifts between the different levels of government. There are strong and stable relations to national and provincial government and to the senior-level of local government. Acknowledging the limited autonomy of local government it is often higher levels of government which are lobbied. Impacts are then supposed to filter down to municipal levels through the intergovernmental relations.

At higher levels of government the NGOs take over an advocacy role as they make policy submissions and are integrated as stakeholders in various institutional forums (provincial and national land summit, national NGO PHP Reference Group, national Extended Interim Policy Working Group, and provincial Human Settlements Reference Group). At the same time DAG increasingly takes over commissioned research for higher level of government.

At local government level the relationship is characterised by lobbying against local government planning practice and by more cooperative forms of engagement. This comprises cooperation in policy-formulation, collaboration with champions in local government or commissioned work by local government.

These collaborative relations of 'like-minded' professionals, however, do not translate on a project-level where the practice of the delivery arm of government is opposed by DAG.

In order to shift state practice the *Development Action Group* therefore intends to get Grassroots Organisations in the driver's seat for claim-making. Networks of People's Organisations (referred to as 'CBO advocacy platform') as an option to collectively address government are in their infancy stage, however perceived as key for future lobbying activities. This indicates an emerging tendency for DAG to shift from a NGO advocacy role to support grassroots advocacy. As this network has not yet been established, People's Organisations lack relations to state actors at strategic level (see figure 6.7).



Fig. 6.7: Strategic level state engagement by Alliance A, Source: Own design

Alliance B: grassroots-centred partnerships

Alliance B avoids stakeholder engagement in government forums. Instead, it focuses on **partnership relationships**. Similar to Alliance A, strategic engagement emerges predominantly at the national and provincial levels of government. At local government level the alliance seeks to single out those actors whom they perceive as agents of change.

A major finding is that governance arrangements have emerged outside the institutional channels of the state. Relationships are established through inviting government representatives to the **informal governance space** of Alliance B (uTshani Trust, land trust, national working group, CORC board, SDI exchanges).

The strategic level is characterised by activities which take place outside the government sphere. Specifically, **learning and networking** is seen as the basis for capacitating members to negotiate at local level. Core practices are exchange programmes between Federation groups nationally and internationally, savings to build network and access external funds, data gathering to gain knowledge and as a basis for negotiations, mapping to un-

derstand a settlement situation and make informed choices.[2] Resource mobilisation (secure privileges) for project-level is meant to **showcase alternatives**.

Negotiations on a strategic level are characterised by relationships to key champions on mostly higher levels of government. FEDUP lobbying and advocacy is assisted by the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC) in the role of that of a mentor. NGOs take over an enabling function and are characterised as **'door openers'** for the Federation to engage with the state. The relationship between the Federation groups and support NGOs is shifting and characterised by different stakeholder driving the strategic agenda (see figure 6.8).



Fig. 6.8: Strategic level state engagement by Alliance B, Source: Own design

[2] See Baumann/Bolnick/Mitlin (2001), pp. 24-28.

6.4.2 Project-level state engagement: changing roles and relationships

Alliance A: roles and relationships determined by regulations

Alliance A does not connect strategic and project level of activities – only from time to time when projects are used as case studies and precedence to inform policy-making.

Relationships between the NGOs are loose in project contexts. The *Development Action Group* addresses the People's Organisations throughout all phases, whereas the *Kuyasa Fund* relates to the individual household level confined to the project preparation phase.

It is, however, at project-level that situational alliances between NGOs and People's Organisations emerge. The micro case studies show that projects are initiated by the People's Organisations as the key drivers who either resist formal interventions (micro-case Freedom Park) or seek to be integrated into formal interventions (micro-case Netreg). Through this experience the People's Organisations have learned to verbalise their concerns.

In both micro-cases DAG supports the People's Organisations in securing land and funding for development. This is achieved by providing **technical support** or by taking over an **intermediary function** between the state and the People's Organisations (micro-case Netreg and Freedom Park). External consultants collaborate with the NGO and People's Organisations by providing legal advice (micro-case Freedom Park) or technical support (micro-case Netreg).

The study demonstrates that People's Organisations develop from an informal organisational structure (Freedom Park) or SANCO-aligned entity (Netreg) to independent formalised organisations during the process. DAG assists the **formalisation process by leadership training and organisation-building**. The formalisation has increased transparency of internal decision-making, but also caused internal leadership conflicts.

In the phase of **accessing land** the interface with local government is predominantly **competitive** with local government opposing community initiative. This is illustrated by either dismissing applications (micro-case Netreg) or insisting on eviction (micro-case Freedom Park). In both cases the conflict was resolved by a change of interest at the political level to scale-up City projects (N2 Gateway project in the case of Netreg and Urban Renewal Programme in the case of Freedom Park). The Netreg case furthermore illustrates that People's Organisations by addressing higher levels of government can speed-up the process through pressure on local government. The space for interface is either consti-

tuted by local government (NGOs and POs invited to meetings) or outsourced by the state to an external mediator (as in Freedom Park) (see A1 and A2 in figure 6.9).

Once land had been secured, the relationship to the City has changed from competitive/confrontational to more **consultative** relations. The formal **project preparation** framework is acknowledged by Alliance A, but also challenged in terms of trying to speed-up the process. In the absence of institutional spaces for participation DAG field staff together with the People's Organisations and often with the support of private consultants lobbied City officials and political representatives to support projects and approve submissions. This has created a situational alliance between the NGO, the People's Organisation and consultants.

DAG has a predominant advocacy and mediation role in land access and shifts to a more technical and advisor role in later phases. It then supports communities in their housing process by providing **technical support** (access finance, layout plans, house designs, construction programmes) as well as by **skills and institutional development** (e.g. in negotiating and communication and financial management).

People's Organisations changed from principal agents in claiming for land, to stakeholders or **interest groups** in project preparation. However, the micro-case Freedom Park demonstrated that existing communities can build up alternative self-driven initiatives (such as food gardening and neighbourhood watch) to sustain self-initiatives more easily than organisations made up of dispersed members.

Both the Freedom Park and Netreg Housing projects revealed that the meetings with housing officials were often characterised by bargaining during this phase. Although local government was interested in enforcing its mode of housing delivery, it was also more willing to consult with the community and get their buy-in (see A3 and A4 in figure 6.9).

During **housing development** the formal framework dictated the relationship between the actors. The regulatory frameworks of the *People's Housing Process* defined the relationship between NGOs, People's Organisations and local government. DAG then changed its role to a project manager/PHP support organisation. As this rather requires technical skills, DAG gained a more distant position in relation to the People's Organisations. People's Organisations shifted during the housing development phase to **stakeholders** in project steering committees. By being included in this institutional space, the influence of the People's Organisations declined as they were reduced to a **consultative** role.

Whilst community self-reliance is high during land negotiations, during project implementation the PHP process regulates that financial coordination remains with the support organisation (DAG). The People's Organisations are in the back seat in the project development and have loose control of the development. A further noticeable finding was that in both micro-cases a private charity organisation provided additional finance and took over control of the development process.

Government actors retreat to **hierarchical coordination**: The role of national and provincial government is to provide resources and approve projects whilst local government has to care for control and regulates housing development (see A5 and A6 in figure 6.9).

Greenfields		**Upgrading**	
A1		**A2**	
A3		**A4**	
A5		**A6**	

Fig. 6.9: Dynamics of relationships between Alliance A and the state, Source: Own design

Key characteristics of the project-level state engagement can be summarised as follows:

- The interface between state/alliance shifts from competitive to consultative to hierarchical.
- Space for interface is created by the state.
- POs shift from principal driver, to stakeholder to interest group.
- NGO shift from advisor, mediator to a technical service role.
- Local government actors shift from a restrictive to a controlling/consultative role.
- There is a clear boundary between all entities.

Alliance B: dynamic relational web

The findings show that in the case of Alliance B the strategic and project-levels are difficult to distinguish as strategic impact is believed to be achieved by changing practice at project-level (pragmatic/ bottom-up change).

The Klipfontein project was to showcase opportunities of land donations by the Methodist church (micro-case B2), the Ekupumleni project was integrated as a pilot for building '100 houses in 100 days' based on an agreement with the national housing Minister (micro-case B5), the Site C project was integrated to a pilot by provincial and local government to replan Site C (micro-case B4) and the Kuyasa project was part of the South Africa wide FEDUP/*uTshani Fund* initiative to recover subsidies (micro-case B6).

The FEDUP members have either been living in informal settlements and are negotiating around tenure rights and upgrading (as with the Klipfontein project), are organised backyard dwellers and negotiate with the state for land (Macassar) or are living in site-and-service schemes and are negotiating around consolidation and relocation (Site C and Kuyasa). Obviously the different background and shelter needs also determine the stability and dynamics of the local networks. Experience with Federation groups demonstrated that existing communities with formal tenure are quick to mobilise, but will show bias during the process (such as Site C). On the other hand landless groups are more difficult to organise, but more committed during the process (such as Macassar).[3]

The hybrid alliance of case B is characterised by **flexible relations** at project-level.

During the phase of **accessing land**, requests for land are primarily **driven by the *Federation of the Urban Poor* (FEDUP)** network with occasional assistance from the *Community Organisation Resource Centre* (CORC). The phase of accessing land is accompanied by mobilising savings and enumeration activities and thus building leadership and organisation within FEDUP groups. The *Coalition of the Urban Poor* (CUP) has taken over this activity of FEDUP during its internal conflicts. NGOs are present in the form of **social facilitation** by assisting in setting up saving schemes, database, and enumeration processes. The local FEDUP groups advise and inform the local saving schemes and establish **systems of internal decision-making** and information (micro-case Macassar). The case studies show that differences emerge if land is to be allocated by government. Then the local FEDUP group drives the identification process, contracts consultants for

[3] The correlation between the tenure form/ location of federation groups and their behaviour and dynamics had been already indicated in other research. See: Bay Research and Consultancy Service (2002), pp. 15f.

land surveys and negotiates with local government. In this case NGOs are absent in the direct interface with local government and just offer advice. Also, the FEDUP group primarily addresses the political level for buy-in and tries to establish ties with the local councillor.

The Klipfontein project represents an alternative to land requests. It reveals different roles and responsibilities aligned to manage the transfer and rezoning of land. Conflicts do not emerge between local FEDUP groups and local government, but within the community. CORC then adopts the role of a **mediator**. The interface with government is more of a technical nature which is addressed by consultants contracted by Alliance B (see B1 and B2 in figure 6.10).

In the **project preparation** phase the two micro-cases illustrate differences in the interface with government. The Ekupumleni case (B3) reveals a way how the **formal procedure is circumvented** by building houses upfront prior to the approval of layouts and subsidies. Obviously negotiations then take place for post-approval and service delivery which is met by reluctance by the delivery arm of local government. Here fine-tuned agreements are reached through negotiations around technical matters. NGOs play an **intermediary** role translating Federation thinking to professionals and vice versa. *People's Environmental Planning* is then contracted to represent the local interests.

The Site C project (micro case B4) on the other hand is characterised by **collaboration** with local government to implement the rezoning plans of the state. Local FEDUP groups and saving schemes meet and discuss implementation with local government on a weekly basis. This is complemented by *uTshani Fund* and *People's Environmental Planning* (PEP) which negotiate technical matters with City officials. UTshani, PEP and the *Community-Microfinance Network* link up with the savings schemes and FEDUP group in terms of preparing the business plan. This case study revealed the **lack of understanding of the role** of the *uTshani Fund* both by City officials and saving schemes. Conflicts then emerge not between the City and the local FEDUP group, but between the local FEDUP group and the *uTshani Fund*. These findings show that in such a situation FEDUP adopts the role of a **mediator** between the two (see B3 and B4 in figure 6.10).

The formal **housing development** route is resisted by Alliance B. This translates into **collaboration with champions** in government who are interested in piloting alternative intervention routes. The micro-case of Ekupumleni (B5) reveals that conflicts then emerge between the political promoter at higher level of government and the delivery arm of local

government. Also, the **clash between local FEDUP groups** translates into conflicts with *uTshani Fund*. In this situation CORC plays a **mediation role**. PEP assists in technical advice but withdraws in social conflicts.

The case of Kuyasa (B6) illustrates that Alliance B seeks to **showcase alternative development** of housing. Interface emerges by accessing the capital subsidy system. Officials then want to ensure that projects are implemented according to regulations and standards. This translates into **competitive** relations between the *uTshani Fund* and the City or Province. Also Federation groups are confused by the *uTshani Fund*'s reluctance to provide technical support which translates into conflicts between some FEDUP members and the Fund (see B5 and B6 in figure 6.10).

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B1		**B2**	
B3		**B4**	
B5		**B6**	

Fig. 6.10: Dynamics of relationships between Alliance B and the state, Source: Own design

Key characteristics of the project-level engagement with the state are as follows:

- SDI aligned groups use their alignment to the larger network and strategic relations to higher sphere of government as a basis for negotiation on project-level.
- Alliance B constitutes dynamic relational webs both internally and with local government.
- Functions shift between entities not only within the alliance but also between actors in the alliance and actors in government.
- The interface with local government is not informed by the political opportunity structure, but by the degree of how alternative development is in conflict with the formal intervention framework.
- Relations then can be of a collaborative or competitive nature at project-level.
- Neither state engagement nor internal governance is free of conflicts and requires constant negotiations.

6.5 Emergent patterns of moving targets and oscillating structures

Opportunity structures are changing

From an institutional governance perspective institutions are not static, but influence and can be influenced by actors and policies. In terms of institutionalised participation this translates into dynamics of political opportunity structures. Clearly, the case of Cape Town reinforces these observations in the literature. It indicates that considerable attention needs to be paid to the wider political and institutional context within which actors operate.

In Cape Town conflicting planning and housing strategies constitute governance gaps. Powerful influence of higher spheres of government and contestations within local government and powerful market forces therefore determine how policies and strategies are interpreted and implemented on the ground. The observations indicate the relevance of a political economy theory to explain the aspect of **power influencing policy outcomes**.

Moreover, from an urban management perspective, horizontal integration of civil society actors needs to be anchored in local government practice. The case of Cape Town has shown that **participation is a matter of willingness, capacity and risk-taking** of officials. Civil society actors react to ineffective engagement opportunities by low motivation to be included into processes.

A central finding, which the case studies point to, is the fact that **political opportunity structures emerge outside institutional channels** provided by the state. It is then not only civil society actors who are integrated or excluded in governance arrangements, but also state actors who are at times invited to and at times ignored in governance arrangements.

Civil society approaches are influenced by and influence policies

Actor-centred institutionalism argues that policy, institutions and options for actions influence one another. Strategies of civil society actors thus represent institutional mechanisms for policy influence. The research has shown that in Cape Town both right-based and alternative development **positions have taken effect on the mode of governance** by insisting on people-driven processes. Vice versa policies have taken effect on the people-driven process itself and on the civil society actors by **limiting their role perception** through roles outlined in regulatory frameworks. In the *People's Housing Process* Non-Governmental Organisations are reduced to support organisations and grassroots organi-

sations to stakeholders in committees. Alternative development practice would contest the regulated roles by setting precedent. Setting precedent as a form of counteracting is also increasingly applied by right-based organisations.

Emergence of overlapping and hybrid structures

The empirical findings confirm the assumption that **different patterns of organising co-exist**. A major finding is that the classification along the attributes of organisations and networks does not comprehend case reality. As Bommes/Tacke (2005) indicated, reality is closer to double inclusion of actors in both networks and organisations. The case studies affirm this observation where saving schemes and Federation groups network on horizontal level and are at the same time embedded in a vertical accountability structure. Moreover, a **hybrid alliance formation** between NGOs and grassroots has emerged. This formation is characterised by strong links, overlapping organisational structures and the blending into each other of both networks and organisations.

Organisations as collective actors as well as networks are assumed to have structuring effects for the interaction between civil society and the state. A shift towards interdependent and multi-centred networks between actors has been outlined in the literature. Here, the study applied theories of organisations and networks to shed light on the emerging arrangements between civil society alliances and the state. The findings of the evaluative studies provide evidence that support the view that **sectors are less homogeneous** than assumed and that **relationships between actors are more complex** and expose a variety of modes of governance.

Moreover, case B reveals that state actors are integrated in partnerships with the Federation Alliance and at the same time they are part of the state bureaucracy. This **coexistence** seems to be a self-evident practice in society where some easily network and simultaneously operate in a bureaucracy.

Dynamics create moving targets

It is assumed that roles and relationships change and adapt with regard to the political opportunity structure. During the field study, issues related to dynamics at levels and phases were examined. The research evidence supports the claim that **modes of governance and relations between actors are dynamic**. Changing roles and relationships have led to alternating inclusion of actors. Given these dynamics, organisations as collective actors appear to be '**moving targets**'.

Emergence of oscillating structures

Opportunity structures are changing. This influences how civil society actors organise as well as that their way of organising influences the institutionalised opportunity structures. Organisations do not only coexist, but also overlap. Emerging organising structures in alliances are not only organisations or networks, but hybrids. In their engagement with the state, actors within alliances are dynamic 'moving targets' confronted with or confronting the political opportunity structures. At times they emerge as organisation-like networks and at other times as network-like organisations.

Given the above complexity and **fluidity**, this indicates the most crucial finding: It is possible to sustain the hypothesis that **organising structures are oscillating**.

6.6 Understanding local governance practice in South Africa

The above conclusions may contribute to an understanding of the housing practices, evolving urban governance and the role of civil society widely discussed in the South African literature.

Relevance of self-initiative and difficulty to integrate it to the state framework

The international thinking of planning and housing as a matter of governance is also revealed in the case studies. However, a **juxtaposition of enabling positions** is prevalent and affects aligned political opportunity structures.

Titling to enable access to the property market is a key feature of the capital subsidy system. It thus links to international development thinking aligned to De Soto's assumption that titling is effective for **enabling markets**.

Although the micro-cases were not evaluated in terms of the effectiveness of this approach, the research has shown that during the land negotiations security of tenure and not titles were of primary concern. This supports the thesis that **legal recognition** is more central to poor households than individual ownership of property. Only once the households sought to access housing subsidies, did titles became of interest as a precondition for subsidy allocation.

Further, the micro-case of Kuyasa indicates that although households hold individual titles, they seemingly cannot access loan capital as a way to finance the finishing of their housing units. This conforms to observations made by Gilbert (2002a), Datta/Jones (2000) or Durand-Lasserve/Payne (2006) that titling does not strengthen the financial capacity of the poor.

Instead, all micro-cases give evidence of alternative finance sources. All groups were practicing savings except for those who were affected by internal leadership conflicts.

Scholars fear that titling leads to speculation and displacement of the urban poor. The micro-cases indicate that speculation in their context was less of a concern. But this is due rather to the **peripheral location** of land being made available. It indicates a further difficulty to provide titles in well-situated locations as a precondition for integration and access to livelihood opportunities. The micro-cases illustrate that this requirement not only exposes a challenge to government; also those groups pro-actively accessing land may reproduce what has been referred to as the 'Apartheid City'.

A further concern linked to titling is that it relates to **social differentiation** amongst the urban poor. The data of the research supports that view. Firstly, the cases of Klipfontein, Freedom Park and Ekupumleni clearly indicate that formalisation of tenure can result in severe community conflicts. Secondly, all projects focused on beneficiaries to the capital subsidy system which is linked to ownership tenure. Those not eligible to the state subsidies such as the many non-South African migrant population are therefore automatically excluded.

Furthermore, the housing development process in the case studies reflects the discourse on self-help (Turner/Burgess). As the *People's Housing Process* provides for a conventional housing unit conforming to norms and standards outlined in policy, it is not more needs based, effective and affordable than other conventional housing solutions. Self-help then just represents another form of delivery which would reaffirm criticism of the myth of self-help. The Cape Town context shows that in a context of an absent private sector and lack of delivery capacity by the state, **delivery responsibility** is shifted to civil society actors. This links to the critique of Huchzermeyer (2004) who suggests understanding the South African support-based models of community-managed housing approaches as distorted. The capital subsidy system, according to Huchzermeyer, results in a focus on an individual house and neglects comprehensive interventions beyond house construction.

Although this also holds true for the project-level in the case studies, some of the micro-cases show grassroots activities beyond house construction such as neighbourhood watch, savings or food gardening.

Instead of self-building, civil society actors promote **assisted self/community-managed approaches**. The case studies reveal the difficulties in implementing such approaches confronted with the **roles and responsibilities predefined by institutional frameworks**. Roles continue to be confined to the urban poor as objects of development and to the developmental local government as an almost paternalistic state. Participation is characterised by **sporadic involvement** in individual housing projects. If grassroots groups are integrated in the institutional frameworks as with the project steering committees, the micro-cases revealed a decline in their role for project management. Instead of creating synergies, the micro-cases reveal a juxtaposition of expert-led top-down processes and the continuation of self-organised participation outside the governance space.

Those micro-cases which insisted on a community-managed process beyond the institutionalised framework were confronted with **confusion about aligned roles and respon-**

sibilities amongst all actors. The micro-case of Site C illustrates that resulting conflicts emerge not only between state and civil society actors but also within civil society alliances.

Self-help, it is assumed, represents a means to **empowerment**. This is particularly stressed in the current debates on poverty reduction measures. The South African housing policy is therefore seen as a contradiction to debates on urban poverty as it continues implementing technocratic and market enabling approaches. With *Breaking New Ground*, the new national housing policy, and other local efforts, alternatives emerge such as area-based upgrading. The Cape Town example illustrates that the more progressive elements of policy are however **difficult to implement in an environment shaped by a dominant delivery focus** whereby upgrading continues to be implemented as conventional projects (in the form of rollover schemes) and people-driven processes are perceived as time-consuming. Also, the micro-cases of Alliance A showed the negative effects of external charities who undermine people-driven initiatives with their focus on speeding-up housing delivery.

Relevance of networks and the problem of inclusion

Partnership conceptions, according to the critique, idealise roles and relationships between distinct sectors (Majale, DiGaetano/Strom, Lowndes/Skelcher). Instead, it is assumed that relationships are far more complex and heterogeneous. The case studies provide deep and critical assessments of the governance arrangements on the experiences of stakeholders in the two civil society alliances. The research evidence supports the claim that relationships are more complex and heterogeneous. The findings also provided evidence that **boundaries between sectors are more blurred** than outlined by idealised 'good governance' conceptions.

Network theories stress the relevance of networks to deal with the complexity and interdependencies in society. The key attribute is therefore the participation of actors in networks. In the development context this translates into new forms of co-operation in a complex landscape of actors. Networks are assumed to be horizontal and thus present an opportunity to function as an intermediary between social, economic and political differences of actors.

Nevertheless, a key dualism emerges between participants and non-participants of networks which became evident particularly on the strategic level where the Alliance B was

able to leverage state resources. With its link to *Shack/Slum Dwellers International* it has gained an international reputation which filters down to national and local negotiation level. This reconnects to democracy concerns in network theory. On the one hand the Federation managed to operate in a "space of flows" which at the same time leaves non-participants excluded and confined to the "space of place". This affects non-Federation households in the communities. Conflicts such as in Site C where Federation groups are opposed and mistrusted by other community groups can be understood against this background.

This **tendency of exclusion** by networks also affects local authorities which are by-passed by both alliances who are establishing relations with national and provincial government. However, this is less an indication for the exclusiveness of the alliance than a demonstration that decentralisation has not given local government adequate powers.

Relevance of internal governance for the democratic functions of civil society

Enhancing democratic practice is often equated with influencing decision-making and accountability of state actors. In terms of development practice it is hoped that civil society will induce a paradigm shift. For instance, Huchzermeyer (2004) stresses that in order to change the housing intervention framework the dominant development paradigm in South Africa needs to be challenged by civil society. There is evidence in the case studies which confirms this democratic role: NGOs who were reduced to service organisations have returned with an oppositional position against the ANC-led government. Moreover, they also assist networks from grassroots to emerge which directly address the state.

Although the research did not intend to measure effectiveness of outcomes in terms of **empowerment**, what needs to be noted is that the current South African housing practice is criticised for limiting self-initiative and cooperation. Those singular grassroots organisations that fostered participation in the institutional context were mostly limited to **short-term involvement** in steering committees. Acceptance and integration of civil society activities seemed to emerge only if it matched political interest.

The transformation of governance arrangements with the state requires structures from civil society which can bring about this change. Here the democratic function transcends to internal democratic practices. The experiences of both alliances show the **importance of internal governance**, providing the opportunity for participation within the alliance.

Key to both alliances was leadership-building at the grassroots level. All groups developed over time by voicing their interests and learning to use leadership and manage conflicts which emerged during the process. Tenure workshops and other trainings provided by NGOs have improved informed grassroots participation. Obviously, both alliances are **learning organisations** in terms of restructuring their set-ups and learning from past failures. To find consensus at times of internal conflicts seems to be a powerful learning factor for cooperating in other governance arrangements. All groups have changed their engagement with government and have learned to negotiate more effectively.

Moreover, the Federations' internal governance practices created an **outside space**. Its relevance has, however, been differently interpreted: It is either seen as deep democracy (by creating this space the poor are empowered to engage) or as "governance beyond the state" (by creating a space which then can be co-opted by the state's agenda).

7. Conclusions

Based on the evidence from the empirical part which outlined the evolving internal governance structures of civil society actors and their interfaces with the state in local housing processes, this chapter explores the broader implications for theory.

If the premise of dynamic and hybrid and therefore oscillating structures is accepted, what future perspectives derive from the observations as appropriate for planning and housing?

7.1 Towards oscillating structures in local governance

This thesis takes into account a multiple theoretical perspective. The focus has been on theories which are concerned with organisations as collective actors and networks. Two positions are prevalent: on the one hand institutional governance and network theory stress the relevance of network governance for enhancing inclusion. On the other hand, from a civil society and political economy perspective, stronger focus is given to the democratic significance of including civil society actors.

Against this background, South African case studies could be interpreted as an exception providing special cases with limited insights for a general discussion on housing, governance and civil society. South African cities have a relatively effective state provision in housing, a relatively advanced governance system and a particularly active civil society.

Nevertheless, South Africa provides an ideal laboratory to study transformative governance. In this context the housing crisis represents a central concern in politics. The growing housing backlog at times of economic growth reflects the international tendency of increasing inequalities in urban societies. Civil society actors are confronted with an ambiguous role of the local state with regard to housing policy, typical for emerging markets where pro-poor and pro-growth initiatives inform policy-making. Thus actors need to adapt and find innovative strategies to sometimes collaborate with, and sometimes contest the state. South Africa therefore is exemplary and provides insights to the relevance of governance concepts in transformative contexts.

7.1.1 Housing as governance

The findings of the research have implications for the discourse on housing. As housing is increasingly recognised as a governance challenge, the role of local government is then to enable institutional cooperation and partnership models.

Generally it can be said that an enabling role for the state translates both in enabling markets and self-help approaches with a shifting emphasis between the two. As a result, enabling strategies reflect a degree of ambiguity which creates a governance gap for their implementation. Governance gaps then leave open space for interpretation by local actors. Hence, the role of planning and housing aligned to partnership models requires an analysis of which actors make use of this interpretative space.

From a pro-poor perspective it is civil society organisations that are capable of addressing the multiple aspects of urban poverty and local governance. The deficiencies of the formal state housing process indicate the importance of civil society organisations that assist in developing appropriate alternative mechanisms which are responsive to the social situation of households. These mechanisms require a high degree of flexibility as they are informed by the changes in institutional channels for participation. It seems to be necessary to apply analytical concepts which take into account the dynamics of civil society actors so as to fully comprehend their capability to make use of changing governance spaces.

Civil society's capability to adapt and to change roles and relationships seems to aggravate confusion and raise mistrust amongst actors within and outside civil society alliances. Collective approaches are then constrained or enhanced by the ability to enable flexibility whilst ensuring accountability and transparency. These internal governance challenges and their effects on local governance have not been taken into consideration adequately. They are often summarised as 'community conflict' and accused of causing blockages and standstill in development projects. Instead, the case studies indicate that if these internal governance challenges are not taken as the 'abnormal' incident, but as a constant threat, groups then accept to learn from the experience in the long run. The learning process could then be a ground for reaching consensus and accountable and transparent leadership and ultimately enhance empowerment.

7.1.2 Governance actors as moving targets

Tendency towards flexible formations

The research has shown that hybrid and oscillating structures emerge which cannot be explained by existing typologies of organisations and networks. The fluidity signifies an inaccuracy when applying organisations and network concepts which have been elaborated in contexts of stable democracies with formal regulation of the functions of actors. This is not a universal context and particularly questionable in situations of transformative institutions and a high degree of informal mechanisms at work.

The case studies illustrated a civil society alliance with clear and one with fluid boundaries. That raises the question as to which of the forms is more typical under condition of transformative governance. The tendency to withdraw from NGO-centred and organisation-type structures and instead to establish grassroots networks and autonomy, is indicative that more flexible alliance formations are emerging.

Oscillating and hybrid structures as new forms of social organisation

The central question is if these hybrid and oscillating structures merely constitute a reaction during a phase of transition or if they indicate a substantial change in social organisation. If taken as a transitional phenomenon, conventional types of urban governance and decentralisation, which assign a driving role to the state, would then not yet be capable to solve urban problems. Thus participation and partnerships would merely be a mechanism to enhance effectiveness. But reality is closer to that public steering of urban development is constrained under the conditions of structural shortcomings. Then hybrid and oscillating forms of governance are not a short-term phenomenon. They go beyond single projects and are capable of innovations to appropriate and re-interpret the dominant development paradigm and thus indicate that new forms of social organisation have been constituted.

Convergence towards the informal

Relations emerge in a governance space. Partnership frameworks assume that governance spaces are provided by the state and rely on the involvement of non-state actors which then have to formalise their relations. The research has shown that governance spaces can also be organised outside the state (which would be labelled ‘informal’ by the administra-

tion). Therefore, initiative is not confined to the state. Goethert (2005) envisages a change of participation which does not try to integrate the informal into the formal framework, but instead he assumes a convergence towards the informal. The institutionalised spaces and integration of state actors by the Federation, point to the relevance of this process. This seems to be an essential pre-requisite for the continuity of informal relations.

Actors as moving targets

The thesis indicates the deficits of theories which try to align particular functions to specific actors. Usually relationsships are conceptualised in terms of links between separate actors. Roles may shift but are predefined by institutional frameworks at work. The study provided important arguments that actors within hybrid structures, instead, show a complexity and fluidity of roles beyond the institutional frameworks. Functions are then not specific to one organisation. Instead, within hybrid and oscillating organisational forms, functions move from one actor to another. For instance an intermediary function does not apply to one specific third actor between two separate entities. Also a watchdog function can then even transcend to the state sector. As a result actors are far more dynamic than suggested by conceptions. At the same time this flexibility causes confusion and suspicion by inside and external actors.

7.1.3 Civil society as a laboratory for internal governance

For some time the development discourse did not focus on the democratic relevance of civil society. Instead, questions of performance, accountability, scaling-up, institutional development, aid flow and social capital were of concern. Recently a shift to the role of civil society actors as structural change agents has been noted. This understanding links development thinking to the discourse on the democratic value of civil society in urban development.

Fluidity of roles

The research well illustrates the diversity of what is believed as one sector in society. This said, it becomes evident that a third sector function (prescribing a role as intermediary) is reducing the roles fulfilled in this plurality. The case studies reveal that a clear division of roles is not applicable in a complex local context where these intermediary functions alternate between actors. This observation raises questions about appropriate structures

within civil society which are able to integrate flexible functions. Hybrid forms might then be more adapted to deal with the outlined fluidity of roles.

Internal governance as key to democratic practices

This leads to a further observation: the return to democratic function is linked to organisational change within civil society. The underlying assumption is that by creating democratic practices internally, a precondition is given for state engagement. Nevertheless, internal governance arrangements are not free of conflict and should therefore not raise idealised expectations. The reality shows that practices towards the state are unpredictable and actors can become gate keepers when gaining a high degree of influence.

Generally, this points to a critical aspect about the inclusion of grassroots which is normatively assumed to make governance more responsive to the needs of the poor. ‘Input legitimacy’ in terms of responsiveness to group interests is high, but exposes substantial weaknesses in terms of producing ‘output legitimacy’ by integrating larger society interests.

7.2 Future perspectives

Challenges for development actors

Poverty has been put back on the global agenda with the Millennium Development Goals as the action plan for ending poverty by investing in development. Target 11 which specifically focuses on the urban poor seems to suggest investment in tangibles such as sanitation and housing. At the same time aid harmonisation led to an increase of aid flow to national governments in terms of budget support. This seems to be a disadvantage to civil society and local government initiatives. Careful attention needs to be given that implementation does not bypass local processes. Enabling strategies should make use of and strengthen local potential and initiative.

To support internal governance seems to have democratic relevance in voicing grassroots interest within civil society alliances. This implies that donors should review their fundings:

Firstly, the development of internal governance structures seems to require long-term support of organisations and networks instead of once-off project-support.

Secondly, diversity in civil society is eligible. It would have adverse effects to give preference to a single actor, strategy or organisational form. The diversity offers an added value of checks and balances. Only by unfolding the shortcomings of the others' approach, the other is pressurised to react and adapt towards more general societal concerns. A single actor is more threatened to act in self-interest. This indicates that consequently the plurality of civil society and of their strategies and organisational forms needs to be supported.

Thirdly, this leads to a further aspect which needs to be stressed: Obviously the diversity of civil society varies in different localities. The establishment of networks will therefore take different expressions and require thorough and context-sensitive analysis on agency structures. As a result of the complexity of relationships, it is not possible to implement standardised partnerships models in complex local contexts.

Fourthly, funding to grassroots initiatives does not necessarily enhance their democratic practices. However, careful balancing is required between formalising grassroots structures to ensure accountability on the one hand and enabling a continuity of informality to

mitigate the negative effects that come with formalisation (loss of flexibility, leadership conflicts) on the other.

Fifthly, external actors involved (consultants, charity organisations) should be informed about the implications of people-driven processes in order to prevent adopting an interventionist role which is well-intentioned but counterproductive as it takes over local initiative.

Challenges for planners in local government

An enabling role for local government officials implies a number of challenges and opportunities:

Firstly, housing development in a context of poverty requires a diversification of strategies. This has been stated time and time again. Still, if housing policy is not comprehensive and pro-active, it is unlikely that the needs of the target group will be met.

Secondly, progressive planners can take the risk on themselves of pursuing an enabling role; they might as well look for coalitions. Civil society actors can provide planners with the necessary legitimacy to test innovative solutions. This seems to be of central importance to situations where the political-administrative context is highly fragmented and characterised by political patronage.

Thirdly, whereas government officials are often held accountable for the lack of policy implementation, the case of Cape Town well illustrates their limited latitude given the political interests in housing. This is a substantial point: As long as housing is used for political patronage, it will be difficult for local government to fulfil its mandate for participation and people-driven housing development. It seems to be relevant to take authority away from local politicians to prevent housing from becoming a question of local political power games.

Fourthly, there is no stereotype counterpart in civil society. Singling out particular civil society actors and inviting them as representatives to stakeholder forums or entering into partnership agreements can be detrimental to those whose interests are left outside these governance spaces. Institutional frameworks in housing development create spaces of inclusion and exclusion. Local government should ensure that criteria for participation is

made transparent and lay open agreements reached so as not to be accused of cutting deals or sidelining the grassroots.

Fifthly, there are also no stereotype roles when cooperating with civil society organisations. There are indications that partnerships with grassroots continue to be on the rise. Planners should not expect them to be a stable partner in delivery. Housing at the end of the day is a decision over resource allocation which is a highly conflictual issue. Frustrations are often caused when community conflicts arise, projects are blocked and local government backs out of the development process. It is exactly here were planners together with NGOs can take over a function as mediator between contesting groups to unblock stalled projects in the interest of all.

Finally, it should be recognised that channels for participation have opened at local level thanks to decentralisation and innovations by municipalities. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to interpret decentralisation as a matter of local level service delivery and performance of public entities. There continuous to be a need for improving and specifically opening channels for strategic decision-making. Currently discursive spaces for housing development are organised outside the state. Informal spaces are met with suspicion and reluctance and often equated with clientelism. They nevertheless present a vehicle in development, but require a high degree of transparency.

Challenges for civil society actors

With the shift from a focus on performance to its democratic relevance in society, civil society organisations need to pay attention to both their internal governance and their relations to the state. This implies the following:

Firstly, transparency is most needed in situations of flexible functions. There is a high degree of uncertainty in the allocation of roles and powers between actors. Where informal governance spaces are created, civil society organisations have to balance the requirement to be accountable and transparent for others without losing their flexibility.

Secondly, antagonistic attitudes between right-based and alternative development supporters should be overcome in terms of innovative cooperation in order to accomplish common aims on the least common denominator. There are shared understandings about the shortcomings in urban development. Nevertheless, the opportunity for cooperation has

not been exploited to its full degree. The reason lies partly in the dependency of donor funding which causes competition amongst NGOs. A stronger position could be pursued by jointly addressing donors, who are in any case similarly dependent on the NGOs as channels for their funding streams.

Thirdly, in the context of distorted decentralisation, cooperation with the implementing arm of local government remains limited. Nevertheless, civil society actors should proactively create synergies with local government actors to enhance decentralisation instead of by-passing local government. It is central for those localities where decentralisation will advance and where local government will increasingly take over responsibility. In other localities where decentralisation remains unfulfilled, coalitions at local level can jointly address the devolution of functions to the local level. Otherwise the hierarchy of the state will be omnipresent by centralising power relations. Civil society can then just react by addressing higher spheres of government.

7.3 Recommendations for further research

Housing in the rapidly urbanising world has been studied by different disciplines which have created indepth-insights in their respective fields, but also aggravated a disconnection from one another. The reconnection helps to understand processes at work and to make recommendations.

Conclusions derived from two cases must necessarily remain propositions that require further research that investigates a larger number of cases and narrows down critical aspects:

Firstly, further empirical research will have to consider the broader political context as the effectiveness of interfaces between civil society actors and the state is limited by the context. This should also take into account the role of private sector actors in relational webs.

Secondly, further research could analyse the link between innovative informal governance and formal institutional governance practices.

Thirdly, this study focused on the meso level where organisations as collective actors are linked up with state actors. In order to understand their impact at micro level a long term analysis of households linked up in networks would be of value.

Fourthly, this leads to a final suggestion when investigating the household level. All investigated local housing developments were driven by women. This gender aspect has not been the focus of this study. Nevertheless, it could provide central insights for understanding the effects of empowerment.

Also, there is a second aspect aligned to this. ‘Household’ is a stereotype category often misleadingly equated with families. In a context of often fragmented family structures, it is highly recommended to differentiate household composition and reveal if the most vulnerable households are adequately represented. This analysis will be central to inform pro-poor urban strategies.

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Annex A
List of informants

NGO respondents

Organisation	Abbreviation	Interview Partner	Date
Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC)	CORC	Joel Bolnick, Coordinator	13.03.06 26.10.06
		Coordinator CESVI (Cooperazione e Sviluppo)/ Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI)	12.09.06
		Coordinator City Profile	14.09.06
		Finance coordinator	15.10.06
		Coordinator *Community Microfinance Network* (CMN)	30.10.06
		Coordinator Urban Land Programme	08.11.06
People's Environmental Planning	PEP	Shawn Cuff, Director	20.09.06
uTshani Fund	UF	Programme coordinator Cape Town office	12.10.06
		Programme coordinator Johannesburg office	08.11.06
Development Action Group	DAG	Anthea Houston, Chief executive officer	15.03.06 25.10.06
		Senior researcher	19.09.06
		Project coordinator	04.10.06
		Coordinator municipal-wide planning	04.10.06
		Coordinator citizenship and participation	04.10.06
		Project coordinator	18.10.06
		Programme manager	16.10.06
Kuyasa Fund	KF	Programme coordinator	03.10.06
Community Resource Organisation	CRO	Director	18.10.06
		Marketing and resource development officer	10.10.06

Federation and People's Organisation respondents

Organisation	Abbreviation	Interview Partner	Date
Coalition of the Urban Poor	CUP	Theunisen Andrews, Community mobiliser	13.09.06
Federation of the Urban Poor	FEDUP	Patrick Magebula, National leader coastal regions	02.11.06
		Western Cape leader	13.09.06
		Member of City Profiling team	14.09.06
Klipfontein Communal Committee		Committee member	27.09.06 20.10.06
Hazeldean Housing Association	HHA	Committee member	25.10.06
South African Homeless People's Federation	SAHPF section 21	Leader	25.10.06
Freedom Park Housing Association	FPHA	Leader	25.09.06 19.10.06
Netreg Housing Project	NHP	Leader	13.10.06

Local Government (City of Cape Town) respondents

Department	Interview Partner	Date
Housing Research	Director of research	11.10.06.
Human Settlements	Manager of housing, land and forward planning	20.03.06
Human Settlements	Regional coordinator	14.03.06 04.10.06
Human Settlements	Manager new settlements	12.10.06
Human Settlements	Regional coordinator	19.10.06
Human Settlements	Project coordinator	17.10.06
Planning	Manager of area integration	30.10.06
Integrated Development Plan, Performance & Participation	Director IDP	13.10.06
Information and Knowledge Management Department	Manager strategic information	05.10.06

Provincial Government (Western Cape) respondents

Department	Interview Partner	Date
Local Government and Housing	Chief director planning and development	23.10.06
Local Government and Housing	IDP-Coordinator	23.10.06

Local Politicians

Interview Partner	Council	Position	Date
Neil Ross (DA)	Portfolio committee housing	Chairman	24.10.06

Key experts

Interview Partner	Organisation	Position	Date
Prof. David Dewar (informal discussion)	University of Cape Town (UCT)	Chair of Planning	27.03.06
Dr. Sophie Oldfield (informal discussion)	University of Cape Town (UCT) Department of Environmental and Geographical Science	Researcher and senior lecturer	27.03.06
Prof. Alan Mabin (informal discussion)	University of the Witwatersrand	Head of School of Architecture	04.09.06
Prof. Marie Huchzermeyer (informal discussion)	University of the Witwatersrand	Researcher and coordinator postgraduate housing	04.09.06
Sarah Charlton (informal discussion)	University of the Witwatersrand	Researcher and senior lecturer Housing & Planning	04.09.06
Marianne Millstein (informal discussion)	University of Oslo	Researcher	03.10.06
Francois Menguele	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Strengthening Local Governance Programme (SLGP)	GTZ advisor, Human Settlements & Urban Renewal	01.09.06
Dr. Mark Napier	Urban Land Mark Project	Director	07.11.06
Laila Smith (informal discussion)	Raising citizens' voice	Director	05.10.06
Nigel Titus	CndV Africa	Director	16.10.06
Jackie Boulle		Freelance consultant	30.10.06
Ahmedi Vada (informal discussion)		Freelance consultant	05.10.06

Meetings observed

Meeting	Organisations/Stakeholder	Date
Negotiations with councillor around land claims	FEDUP Macassar	13.09.06
Funding negotiations for telecentre, action plan for city profiling	FEDUP City profiling team, CORC, NASHUA	14.09.06
FEDUP meeting with saving schemes	FEDUP Macassar	17.09.06
Chambers, Claim for interdict to close community trust	Klipfontein Communal Committee	20.09.06
Meeting with city official around Site C project procedure	uTshani Fund, PEP, CMN, City	21.09.06
Survey in Macassar for FEDUP database	CMN coordinator, FEDUP regional coordinator	29.09.06
World Habitat Day	DAG, Netreg Housing Project, Freedom Park Development Association	02.10.06
Meeting to discuss conflict between uTshani Fund and FEDUP group	FEDUP Site C, FEDUP national coordinator, uTshani Fund, City	11.10.06
Portfolio Committee, workshop on informal settlements upgrading	City of Cape Town	13.10.06
Saving group exchange in Strand	FEDUP Macassar and Strand	17.10.06
Project steering committee meeting	Netreg Housing Project, DAG, NMTT, City	18.10.06
Regional meeting FEDUP coastal in Mannenberg	FEDUP national and regional coordinators	20.10.06
Leadership training workshop on advocacy and lobbying	Various People's Organisations, DAG	20.10.06
Klipfontein mediation meeting	CORC, consultant, Klipfontein Communal Committee	20.10.06
Group discussion with FEDUP Piesang River	FEDUP local members, FEDUP national coordinator, uTshani Fund	02.11.06

Site visits

Site	Project	Date
Sweet Home	Verification City Profilie	14.09.06
Freedom Park	Housing/ Land	25.09.06
Site C, Khayelitsha	Housing	26.09.06
Kuyasa, Khayelitsha	Unfinished Houses	26.09.06
Klipfontein	Housing/ Land	28.09.06
Macassar	Land	28.09.06
Netreg	Housing	18.10.06
Ekupumleni	Land transfer, housing	25.10.06
Piesang River, Durban	Housing/ Land	02.11.06

Annex B

Interview guidelines

1. Interview guideline for NGOs

Introduction

Name of informant
Professional background
Position

Background

1. When was the organisation established? How did the organisation come into being?
2. What legal status does the organisation have? Where and how is it registered?
3. In what fields does it work? Is the NGO specialised in a field (consulting, education, advocacy, service etc.)?

Staff

4. How many people are employed? What is their professional background?
5. Are there volunteers active?
6. Why do they work at the NGO (social advancement, engagement, no alternatives etc.)?
7. How do they see the NGO?

Internal Organisation

8. How is the NGO structured (departments, responsibilities)?
9. How is the management/internal decision-making organised (democratic, professional, hierarchy)?
10. Is there any self-evaluation?
11. Is there any “proven track record” of implemented projects? Is there any documentation published?

Donors/ Finance

12. Who finances the NGO?
13. On whose commission did the NGO work until now? Did it apply for own projects? Where and with which success?
14. What turnover does it have?
15. How many projects are currently implemented?
16. How does the organisation perceive its relationship to donors?

Position in housing development

17. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to reduce poverty/the housing backlog?
18. What connection is there between the understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach? What role does it see for itself in housing development?
19. Who are the target groups? Does the organisation work with specific groups (ethnic, men/women/youth, professional groups)?

20. What understanding does the organisation have of participation? How are target groups integrated into decision-making?
21. How present is it locally? Are there affiliations/local offices outside the head office?

Cooperation within alliance

22. Are there strong relationships to other civil society organisations? NGOs? People's Organisations?
23. Are there commonly defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the aims?
24. What hierarchies exist? How centralised is the network concerning its functions, competences, rights? What consequences does this have?
25. Who is responsible for what?
26. Are there conflicts within the network? How are conflicts dealt with?
27. How does communication look like?
28. Who initiates activities?
29. Who makes the decisions?
30. Are grassroots groups included in decision making?
31. Is responsibility decentralised so that members can actively participate in the network?
32. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why?
33. To what and to whom is the alliance accountable?
34. Do grassroots groups have access to alliance resources (also information)?

Interface with state

35. What is the relationship of the NGO to government, particular local government? Cooperation? Conflicts?
36. With which government actors does cooperation exist and in what way?
37. Does the NGO participate at meetings (committees etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal? How is the NGO integrated into the decision-making of a project?
38. Are there any (personal) relations to the state (former state employees who work at NGO or vice versa)? What does this imply?
39. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply?

Relationships to other civil society actors

40. Which contacts exist "outside"? Cooperation? Conflicts?
41. What is the relation of the NGO to other civil society actors?
42. With which actors does cooperation exist and in what way?
43. Does the NGO participate at meetings of other development actors (board meetings etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal?
44. Is there any networking between other NGOs? Is there any coordination or agreements? How much information does the NGO have about other NGOs?
45. Are there any relations to parent associations? In what way?
46. Are there any international contacts (besides donors)? Which? Are there contacts to academics/university?

2. Interview guidelines for Federation of the Urban Poor and Coalition of the Urban Poor

Introduction

Name of informant
Position in movement

Background

1. When was the organisation/network established? How did it come into being?
2. What legal status does it have? Where and how is it registered?
3. In what fields does it work?

Internal Organisation

2. How many groups/people are members? How does a group/person become a member?
3. Are there clear defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the aims?
4. What benefits exist for members? What do they expect and what is offered to them?
5. What hierarchies exist? How centralized is the network/organisation concerning its functions, competences, rights? What consequences does this have?
6. Who is responsible for what?
7. Are there conflicts within the coalition/federation? How are conflicts dealt with?
8. What does the communication look like?
9. Who initiates activities?
10. Is responsibility decentralised so that members can actively participate in the network?
11. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why?

Position in housing development

12. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to reduce poverty/the housing backlog? What connection is there between the understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach?
13. What role does it see for itself in housing development?
14. What understanding does the organisation have of the role of NGOs in housing development?

Cooperation within alliance

15. Are there strong relationships to other civil society organisations? NGOs? People's Organisations?
16. Are there commonly defined goals? What are the aims? Who formulated the aims?
17. What hierarchies exist? How centralised is the network concerning its functions, competences, rights? What consequences does this have?
18. Who is responsible for what? Is responsibility decentralised so that members can actively participate in the network?
19. Are there conflicts within the network? How are conflicts dealt with?
20. What does communication look like?
21. Who initiates activities?
22. Who makes the decision? Are grassroots groups included in decision making?
23. How is it financed? By whom, how, since when, why?

24. To what and to whom is the alliance accountable?
25. Do grassroots groups have access to alliance resources (also information)?

Interface with state

26. What is the relationship to government, particular local government? Cooperation? Conflicts?
27. With which government actors does cooperation exist and in what way?
28. Does the network participate at meetings (committees etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal?
29. Are there any (personal) relations to the state? What does this imply?
30. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply?

Relationships to other civil society actors

31. Which contacts exist “outside”? Cooperation? Conflicts?
32. What is the relation to other civil society actors?
33. With which actors does cooperation exist and in what way?
34. Does the network participate at meetings of other development actors (board meetings etc.)? Is this institutionalised or rather informal?
35. Is there any networking between other networks/non-Federation groups? Is there any coordination or agreements? How much information does the Federation have about other NGOs?
36. Are there any international contacts (besides donors)? Which? Are there contacts to academics/university?

3. Interview guidelines for local FEDERATION groups and People's Organisations

Introduction

Name of informant
Name of project
Position in grassroots group

Background

1. When was the organisation/network established? How did it come into being?
2. What legal status does it have? Where and how is it registered?
3. In what fields does it work?

Perception of the housing process

4. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to reduce poverty/housing backlog? What connection is there between the understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach?

Interface with the State

5. What is the relation to local government?
6. Are there any (personal) relations to the state? What does this imply?
7. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply?
8. What kind of cooperation with the state do they have?
9. How is the group integrated to the decision-making, design phase, preparation and implementation of a project?

Cooperation within alliance

10. What reputation do NGOs have (poverty reduction, integrity, professional)?
11. How can alliances be accountable to their members?
12. How does the division of roles and responsibilities among alliance members look like?
13. How close is it to the civil society?

Policy outcomes

14. Did the alliance win desired policy advantages for those it represented?
15. How significant were its compromises?
16. Even if the gains were small, were they consistent with longer-term objectives, or was the alliance co-opted?

Civil society outcomes

17. To what extent has the alliance, through its organisation and campaigns, strengthened the institutional base for citizen action?
18. Has it nurtured informed grassroots participation?
19. Has it contributed positively to an inclusive political culture and to public resolution of conflict?
20. Is there a commitment to strengthen civil society? (impact on participation and building grassroots)
21. Do grassroots groups influence on structure, goals and strategies of alliances?

4. Interview guidelines for local government respondents

Introduction

Name of informant
Professional background
Position

Perception of housing

1. How is poverty/housing and its causes perceived? What could be factors to reduce poverty/housing backlog? What connection is there between the understanding of poverty/housing and the work approach?
2. How is housing delivery by the City perceived within local government?
3. What role does it see for itself in housing development?
4. What constraints do officials face in carrying out housing projects?

Perception of participation

5. What understanding does local government have of participation? How are target groups integrated to decision-making? What avenues of communication are open to residents wanting to access Council? Do the residents have any input into strategic planning?
6. How much interaction do officials have with residents regarding housing and servicing?
7. How present is local government locally? (Visits by staff, discussion groups…)
8. What constraints do officials face in carrying out participatory approaches?
9. What would officials like to see to be done in terms of participation?

Perception of civil society organisations

10. What is the relation to civil society organisations (NGOs, federation groups, People's Organisations?
11. Are there any (personal) relations to the civil society organisations (e.g. employers who worked at NGO or vice versa)? What does this imply?
12. Are there any (personal) relations to (party) politics? What does this imply?
13. What kind of cooperation with civil society do they have (advocacy, design, implementation, training)?
14. How is civil society integrated to the decision-making, design phase, preparation and implementation of a project?
15. What constraints do officials face cooperating with civil society organisations?
16. What role would they like them to perform?

Relation to other spheres of government/ government departments

17. What is the relation to other spheres of government?
18. Does the department participate at meetings of other departments? Is this institutionalised or rather informal?
19. Is there any networking between other departments? Is there any coordination or agreements? How much information do staff members have about other departments?
20. Are there any external contacts? Which? (consultants, academics/university)

Annex C

Evaluation framework for roles and relationships

Actor	Role	Land Access	Project Preparation	Housing Development
Local Government	Surrogate(interventionist)			
	Advocate			
	Stakeholder (enabler)			
	Resource			
	No role			
NGO	Surrogate			
	Advocate			
	Stakeholder (mediation)			
	Resource (technical)			
	No Role			
PO/ local FEDUP group	Principal			
	Stakeholder			
	Interest group			
	No role			
Alliance	Principal			
	Stakeholder			
	Interest group			
	No role			

Relationship	Characteristic	Land Access	Project Preparation	Housing Development
Mode of governance in relationship	Network - horizontal			
	Network supplemented with technical relations			
	Technical relations supplemented with network			
	Technical-bureaucratic-hierarchical			
	No relationship			
Style of interface	Collaborative (Shared control)			
	Consultative			
	Negotiative (competition)			
	Claim (competition)			
	Contract (resources)			
	Command (power)			
Closeness of civil society actors	Strong link alliance (high)			
	Strong link GRO (medium)			
	Strong link NGO (low)			
	Self-help (No influence)			